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Otten, the task of rebuildIng war-devastated settlements Is
seen entirely as a 'senes of short-term quick {Ix proJects';
carried out by central governments; and often imposed from
above to serve 'hidden political agendas', with the ultimate
result of the disaster of war being followed by the 'disaster of
reconstruction '.
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ABSTRACT
This study is concerned with the issue of reviving settlements after war. It focuses
on the formulation of reconstruction policies and programmes. The aim is not to
propose ready made solutions but rather to identify a set of 'practical' and 'effective'
reconstruction recommendations, that could in the future constitute a morally based
international reconstruction philosophy. The problem we are addressing is that:
The hub of this research is based on field investigations and literature studies and, Is
presented to support the following hypothesis:
Settlement reconstruction should be an Integral part of the
natIon-wIde post-war development strategy, and within that
reconstruction policies should foster the Incremental learning
process by the affected local communities.
This dissertation sets out to understand the nature of armed conflicts and the
complexity of reconstruction after war. It attempts to catalogue and discuss the
different tasks involved in the process of reconstruction by establishing, from the
available (cross-cultural) literature, a conceptual framework of some of the main
planning and implementation issues and dilemmas. It then examines in detail the
three cases of Iraq, Yemen and Belfast.
Finally, it focuses on the concept of community participation In reconstruction which
has widely been claimed to be the answer to many reconstruction problems. And
concludes by: (1) drawing up a set of 'policy and practice' recommendations, that
would enable 'careful' decision-makers, professionals and community leaders to
ensure that the 'disaster of war' will not be followed by a 'cetastrophe of
reconstruction', and (2) 18ylngthe basis for an internationally respectable 'Charter for
Reconstruction after War', that would help to involve governments and international
bodies in the development and application of sound reconstruction pollctes, with the
ultimate result of them being responsive to the needs of people. Both are translations
of the insights gained from this research into practical solutions.
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THE PREAMBLE
REVIVING WAR DAMAGED
SETTLEMENTS
P.1. DEFINING THE PROBLEM.
This study is concerned with the issue of rebuilding settlements after war. The
particular focus is on the formulation of reconstruction policies and programmes and
on issues of organisation and management in their execution. The aim is not to
propose ready made solutions but rather to suggest new ways of approaching the
alleviation of suffering in the immediate post-war period. The proposition that is
addressed can be summarised as:
How is it possible to speed the recovery of the 'survivors' and
to 'rebuild' settlements in a post-war context, where the local
organisational, social and cultural structures are disrupted,
and where many resources are in short supply? At the same
time, where the national demand Is high and urgency is
acute, to answer these questions the State has to meet its
immediate political needs {rom reconstruction, without
inflicting a negative socio-culturallmpact on society.
Despite the fact that since the end of WW2 more than 300 wars have taken
place all over the world claiming mUlionsof lives, and devastating entire landscapes.
towns and cities, the Issue of reconstruction following war has been largely ignored
by international agencies and academic institutions. War continues to be disregarded
as a disaster and is still looked on as an abnormal (one off) event, though for the last
few decades "...there has been no single day free of war and few islands of
tranquillity". (Lewis, 1988a). Morally, we have to believe that avoiding wars must be
every government's responsibility, but the reality is that power has a magnetic
attraction and in its pursuit wars of all kinds are fought; against neighbours within
nations, between states and across continenti.
During and after war, citizens, local and central governments, as well as some
international non-governmental organisations will undoubtedly embark on the
necessary task of reconstruction and the costly return to normal life. There appears
Reviving war damaged settlements.
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to be little or no systematic understanding of this task and Its requirements.
The initial examination of the subject, In the light of recent reconstruction
programmes within the Middle East (both post-earthquake and war disasters),
revealed the extent to which the task of rebuilding human settlements is seen entirely
as a 'series of short-term quick fix projects'; carried out by central governments; often
imposed from above and aided from outside and reinforcing narrow political
objectives. Such 'hidden agendas' do not often correspond to the people's physical
or spiritual needs. Consequently, official preoccupation with the technical aspects
of rebuilding seem to overwhelm the genuine needs and concerns of the citizens,
resulting in the disaster of war being followed by the 'disaster of reconstruction'.
In short, It seems that If the rebuilding of human settlements after war Is to be,
in any way, responsive to the real needs of the people, immediate attention Is needed
to counter: (a) the complete lack of specialised knowledge on post-war rehab1l1tatlon;
(b) irresponsibility of State institutions towards rebuilding settlements; and (c) the
total absence of international interest and commitment to the issues of post-war
reconstruction.
There is then an urgent need for a considered philosophy of reconstruction.
Such philosophy would establish and widely disseminate a general framework of
recommendations for approaching reconstruction (in a multi-cultural context) with
the intention of (a) meeting foreseeable needs of war-tom communities; and (b)
drawing to the attention of the world community the costs of reconstruction and their
responsibilities to act accordingly. Hopefully, the knowledge acquired in this research
would sow the seeds for such philosophy.
P.2. THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY AND HYPOTHESIS.
The dissertation sets out to catalogue and discuss the different tasks that are
faced during the rebuilding of war-tom settlements by examining in detail the three
cases of Iraq, Yemen and Belfast. And concludes by drawing up a set of 'pollcy and
practice' recommendations, that would enable 'careful' decision-makers,
professionals (architects, planners, engineers, etc.) and community leaders to ensure
that the 'disaster of war' will not be followed by a 'catastrophe of reconstruction I. The
hub of this argument is based on field investigations and literature studies and, is
presented to support the following hypothesis:
Settlement reconstruction should be an Integral part of the
nation-wide post-war deoelopment strategy, and within that
reconstruction policles should foster the incremental leaming
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process by the affected local communities, who would learn
to 'grow it' and grow 'with it', preferably in partnership with
the State. Against this approach, on the other hand,
reconstruction that takes the form of an arbitrary series of
centralised, top-down projects (infrastructure, housing, public
bulldings etc.), conducted by 'outsiders' is unlikely to be
physically effective, culturally appropriate, or environmentally
sustainable.
This study recognises that people and authorities, faced with the great task of
rebuilding from the ashes of conflict, do not need yet other 'outsiders' to suggest
ready solutions, on what, how and when to rebuild. They could rather more greatly
benefit from evidence on others' past successes and failures in reconstruction. The
role of this study therefore is to draw attention to a number of aspects and issues that
ought to be taken into account by people, planners, professionals, and national and
international NOC's, when considering the task of rebuilding future settlements.
Thus, through out this work attempts have been made to extract such issues from
cross-cultural experience and catalogue them under recognisable headings.
It is important to present the outcome of the debate on those issues in a way
that would interest the concerned people, and achieve a balance between peoples'
needs and governments' interests. The main message to those people should be
that:
Settiement reconstruction should not be approached from the
'drawing boards of central government', but from the physical
and spiritual needs and expectations of millions of inhabitants
of those damaged settlements.
The dilemma of government reconstruction versus peoples' involvement, leads
us to address issues, such as the degree of local participation and the promotion of
local cultural traditions and building skills. Why and how should these be achieved?
When local communities are excluded form the process of rebuilding their own
settlements, in very much the same way as they have been excluded from the
decision to wage war in the first place, their participation is usually replaced by
'utopian' schemes, decided upon many miles away by central government, often only
partially realised, and without consideration of the local climate, culture or conditions
in the affected areas.
Thus the social, cultural and psychological dimensions of the reconstruction
process are easily forgotten, to the extent that the act of rebuilding becomes a largely
physical propaganda, or even a simple profit-making exercise. Although this
dissertation is primarily concerned with policy formulation and management
Reviving war damaged settlements.
• The relationship between war and development; types of conflicts;
similarities and differences between war and natural disasters.
xiv
organisation of the built environment, It does so in the context of economic, social
and psychological recovery. It Is our belief that professional planners must be made
more aware that their decisions can only have validity, if they are set in an
environment made by sensitive social and economic development policies. The
primary aim of reconstruction in practice must be to revive and enhance devastated
communities.
We realise that this 'people first' approach to general economic development
theory goes counter to the conventional wisdom of the last 40 years, our analysis Is
that those theories have failed. Centrally directed economies that Ignore or suppress
the basic demands of their people for growing self expression, do in the end fall apart;
often with disastrous consequences akin to those following war.
P.3. AIM AND OBJECTIVES.
The main aim of this study is to Identify a set of 'practical' and 'effective'
reconstruction recommendations, that could in the future constitute a morally based
international reconstruction philosophy. It recognises the importance of Introducing
an international perspective into the subject by exploring it in a number of different
contexts and over a number of years, using the author's objectivity as an 'outsider'
in all cases, hopefully without falling into the trap of 'universally applicable solutions'.
The wider aspiration is to lay the basis for an internationally respectable 'Charter for
Reconstruction after War', that would help to involve governments and international
bodies in the development and application of sound reconstruction pcllcles, with the
ultimate result of them being responsive to the needs of people.
Having this in mind the following objectives are set up to provide a framework
to guide the investigation and development of this work.
1. To develop iii theoretical understanding of the nature of armed conflicts. This
involves examining:
• The theoretical background on the study of war.
• Vulnerability and social preparedness.
• The immediate, indirect and side effects of war (both negative and
possible positive effects).
• The impact of defence on city planning and architecture.
The Preamble.
xv
2. To establish from the available (cross-cultural) literature a conceptual
framework of some of the different issues and dilemmas which could possibly
be involved in:
• The context of formulating a national strategy for reconstruction.
• Settlement planning at local and regional levels.
• The implementation of reconstruction programmes.
3. To examine, in detail, a number of reconstruction case studies both after war
and natural disaster, highlighting the conceptual issues identified in the
theoretical part of this study:
• The first was of Basreh and Fao In Iraq following the Iran-Iraq war (1980-
1988) focusing on aspects of decision-making and implementation of
reconstruction at a national policy level.
• The second was of the contractor-built reconstruction projects in Dhamar
after the 1982 earthquake. Beside reconstruction pollcles the field work
focused on the detailed process of settlement planning and
implementation using an evaluation of the reconstruction based on
feedback from the local inhabitants.
• The third was of Belfast in Northern Ireland, the focus was to investigate
how long-term civil unrest can become a 'war-culture' and affect the
urban environment in a number of ways.
• The forth was of the Dhamar Aided Self-help project, where the particular
focus was on the formulation and application of reconstruction
programmes that involve the participation of the people.
4. To focus on the concept of community participation in reconstruction which has
widely been claimed to be the answer to many reconstruction problems.
P.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOOY.
In order to overcome some of the difficulties associated with the study of
reconstruction after war, such as 1) lack of documents on the subject (Davis, 1988;
Zargar, 1989a, EI-Masri, 1992); 2) the fact that most of the available literature deals
with the aftermath of Second World War in Europe. Consequently, "...the significant
differences between the contexts of damaged European countries with the present
devastated nations such as Iran, Iraq or Lebanon, drawing conclusions from them for
the present situation, Is not without difficulty". (Zargar, 1989b:427); 3) the absence
of a satisfactory conceptual framework for the study of reconstruction after war.
(Zargar, 1989a; Amirahmadi, 1991; El-Masri, 1992), this research used a
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combination of empirical evidence and theoretical perceptions.
Three main research methods have been employed In the preparation and
development of this dissertation: (1) literature review; (2) a number of workshops,
conferences and short courses, that were used as learning tools over the period of this
study (1989-1992) and: (3) field-work case studies. Although a full discussion of
these methods and constraints Is presented in Chapter 3 (for literature review) and
Chapter 5, it may be helpful to point out the following:
1. The comprehensive literature search that was conducted over the last 3 years.
had two main aims in mind: (1) to develop the author's knowledge on Issues
of post-war reconstruction, which Included an understanding of the previous
work and research carried out in regard to the topic, and (2) In doing so, there
has been a consclous attempt to avoid 'rediscovering the wheel', thus this
literature review was meant to march in formation with those who have already
left useful research signposts.
2. Participating In, as well as organising a number of national and International
events (workshops, visits, conferences and short courses) have played a
significant role in the development of this study, particularly as the amount of
published information on reconstruction after war was very limited.
3. In order to conduct the different field visits appropriate date collection
techniques were used, to satisfy the different explorative and descriptive needs
of each place. In all cases field work wal approached without being
constrained by rigid pre-determined categories of response, which contributed
to the openness, flexibility and the depth of qualitative inquiries and allowed the
employed techniques to be dependent on (a) being socially acceptable (b)
being Innovative (c) using locally available resources; (d) making and taking
opportunities; (e) using locally acceptable practice •.
Finally, it should be observed that the highly political context of any post-war
situation imposes some limitations on research into the Issue of reconstruction in
general, and severe constraints on fieldwork in particular.
P.5. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY.
In order to support the above mentioned hypothesis, this study will start by
exploring the state of the art of reconstruction after war (Chapter 1); it explores war
as a phenomenon, concentrating on the dilemma of war, peace and development.
Accepting the simUarities that have been Identified between natural and war disasters,
this Chapter argues that too much dependence on natural disaster literature, could
be misleading. Thus, it attempts to understand war by formulating a general
framework, based on identifying a number of measures in which war Is different form
natural disasters and that can be used to measure war.
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A 'clear' understanding of armed conflicts and their different dimensions is
essential to explore the effects of war and the stages of recovery (Chapter 2). Citing
that no two wars are alike in terms of their effects and that the effects of the same
war could differ from one battle or attack to another, this Chapter attempts to
separate the effects of war into three categories in terms of impact and time, while
keeping In mind the fact that these categories overlap: Immediate impact, Indirect
effects and side effects. This Chapter, also reviews the different stages of recovery
after war through considering the sub-culture of war and concludes by highlighting
the reconstruction phase, which is the main concern of this dissertation.
Chapters 3 (, 4 set out to provide a picture of some of the different dilemmas
which could possibly be involved in the context 0,. thinking on the planning and
management of post-war reconstruction. They do so by reviewing the available
literature on the post-war reconstruction experience of more than 30 countries. They
conclude by raising the main problem of people's needs versus government's
interests.
A description of the research methods adopted by the author through out his
studies is to follow in Chapter 5. It will discuss, besides the literature survey,
research methods used during field work in four countries: Iraq, Iran, Yemen and
Northern Ireland, as well as a number of workshops, conferences and short courses
that have acted as 'learning tools' for the author. This Chapter concludes by listing
a number of methodological considerations that ought to be taken into account in
post-war reconstruction research.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will present the field work carried out in Iraq, Yemen and
Belfast, respectively. Each casestudy, with its own objectives, supports one part or
more of the main hypothesis of this dissertation.
Chapter 9 suggests a model for looking at reconstruction as a partnership
between the state and the local communities of that State. Finally, Chapter 10
introduces a set of recommendations for the planning and management of
reconstruction programmes along with suggestions for future topics of research.
P.6.DEFlNmONS.
While this dissertation does not call for a formal glossary of terms, some
comments on the use of definitions are In order.
Armed confllcts: In this study the terms 'war' and 'armed conflict' are used
interchangeably to denote conflicts in which direct confrontation takes place
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between two or more parties, nations, states, or even within a nation, that has
a defined time span, during which a society undergoes severe danger and
incurs human, physical, economic, social, psychological and environmental
losses, that eventually would affect the four bounds of any stable society
(community, environment, state and market).
Vulnerablllty, is a general term that implies the level of loss that would be caused to
an element at risk, if a certain level of hazard was to occur.
Shelter, is "..the superstructures of different shape, size, type and materials erected
by mankind for security, privacy and protection from the elements and for his
singularity within a community". (UN, 1976b:37).
Infrastructure, is "..the complex networks designed to deliver to or remove from the
shelter people, goods, energy or information". (UN, 1976b:37).
Services, cover those required by a community for the fulfilment of its functions as
a social body, such as education, health, culture, welfare, recreation and
nutrition.
Physicai reconstruction, is the process of repairing and rebuilding the physical
elements in a settlement: shelter and infrastructure.
Post-war reconstruction, is the first step that has to be taken In the development
process following a war. Reconstruction could be distinguished from any other
form of normal building activity or development project, by the level of
complexity involved in this process (emotional energy; righting wrongs;
rebuilding lives; solving differences to achieve national goals, etc.), and the
magnitude of the task that has to be undertaken in the most pressing and
demanding economic. political. social and cultural circumstances.
Post-war revitalization: From reviewing the different effects of war it has become
evident that physical rebuilding is just one segment of a wider process of
reconstruction following war, which involves economic, social and psychological
readjustment. Housing is a significant part of this segment. Thus It might be
more appropriate to use the term revitalization or rehabilitation Instead of
reconstruction.
Reconstruction strategy, is that body of knowledge, which helps determine the most
important tasks that have to be implemented at each stage of reconstruction,
the type and amount of resources needed, and the location of reconstruction
projects. A strategy involves defining goals and objectives, setting priorities
and targets, making plans or facilitating market mechanisms, and formulating
policies for implementation.
Reconstruction planning, is a process to achieve the goals and objectives of national
reconstruction strategy through the rational and efficient ule of available
resources.
Sultan Barakat
YORK, May 1993
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1CHAPTER ONE
RECONSTRUCTION AFrER WAR:
THE STATE OF THE ART.
1.1. INTRODUCTION.
In order to better plan reconstruction, it is important to understand the different
characters of war that cause destruction. This is the aim of the following two
chapters. This Chapter explores war as a phenomenon, concentrating on the
dilemma of war, peace and development. The argument is later expanded to discuss
why the issue of war as a disaster has been largely disregarded by international
research and aid institutions over the last few decades, a fact that has recently led
researchers to pursue the studies of natural disasters in order to develop their
understanding of reconstruction after war.
Accepting the similarities that have been identified between natural and war
disasters', this Chapter argues that too much dependency on natural disasters
literature, could be misleading, because of the considerable differences in the nature
of post-war reconstruction and that of disaster. An obvious example is the highly
political context within which reconstruction after war has to be undertaken. These
differences are the consequence of the basic contrast between war and other natural
phenomena. In the absence of hard data, the following text can best be described as
working hypotheses that needs to be tested under various conditions. It attempts to
understand war, by formulating a general framework based on identifying a number
of dimensions, in which war is different from natural disasters and that can be used
to measure war and its aftermath: its scope, speed of attack, duration, methods of
destruction and vulnerability.
This Chapter is not intended to present an in-depth study of war, but rather to
help those concerned about reconstruction to better consider the causes of
I See the work of Davis (1986; 1988a; 1988b; 1989); Lewis (1988a); larger (1988b; 198ge);
Meyers (1991) and E1·ft\asri (1992).
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destruction. Moreover, Itwas written while having the MiddleEast, as a geographical
region, in mind and more precisely, while having the 1980s as a parameter within
which we would limit the scope of this research. Nevertheless, every now and then,
our examination expands to include other wars when needed. This limitation has
been considered in order not to fall into the trap of excessive generalisations.
1.2. THE LEGEND OF WAR.
Creation and demolition, construction and destruction have always been an
integral part of human life and activity. Almost every nation, culture and civilisation
through out history, has acted both as a 'founder' and 'destroyer' of human
settlements. Through out history, many societies all over the world have experienced
devastation and dispersal. Some have disappeared altogether, others have rebuilt,
in one form or another, their new place from the rubble of the past. The world has
seen many massive wars; some were long before recorded history and only became
known to us through archaeological evidence. Others were recorded in literature,
legends and holy books. One just needs to review the different kinds of major wars
of the distant and then the more recent past, in order to see that wars are seemingly
integrated Into the fabric of the human condition. One of the hopes of modem times
was that this need to kill and destroy, as a means of settling differences, would
become less and less attractive or necessary. But the contrary seems to be the case.
In fact, as the means have developed, so have the opportunities arisen and the scale
of tyranny multiplied exponentially.
To mankind, ultimate security has always been provided by the construction of
his habitat and shelter. However, 'national security' for some societies has at times
meant destruction for others. This tragic and ironic consequence of so much
'security' in recent times, has too often resulted in the destruction of defenceless
settlements. It seems that the bombardment of human settlements has become one
of mankind's principal activities, often lavishly supported by 'public funds'.
Moreover, it also seems that the 'horrific' events associated with destruction, are
given more credence and prominence than the rebuilding of communities and the
population of new settlements. Sadly there seems to be today, a preoccupation with
destruction, where the technology, In the hands of a few, can cause death and misery
to the many.
We would all agree that 'nature' has been harsh on mankind, through what we
would call natural disasters. Still, "..the greatest death and destruction, loss and grief,
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occurred through warfare. The slaying of human by human in either direct combat
or through sophisticated weaponry brings cruel mutilating injuries and sudden.
untimely and violent death... And of course. warfare destroys the homes and
habitations. the livelihoods. and even lives of many non-combatants .... mankind's
capacity to create psychic trauma through war. to create horrifying forms of warfare.
has increased exponentially" (Raphael. 1986:18). It has been claimed that between
1955 and 1976 the toll of death caused by natural disasters did not exceed 1.2
mlllion.! Within the same period for instance. the Vietnam War (1960-75) killed 1.8
million; the Biafran War (1967 -1970) 1.1 million and the Bangladesh war (1971) 1.5
million. (see Davis 1978:116-117). These figures are quoted to support the
argument that. now. it is true that man's capacity to kill and destroy has
overwhelmed anything that nature can deploy. Being aware that it is hard to
demonstrate this fact in a historical perspective. this Chapter suggests that it is self-
evident that war is a continuing major source of human suffering and destruction.
1.3. THE DILEMMA OF WAR, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT.
In today's world. despite the super powers' belief that. based on nuclear
deterrent. they have maintained the peace for more than forty-five years, more than
300 armed conflicts have taken place all over the world since the Second WorldWar.
Some still continue and new ones are starting every month. and now even Europe
can not be excluded. (Kirdon £, Smith. 1983). Under the threatening 'cloud of the
nuclear mushroom'. of the 159 members of the United Nations at least 50 have been
involved, either in a national, regional or international war, as well as civil strife or
revolutlorr'. The First York Workshop on Settlement Reconstruction. held in May
1988. noted 33 countries that have been directly affected by war since the Algerian
War of Independence (1954-62)4 (Lewis, 1988a). However, since 1988 many
2 This figure Includes the 1976 Tangshan earthquake In China In which 650,000 people were killed
and the 1970 Chittagong flood in Bangladesh that killed 300,000 people.
) Note that the number of the UN members keeps on growing. Recently. Namibia. Estonia. Latvia,
etc. have joint .
..Afghanistan; Algeria; Angola; Bangladesh; Kampuchea; Chad; Cyprus; Egypt; El-Salvador; Eritrea;
India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Israel; Jordan; Lebanon; Libya; Malaysia; Falklands (Malvinas); Morocco;
Mozambique; Namibia; Nicaragua; Northern Ireland; Pakistan; Philippines; Somalia; Sri Lanka; Thailand;
Uganda; Vietnam; Zaire.
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Uthuania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Iraq, Uberia, Saudi Nabla, Qatar, United
Arab Emeriti, South Africa and nowYugoslavia. However, one should not Ignore the
indirect, as well as the direct involvement of the flve Security Council permanent
members: United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China in most of these
conflicts far from their own land. In fact the West has been involved in 35 conflicts,
while the old Eastem Block has been involved in at least 20 of these. The greatest
number of these conflicts have taken place in the Third World, and were fed by the
tensions of the Cold War, the We.tem Capitalist powers lOught to exert their authority
over the region against the intrusion of the Communist forces. (Marxism Today,
August 1991). Other sources such as Trainer (1989: 144) dalmed that in term. of
direct involvement, "Of the 120 wars that broke out between 1945 lind 1976, socialist
or communist countries have been involved in only six, but the rich Western countries
have been Involved In no fewer than 64".
War between nations, with its misery and ruin, is the most demanding and
painful test of a people's commitment to their nation. The more prolonged and bitter
the conflict, the greater the test of the true mettle of a nation's spirit and the solidarity
of its people. War within a nation, so called civil war is often more damaging and
invasive into the lives of more families, in every community, making, as they set
friends, colleagues and relations against each other, reconstruction more difficult and
psychological repair almost impossible. However, the author believes that If the
people's interests could be truly represented by their Government then peaceful,
stable and prosperous development, in partnership with Government, Is surely what
they would choose.
In a number of philosophical and sociological studies war has been attributed
to mankind's nature. (Holmes, 1986; Miedzian, 1992). It is claimed that over the
years, war has been used to secure and maintain man's needs and resources through
power and domination. Moreover, war has also been used to satisfy man's so called
immoral needs such as pride, aggression, envy and prejudice; while In intemational
terms, war is seen as a direct result of political, ideological and economic pressures.
Whether it is mankind's nature or the economic and political pressures, "... we ftnd
that almost every government in the world, lavishly protesting that It i. peace- loving,
... [and] wants ... to defend itself ..., spends Incredible amounts of money and
commits enormous human, scientific, technical and other resources to producing
weapons for its own use and for sale to others". (Harper, 1985:26). It has been
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on arms. (D+C, 2/1992:6).
This Chapter takes the position that war is directly related to development in
both, developed and developing countries. The two Developed Blocks are producing
weapons, 65% of which are bought by the developing countries (conventional
weapons). The rest are used to reinforce their own armies. During 1990 the USA
being the biggest erms supplier to the Third World, sold anna worth 18.5 billion
dollars. Developing countries continue to spend an estimated 200 billion dollars a
year on their armed forces. (O+C, 2/1992:6). Thus, in the developed countries the
production of arms is supporting a considerable section of their economies, while the
consumption of this weaponry in the South, suggests that too many of these 'small'
conflicts are due to the failure of fair economic and social development policies, at
both national and intemational levels. Some of these ideological wars, fought by
proxy on behalf of external forces, speak of the 'success' of the Intemational arms
lobby over the 'failure' of the humanitarian development lobby. We are forced to ask
if wars really are the best way to promote a suitable substitute for sustainable
economic development?
Looking into the future, and as we are approaching the end of the millennium,
it seems that war as a means of solving political differences is more comprehensively
used than ever before. With the end of the 'Cold War', the threat today is no longer
of an old style West-East conflict, but this has 'left room' for the development of
conflicts on a North-South basis. As long as building 'peace' is dependent on
annaments and preparation for war, rather than on the enhancement of societies and
education (science, culture and environment), hopes for a stable and therefore a
sustainable future for all of us are unlikely. Of course the human tragedy does not
have to extend to active war, it can be created by the 'excuse' of a possible war, thus
depriving the population of resources and stability in which to grow and develop.
Some sources, such as Economist (Dec. 1988 ) and United Nations (1988), hoped
to see a brighter future in which war will be avoided. They have built their hopes on
the dramatic political changes that took place during 1988 and 1989. Where it has
been said that "... of the 26 wars in progress 12 have stopped, or stand a good
chance of stopping" (Zargar, 1989b:380). Still, three years later there does not seem
to be many indicators for optimism. Although it is true that since then a number of
wars have been brought to an end, a number of wars have been initiated, and the
lives of many thousands have suffered terrible and tragiC consequences.
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Still, following the liberation of Kuwait, most of the high-technology weapons
used by the coalition forces were displayed at the Singapore 'Defence' Exhibition, In
March 1991, with the slogan 'combat tested'. Special emphasis at the exhibition was
given to the new-generation of weapons: computer-controlled missiles and laser-
guided bombs. (see Guardian, 27 March 1991). It IIunfortunate that we can not talk
about war as part of history, It Is a part of our present reality, al it hal been all this
century in the Middle East.
Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War and the renewed confrontation between
the developed and the developing countries during the Gulf War 1990-91 have
introduced a new dimension to the dilemma of war, peace and development. Today
there is a strong attempt between the major international donors like Britain, France,
the United States, Germany and the Scandinavian countries to condition aid to
political and economic reform in the developing world and In Eastern Europe'. If
these conditions are genuine, then there is a growing hope that aid will no longer
follow political alliances but rather the promotion of global human rights. To give an
example, Brauer (1992) claimed that the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation
has published five criteria for granting aid to developing countries including: 1)
respect for human rights; 2) popular participation in the political process: 3)
guarantees for certainty in law; 4) a market-friendly approach to economic
development: 5) reduction of 'excessive' military spending. (see also, D+C 1/1992:4-
5).
The immediate question that comes to mind is how do political conditions work
in practice? And what about aid that is being given in armament form. Although It
is too early for an assessment, there are some recent examples of actions where aid
has been suspended or curtailed, usually on the grounds of abuse of human rights.
For instance the British government has cut off aid to Sudan, Somalia and Burma for
such reasons. (Brauer, 1992:3). The problem, from our view point is that, countries
in great need for post-war reconstruction are more likely to 10le out on the Ie
conditions. egoSudan, Iraq, Somalia, Vietnam, etc. In a more cynical view, one could
claim that donors (knowing that it is very difficult to implement political and
economic reform In those countries) are ullng theM conditionl .1excUI.I to cut or
reorient their aid programmes to favour Eastem Europe.
5 For more details see Aid and Political Reform, Oversels Development Institute (001), Briefing
Paper, January 1992.
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started for the satisfaction of military commanders, more so when these very
commanders are the government and the defence industries. For instance, on the
14 May 1982, the Israeli news paper 'Yediot Aharnot' quoted General Eitan to have
said, [when asked why the Israeli forces should attack Lebanon]; "Since I have built
an excellent apparatus by the investment of billions of dollars, Imust make use of it".
This was reported three weeks before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. (see Jansen,
1982). Again, emphasising the psychological importance of getting involved in a
conflict, Sharon [the Israeli defence minister during the invasion of Lebanon] was
quoted in Jansen (1982: 7) saying that one of the reasons for the attack on Lebanon
was that, "..nine years after the 1973 war, there was a whole generation of Israeli
soldiers who had no experience of battle and who needed to be given it".
In conclusion, whatever the cause of war is, it is the character of warfare in
various respects that mostly affects reconstruction and needs to be analyzed and
understood if there is to be effective reconstruction.
1.4. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON THE STUDY OF WAR.
There is undoubtedly a considerable popular thirst for military history and the
stories of war, as represented by the hundreds of titles of books found when searching
the literature. John Connell was quoted in Holmes (1986:5) to have said:
"War has had us in its thrall. It has horrified us and fascinated
us .. The stench of war has seeped into our souls. We have
talked endlessly about peace; but in the recesses of our
imagination we have brooded, often feverishly, on war, and we
have written about it more copiously, I suppose, than any
previous generation: memoirs, novels, poetry, histories official
and unofficial, and (increasingly) theoretical studies of greater
prolixity than profundity".
However, most of the literature is descrtptlve, as if in some way war is taken for
granted. Most of the detailed studies that have considered war as a phenomenon
have been conducted in the fields of military and political sciences. The logistic and
strategic studies of war are well developed'. On the other hand, few studies have
looked at the effects of war on society, these were conducted in the field of social
geography (eg. Curson, 1989; Dahlen, 1975; Faour, 1988); sociology and
15 A considerable number of strategic and defence study centres exist in North America, Europe and
what was know as the Eastern Block.
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psychology (eg. lkle, 1958: Raphael, 1986): and most of all refugee studies (eg.
UNHCR's publications: Hamermesh, 1979: Simmonds et el, 1983).
During the last few years, in an attempt to understand the characteristics of war
in order to better plan the reconstruction, scholars sought modem research on natural
di,a,ter, a, a source of knowledge. Thu" In the fleld of dl,a,ter management Itwa,
in the writings of Cuny (1983; 1986; 1992) and Davl, (1978; 1986) that war wa,
counted as a disaster. Still the Issue of reconstruction after war was only paid Up
service. In the field of post-war reconstruction, Davis (1986) was the first to suggest
the existence of many simllarltie, between war and natural dl,a,tera In term, of their
impact and their disruption of peoples' normal life. Later on and based on these
established similarities, scholars attempted to explore the Issue of post-war
reconstruction by studying cases of emergency response and reconstruction after
natural disasters. (eg. Lewis, 1988b; Cockburn (, Zargar, 1989; Zargar, 1988b;
1989a; 1989b; EI-Masri, 1992: Meyers, 1991). This approach was pursued allo
because:
1) Despite the great number of wars and their continuity the Issue was not
recognised as a 'disaster' - particularly by international development and
aid agencies- and consequently was not considered as one, neither In
terms of emergency nor in reconstruction. (UNDRO 1988 ignored war
when it counted the impact of disasters)'.
2) The fact that modern dllalter research has largely neglected the
investigation of war and its impact on the social and culturaildentlty of
the civil population (Amlrahmadi, 1991: Meyers, 1991).
3) Lack of specialised literature and recorded experiences on rebuilding after
war, in particular literature dealing with the developing countries where
the majority of wars have taken place slnce 1945. (Davi•• 1988b).
4) Although the European experience of reconstruction after the Second
World War could be a relevant base for comparison, It can not ea.lly be
used as basis for today's policy formulation. (Azlmi-Bolourian. 1986:
Lewis, 1988a; Zargar, 1989b).
However. it is Ironic that. for Instance, the start of modern disaster relearch In
the United States in early 19501 was largely developed and Initially funded by the
U.S. Military. The creation of a number of di.alter study centre. grew from m1l1tary
7 In this context, E. L. Quarantelll (1987b:7) wrote: "Few of UI would hive trouble chlrlcterlzlng
some aspects of the recent Mexico City earthquake or the Amaro, Columbia, volcanic mud IUde II I
disaster. Vet many of us would hesitate to characterize In the lame way the clalh .. betwMn the Soviet
Union military and the native guerrillas In Afghanistan, the American air strike on Ubyl or the current
war between Iran and Iraq".
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biological, chemical, and, particularly nuclear attack. In the absence of actual
attacks on the U.S. they contracted for the study of peacetime, 'natural' disasters in
order to obtain pertinent information that could be generalized to the war situation".
(Meyers, 1991:4). In fact, most of the big active International and non-governmental
agencies in disaster relief and aid were established as a result of war (eg. Red Cross,
Oxfam, etc.) and consequently their model of intervention and provision of relief
following natural disasters -for a long time, until the late 1970s- followed models of
post-war intervention. On a number of occasions, these agencies were criticised by
natural disaster management experts, for failing to distinguish between natural
disasters and conflict, which led, in numerous cases, to approaches designed for
shelter after war being used to provide shelter in the aftermath of disasters. (Cuny,
1983; 1992:27). Earlier on, we stated that the lack of specialised literature on
recovery and reconstruction after war had led scholars to explore in more detail the
issue of natural disasters, in an attempt to obtain information that could be
generalised to war situations, thus reversing the roles.
To start with, it is important to make a number of speculations on why the issue
of war as a disaster has been, and largely still is, neglected by disaster research,
particularly in the area of reconstruction. The following reasons can be suggested:
1) Methodological imperatives on the side of psychological and sociological
researchers (Barkun, 1977:221; Meyers, 1991), whose desire to grasp the
dynamics of catastrophic change has led them to search for and
concentrate on, cases that are most readily studied, i.e. small
communities affected by natural disasters.
2) For the last 45 years (the duration of the existence of disaster studies as
a science) wars have been limited to the Third World. The fact that the
involvement of the developed countries - where most of the research and
publications take place - has been generally limited to the development
of destructive methods in connection with the Cold War. On the other
hand, countries involved in war were more concerned with the job of
reconstruction rather than researching it. (This fact can be found even
today. For example see the Iraqi reconstruction case-study).
3) The reluctance on the part of the international development agencies to
intervene and support research in what they see as highly political
situations, where they are bound to take sides.
4) Some social scientists were "..reluctant to expanding the disaster area to
include 'war' phenomena" (Quarantelli, 1987a:299) because they were
concerned that "..war-inspired disaster studies might be put to negative
uses", (Meyers, 1991:5).
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From the above assumptions. one can conclude thpt it is for the very repsons
that are given for not studying reconstruction after wpr that too much dePendence on
the study of reconstruction after natural dlspsters coyld be mlslepdlng. Furthermore,
It could be a fatal mistake to argue that "Reconltructlon II much the 18me procell
whether it be after war, earthquake, explosion or any other source of deltructive
forces". (Lewis, 1988b:24). For instance, the fact that disaster research has mostly
been concemed with cases that are most readily studied, i.e. small communities
affected by natural disasters, suggests that caution should be exercised when
generalising information to be used in a post-war context, where reconstruction
mostly starts at a national level. Furthermore, the nature and the tone of disaster
literature, which Is mostly addressed to NOO's, International development agenclel
and UN bodies, is very different from what Is appropriate to address local and central
governments in the highly political contexts of war. The following quote from the
writings of Cuny (1983) symbolises the attitude of many natural disaster researchers:
"To a large extent, this book explores disaster response
without considering the political context. In reality, just as
disasters and development cannot be separated, neither can
disaster response be divorced from politics. Unfortunately, few
governments in the Third World are democratic and many
regimes perpetuate underdevelopment because It supports the
needs of an oligarchy or other privileged class. Thus many of
the ideas presented here are anathema to these groups. For
them, control of disaster relief goods from foreigners Is the
preferred method of aid, for it Is in keeping with the dictatorial
system". (Cuny, 1983:7).
However, in recent years some attempts have been made to investigate and
understand the magnitude of post-war reconstruction by a number of governments:
Lebanon, Iran and Iraq. It Is Interesting to note that in the cases of Lebanon and Iraq,
where natural disasters are rare, attention was Immediately directed towards other
countries that have experienced war and reconstruction, ego Korea, Japan and
Vietnam. While in the case of Iran an attempt has been made to learn form natural
disasters. (for more details on these attempts see Chapter 3 (, Chapter 4).
1.5. THE AGENT OF MISFORTUNE:
THE MAIN CONTRAST BETWEEN DISASTERS AND WAR.
Defining the phenomena associated with disaster. I. an I•• ue that hal been
addressed by a number of researchers during the last few decades, since the
establishment of modem disasters studies. However, no clear consensus has been
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reached. (Quarantelli. 1987a; 1987b). It is important to start by noting that the early
definitions have emphasised the physical quality of the disaster agent's or the agent
impact. (Quarantelli. 1982). Thus. generally disasters came to be classified
according to the cause of hazard, that could be either natural such as earthquake.
cyclone. flood. volcano and drought/famine. or man-made. such as urban fire.
industrial disasters. transportation disasters, collapse of man-made structures and
war. (Cuny. 1983; Raphael. 1986). This kind of classification emphasises the
physical quality of the disaster agent. Such emphasis, somehow. relates to the way
disasters have often been described in quantitative terms: the number of dead and
injured. the extent of damage to buildings and other physical resources. the number
of homeless and the ultimate economic losses. It is interesting to observe how. under
this classification war has always been counted as a disaster. but not really
considered as one. (Zargar. 1988b. Meyers. 1991). Such classification and definition
of disasters" ...tends to be used by geographers and others with an interest in natural
hazards and mitigation measures". (Quarantelli. 1987b:19).
On the other hand. more recent definitions. particularly in the field of social
studies of disasters, put the focus on the human consequences rather than the
particular disaster agent. Such focus made the classification of disasters more of a
reflection of the real needs of the affected population. Quarantelli (1987b: 19) quoted
the definition reached by Fritz's (1961:655) as one of the well known definitions of
disaster. when he wrote, disaster is any event:
"... concentrated in time and space. in which a society or a
relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society undergoes
severe danger and incurs such losses to its members and
physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted
and the fulfilment of all or some of essential functions of the
society is prevented".
Moreover. such a definition made it possible for a number of researchers to
construct general principles of social effects under which a phenomenon can be
consider a disaster. Thus, war was counted as a disaster under this classiflcation too.
This definition also led to the widening of the scope of what is a disaster.
Although this Chapter takes the position that war clearly fits the various
definitions of disasters, it argues that, it is important not to mix and consequently
confuse disasters with war because: (1) war is distinguished from virtually all other
disasters (natural and man-made) by the deliberate and conscious attempt by the
warring parties to infiict harm, suffering and damage to individuals and settlements
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as we are seeing in Bosnia today; (2) war in general and civil strife In particular are
characterised by social and political ccnfllcts, a phenomenon that II not readily found
in disaster situations.'
To support the flrst given reason we would argue that all dllalters (natural and
man-made) by definition are associated with a certain element of mllfortune. In ita
popular definition the Oxford English Dictionary, writes, disaster Is anything rulnou.
or distressing that befalls; a sudden or great misfortune or mishap; a calamity.
Furthermore, Raphael (1986) cites that " ..the word il derived from the Latin 'astrum',
or 'star', and thus means literally ill-starred, connoting the elements of luck and
magic and the powerful disturbances attributed to heavenly bodies". Such an
element of luck and misfortune is totally ruled out in the case of war. It is the only
phenomenon on which huge sums of money and human rescurces are spent and
devoted for its development and initiation.
Relating disasters to misfortune in this context does not undermine the flnding.
of a number of disasters' researchers in relation to the magnitude of man-made
involvement in all kinds of disaster. A fact that is now being stressed by a number
of authors and is dominating the natural-disaster mitigation literature. One of the.e
authors is Cuny (1986) who wrote" ..even though disasters are referred to by the
event that cause them, a disaster is not the event Itself. For example an earthquake
is a natural phenomenon; if it does not strike a populated area with weak buildings,
it is not likely to be a disaster" (Cuny, 1986). In this definition we can Identify two
dimensions that have to come together in order to constitute a disaster: a natural
hazard which triggers the disalter and a vulnerable environment (context), which
allows the natural hazards to develop Into a disaster. No matter how significant the
role played by man In natural disasters It Is limited to the vulnerability dimension and
never to the source of hazard, while In the case of war man's role in the latter i.
greater than hi. role in the former.
Furthermore, even the so-called man-made disasters are mainly triggered by
accidents. "Technological disasters are usually a result of accidents or incidents
occurring In the manufacture, transport, or distribution of hazardous substances such
as fuel, chemicals, explosives, or nuclear materials" (Cuny, 1986:26). During the last
few decades rapid development and Industrialisation have resulted In a number of
• In fact, our view coincides with that of Quarantelli (1987.) who went al far .1 excluding civil
disturbances and riots from his definition of disasters.
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technological disasters, which by their nature have been more severe when occurring
in developing nations because of their lack of preparedness. The catastrophic gas
ieak at the pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, in 1984 is an example. "The accidents
themselves are not much different from the kind of accidents that occur in
industrialised countries, but the likelihood of their occurring and the potential
damage is much greater. The death tolls from the resulting accidents could be
magnified because Third World industries often are encircled by shantytowns and
slums filled with migrants from the surrounding countryside" (Cuny, 1986:26).
1.6. MORE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE DIMENSIONS OF DISASTER
AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WAR.
It is beyond the scope of this study to comprehensively research the issue of
'war' in general, as war could take the form of an armed conflict (this is the easiest
to study in terms of effects), an economic war, an ideological war (of which the
1945-90 'Cold War' is part), a 'dirty war' (where no official war is declared, while the
persecution of political opponents Is going on, e.g. the disappeared in Argentina and
against the Intefahda in Israel). In the literature it is common to find confusion in the
way authors employ the term war to describe one sort of conflict or another. Thus
the distinction is made mostly on the basis of the parties involved or on the type of
weapon used. (eg. civil war, national, intematiomd, war, chemical war, etc). On the
other hand, despite the obvious similarities between different wars in terms of their
effects, a careful look reveals that the effects of war depend on a mixture of
characteristics, such as the announced and the hidden agenda; aims behind the war;
type of weapons used; war strategies and where and for how long the war lasts; the
degree to which civilians are involved, etc. Hence, generalisations about war become
more difficult. Nevertheless, it is felt that, in order to be able to better consider
reconstruction on an international scale, there is a need to introduce a typology based
on general dimensions and characteristics that not only cut across different kinds of
war, but also within the same war. Considering the fact that post-war reconstruction
as a science is still at its beginnings, there is a need to research in a wider sense. Of
course, detailed studies in particular aspects of war are needed, but we have a
different responsibility of piloting the Issue and thus we need to make some
assumptions and hypothesis, which can serve as a basis for the questioning and
development by forthcoming researchers.
This Chapter attempts to reach a definition of the term war that encompasses
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what we believe are the different dimensions or characteristics of war. Thus in this
study the terms 'war' and 'armed conflict' are used interchangeably to denote
contuas In which direct confrontation takes place between two or more parties,
nations, states, or even within a nation, that has a deflned time span, during which
a society undergoes severe danger and incurs human, physical, economic, socla~
psychological and environmental losses,that eventually would affect the (our bounds
of any stable society (community, environment, state and market).
The following Sections will Identify some of the fundamental dimensions of war,
that would Inevitably dictate the end effects of war (war effects are dl.culled In
Chapter 2). and thus Influence our thinking on reconstruction. As far II possible. an
attempt is also made to, further distinguish between the phenomenon of wlr Ind
disasters.
• The scope of war: a. Declared or undeclared war (threat of war,
cold war).
b. Parties Involved (civil disturbance. civil war,
regional. International, etc.).
c. Geographical zone of war and population
involved (urban, rural, borders, etc.).
• The speed of attack: a. Unpredictable sudden attack.
or onset. b. Gradual built up.
c. Terrorist bombing.
• The duration of war: a. Short period / Intermittent.
b. Long term I recurrent.
• Methods of Destruction: Broadly, weapons of destruction are clalilfied In
three groups: conventional weapons, chemical and
biological weapons and finally, nuclear weapons.
• Vulnerability and
social preparedness:
1.8.1. The scope of wlr.
In terms of the parties lnvolved, armed conflicts, can take the form of a local
war between two countries (eg. Iran-Iraq war, 1980-88), or a reglonll war In which
more than two nations are involved In a larger scale conflict, within the same
geographical region (eg. the Arab-Israeli war, 1948; 1968; 1973). Obviously, the
worst type of war that we have witnessed this century were the two World Wars,
where practically every nation was involved. Wars of Independence were seen
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following WW2. Civil Wars between two or more parties within a nation are still
common (eg. the Lebanon 1975-1991, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, etc.). Civil unrest is
another form of war during which destruction and development go on side by side
(eg. Northern Ireland). One of the most serious types of armed conflict that does not
receive sufficient media coverage are the very local wars, where a certain group of
people or liberation organisation is fighting to over throw the government. Such
people who usually call themselves 'freedom fighters', may also be referred to as
terrorists by other nations. (eg. EI Salvador, Peru, etc.).
The annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 created a new category. This
new war has brought into direct confrontation a Western super power with an Eastern
regional power. It is not a world war, nor is it a regional war. Nevertheless it is a war
in which disaster and damage took place (both in Iraq and Kuwait) of a type not
experienced in the past. Despite the images of tanks and trenches, reminiscent of
the Second World War, this has been a high-technology war, bringing its own
reconstruction problems. (loMS call for papers. 1991). In conclusion, in the case
of war there are at least two parties involved. A dimension that is not observed In the
case of natural disasters. The implication of this dimension, when it comes to
reconstruction, is that people, organisations and states intervening for reconstruction
are inevitably seen as Sidingwith one party or another. This dimension is particularly
acute in the case of civil war or urban unrest, where the community itself is living in
conflict. The effect of the 'troubles' on the construction industry in Northem Ireland
can be given as an example, where even employed contractors are seen as allies of
the enemy and thus their construction sites are targeted for bombing. (For more
details see Chapter 8).
Declared or undeclared war. We should register the fact that the threat of war
can in scme circumstances be as damaging as war Itself. The threat of an America
invasion of Iraq and occupation of Kuwait, in September 1990 caused hundreds of
thousands of refugees to flee both countries, into Jordan and Turkey. The threat also
had an initial effect on the international price of oil.
This is not to say that other types of wars are less important. For instance, no
one can neglect the effects the 'cold war' had, not only on the two blocks of
superpowers, but also on the Developing Countries, where the actual wars were
fought out. While in the developed world, where there have been no actual
confrontations, its effect was mainly economic due to the arms race between the two
groups of nations. Although some would argue that the 'cold war' had a beneficial
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impact on the developed nations' economies through the arms trade, investment in
defence and employment.
However, it is now believed that the last two years have witnessed the end of
45 years of 'cold war' between East and West. In fact, on the 19th November 1990.
22 countries of the Warsaw and Nato Pacts signed a Non-aggre •• lon Declaration and
an Arms Treaty that will reduce conventional weapons In Europe by almost a third.
The Paris Conference on Security and Co-operation In Europe (CSCE) offiCially
declared the end of the so-called 'cold war', concluding a proces. that lalted at least
three years. The Treaty committed the twenty·two countrie. to scrap a considerable
amount of their military equipment. "More than 60,000 items of equipment have to
be cut up, blown up or converted". (The Times, 20 November 1990). The treaty also
outlined a range of options on how to dispose of the vast surplus of equipment'.
How will such a treaty be carried out and what will Its effects be on the developing
world? Will it be seen as the beginning of a brighter future in which war can be
avoided as a means of solving poUtical differences, and In which problems of poverty
and North-South relations might take priority. This Is unlikely to be achieved as long
as the industrialised world continues Its investment in the arm. Industry and if the
West does not replace their militaristic economy, with more constructive goods
essential for long term development.
"Wars of ambition and fear are also waged with economic weapons, such as
inequitable trading terms, sanctions or boycotts. 'Invisible' war. for the hearts and
minds of people and nations are more Insidious often causing greater suffering"
(Zargar, 1988b:37). Recently, economic sanctions have again become a popular
form of war In which the receiving side wlllluffer Indirectly, while the other side does
not have to cope with the vote loosing images of an armed conflict. The August
1990 United Nations sanctions against Iraq Is such a cale that included even food,
and medicine. The 1992 UN sanctions againlt Serbia Is another example.
This is another characteristic that is very different from the dimensions of any
natural or even man-made disaster, in the sense that the cause of destruction and
economic deterioration is invisible and some times hard to Identify. Moreover, and
because of its international dimension it is hard if not impossible to counter.
The geographical scope of war II greater than any natural dl .. ster, It often
II The suggested range of options for removing tank. and other equlpmentl from Europe Ire
discussed In the Times, Tuesday, 20 November 1990. Also. In the •• me new. piper lOme extrlctl from
the Treaty can be found.
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engulfs nations or entire regions. Although battle fields can be limited to a particular
geographical zone, its impact is felt all over the country (disrupting organisations,
economies and communities) and it is not only local communities that suffer,
neighbouring communities, and in many cases other countries, have the refugees to
look after.
1.6.2. Speed of attack and the on-set of a crisis.
Generally, disasters can be classified into two categories in terms of their speed
of on-set. Disasters such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, chemical
contamination and transport accidents are thought of in terms of sudden and
dramatic events, with rapid time sequences, disrupting the usual coping mechanism.
While other kinds of disasters such as famines, may have a gradual and prolonged
on-set, creeping up almost imperceptibly on a community. In this case the disaster
starts with a drought which might last for years, before developing into a famine.
Global warming is another example of a prolonged on-set of a disaster the effect of
which may not be seen in a life time.
Considering the speed of on-set, war is different from both categories identified
earlier and at the same time it shares some of their characteristics. In war the
element of surprise is a powerful advantage to any aggressor. The successful
preemptive strike can win a war. An example is the Israeli attack in 1968, where the
enemy's, in this case Egypt, air force was destroyed in the first few hours. Although
the element of surprise plays an important role in war strategies, the build up for war
can hardly be a surprise these days. The, usually, long period of social and political
instability and the military mobilizations which precede wars can give a greater
degree of predictability, particularly with today's advancements in communications.
"Furthermore, wars are comprised of many attacks and battles, each one of which
might be a disaster and none of which, after the first one, can be wholly unexpected.
Thus wars have an ongOing, recurrent character rather than a sudden, abrupt
quality". (Meyers, 1991: 11).
1.6.3. Duration of war.
Cuny (1983:39) classified disasters in terms of the time span of their
occurrence, into cataclysm, and long-term or continuing disasters. Describing the
difference between the two he wrote:
"In a cataclysmic disaster, one large scale event causes most
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of the damage and destruction. Following this event there
may be a tremendous amount of suffering and chaos, but
things soon begin to improve. In a long-term, continuing
disaster, the situation after the event remains constant or may
even deteriorate as time passes".
All natural disasters, except famines and epidemici have a limited period of
Impact that can be measured In days, weeki or at mOlt monthl. While mOlt armed
conflicts, in particular the prolonged civil wars can last for years and are usually long-
term disasten. The Lebanese situation, where the war hal lasted for 15 years, hal
witnessed different stages of renewed hazards, with ludden Impacts luch as the
Israeli invasion in 1978 and 1982, as well as the repeated Ilraeli air raids on Beirut
and the south of Lebanon. Northem Ireland is another example of prolonged civil
unrest, in which the same locations and communities are frequently targeted.
The duration of war does not only relate to the amount of damage and lOll, but
also it makes reconstruction, though necessary, very difficult to carry out before
hostilities cease, with the accumulation of damage. (In Chapter 3 we wlll further
discuss how the continuation of war works as a regulating factor for reconstruction).
While for instance in the case of an earthquake, the end Is identiflable, despite the
tremors, the stages of response Into emergency, relief and rehabilltation can be more
or less defined. Moreover the duration of war is directly related to the creation and
maintenance of a 'war sub-culture'. (see 'War Sub-culture', In Chapter 2).
1.6.4. Methods of destruction.
This Is one of the most Important dimenlionl In which war differs from
disaster •. Today our improved scientific knowledge makea it pollible to analyze and
understand most, if not all causes of natural and technical hazards, to the extent that
it has become possible to mitigate against such disalterl. While in the cale of war
the means of destruction and their mechanisms are undergoing continuous
improvement day by day, making it almost impossible to predict the effects of the
next generation of weapons.
This Section is an attempt to bring together the principal knowledge of the three
main types of weapons that have been or could be used in the M.lddle East armed
conflicts, these include: (1) conventional, (2) chemical and biological, and (3)
nuclear weapons. This effort Is made In an attempt to understand the mechanism of
destruction of each weapon and consequently Its effects on human settlements. It
does not attempt to present a comprehensive study on the different type. of weaponl,
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as this type of knowledge exists elsewhere, and has its own field of studies. What has
not been sufficiently established is the direct and indirect links between the type of
weapon used and the reconstruction strategies required. Such understanding is very
important in determining the most appropriate emergency and civil defence policies.
Also it plays a significant role in identifying the scale and type of loss and damage
and thus in proposing reconstruction strategies.
This Section is divided into three parts. Each part is concerned with one type
of weapon; it first assesses the likelihood of an armed conflict using that particular
weapon in the Middle East; secondly it reviews the destructive mechanism of such
weapons and their link to reconstruction.
1.6.4.1. Conventional weapons.
There is a widely held view of warfare that the least dreadful weapons are the
conventional ones; this is an unrealistic perspective, no weapon is a good weapon.
The massive use of conventional weapons is as destructive as a nuclear weapon and
as fatal as a chemical one. Recent experiences in the Middle East shows this vividly.
For instance, "When Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982, using the latest and most
sophisticated American [conventional] weapons, the human and material cost was
devastating for this small country". (MacBride, 1983)10. A more recent example
was demonstrated by the American and British bombing campaign against Iraq in
January 1991. Pentagon sources claimed that in order to keep their casualties to the
minimum, they used more explosives in the first three weeks than in the whole of the
2WW. "They also claimed that in the first 12 hours of the war, more bombs were
dropped on Iraq and Kuwait than during the 17-day Une-backer 2 bombing
campaign in Vietnam, in 1972" (the Sunday Times, 27 January 1991).
In short, the real threat of conventional weapons is that they are readily
available in the Middle East for both, states and even individuals. Moreover they have
been developed and advanced to the extent that they have become real terror
weapons. The other threat is the fact that as long as any weapon is labelled
'conventional' it is seen as an acceptable weapon. Thus, cluster, air-burst and
fragmentation bombs and shells, phosphorus and vacuum bombs are all part of what,
in our view, should be considered as conventional terror weapons. For instance,
10 MacBride, Se6n (Chairman) Israel in Lebanon; the Report of the International Commission to
enquire into reported violations 0( International Law by Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon, Ithaca
press, London, 1983.
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"...the cluster bomb is a canister which on impact sprays up to 650 separate bomb-
lets or grenades that then explode on impact" (Jansen, 1983:32). The cluster bomb
indiscriminately blasts an area several hundred feet. which makes it a lethal weapon
if used against civilian neighbourhoods. Fragmentation bombs were used for the ftrst
time In the Middle East by Israel during Its Invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and also by
the Americans in their recent war against Iraq.
In terms of their destructive capabilities, conventional weapons In general
depend on creating an explosion that releases flying fragments. This explo.ion alao
results In a sudden increased air pressure (blast) .preadlng Incircles and decreasing
with distance from the explosion centre. This blast is the main destructive power on
property. Another major impact comes as a result of the power of penetration by a
shell or rocket I I. The author was often surprised, when visiting war-damaged
settlements in different countries, to flnd out the extent to which people can recognlle
the type and calibre of weapon deployed against them, and even the extent of
structural damaged they can cause.
1.6.4.2. Chemical and biological warfare.
Recently, during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, the possibility of using chemJcal
weapons has been brought to light again. It has been claimed that Iraq employed
chemical gases during the war, both against the Iranian troops and Its own population
in the Kurdish city of Halabja and DOjaila village in March 1988. However, these
claims were only given particular media attention just after the Iraqi Invalion of
Kuwait. Today, Israel, Iraq, Iran, Egypt and probably Syria have acquired such
weapons. Thue the Middle Ealt contains 5 out of 12 countries who have a chemical
capability besides those countriel in the Nato and the Warsaw pactlla•
"There are four main types of chemical weaponl: bUster agents, such a.
mustard gas, which destroy the skin and tissue and can cause bllndnell on contact
with the eyes; choking agents, such al Phosgene, which caute the blood ve.tel. In
the lungs to burst; .. blood agents, such as Hydrogen Cyanide, which Interfere with the
II A more comprehensive study on the mechanism of bomb destruction was carried out by the
author, In March 1990, within the context of the effect of civil unrest In Belfat on Itt built environment.
12 According to the Sunday TImea,27 Janual'Jl 1991, the rnt of the twelve countries are: Burma,
China, Ethiopia, North Korea, South Koree, Taiwan and Vietnam. The um.lOurc. claim. that a further
18 countries are trying to develop a chemical capability and will probably do 10 In the next 10 years.
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use of oxygen in the cells and are instantly fatal; and nerve agents, such as Tabun
and Sarin, which disrupt the nervous system and cause convulsions and paralysis,
and are frequently fatal". (Sunday Times, 27 January 1991).
Some of these weapons have long been developed and even used, for instance
'Mustard gas,13 was first used by Britain, France and Germany during the First
WorldWar, and a million people were affected. While during the Second WorldWar,
although Poison gas was available on both sides, it was not used. Still since then it
has been highly developed and tested. The Germans for instance developed
advanced 'nerve gases' as early as 1936. By the early 1940's, the British, French
and Germans produced a new generation of biological agents.
Although until then those weapons were not used, some of the experiments
have resulted in ecological disasters. It is claimed that the British experiment of
'anthrax bombs' on the Scottish Island of Gruniard, in 1947 has left the island
uninhabitable until today. Similar results from other tests carried out by the British
and the Americans were reported to have taken place in the Caribbean in 1948. (see
Socialist Worker, 16 February 1991).
However, the world witnessed the gravest results of such weapons when they
were put to use during the Vietnam war. When 17 million gallons of defoliant agents;
orange, blue and white were dropped by the U.S. air force over the Vietnamese
forests and people. In fact, more than twenty years later the Vietnamese are still
livingwith the effect of those chemicals. Vast areas of forests have not yet recovered
and some may never recover. Children are born with different kinds of deformities
as a result of that bombing. Also, 'Napalm Bombs' were among the terror weapons
used by the Americans in Vietnam (the Four Horsemen, Channel 4 Film), and more
recently in Iraq and Kuwait.
As Ikle (1958) underlined, the two principal aims of using chemical and
biological weapons are either to cause a great loss in population, both civilian and
military, or to reduce the food resources of a nation by using such destructive
methods against livestock or crops. In both cases the main obstacle to their use has
always been the difficulty of delivering and spreading the effects. This is particularly
difficult to implement against livestock and crops, mainly because they are more
widely and evenly distributed than the population. Also because of the need for
13Mustlrd gas affects the skin as well IS the respiratory organs. Thus gas milks on their own do
not offer adequate protection.
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different chemical and biological agents to destroy different kind of crops or livestock.
their is the problem that they would leave the attacked natJonwith other options of
food resources, especially if It had a div.... ity of food lupply before the war.
However, such attacks on food resource. might tAlkemonth. or even year. to affect
a population seriously. Thus, u.ing .uch weapon. directly agalnlt the human
population would be a more effective way and for tho.. natJon. which have nucl .. r
weapons it would be more decisive to ute them. But. If the pUrpol. of the war I. to
conquer people and take land. then nuclear weaponl are Mlf defeating and for u..
of deterrent rather than a practical tool; nuclear weaponl produce radio activity.
destroy people, physical structure. and contaminate land alike. thus making It
impossible for the attacked land to be productive.
Thus, the main distinction that set aside the chemical and biological weapona
from the conventional or nuclear one. I•• that It only affectt human. animal. and
plants, without any physical destruction of property, tran.portation and
communication facilities. In some situations, thil might be teen. by a conquering
force, a. an attractive charaderi.tlc.
When talking about reconstruction, the polntl we Ihould keep in mind are that:
(1) in the case of chemical attack, "The ratio between consumer and physical
resources would decrease, not Increale al in nuclear and conventional bombing (with
the exception of medical supplies)", and that, "..the Impact of the.. typel of warfare
upon morale would basically correspond to the general Impact of casualtles upon
morale" (Ikl', 1958:39): (2) however, thl. might be an Idealistic and an Irrational
perception, for so far there has never been an attack that I. exclusively chemical.
Chemical weapon have alway. been uaed a. part of wider conventional attack ••
resulting in physical damage to the built environment: (3) Moreover, wherever
chemical weapons are deployed, clearing contamination becomes a neeenity In
order for recon.truct1on and rehablUtation to atart.
1.6.4.3. Nuclear weapons.
The two atomic bombs that were used In Japan during the Second World War.
were enough to demonstrate the gravest conMquence. of using nuclear weapona
against citles and human settlements. Despite the fact that nuclear weapon. have
never been used since, many developed nation. went on stock·plling luc::hweaponl
together with the needed planes and mlnlle. to deliver them. A number of
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experiments took place some of which resulted in ecological disasters. However, in
spite of all the evidence and efforts of the Nuclear powers, some developing nations
have obtained such weapons or they are on their way to doing so.
The likelihood of a nuclear attack in the Middle East has never been greater
than it is today, with Israel acquiring its own arsenal of nuclear weapons. Moreover,
the direct confrontation of Western super-powers with Iraq, as an Eastern regional
power, made the use of such weapons even more likely, especially after the end of
the 'cold war'. Although everybody is aware that nuclear weapons exist in the Middle
East and can be delivered against cities, all the Middle East countries are entirely
unprepared to face this risk. Nothing is being planned to mitigate the potential
consequences of their use.
The most serious and certainly the most tragic result of nuclear warfare is the
huge number of dead and injured. During the Second World War, casualty rates from
the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki contrasted sharply with
those from conventional bombs used on other Japanese cities such as Tokyo. This
fact was raised by Ikle (1958: 17), when he wrote:
"In Tokyo, the mortality rate per square mile destroyed by
high-explosive bombing was 5,200 persons, while in Nagasaki
and Hiroshima the rates rose to 20,000 and 15,000
respectively" ••.
The same author explains that this fact is due to the added hazards of an atomic
explosion, which (besides the blast and shock waves) is accompanied by a heat flash
and nuclear radiation I'.
But, certainly the suddenness of the widespread explosion and destruction of
a nuclear attack is the main hazard responsible for the great number of casualties.
One can compare the sudden widespread destruction of a nuclear bomb to that of
an earthquake, where all the devastation takes place within a few seconds, leaving
no time for people to react or take shelter. In contrast with conventional attacks, a
'ncrmal' atomic bomb could cause great destruction within a few seconds, thus
depriving the population of an opportunity to take refuge in shelters or to flee after
the attack had began. In the case of nuclear bombing, therefore, protection and
•• Iklt based his ngu.... upon a study conducted by Los Angelus Scientific Laboratory, 1950, The
E(fectJ 0( Atomic Weapon$, Oovemment Printing Office, Washington.
I~ The heat flash Is a combination of very Intense heat and light that lasts for a few seconds, causing
fire .torms and conflagfltJona. It wa. estimated that 5-15" of all fatalltle. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki
resulted solely from nuclear radiation.
The stllte of the art.
24
evacuation are effective only with advanced warning.
The report of the 'Greater London Area War Ri.k Study Commillion',
(OLAWRAS), conducted in 1986, Illustrate. the pollible effecta of a nuclear attack
on the Greater London areall. In the following paragraph, some of the report'. main
conclusion. are quoted jUlt to give an Idea of the effect of .uch attack on an
advanced city such a. London, in order to .how how grave the consequence. could
be on a Middle Eastern city.
"If nuclear weapons were ever used, attempts to re.trlct their
use to military targets would be likely to fall. Should thl.
happen, London would be destroyed· (p.I).
"Even a much less levere attack, Involving 31 Mt on the UK,
of which only t.35 ft\t would faU on London, would deltroy
about one third of the city. A. a relult London might entre a
spiral of decline from which It would never reeever" (p.l).
Emphasising the difficulty of mitigating the deva.tating effects of a nucl.ar attack the
report pointed out that:
"All forms of civil defence would be useless aga1nlt heavy
nuclear attacks. The OlC or Ita luccetlOr lhould therefore
restrict its civil defence planning to deal principally with a war
scare, conventional attack or the much lell likely contingency
of a small nuclear attack" (p.2).
However the report listed some mitigation mealurel that would reduce the effects of
a small nuclear attack. These include: "...an extended concept of lsnd- UN planning,
a public infonnation programme, Improved communication I, the provilion of food
and medical reserves, and plans for food rationing. the evacuation of high·rllk areas
in London, and the manning of el.ential and emergency .. rvlce. before and after
attack" (p.2).
IIClarke, Robin (Rapporteur), London under •• Ie: the Report 0{ the 0IalIr London Aru War Rlalc
Study CommLsslon, 1986, Belli Blackwen, Oxford. The commlMlone" I,.: Anne Ehrlich, S. WIlliam
Ounn, J. Stuart Horner, John Marshall Lee, Peter Shlrfman Ind Frank yon Hlppel.
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1.7. VULNERABIUTY AND SOCIAL PREPAREDNESS.
Vulnerability is a general term that implies "..the level of loss that would be
caused to an element at risk if a certain level of hazard was to occur" (Coburn, 1990,
Oxford) 17. The term can be applied to a single building, a rural settlement or a city.
For a long time, the physical vulnerability of individual structures to natural hazards
has been well observed and analyzed to the extent that, now it is common practise
to design buildings that resist many of nature's forces. The same could be said about
a number of entire settlements and cities in the developed world, where physical
vulnerability has been reduced on a large scale (e.g. United States and Japan).
However, in recent years, researchers became more aware of the scale of
human contribution to the occurrence of natural disasters. The environmental
degradation caused by either excessive exploitation of natural resources,
(deforestation, desertification, erosion) or by pollution due to rapid industrialisation
are some of the examples used by those who support the opinion that disasters are
mostly 'acts of man'. Recent studies in the field of disaster management went so far
as to sum up with the view that "The term 'natural disaster' can be misleading
because it implies that the disasters are solely a result of natural hazards, when in
fact, human endeavour is a major contributing factor in creating a disaster" (Cuny,
1986:24), thus, emphasising the issue of vulnerability, an issue in which war differs
significantly from natural disasters.
Such a view is based on the argument that disaster Is all about 'risk' and that
risk Is the outcome of a vulnerable situation met by a natural hazard. For Instance,
if settlements and farms in Bangladesh were not located in flood plains (vulnerable
site), the flood itself, as a natural hazard, could not result in a disaster. In the same
way, an earthquake in Yemen (1982) of magnitude 5.8 on the Richter scale resulted
in a disaster, while the same scale earthquake in California (1990), where buildings
are built to earthquake-resistant standards, was hardly a crisis. Thus it is the
vulnerable situation of communities, settlements and countries that effectively
contribute to the scale and magnitude of a disaster that results form a natural
11 Notes given by Andrew Coburn at the Disaster Management Centre. 1990, Oxford. UNORO, 1979,
Natural Disasters and Vulnerability Analysis, Report of Expert Group MeetIng 9- 12 July 1979 Office of
the United Nations Disasters Relief CoordJnator, Geneva.
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hazard!8.
Based on more than 25 years of experience in disaster relief and mitigation, Ian
Davis (1990, Oxford)!9 observed the progression of vulnerability In the case of
natural disasters, when he pointed out that vulnerabiUty may start with underlying
causes, such as limited access to power structures and resourcee. Ideologies,
unhealthy economic and political systems, armed conflicts and other general
precondition factors. Then there are dynamic preuurel, such 211 a lack of local
institutions, education, training, appropriate skillI, local Investment, local marketl,
press freedom, ethical standards in public Ufe,etc... Under dynamic pressures he
also included some macro forces, such as population growth, urbanisation, anns
expenditure, debt repayment schedules and deforestation, etc. Finally, what would
bring vulnerability to a peak is having, on top of the above mentioned factors, what
we might call unsafe settlement condltlonl. Such condItions Include fragUephysical
environment, where .ettlements have been located on dangeroul Iitel, 21110 w....
buildings and infrastructure are poorly conducted and maintained. They alao Includ.
fragile local economies as well as uncontrolled biological mechanisms. Tbese
observations suggest that targeting the cause of vulnerability would reduce the effects
of disaster on a particular community. But, certainly Itwould not eliminate the cause
of hazards, such as earthquakes and high winds.
Writers on the subject tend to explore vulnerability more in its physical form,
no matter what kind of disaster they are dealing with, despite the recent
acknowledgement of the underlying factor of economic and political vulnerablllty.
In the case of war, such understanding of vulnerability is not good enough. Now, It
seems, is the right time to start considering what might be as Important as physical
vulnerability if not more important, and that is the Issue of social, cultural &
Ideological wlnerabWty. There seems to be little that can be done physically to
mitigate war and its effects, while the bulk of vulnerabillty reduction action could and
should be targeted against the source of hazard itself. Unlike natural dllalters war
II At this point we should note that, for Instance In the ca.. of comparison between Yemen and
America, although California suffered les. destruction, Its economic and nnanclal cost Is expected to be
much higher than the Yemeni one because of the high nature of Investment they hive put In their clUes.
On the other hand, recovery seems to be quicker In Callfomia because of the deg .... of development
they have achieved. On the Indlviduaiscil. Insuranc. played a great part In compen.IUng victim. for
their 10.....
III Notes from lectures given by Ian Davis It the Dlsa.ter Mlnagement Workshop, DII.ster
Management Centre, Oxford polytechnic, Oxford, 17June· 21 July, 1990.
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is initiated by man, and no matter how idealistic this might sound, there should
always be a hope to eliminate the cause of war. In our view, war can not be
compared to earthquake and other natural phenomena, as being the source of hazard
that might trigger a disaster; war by itself is a long-term disaster that is usually
triggered by a political question; assassination, kidnapping, military border operations
or even just the threat of economic or political interests (these are all types of
hazards).
1.7.1. Social, cultural and Ideological wlnerabUlty.
It is refreshing to find some authors such as Anderson (, Woodrow (1989: 13-
15), and Wilches-Chaux (1992:30-35) referring to the crucial issue of social
vulnerability. They even consider it as one of three categories around which they
have designed their analytical frameworks to understand disasters and to compare
the experience of different NOOs working in the field. Anderson & Woodrow
(1989: 13) claimed that, in the context of natural disasters, "Social and organisational
vulnerability are obvious when there is prejudice, or conflict within a society.
Divisions according to race, religion, ethnlcity, language, class, or caste can weaken
the social fabric to such an extent that people are more vulnerable to crisis". Such
vulnerability could exist within social organisations, political structures on a national
and regional scale and could be traced back to the local level, to include informal
systems through which people get things done, such as making decisions,
establishing leadership or organising various social and economic activities (at this
point I have corruption in mind). Such informal systems could be presented in a
tribal structure, or even just in the form of a neighbourhood or an extended family.
In fact, "The most obvious and devastating disaster resulting from social vulnerability
Is war when conflict becomes overt". (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989:14).
In a natural disaster situation such vulnerability would certainly influence the
degree of the disaster's impact on people. Having a healthy social system would help
the community to stand together and serve them in the face of the disaster and the
subsequent reconstruction. While, a vulnerable community, with one or more of the
above mentioned criteria, would not only fell apart in front of a rising hazard, but it
might generate a side conflict, that might develop into a local, or civil war.
Still, all of this need not be enough to result In a disastrous war, unlike natural
disasters it is the vulnerability of nations and communities that make it easier for a
war to start and consequently accelerate into a disaster. Thus as reconstruction after
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war researchers. we should emphasis the soclallnd cultural wlnerlbWty. along aide
the above mentioned economic and political vulnerability. aa a progrellive atage of
vulnerability to war. The existence of such vulnerability makel It very easy for a
conflict to be triggered by the smallest event. Civil strife and wars all over the world
are obvious examples that can be used to support luch claim. From our region one
just needs to look at Lebanon in order to explore thil phenomenon. A more recent
example is today's situation In Iraq. where losing the Kuwait war uncovered the
underlying social and cultural vulnerability between the different sects of Shial.
Sunies and Kurds. as well as the fragile political IYltem. Another example can be
seen in Europe today. where the war is still going on between Bolnia. Serbia and
Croatia.
Cultural and Ideological vulnerability to conflict. 211 well al to natural dllasters
has been observed through out this study In Iraq, Iran. Yemen and Northem Ireland.
It is important to acknowledge that most cultures strongly believe In the strong 'hand
of God' whether its called. the 'Lord', the 'Holy Spirit' or 'Allah'. For them, dl"ltera
as well as 'holy wars' are Justified as being purely acts of God or fought for God. For
instance, it was observed in Yemen (Mullims). that they Itrongly believed that the
1982 earthquake was employed by God as a means of testing man's faith In him.
This beUef applies on both personal and community levell. The Holy Quran readl:
"Be sure we shall test you with something offear and hunger.
some loss in goods or lives or the fruits (of your toil). but give
glad tidings to those who patiently persevere. Who lay. when
in calamity: 'To God we belong and to him II our return'".
(ii.155.156).
In the case of anned conflicts such vulnerability hal been demonstrated In
Lebanon and Northern Ireland where the religioul dlmenllon hal dominated the wlr.
Such beliefs have positive and negative dlmenllons. Positively, It helps In shaping
the coping mechanism of the society. Negatively. it can make them do lell to
reduce their vulnerability.
Advocating the conception that disasters are largely an 'act of man', and that
man's negligence al an individual, a community or even a government II what really
Uesbehind the extensive 1011 of life and property. Davll (1988) wrote an article In the
Guardian (December 30, 1988). Contrary to the opinion of Davil (1988) and others
(such as Cuny, 1981 & 1983). Zargar (1989b:743) wrote, "..there II evidence that
disasters are essentially acts of God". Zargar's Interesting argument is largely based
on his religious believe in God's existence and power. He IUpPOrts thil view with
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quotations from the holy books. However, both commentators did not attempt to
justify the war phenomenon, which has long been counted as 'a deliberate act of man
based on materialistic realities' 20. Using the same argument as Zargar's, one can
easily suggest that even war could be conceived by some cultures and religions as
an Act of God, either to test the faith of a certain community or to punish them. In
fact, following the American attack on Baghdad, it was observed in the field, that
people largely believed that the hardship brought upon them by the bombardment
was directed by God, both as punishment for not observing Islam as a way of life by
the society and as a test of people's faith in God. Subsequently, religious feelings
grew stronger during and after the war.
1.7.2. Material and physical wlnerabUlty.
Accepting the concept of vulnerability, many researchers have associated
natural disasters with poverty and lack of resources of the affected communities. In
the case of war, nations can become vulnerable not just because of their poverty but
also because of their wealth, natural resources and even their strategic location, e.g.
the Arab Gulf states. Furthermore, It seems that the richer and stronger a nation, the
greater its chances to get involved in a conflict. However, on individual and family
scales the poor are usually the most affected, as they are the least mobilised and the
most attached to their small belongings. Nevertheless, when it comes to
reconstruction, it has been observed in Khusistan, Iran and in Kuwait that the poor
are the ones who returned first to their home land. The rich and the businessmen
were still feeling too insecure.
Going back to physical vulnerability, it is very difficult in the case of war, to
assess the scale of vulnerability and subsequently to take mitigation measures
against war damage, simply because the destructive means are being developed
daily to make it neatly impossible to resist. Also because it is not a cyclical
occurrence, as in the case of natural disasters where there often appears to be an
established return period (average length of time between events, UNDRO, 1979).
Thus no one can really predict when or where the next war will take place and what
kind of weaponry is going to be employed. However, in the Middle East region, it has
become common practice to design at least military installations to resist attack.
In general, "..It is possible to reduce the [war] vulnerability by hardening the
20 This coincides with the view of this dissertation.
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infrastructure at very little cost. The infrastructure is all those facilities that maintain
civilised life, water supply, health services, electricity supply, communicationl
systems and roads. These can be protected by lenlible planning concemlng their
location and interaction with each other: allO by Iultable contingency plannlng".
(Ledbetter, 1988:75).
Some of those measures were implemented in Iraq during its war with Iran
which proved successful, particularly in the capital, Baghdad. But later on those
measures could not withstand the Allied comprehenlive attackl that targeted the
cities' services, in particular using the most advanced and accurate weaponl. It II
believed that hospitals should have been located InMveral areal of the city, allO the
overall problems created would have been eased If there had been other citiel with
adequate facilities, besides the capital. "It Is clear that important buildings luch as
hospitals should ideally have more than one supply of water and electricity. Where
that is not possIble they should have a protected supply". (Ledbetter, 1988:76). The
recent experience of bombing Baghdad showed that It Is almost impossible to entirely
eliminate war vulnerability for a particular city. Neverthelell it can be reduced by:
1. Dispersal of facilities within a town, a region or a country away from mUltary
installations that are usually targeted first.
2. The use of parallel technologies, rather than a lingle method which may
contain an unforeseen weakness.
3. Duplication of Important supplies and routel of communication. <lee
Ledbetter, 1988).
Other measures of reducing vulnerability could be achieved through planning
decisions, such as relocating a settlement that II In danger from a continuous war
effort, l.e. located in a sensitive border zone, between potentially hOltile neighboura.
This measure, of course, contradicts with the wildly advocated recommendation of
rebuilding the origInal settlements, In order to avoid any unnecelury social or
cultural disturbances. (more about settlement relocation InChapter 3 and Chapter 7).
But, one should not forget that luch open advice ulually has one or even more
hidden facel, that might be Interpreted and even used by central governments to
achieve their own aims, despite their people's interests. This IIbecause the people's
needs do not always necessarily coincide with their government'llnterelta.
It seems that In the case of natural diustera it il eal1er to take a decision to
relocate a community on the basis, that the original site II not safe any more, and
usually such decisions are carried out and In some cases forced on the people. WhUe
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in a war situation, not to relocate people and even rehabilitate them back on their
own land seems to be a favourite policy for some governments, despite all the
underlying dangers. For instance, the recommendation to rebuild settlements on their
original sites, could be abused by governments, whose aim, behind the re-population
of war damaged or recaptured areas, is to avoid future incursions, "..on the grounds
that empty land is a clear invitation for invasion or land grabbing" (Davis, 1989),
rather than to help people recover and rebuild their lives. An example of such a
policy has been observed in the rural areas of Khusestan province in Iran, where the
authorities did not consider any mitigative and preventative measures, in case of
continued vulnerability to the war hazards. On the contrary, they started to rebuild
during the continuation of hostillties of the Iran-Iraq war, thus towns and villages such
as Hoveizeh and Bostan, in the south-west of Iran, were rebuilt twice. During their
occupation they were razed to the ground, then new settlements were built in their
place and people returned and started to settle down again in their new houses. But
because of the continuous elr reids and bombardment people decided to ebendon
their towns again with no one to look after them. This is an incident where we should
ask ifit was appropriate to start reconstruction and rehabilitation while the whole area
is still at risk. This might sound rather a strange question if we consider all the
professional advice that has always been given to start rebuilding as soon as possible.
This issue of when to start end where to build is one of the common dilemmas that
are facing planners, dealing with post-war reconstruction and has to be addressed
individuelly. (see Chapter 3).
Using settlers, as a means of defending territories and even as an offensive
means, is not a new phenomenon it has been used many times during history.
Today, Israel is an obvious example, where settlers from all over the world have been
brought to Israel in order to create a population density that would better guarantee
its occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Currently, thousands of Soviet
Jews are arriving monthly to be settled in the Palestinian occupied territories. Such
issues raise the importance of discussing the rights and entitlements of clvlllans
suffering from war damage to their physical environment.
On the other hand, if we were to give a blanket of recommendation to the
relocation of the affected communities, as an approach to the question of post-war
reconstruction, then it could be misinterpreted too, and used to answer the interests
of the central government rather than the locel people. Another instance is where the
Iraqi Kurds, were dispersed all over Iraq in the name of their own security, under a
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hidden agenda aimed at merging them with the rest of the population, and reducing
their power and claim for independence.
1.8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
The political mainsprings for war still exist. Indeed, as we near the end of the
millennium, It seems that these springs are more tightly stretched than ever over the
struggle for resources, in a world divided as much between north and south a.
between east and west. The great suffering and destruction caused by war i. Ukely
to continue, as long as building peace is dependent on armaments and other
preparations for war, rather than on mutual understanding and the enhancement of
societies.
In this chapter three principal areas of concern were Identlfled:
• Concerning the theoretical study of war, we thowed how over the yeara the
emphasiS has been shifted from war to disastert. The reasons why, In the lilt
few years natural-disasters research has been used as I methodological model
to explore the issues of post-war reconstruction.
• This Chapter stated that overdependence on natural disaster literature could be
misleading, because war differs significantly from any other kind of disaster in
a number of ways. These include, its scope; number of parties Involved; the
speed of attack; duration of war; types of weapons employed and methods of
destruction and finally. population vulnerability.
• War and the arms Industry have always played a controversial role in national
development. Today's wars are fought for all sort of reaIons, some of which
may not be seen as irresponsibility on behalf of the State. Governments Ire
expected to plan for development and they too are the principle wlgers of war.
• The end of the Cold War has. on one hand, brought a number of fresh hopes for
peaceful future development and for regulatlng the arms market. on the other
hand, it has caused the threat of many a North-South confrontation over
resources.
Finally a personal concern, that has to do with the continuous development of
new weapons systems that enables the soldier, even on the battlefleld, to fire more
lethal weapons, more accurately to longer ranges: his enemy is Increasingly, an
anonymous figure encircled by gunfire .
••••
The coming Chapter will discuss the different effects of war and the stagel of
recovery.
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CHAPTER TWO
EFFECTS OF WAR AND STAGES OF RECOVERY:
THE SOB-COLTURE OF WAR
2.1. INTRODUCTION.
By reviewing the different dimensions of war one concludes that in comparison
with natural disaster, war creates more extensive and multi-faceted damage (also see
Cuny, 1983:44-61). Moreover, the degree of this damage differs form one war to
another depending on the previously identified dimensions of war. In other words. no
two wars are alike in terms of the degree of their effects, that can differ not only from
one war to another but also from one battle or attack to another within the same war.
However, it is also fair to say, that the immediate impact of all wars can be
summarised In human casualties and suffering, as well as destruction to the built and
soft environments.
However, and as we explored in Chapter I, the little available literature that is
not merely descriptive of war, contains a great confusion as to the effects of war.
There is no clear distinction between, the immediate impact of war, the side-effects
of that impact and the long-term effects. This confusion might exist because of the
nature of the different available studies, in which experts are mostly concerned with
reflecting war effects, in relation to their own field of study. Thus, we find some
studies that are concerned with the effects of war on demographic patterns (Curson,
1989; Dahlen, 1989; Faour, 1988); others concerned with social and phycological
effects (eg. Ikle, 1958; Raphael, 1986); others with human behaviour and social
response to air-raid waming (eg. Mack (, Baker, 1961); and yet others, with physical
damage and architectural heritage loss (many articles on Dobrovnik); and finally
those concerned with refugees (Hamermesh, 1979; Simmonds et al, 1983), etc. As
yet, I have not come across a study that represents a comprehensive picture of the
effects of war, not even in the damage assessment reports, produced by national or
intemational agencies. (eg. Iraqi report following the Allied bombing, 1991).
A further complication one faces when researching the effects of war is that,
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some effects can be explored in much more detail and more easily than others. For
instance the damage to buildings and the numbers of deaths and Injurlel, can be
assessed quantitatively. Thus the figures produced have alwaYI provided the basic
illustration of the effects of wars, al well as of natural disasters. However, the author
feels that psychological. social. economic and political damage II equally Important
to asses in the long run.
To plan reconstruction it is important to present an Integral picture of the
immediate impact of war on the four bounds that constitute a stable IOclety: the
community, the state. the market and the environment (built: housing In particular
as well as ecological), and the indirect effects thJI devaltation halon
communications. consumer goods' supplies. and the consequent social and
economic losses. All in the view that a nation II a IOclal, economic and
organisational entity. of which the deltroyed and damaged settlements form a
functional part.
However. this Chapter does not claim the ability to produce a comprehensive
picture of the effects. What it attempts to do Is to provide a basic framework
(skeleton or even just a check list) for planners and decision-makers, responsible for
reconstruction. to use in reviewing the different effects; to Identify areas of problems,
while making sure that they have not missed one or another of the long list of effects.
To serve the aims of this dissertation an attempt has been made to categorise
the effects of war into three categories. in terms of impact and time. while keeping
in mind the fact that these categories overlap. We are aware that these categories,
may seem like an over-simplification of the problem. Itlll. we believe it II Important
to attempt to categorise war effects in a manner that goes beyond what has already
been established in natural disaster studies. The three categories are:
• Immediate impact: The Immediate Impact of war affects population. state.
market and the environment (In Its wider lenle).
• Indirect effects: Due to the Immediate Impact of war a number of side
effects would result. thele Include seeje-eccnemlc,
cultural. political, administrative and organilltlonal
disruption.
• Side effects: And long-tenn results of war. are the accumulative
results of the direct Impact appeared over a period of
time. Thele are directly related to the amount of
rehabilitation that has been carried out during and
immediately after the war.
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These categories taken together try to represent the most comprehensive
picture of war effects and the probable results of engaging in war. Still in practice it
may be very difficult to accurately assess such effects. Simply because the end
result of any war, on a certain nation, depends critically on the interdependency of
many individual effects, some of which may not be immediately observed. For
example, one of the side effects of the psychological impact of war within a certain
community may be a reduction in man power, which in its tum, would prolong the
economic recovery process. Equal1y important are the side effects resulting from
having a considerable percentage of handicapped people.
2.2. IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF WAR:
ITS EFFECT ON POPULATION, ENVIRONMENT, STATE, AND MARKET.
2.2.1. Effects on the populatIon.
The direct impact of war on the population, both civilian and military, can be
summed up in three areas of concern: (1) Mortality and injury; (2) psychological
impact; (3) reduced fertility and (4) migration: both displacement and refugees.
Mortality - even before the controversy over the degree of physical destruction
in any out break of war, a fiercer controversy usually (and rightly) erupts over the
human cost, and particularly to civilians, which could take the form of death or
injuries and disabilities. It has been established that natural disasters attract public
and governmental attention through the number of casualties, consequently receives
aid and help. The same can be said about war, where the factor of mortality plays
a significant role in publicising 8 particular war.
While, in its review of disaster frequency and mortality in the 1970-81 period,
UNDRO (1986) seemed to have ignored war, along side famine and epidemics of
infectious diseases, as major causes for mortality. Other scholars, such as Curson
(1989:6-7) have classified war as being third, after epidemics and famines in terms
of numbers of deaths caused over the period 1974-81. In a comprehensive
assessment of human losses from disasters over the same period, Curson (1989)
claimed that, while epidemics have killed 45 million people, famine has killed 40
million people and war has claimed the lives of 9,677,500 people. The importance
of this assessment appears, when one compares these figures to the next highest on
his list; these caused by cyclones, hurricanes, and typhoons 500,000, followed by
earthquakes causing 426,998 casualties. This study shows that the UNDROconcern
covers, only a fraction of the real rate of mortality 2111 over the world. Still, these
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figures do not include the casualties over 6 years of WW2, which according to various
sources, ranged between 35 and 50 millions. (Shah 1983; Otok, 1989).
Curson's claims seem rather underestimated If compared to tho.e of Otok
(1989:219-221), who estimates that the number of war ca.ualties since the end of
WW2 is between 16-20 million lives, excluding the victim. of civil war and internal
political conflicts, which, later on, he estimates as being more than 6 million people.
However, if we looked carefully into the world wide experience of war., the
number of casualties in most cases has been lower than that of survivors (who could
have been injured). The exceptions to this phenomenon could be ob.erved In the two
cases in which nuclear weapons were used, where they resulted In a large number of
dead, and also in instance where deliberate massacres took place. For example, the
massacres of Sabra and Shatila south of Beirut, between the 16th· 18th September
1982, in which 2000 people were killed.
In the case of natural disasters governments tend to exaggerate the number of
human casualties, in order to obtain greater international alll.tence, while In the caM
of war one observes the opposite. Both, Iran and Iraq during eight years of war were
keen on keeping the number of announced casualties as low as possible, particularly
that of the military, in order to keep the public moral high. Also, today, in the AIlied-
Iraqi war, America and its allies are keen on keeping casualties low, not only theirs
but also those of Iraq, especially the civilian ones, in an attempt to give the Image of
a 'just' war, and to avoid any diversion In public opinion and support.
Writing about the number of casualties resulting from the Ilraell Invasion of
Lebanon, Jansen (1982:22) pointed out that, "The difficulty of arriving at a
reasonably accurate figure for the dead, the wounded and the homelell wal that one
had to juggle with three sets of figures· one provided by the Intemational agencies
and by foreign correspondents reporting on a single town or Incident; another
provided by Lebanese sources, the Red Cross and the police (and these are not
always the same); and a third provided by the Israelis".
l'1Iurles - In terms of medical needs, It has been established that war Is the worst
disaster for inflicting injuries and thus requires the hlghelt lurglcal need. over a
continuous period of time, in which the medical teams have to operate under the
most dangerous circumstances. While all typel of disaster except perhaps for
earthquakes, require low to moderate surgical needs and often only between the first
24-72 hours of the disaster. (Western, 1972 quoted In Cuny, 1983). On the other
hand, while the immediate threat of epidemiological diseases due to war are unlikely,
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secondary threats are common and all waterborne, personal contact and vectorbome
diseases become a possibility, due to overcrowding and destruction of infrastructure
and the loss of clean water resources 1• The break out of any communicable disease
is made much worst by the continuation of war, which makes it nearly impossible to
take measures to identify a disease, isolate it and prevent an epidemic, as well as to
take any environmental improvement measures.
Psychological Impact - "There can be little doubt that war is a disaster and that
it, too, may scar the minds of its survivors". (Raphael, 1986:221). This is one kind
of damage caused by war that is often neglected by planners, architects and
decision-makers embarking on reconstruction, it is hard for them to visualise and
measure such effects. However, a number of leading studies have been conducted
on the psychologically traumatic effects of combat on soldiers and civilians alike.
For example Frye and Stockton (1982); Boman, (1982; 1984) studied stress disorder
in the Vietnam veterans; Janis (1951) studied the psychological impact of bombing
on civilians arguing that there are two groups of civilians living war; those who had
'near miss' experiences of death and those who had a 'remote miss'. The first group
develop severe fear reactions, as well as higher levels of psychiatric damage due to
anxiety and emotional stress of later air raids. While the second group may show
diminished levels of fear and greater capacity to withstand the emotional stress of
later air raids. Furthennore, Raphael (1986) and 0mer (1988) supported the claim
of Janis (1951), that it is possible to predict the prevalence of severe emotional
reactions following bombardment from: 1) the number of non-fatal casualties; 2) the
number of survivors in public shelters or homes damaged during an attack; 3) the
number of families in which a fatality has occurred; 4) the number of homeless
people; 5) the number of visible casualties seen by survivors.
What they all agree on, is that war as an experience, with what it contains of
confrontation with death, separation of family members, war time stress, general fear
of invasion, bombardment, capture and occupation, may all help develop the
syndrome known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 0mer (1988:78) sums up the
common reaction to those people so far, "Full psychic reconstruction eludes these
unfortunate survivors and the consequences for them may range from fairly mild,
I Waterbome diseases: typhOid. paratyphoid fevers sewage poisoning, cholera, schistosomiasis,
leptospirosis. Vectorbome diseases: louseborne typhus, plague, malaria. viral encephalitis, relapsing
fever. Personal contact diseases: shigellosis, diarrhoea, skin infection, hepatitis, measles, whooping
cough, diphtheria, influenza, tuberculosis. (Cuny, 1983:47).
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transient irritants to profound psychological dl.turbance. culminating sooner or later
in acts of self destruction either by suicide or spiritual annihilation".
Fertility _War has been classified along other long-term disasters such a.
epidemics and famine to cause a decline In fertility. A claim that hal been IUpported
by Curson (1989:16) when he wrote: "During the Flrlt World War the French birth
rate fell from 17.9 per thousand In 1914 to only 9.5 per thouland three yearl later
at the height of hostilities. During the same period the Oerman and AUltrian birth
rates fen by 48 and 42 percent respectively". Thll hal been oblerved in Iraq during
its eight year war with Iran. Although no offielal figure. have been announced. the
fact that. between 1984-1989 the government launched the biggelt campaign of Ita
kind in the Middle Ea.t, to encourage young people to marry and to have children.
is an indication of an alarming decline in fertility. The uncertain future accompanying
war. discourages young people from marrying. Moreover, as In the MJddle Ealt,
marriage is related to happiness and celebration. It is naturally seen a. inappropriate
during war when other people are suffering.
Migration - Populations fleeing the area of conflict. or are under threat to do 10.
are one of the major phenomena alloelated with war. It II the mOlt common
response to disasters In general and to war In particular. De.plte the fact that In
recent times, it has been described as a 'disaster myth' (UNDRO. 1986:13-16). it
continues to be an important survival strategy. Thus refugees and displaced people
continue to constitute one of the tragic consequences of war and civil strife.
It may seem appropriate at thll .tage to Ihed more light over the needl of
refugees and displaced people, both groups shere the lame hard.hlp of having left
their homeland, becoming homeless, jobless, etc. But refugee I receive more
international recognition as they have made the move Into neighbouring countriel,
and have thus become under the mandate of the United Nations High Commi.sloner
for Refugees (UNHCR). While In the case of displaced people who have moved only
from one part of their country to another, are con.idered the re.ponlibility of their
own govemment.
Over the years the official definition of refugees hal evolved. In 1951, the
United Nations Convention, which was extended by the 1967 Protocol. define. a
refugee as:
"Any person who owing to a well-founded fear of perlecution
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
particular social group or political opinion II outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or owing to luch fear,
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is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country;
or who, not having e nationellty end being outside the country
of his former hebitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it".
(UNHCR,1979).
Hernermesh (1979:348) reported that "The Organisation of African Unity found it
necessary to add a sixth clause the {light from war". While Simmonds et al (1983:2)
stated that in subsequent General Assembly resolutions, the UNHCR's rnandete has
been extended to include:
"1) Displaced persons who are outside their country of former
habitue! residence,,,.; 2) Former refugees and displaced
persons repatriated to their country of origin; 3) In specific
cases persons dlspleced es e result of men-made disaster in
their own country".
All the above definitions make the determination of refugee status a complex
issue. Starting from 1991 the Vietnamese 'boat people', who left their country for
HongKong in waves, starting from 1978, have been repatriated by force by the
Hongkong authorities with the blessing of the British Government, on the bests thet
they have left their country more from economic pressures than from fear of
persecution.
The number of refugees seems to be growing year by year. In 1951 there were
about 1,250,000 offlciallyrecognized refugees in the world (Simmonds et al, 1983:3).
By 1979, the number of officially classified refugees reached 15,000,000
(Hamermesh, 1979:348). While in 1991, it reached 17,000,000 (Vasquez-Velasquez,
1991: 13). "Under the terms of its statute the UNHCRmust seek durable solutions for
refugees. In order of preference these solutions ere: Voluntary repetrlation; Locel
integretion in e neighbouring country of asylum: Resettlement in e third country of
asylum". (Simmonds et el, 1983:3). However, the maln points we need to observe
when talking about war refugees and displaced people are:
1) There when end how of their retum to their homeland is often not clear. After
a natural disaster the survivors start almost immediately desiring to go home,
usually, it takes a year or two before they return home or settle permanently
where they are.
2) The wer refugees ere often part of a planned political agenda end thus their
camps may tend to become permanent.
3) War refugee camps ere at risk of military attack. as has happened with the
Palestinian refugees over the last four decades. the Kurds refugees. and those
in the Sudan and Ethiopia.
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4) Unlike refugees of natural disasters, the numbers of war refugees wlll probably
fluctuate with the respective periodl of peace and war.
5) In designing a camp, the type and area of shelter required by war refugee ...
another area of difference. Cuny (1977) claimed that often war refugeel have
fewer possessions with them than those fleeing from natural catastrophel. Th1a
point is directly related to the dimenllonl of war, and whether there hal been
a warning or not.
Surolvors _Victims of war_ In the context of an emergency responle after a dlN.ter,
and while commenting on the term 'victims', Cuny (1983) wrote: "The tenn vlctlm.
has many negative connotations. It provokel Images of helplellnell, of people who
must be taken care or. Still, the lame author kept on uling the term on the balla
that substitute terms, such as 'beneficlariel' or .recipients' do not adequately d.lcrlbe
all the people affected. At the same time, Cuny (1983) suggelted the tenn
'survivors' as a substitute, while keeping In mind that It applies only to thOle who
have escaped a life-threatening lituation.
The main argument Cuny (1983) puts forward II that, whether we call them
'victims', 'survivors', 'beneflclarles', 'recipients' or what ever, they are not helpl ....
"They are capabie of making intelligent choices and when lpeelal allowance. are
made so that victlms can cope with personallollel, they can participate effectively
In all polt-dlsalter activltiel... the term ulctlnu Ihould be coterminoul with
partlclpant" (Cuny, 1983:7).
2.2.2. Effects on the environment.
The direct effect of war on the environment can be lummarised by: (1)
destruction to the built environment, Including relidentlal and commercial property.
housing, industry, infrastructure, etc.; (2) devaltltion of agricultural land and crop.;
(3) damage caused to the varioul eco-IYlteml. The datructlon of the built
environment is the most frequently portrayed and probably the belt Indicator of the
horrors of war. However, the indirect effect of phYlical deltruction on the local
community depends on the type of damage inflicted on the buildings and
infrastructure. We can think of a number of broad categorlel of buildings, where the
bombardment could have a different result. thole would Include, housel, schools.
hospitals, universities, holy places, public and adminiltratlve buildings. commercial
offices. shops, industrial sites, storage (food, chemical, ete.), portl. communication
and finally military buildings. Similarly the infrastructure can be categorlled Into
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roads, bridges, power-generating plants, water supply and sewage systems, etc.
It is a well established military tactic that the attacking force would start an
offensive with a massive bombardment (from land, air and sea), in order to preempt
a counter attack and thus hopefully to minimise its own casualties. We have
witnessed this during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in the Iran-Iraq war and most
recently during the Allied attack on Iraq. Most attacking armies would claim they are
conducting a 'responsible attack', by trying to be highly selective against military
targets and sparing residential areas, hospitals, and holy places.
This has never proved to be wholly true in any war, such bombardment could
easily be re-directed against inhabited areas, on the bases that the enemy is siting
his military installations and gun positions in residential areas or near mosques,
churches, hospitals, schools, embassies and so on. The degree of physical damage
to settlements could vary from 1 to 100%, depending on a number of factors, such
as: the location of the settlement, its strategic importance, the attacking army's
military strategies, the bombing accuracy, etc., and sometimes the obsession of
military and para-military leaders. In the 2WW the cities of Coventry, Dresden and
Warsaw are clear examples of how far man is ready to go, in terms of the devastation
of human settlements. This attitude has not changed since then, in fact it seems to
have become worse. The world has witnessed over the last 45 years many cases
where villages, towns and cities have been systematically destroyed. InWarsaw, the
aim of such systematic destruction was to erase the Polish identity. Against the
Palestinians, Israel's aim has always been the dispersal of the population, both inside
and outside the occupied territories. This was evident during the 1982 invasion of
Lebanon, where Ilrael perceived the UNRWArefugee campi al being the physical
and organised presence of the Palestinian people. For instance, Ain Hilweh camp,
which was razed to the ground, has been subjected to heavy air bombardment first,
then the camp was systematically reduced to rubble by blowing up and bulldozing the
surviving houses. The United Nations Reliefand Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
(UNRWA), stated on 23 June 1982, in a report on the damage in five of its camps
during the Israeli invasion:
"MiehMieh camp slightly damaged. Bourj el-Shemall: 35% of
refugee houses destroyed. EI-Buss camp: 50% of refugee
houses destroyed. UNRWA Food Distribution Centre, one
school, feeding centre and handicraft centre destroyed.
Rachidieh camp [housed at the time 15,000]: 70% of refugee
houses destroyed. UNRWAbuildings seriously damaged. Ain
Hilweh camp [housed 35,000]: totally destroyed". (See
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Jansen, 1982:18-21).
Examples of total devastation are still taking place. Settlementt such as Feo.
Najar, Wadi El-Khassib in Iraq and Bostan, Howlzah,Abadan and others in Iran, were
razed to the ground between 1980-1988. To paint a picture of what physical
destruction is about, Jansen (1982: 17), quoted the TLmes,on 19 July 1982, to have
reported: "The Israeli air attacks [on Sidon) must have been among the most
ferocious ever delivered on a Lebanese city [this was before Beirut's ordeal). In the
southern sector of Sidon, It looks al if a tomado hal tom through the residential
buUdings and blocks of flatt, ripping off balconies and roof supports, tearing down
massive waUsand collapsing whole blocks. There are still dead In these ruins too-.
Housing _ The effect of bombing on relidential areas as one of a nation's major
resources is immediate, obvious and easily recorded. Probably, easier to trace than
any other urban service that can be affected by war or bombing. The ratio of housing
destroyed depends on the scale of bombardment as well al on the buildings' strength.
Some buildings can be damaged without being hit directly, because of their bad state
of repair. For instance, in Basrah, the author observed a number of buildings that
had collapsed when an adjacent bullding was hit.
Homeleslnellil one of the main forml of human suffering. "During WorldWar
II,the number of persons left home leiS after a raid uling conventional weaponl was
always greater than the number of casualtiel. Thil discrepancy played a decialve
role in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged citiel. Hamburg for Inltance,
lost 3.3 per cent of Its population, but 48% of itt dwellingI In the air ralda. In
Frankfurt, less than 1% of the population wal killed In air ralda, but over one third of
the dwellings were destroyed. Air-raid deaths in Kobe amounted to barely 1% of the
population, but over one-half of the houling wa. lost" (lkI6, 19'8:16).
In quantitative terms, there Is always a certain ratio between the houllng stock
of a country, (which must be counted as a major resource) and its population, the
users, like other services. The effect of a certain war on upsetting thll ratio dependa
on many factors. One of these Is the type and duration of the war and the nature of
weapons used. Also, the country's degree of preparedneal for a war II an elsential
factor. By preparedness we mean; the avaUablllty of evacuation plans, air-raid
shelters, early warning Iystems, etc. Finally, we lhould keep In mind that, alii the
case in mOlt developing countriel, pre-war houling .tock IIu.ually In short supply
due to the continuously growing population.
Chapter Two.
43
In general one can assume that the percentage of housing destruction would
always be greater than the percentage of fatalities. Thus there willalways be a need
to supply housing, but this need may not be as bad as one would imagine by
observing the destruction of housing areas. And certainly, there may not be a need
to rush into supplying temporary housing units, that are often assumed to be part of
the govemment responsibility. Ithas been established that the undestroyed resources
such as housing, transport, etc., would partly absorb the loss from destroyed
resources. Such facts have been claimed by many writers such as lkle (1958), and
to some extent it has been adopted by some govemments as part of their emergency
plans. For instance Iraq depended on this theory, but on a regional scale, where
regions in the north and the east absorbed population from the southem regions
during its war with Iran. The same could be said about Iran. This phenomenon is
what has been identified as 'the elasticity of resources'.
On a city scale the originally least crowded districts would usually experience
a greater increase in housing density, in particular ifthey have suffered less damage.
Applying the elasticity concept on housing stock, Ikle (1958:58) wrote:
"A basic process of re-accommodation within a city can now
be generalised. Inprinciple, the number of homeless survivors
leads to an increase in housing density, and the larger this
number the greater the increase. Thus, the concept of
elasticity seems fully justified, for the resources yield
increasingly to growing pressure".
The same author goes on to clarify that, on the other hand, housing elasticity in a
certain city does not necessarily completely absorb the loss from destruction. But
this makes one wonder how much the above theory depends on the social context
of the affected city. One cannot imagine how the elasticity theory, in terms of
housing, can work in a real world that is so far from being ideal, i.e, where there are
differences in classes, ethnic groups, religious groups and so on. However, we
believe that war does bring people closer together. According to what has been
observed from this research, the very concept of elasticity has been observed in
Belfast during the 1970's, but within the limitations of the ethnic group. Similarly in
Iraq, families, relatives and ethnic groups tended to accommodate each other during
the war. It is interesting to note that in Israel and for the last few months, about 2000
Soviet Jews are being daily accommodated depending mainly on the existing housing
stock and on families sharing dwellings together. In this case it was possible to do
it on a national scale, because of the common belief shared by every body in Israel,
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of the need to increese their population and protect them tel vel al a religloua
integrity.
Destruction o( agricultural land. crops and (orests,a II yet another direct effect
of the impact of war on man and the environment that II often given little attention.
This claim il suppcrted by Freedman'l (1989:298) oblervation, "..in Iplte of the
Impact of wars and the damage cauled to the ecolYlteml. the ecologic.1 effects
have not been subject to detailed Iclentiflc documentation, .nd are therefore poorly
quantifled. The human tragedy il mOlt Itrongly emphallzed".
During war, with the shortage of luppUel. wh.tever available agricultur.ll.nd
becomes an invaluable resource, and hence itmay be deliberately targeted. D.m.ge
to crops and agricultural land can take the form of one or more of the following
factors: (1) Spraying chemicall: the blggelt known crime I. that of the United Stetes
against Vietnam. In an effort to deprive their enemy of food production .nd foreat
cover, over a period of 10 years (1961-1971 ). the Amerlcanl .prayed an area of 1.4
million hectares (about one-Ieventh of the I.nd area of Vletn.m), Including 100,000
hectares of cropland. with a combination of several chemical agents. "The
regeneration that followed was usually slow and spor.dic" (Freedman, 1989:303)';
(2) Destruction due to burning and cutting down trees, either to deny cover for the
enemy's advancing army or to make way for tanks .nd heavy vehicles. It has been
estimated that "..more than 40% of pine plantation I In south Vietnam were burnt
during the war. with most fires being Ignited by exploding bombs" (Oriana and Pflffer,
1970). Similarly, the palm plantation I on the borders between Iraq .nd Iran
witnessed such devastation; (3) During the 1991 Qulf war, because of lack of fuel
during winter, people, particularly Kurdl.h refugeel cut down tree. to u.e to keep
warm and to cook their food: (4) The war make. It difficult and In some e....
Impo.slble to attend to agricultural land. thus f.rmers become thre.tened by loo.lng
their crops. Moreover. since the end of the Qulfwar, Iraq has not been allowed to u..
planes for spraying fertilizers, which hal meant that Its .grlcultural production,
particularly ofwheat, has dropped dram.tically (AL·Zubldl, 1991): (5) Contamln.tion
and damage of the top·.oil. This could relult form the ute of fuel·.lr bomb. to clear
minefields and from the movement of anny personnel and vehicular tr.fflc, which
aThll section hal been prepared with the help of Mr Hoffman Alpl,., a horticulturllt Itudylng for hi,
DPhIl at the Unlverllty of York.
, Several chemical agents were used, notably I 50:50 mixture of 2,4,~· T plus 2,4·0 llao known u
Agent Orange; Plcloram + Cacodylic Acid, etc.
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also causes destruction of newly establishing and mature vegetation.
Furthermore, experience from the last few years has demonstrated that an
'environment-friendly' war does not exist, despite the clean image, media propaganda
can give of a highly advanced technical war. The simple fact that war causes human
casualties proves that it is an ecological disaster, since man, in our view, is the centre
of the ecological balance. Today, it is the magnitude of war's impact on the
environment that is alarming. The consequences of the recent Gulf war is a clear
example on how war [comparatively a short one] could easily become an ecological
disaster with e long lasting effect. Some of the geologicel effects on Southern Iraq
are discussed later on in Chapter 5. In this Chapter let us draw attention to two
phenomena, the oil slicks and the burning oil field.
These two phenomena held the headlines for over a year, since the beginning
of the Allied-Iraqi war in January 1991, when each side accused the other of
perpetrating en ecological disaster, until the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from
Kuwait, when they deliberately set fire to more than 600 oil fields. It is estimated that
6 million barrels of oil entered the Gulf waters, and several smaller discharges
continued to contribute 400-500 barrels daily, since the end of the war until a year
later. The most serious effects occurred along a 560 km. stretch of Saudi coast form
Khaiji to Abu Ali. Sandy beaches are covered with a strip of oil up to 100m wide.
The worst affected were salt marshes and mangroves which act as natural traps for
oil. Recovery of these will take at least a decade. On top of that, vast areas of land
in Kuwait have non-burning oil lakes, oil has penetrated down to 30cms from the soil
surface. (UNEP-UKnews-summer, 1991). Sea-birds were another victim of that war,
they were particularly vulnerable because they spend much of their time on the
surface of the ocean. It was estimated that between 15,000 and 30,000 wading birds
have dled. Finally, the oil slicks have affected commercial fishing in the area
because of fear of oil clogging fishing equipment.
A total of 593 oil fires were still burning by the end of May 1991. By October
1991, all oil fires on land in Kuwait were apparently extinguished. Those oil fires
were responsible for the 30,000 km2 of a dense smoke cloud, which according to
WHOanalysts, produced daily emissions of more than 40,000 tons of sulphur dioxide
(502), 3,000 tons of Nitrogen Oxide (N02), half million tons of Carbon Dioxide
(C02), and a cocktail of other pollutants. "People living and working under the cloud
experienced lowered light conditions and temperature falls in the range of 5-8°C"
(UNEP-UKnews-summer, 1991). Widespread respiratory problems amongst babies
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and elderly people were associated with that smoke.
2.2.3. Effects on the market and the economy.
While "Disasters disrupt rather than destroy economie.M (Cuny. 1983:49). war
can certainly destroy, as well as disrupt them. During and immediately after wars.
and even in some cases before the attack (during the period of threat). normal
economic activities are severely di.rupted, due to one or more of the following
effects: (1) direct destruction of factories, .hop. and office.; (2) destruction of
infrastructure and communications; (3) people leaving their jobl and occupationlln
trade for survival and security for themHlves and their familiel; (4) reduction In man-
power due to mortality, disability (both physical and mental) and migration; <') lack
of security would drive local businesses and banks, etc. to operate out aide the war
zone, or even outside the country, thus causing a loal of Inveltment; (6) Loll of
crops and deterioration of agricultural land, in rural areal; (7) lack of goodI In the
local markets causing inflation and a black market. making It very difficult for
families to get hold of food, etc.; (8) post-war, local economles (in the war-zone) are
bound to suffer competition from centres of production that have flourished during
the war because of their relative security.
The speed of economic recovery depends directly on the scale of damage as
well as the degree of preparedness. For instance, in Abadan, Iran, It wal oblerved,
that despite the fact that the refinery walseverely damaged, It managed to operate
at reduced levels. This made it possible for the reflnery to come back to 40% of ItI
pre-war production within only 2 years. Following the war, the refinery'l work force
was employed in recycling damaged machines and equipment, as well as on the
production lines. Thus providing a con.iderable level of employment. Simllarly, on
the other side of the border, but this time following the Allied bombardment, workers
in Iraqi factories were employed to clear rubble, rebuild and to maintain machinery
in their factories.
The speed of recovery following war is generally affected by the fact that
national and intemationallnsurance doeI not provide cover to bUllnesses In the case
of war or civll strife<4.Thus reconstructing the economy and helping bUlinel' and
Industry to rebulld often becomes a governmental responllbility. The way thll II
approached differs from one country to another. For Instance, while Iran could only
4 Insurance Is provided In many CI ... of technlcllind naturll dI... te,..
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help its factories by allowing them tax-free machinery imports and offering long term
loans, Kuwait on the other hand could afford to give almost 100% compensation.
(More on reconstruction and the local economy in Chapter 3).
2.2.4. Effects on the state: administrative and organisational.
For decades now Ithas been well esteblished between urban planners and urban
sociologists that a city is "...a complex of interrelated physical and social functions.
It is comprised of a network of many relationships between individuals, groups, and
material parts" (lkle, 1958:5). Thus it is a living relationship between individuals;
both as households and dependents, as well as families and the other functions of
housing, markets, transportation, working places, cultural activities, food supplies and
of course, the state. This interrelationship between communities and the state is
more complex than ever in today's world. During war, one or more of the above
relations will be affected, and in most cases all of them, bringing a measure of
disruption to the entire functional system of the city.
The latest conflict in the Qulf brought to mind the fact that in a city such as
Baghdad, one of the above components could be completely destroyed, while another
related one could remaln undamaged. The Allies claim of pin-point bombing
accuracy of governmental ministries and installations, in their war against Iraq, meant
that they have established a new way of paralysing a city, though destroying its
services and communications systems, without inflicting severe damage on its
physical structure.
Apart from physical destruction, the state's economic and administrative
organisations following war will also be affected at all planning and administrative
levels: national, regional and communal. A phenomenon in which war is
distinguished from other natural and man-made disasters, which at most, would affect
the communal and local organisational pattern. However, the degree of damage
differs from one level to the other depending on the dimension of the war itself
(according to the type of war, see Chapter One). Nevertheless, it is almost a rule
that "After the war the central, and to some degree also the regional, administrative
bodies will still function. Vet the communal structure of the areas which are mainly
affected by war willbe destroyed". (Herz, 1991).
In countries where a local or communal administrative structure exists, it tends
to suffer the most as a result of the refugee problem in or out of the war zone;
destruction of infrastructure (roads, railways, communications, etc.); destruction of
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housing; of agricultural and industrial structures and mortality. Moreover, war often
highlight the social struggles in a society and underscores the inherent Inequities
within a political system, as well as the govemment', Inability to cope with the
situation. Often the involvement in war can lead to profound political and social
changes within a society.
Furthermore, the political nature of war makes It inevitable for a mllltarised war-
time government to evolve, with all the features that accompanies such a state. Such
a type of government could evolve In order to counter posllble extemallnterventlon;
that could more easily use the war to Initiate Intemal unrest, revolutionl, etc. On the
other hand, the huge talk of reconltruction ha, to cater not only for physlca.
reconstruction but also for economic. social and environmental recovery; thuI, It
inevitably increases the role of administration In the social, economic and political
spheres, making the effects of war on the state admlniltratlon even more acute.
2.3. WAR AS A CULTURAL EXPERIENCE: STAClES OF RECOVERY.
Experience of natural diusters involves a range of activities which are inter-
related. and cover different time period., the .. activltlel often ever- lap. It hal been
established that the disaster 'life·cycle' has four main pha .... Thele phase. are: pre-
disaster, relief, rehabilitation and reconltructlon (see Cuny, 1983; Park, 1989:196).
Inevitably the period of time occupied by each phase, and the lpeclfic details of
activities carried out, will vary from one type and Icale of dllalter to another.
However, this is not the case with war, because war hal no IIfe·cycle which makel
its extremely difficult to conventionally Identify the different ltagel of recovery al we
do with natural disasters. Thus, In thll Chapter we attempt to derive a different way
in which we can look at the various ltege. of war and recovery in a flexible, but
comprehensive manor. It is suggested that this could be achieved by anlwerlng a
number of questions that are central to the underatendlng of war effeeta and to the
planning of reconstruction. For instance, is there such a thing al a war culture? If10,
what are the characteristics of such a culture? Can the study of this topic enhance
future reconstruction policies?
To help promote this thesis, thil .ection explores the allumption that war II.
very strong cultural experience, through which the different ltage. of war recovery
are displayed. Inmany instances the polt·war 'sub·culture' elliplayed by society will
have been born through terrible and traumatic eventl during the war Itself. Thul the
nation, its communities and its individuals are Indeed shaped by fire. Thil Section
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explores the notion of the 'sub-culture ofwar', in both its 'official' and 'popular' faces,
as a phenomenon that manifests Itself from the very first day or even before that,
during the period when the threat of war starts to affect the existence of community
life. The two faces; official and popular; govemment and people are closely
interrelated and, at the same time, tangibly differ from each other.
2.3.1. What Is war sub-culture?
The term 'Culture' is said to be derived from "..the past participle of the Latin
verb colere, to 'cultivate', and draws some of its meaning from this association with
the 'tilling of the soiL..' In later times, 'culture' took on a more specific sense,
indicating a process of progressive refinement and breeding in the domestication of
some particular crop, or even the result or increment of such a process. Thus, we
speak of agriculture, apiculture, 'culture of the wine', or of a bacterial culture".
(Wagner, 1975:21 )5. In this sense the term 'culture' is mostly employed either to
denote the elitist connotation of creativity and evolution, or It is used in its historical
context to refer to knowledge, productivity and way of living of a certain civilisation.
Taq~fa, the Arabic synonym of 'culture', gives a more precise meaning of refinement
and education. Thus, when speaking of 'human culture', we are talking about what
makes man different from other species: the refinement of his mind and his activities.
The definition of culture, as it is implied in this paper, is closest to that given in
the Collins Dictionary; "..the total of the inherited ideas, beliefs, values and
knowledge, which constitute the shared basis of social action". This is probably the
widest meaning given to the word culture. In other words, "culture is the expression
of mankind in society" (Aysan & Oliver, 1987: 10)6. Thus, war sub-culture is an
expression of the every day life and activities of a society that is living at war;
everything from making bread to people's post-war ambitions and dreams.
Looking into 'war sub-culture' Is an attempt to consider the effects of war, the
destruction not only of buildings but of ways of life, attitudes of mind even religious
practices and the subsequent reconstruction, in a manner that goes beyond the well
established physical determinations of economic resources, material, climate and
topography. It is an attempt to study factors which have influenced reconstruction
5 Wagner, Richard, Invention of Culture, 1975.
6 Aysan, Y. (, Oliver, P., Housing and Culture After Earthquakes; A Guide for Future Policy Maklng
on Housing in Seismic Areas, Oxford Polytechnic, 1987.
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issues and policies, without being given proper recognJtionl of their Importance; i.e.
hard learnt feelings and attitudes, bottled up creativity and frultrated educational
ambitions. In other words, the expression. of every day life of a society living the
abnormal circumstances of being at war, and il gradually becoming used to it, to the
extent that bombardment, food rationing and personal deprivation become part of Ita
normal background.
2.3.2. OffIcial and popular war sub·culture.
Although a war sub-culture can exist almolt everywhere where war ha.
preoccupied people's Uves, It tangibly differs from one nation to another, depending
on and reflecting the aspects of the overall culture. Within anyone country, the
'popular sub-culture' differs from one region to another; and within the same region.
from one ethnic group to the other, and between social cla.. es. However, there may
be a substantial differences between the way people live and exprell their war
affected lives, and the way these thingl are perceived and responded to by the
government of that country.
Observing these phenomena, the author attempta to cla.. lfy war lub-culture
into two broad categories, official and popular, each of which displays the full
characteristics of a national or regional culture. and goa through three main stagea
of cultural development: preparation for war, coping with its prellures while In
progress, and finally recovering from war, with the remnant of this sub-culture being
gradually incorporated Into their evolving overall post war culture.
In the same way as the cultural expression differs from one society to the other
at the 'popular' level, it also differs from one govemment to another on the 'official'
level, mainly depending on the 'political culture' of different regimes. The growth of
so called nationalism and the seemingly endlels need to create more and more new
nation states, has brought Into existence an institutionaUsed (or artificial) type of
official culture. Thus, Institutions like 'M.1n1.trielof Culture' and 'Information' have
become such an essential part of every .tate. that, in many countrlel, they are the
instruments through which the 'Ideological culture' II promoted and the 'political
culture' is enforced. During a war, these inltruments take on an even greater
significance in justifying the war and maintaining the 'correct' public attitude'. It Is
7 It Is Important to note the ever growing intematlonallmportance of luch Institution. during war and
there extended links to private Public Relatlonl organlutlonl (PRI,. It hal been Slid that the Kuwlltl
PR exercise In the USA was largely responsible for the Involvement of the USA In the liberation of
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with these institutions that ' ...truth so often becomes the first victim of war'. To
observe the official war sub-culture, one only needs to wander the streets of a city
living at war, and compare the popular graffitiwith reading what the newspapers and
television say about the situation.
On the other hand, it maybe more difficult to gauge the depth of the 'popular'
support of the war culture. To register such culture, it is not enough to observe in the
field or carry out questionnaire surveys; it is essential to have a close relationship
with the people, to live among them. It is necessary to be in a position of trust for
people to talk about their suffering and the different ways their lives are affected by
the war. These views almost certainly will contradict those of the official culture. In
fact, It seems that In many cases, the longer the war last., the further the officIal and
popular war sub-cultures move apart, and the less the solidarity between the people
and their government becomes.
2.3.3. Preparations for war are the start of the sub-culture.
Before a disaster occurs, it is very much 'business as usual' in the area. Social
and economic activities continue as routine, and quality of life for locals is normal.
With wars this phase is marked by public anxiety over the prospect of something
gOing wrong and the built up for conflict. However, it should be noted that social
preparedness is more likely in the case of war than in any other disaster, particularly
those that do not occur regularly (eg. earthquakes). Social preparedness includes
all measures that are deliberately and systematically undertaken to reduce the
negative effects of attacks. This includes, call up, early warning, civil defence,
stockpiling of food, etc.
Looking at the situation in Baghdad, during the latest war, one wonders how
people managed to survive and cope with the heaviest bombardment in history,
which left the city's civilian life totally paralysed, without supplies of any kind, and
accompanied by the strictest economic embargo ever imposed on a country. In my
view, the answer is the existence of a war sub-culture, developed through the Eighties
during Iraq's eight year war with Iran. The characteristics of this phenomenon are
displayed in the social and economic survival systems, fonnal and informal power
structures, imposed attitudes and beliefs, imported technology, etc.; all have played
Kuwait. More recently the role of international PR institutions have been emphasised during the Serbian-
CroatJan conflict.
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a part at both the official and popular levell. Slmilarly for Iran, It II the experience
forged In that war, that helped the Iranlanl cope with the aftermath of the June 1990
earthquake, the well organised official reUef servicel were eltabUlhed during eight
years of struggle with Iraq and her alliel.
The construction of air raid Ihelten, the development of warning IYlteml, the
stock pillng of food, the means of rationing resourcel and the huge Inveltment In the
military are all part of the 'official' culture of war time. They are most eallly
observed, partly beceuse of their phYlical nature, but allO becaute they are all
pervasive. Although to a certain extent, the dominating political power might be
expected to 'cultivate' the popular war culture, the Itrength and direction of thIa
propaganda may be due to the recurrent impacts of the war: practice makel perfect.
Every victory, air raid or bombardment JI an opportunity to carry thil lub-culture one
step further. Certainly it seems, the greater the damage and luffering. the better
prepared is the ground for the lubculture to grow. These thlngl maybe strengthened
by the experience of war on a local and personal scale. I.e. for a particular town.
neighbourhood or family.
The period of preparedness hal to do with the nature of the cay" for which the
war is being or about to be waged. Thil II more a subculture of 'putting right a
fundamental wrong' or 'seeking revenge', or a way of gaining internal popular support
or diltracting people from the hardlhlp of dictatorship or 're.toring national pride'.
It is a culture of 'winning the cause', of achievement of obJectlvel. etc.
The new culture starts to display Itt characteristici In the fonn of preparedne ••
for the war; the longer this period lasts the more mature the culture can become. For
Instance in the cale of the latelt Oulf War. their wa. no forewarning period. The
attack on Kuwait took everyone except the Iraqi army, by ,urprlle. In thll cate the
Kuwaities had no time to develop a 'preparednell' culture, whereat the period from
August 1990 to January 1991, prior to the re.ponae by the AlUel, gave the iraqi
people time to recall the war lubculture that had developed during the Iran-Iraq war.
This has helped, to a certain extent, to reduce the ,ufferlng of the people. The fact
that many people did not accept the seriou.nes. of the warning may be a measure
of how effective the Iraqi propaganda machine was in acclaiming victory.
In fact, evidence from different wart seems to luggelt that aoclo·cultural fore..
have primacy either in maintaining resistance and physical survival, and or In
maintaining political solidarity, at least at the beginning of the war, and particularly
if the war was seen to be justified in the eyes of the people. In I war .Ituation with
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few resources, one observes the new priority given by the public to religious beliefs
and feelings, and the survival immediate family, both are usually supported and
encouraged by the State.
In the case of Baghdad, although many measures were officially planned to try
to reduce casualties, such as evacuation, when the real attack came, the population
left the city without the support of the government. No camps were set up, and no
evacuation plans were announced, and still, it is said that 60% of Baghdad's
population left during the bombardment, to safer areas near the Iranian border. This
shows the predisposition of people when threatened to band together to share
resources of housing and food. At the family level, describing the way Umm-Ali
managed to sustain her family during the war, she says:8
"During eight years of war with Iran, we used to stockpile
almost everything that we might need for our daily life. In fact,
now, we have a special storage room. After the end of that
war, we kept on stockpiling grain, flour, rice, oil, etc. It
became more of a habit. We always tried to keep the storage
room full, despite the fact that supplies were available. During
the American bombardment, it all became useful". (Baghdad,
April 1991).
Thus, part of the preparedness for the war was to convert the usage of one
room or at least part of a room (usually the safest, which at the same time becomes
the living room) into a storage room. In Baghdad, almost everything was stored,
even gas and petrol. These were usually stored on the roofs, because people were
aware of the danger involved in storing them inside their homes.
The finding of the safest shelter is another aspect of preparedness as part of a
war sub-culture. Families would select rooms or spaces (usually corridors and under
staircases, with minimum openings) as a place where most of the activities were
performed, windows were taped to avoid flying glass. The other option they had
available in Baghdad, because of the previous war with Iran, was the use of public
shelters provided by the govemment. But these shelters presented different types of
problems. For instance Abu-Jamal, head of a family of eight members explained
that:
"At the beginning of the air bombardment we used to spend
the nights in a public shelter, for there is one just around the
comer. But, after a few nights, we could not bear any longer
• Umm-Ali. an Iraqi house wife, in whose house the author lived during part of his last visit to
Baghdad in April 1991.
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the lack of privacy that caused many arguments and fights.
So, we decided to go back to our home, where we ltayed until
the end of the war. At the time, we thought that ifwe were to
die, then, It was Qod's will, and nothing could prevent It."
(Baghdad, May 1991).
2.3.4. Surviving the war.
People are the main resource for reconstruction and development, hence It Is
importent to maximise the survival of people. It II allO Important to underltand the
kind and degree of human suffering imposed on a particular community, In order to
better assess the capabilities of that community to reconltruct. The knowiedge of
mitigation in the context of war, comes under the heading of civil defence, which 1.
well relearched and documented ellewhere. War, however hal lOme .Ingular
characteristici. For inltance, the calculation of rllk il dependent on the artlUery
capabmty and weapons sophistication po.lelled by the enemy, al well al the armed
defence capacity of the home army. This information unlike that of natural disaster
is confidential to the government and not dilclosed. Civilianl have to be protected
but protection from against loss and damage from war II often the lowelt priority of
a government embarking on war.
The source of hazard Is not static and with the deUveryof new stocks and typel
of weapons, the magnitude of rllk, al well al the geographical areal at rllk, can
change very quickly. This could make valt numbers of the population defenceleal
over night. It has even been claimed that a high degree of cIvil defence may
encourage the politicians and army commanders to Initiate a conflict more quickly
than if their civilians were at high risk. In other words, mitigation measurel In case
of war can escalate the risk of attack. In the long term thll may help to create more
sophisticated weapons to ensure the upper hand, lhould the war be launched. It
could be said that a pre-emptive strike by the enemy on the civilian population Is
equivalent to a community being struck by an earthquake.
War does not only cause the deltruction of property but more Importantly, the
disruption of normalUfe and the creation of havoc and panic In the community, which
is a major concern. Thus even where It II poilible to save Uves by mealurel such
as evacuation and shelters, still the disruption of ordinary life causes political and
administrative pressures on the government. So, the mOlt difficult task of civil
defence In war time, 'S the continuity of normal. productive life, while remaining
reasonably protected from further attacks.
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Thus the effectiveness of civil defence plays a significant role in reducing the
number of casualties. Also, the provision of war-shelter is important. Reviewing the
'Report of the Greater London Area War Risk Study', Clarke, R. (1986:96) observes
that, "The initial survey of London's built environment immediately revealed a finding
of direct relevance to civil defence: only 3.5% of Londoners have access to any kind
of basement or cellar".
The images brought to us from Bosnia show that people do not stay in shelters
all the time waiting for a peace break-through, or for relief agencies to hand them
food, they have to take the risk of wandering around the streets seeking bread and
milk and even to do their jobs, when possible. Soon after the war starts, people will
develop their own ways of dealing with the daily demands of life, they will become
content with the minimum of living standards in their efforts just to stay alive. In fact,
it is not only the people but also their governments, who willhave to meet needs from
the resources left undamaged.
As soon as war strikes, all social and economic activities are disrupted, and an
emergency period follows. Search and rescue operations, burying the dead and
caring for affected people (the injured, orphaned, shelterless) take top priority and
has to be carried out while attacks are continued. Naturally, the emphasis is on
speed and efficiency. For days and maybe weeks, efforts are normally made to
provide food, water and medical care to survivors, and to stop continued loss and
disruption related to the war (such as casualties, spread of fire, collapse of damaged
buildings and structures, etc).
It has been established that resources escaping destruction, such as housing,
transport, etc., would partly absorb the loss from destroyed resources by being more
intensively used. Such facts have been observed by many writers who studied
evidence in WW2, they have been adopted by some governments as part of their
emergency plans; It is the case for Iran, Iraq and Israel. This notIon depends on the
overall social and cultural system and of course on the type of sub-culture that has
been created during the war. For instance, are the people ready to accommodate
others or not? As an example, Iraq depended on thIs theory, but on a regIonal scale,
since regIons in the north and the west absorbed the southern population during its
war with Iran. The same could be said about Iran. This phenomenon is what has
been identified as 'the elasticity of resources', Although 'the elasticity of resources'
does exist as a phenomenon, it is not necessarily part of the official planning,
Moreover, there is always a danger of over-simplifying when assuming that, for
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instance, on a city scale, the originally least crowded districts usually experience a
greater increase in housing density, in particular Ifthey have luffered Ie.. damage.
2.3.5. Recovery and war sue-culture.
War lubculture II not only about 'preparing' for and 'surviving' the war, it hal
also a number of other dimensions that are evident after the end of the war and which
are of crucial Importance for the reconstruction of the society. The Itrengthening and
rebuilding of social relations is one of the positive dimenllonl of thll culture:
"One of the conciliating outcomes of this war Is
that it brought the neighbours close to each other.
We shared shelter, food and fuel. Without the war
we would probably not know Abu lUll's flmlly
better. They are very kind neighbour.-. (Umm
Mohammed, Baghdad, May 1991).
War tends to bring people closer to each other, In an extraordinary IOlldlrlty
that can leave its traces in the society for generation. to come. AlIO, based on the
suggestion that 'suffering stimulates artistic creation', one might argue that much of
the development in literature and art In general II owed to war. Popular lOng••
poetry, literature, fiction and painting delcriblng the war with italuffering and victory
are all exprellive fonns of war lubculture. The author hal been particularly
interested in wall graffiti, as an outstanding feature that exilta a1molt everywhere.
where there is an armed conflict. It reflects people' I feelings and conveys the State'.
political and ideological messages.
Wall graffiti has always been an expreilive type of art that re.ponda
immediately to the IOcial, economic and political clrcum.tancel of a certain nltion.
and demonstrates strong, often otherwise unlpoken, mellage. and feellngl. Thll la
particularly true in the cale of civil Itrlfe. In placel sueh al Iran, Iraq, Lebanon.
Northern Ireland and the Israell occupied territoriel, wall graffiti, picturel reprelentlng
the war, portraits of the President, Imam or the leader, and Ilogan. a"llnat
governments and occupation forces have become part of the urban culture.
In Iran a more sophisticated veralon of thil phenomenon, which developed after
the revolution and during the war, can be obHrved. In thll caM, every conceivable
use was made of emotively laden religious symbolism, In order to present the war
against Iraq as being a holy war, that aiml for the liberation of the holiest MUIUm
shrines. Although religiOUSsymbolism Is largely discouraged by 111am,It was used
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in Iran in the form of wall graffiti and street portraits, because of the strong message
it conveys to the people in the street. In some of these graffiti, like in those found in
the main mosque of Khoramshare, the religious structure obviously tries to portray
all those lost in the war as innocent martyrs. These images are surprisingly close to
Christ-like figures as they are known in Christianity. Also, the official anti US, USSR
and Israel messages have become part of the landscape.
Meanwhile on the Iraqi side images of Nationalism and Arabism are dominating
features in the streets and squares of most towns and cities. In the same way,
images of the early spread of Islam by the Arabs were brought to life again,
particularly those of the 'Qadi.ia Battle', in which the Arab. conquered Persia in the
year 637 A.D.
However, this form of mass communication could also be found in Northern
Ireland in its most sophisticated type of political propaganda. "Periodically under
attack from the IRA,passively resented by one third of its citizens, outnumbered by
a Catholic majority in the whole of the island, the majority population of this new
Protestant State of Ulster laboured to project a sense of separate culture and identity.
The introverted imagery of past myths became the territorial justifications of the
present. Thus William of Orange, the red, white and blue of the Union Jack and the
red hand of Ulster became the mainstay of separatist Ulster identity and wall painting
the outward expression of an inward insecurity". (C. Gallagher & A. Hanratty,
1989: 100)9. Equally, the Republicans (mostly Catholics) created their own graffiti
which incorporates symbols of the Celtic culture and Catholic suffering. The
Republican graffiti even went as far as associating the IRAwith other international
revolutionary movements, such as the Palestinian Uberation Organisation (PLO) and
the African National Congress (ANC).
2.4. POSmVE EFFECTS OF WAR.
Although it is hard to believe that any war can leave positive effects on the
affected community, still experience shows that war, similar to other forms of
disasters, may have short as well as long term constructive effects. For instance, it
is a well known fact that the Welfare State in Britain owed a good deal to the effect
of the Second WorldWar (although there were other causes such as the extension to
a democratic parliamentary and local government framework). The war stimulated
II Gallagher. C. & Hanratty, A .• The War on the Walls. OIster Folklife. Vol. 35. 1989.
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solidarity and upper class wlllingness to meet the expectatJon. of social equality - or
lesser inequalities10•
Furthermore, war brings to the surface the underlying ba.ic pre·war problems
of a certain society, that might have been overlooked previou.ly. As Cuny ( 1983: 12)
observes, "It reduces all issues to their molt fundamental level and .trip' Iway III the
ancillary issues that obscure or confu.e the fundamental que.tion. that mUlt be
faced. Critical decisions, previously unaddressed, can no longer be Ignored, and
choices must be made".
There i. no .tronger indicator than a national war to highlight the Inherent
weaknesses within a certain society and within Its govemmental organisations.
Certainly, not all the problems we face In a post·war situation are caused purely by
the war. The war may have acted beside its destructive role as a meant of bringing
into sight long e,osting problems that have only been magnified by the war.
H ... when you embark on reconstruction plaMing everyone you
talk to blames this or that problem you encounter on the
disaster. But gradually as you proceed it become. all too
apparent that at least 90%of the problems you are confronting
were present well before the disaster occurred. All that hal
happened is that the disaster has Icted al a surgeon's scalpel
to expose these latent weaknelles in buildings, the urban
fabric, the planning .y.tem or the adminlstrltive
infrastructure". (George Nez, quoted in Davis, 1989b:14).
This phenomenon could be considered a polltive one, If It wal handled in a
constructive manner; to pursue a comprehen.ive wide-ringing planning of
reconstruction that would overcome many of the exi.ting problem.. For Inltence. It
was the earthquake in Quatemala in 1976 that brought awareness to the middle- and
upper-class families of the extent of poverty In their own country. And what followed
that, was the estabUshing of many voluntary organisation. to help the poorer
communities. In other words, it was the earthquake that forced the old order into
changell•
Also, due to war and Its lubsequent reconstruction. govemments Rnd
themselves more engaged in the development of different area. of the country, lOme
of which may have been previously Ignored becaute of their remotene... Later.
governments find It difficult to withdraw their service., or even to reduce their level.
10 From a discussion with Ed Cooney. Reeder In history. Unlverilty of York. 1992.
II For more details, see Cuny (1983:12).
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without facing criticism from the community. Thus war and the subsequent
reconstruction may mark the beginning of more responsible govemment development
plans.
From the Middle East experience, one can argue that the war in Iraq, may for
instance have long-term positive consequences. It was due to the war' pressure that
Iraq's technology progressed so rapidly. Although in the case of Iraq most of the
technological advancement took place within the military sphere. other industrial
sectors have benefited too.
Probably if it was not for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent
liberation, Kuwait would have never seen the light of political reform and witnessed
its first steps towards democracy, no matter how little the reform has been. After all,
it may be true that, "There is nothing like a war to shake up a sleepy nation and
cause people to think about themselves .... It depends on the price that is being paid,
by whom it is paid and to what ends the means of war are directed, can war be a
vehicle for development in spite of disaster" (Zargar, 1988b:36). Reviewing the
reconstruction experience of Westem Europe, Japan and South Korea, one can find
many examples that support such l!I statement. From our own region Iraq seems to
be such an example, Iran also achieved an outstanding degree of industrial and
agricultural self-sufficiency, largely during the war.
2.5. THE IMPACT OF DEFENCE AND MlUTARY CONSIDERATIONS
ON CITY PLANNING AND ARCHITECTURE.
"Man's desire and need for protection are as old as his
aggressive impulses, and few of his occupations have
absorbed as much of his attention, time, effort, and capital as
the design and construction of defences against the
transgression of his human enemies".
(De La Croix, 1972:8).
Right now, the closest example for us that supports De La Croix's observation
is York city, a medieval fortified city in the North of England, where the author has
been living for the last three years. North of York and at the English-Scottish border
stands Hadrian's wall; a 73 mile impressive man-made defensive structure. Many
would agree that perhaps the most impressive example of 'defensive architecture' is
the Great Wall of China started in the second century B.C., which shows how much
man is ready to make the effort to defend himself (3,720 miles). However, numerous
examples of defensive and offensive architecture can be found all over the globe;
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fortified towns, cities, walls, observation towers, castles and 10 on. But, the main
question that comes to mind is, what about modem warfare. and man's defencel
against it? Do they still affect the landscape and the built environment as they used
to do until the 19th century?
This Section supports its argument mainly with examples taken from the Middle
East, but it also refers to intemational examples when needed. In general this Section
does not attempt to make a typological or chronological cla.. lftcatlon of the effect
of defence and military considerations of human settlements In the Middle Ealt
through its history. But, it is rather an attempt to demonstrate the Importance man
has given to the defence of his settlements; a need that In some ca.es let the
parameters for their siting and planning.
This was not only true in the past, defensive measures are still affecting and
shaping our settlements until today, but with the growing range and power of
offensive weapons, new defensive measures were Introduced. Supporting thAI
argument. Collins (1972) wrote:
"Throughout most of the history of civilization, the size, shape
and interior arrangements of cities have been strongly affected
by man's desire to protect himself and his possessions by
means of fortifications. Each advance In the technology of
weapons has led to more elaborate methods of defence
against them".
Some urbanists went even further, to claim that the formation of the city a. a
whole, is the result of war or at least of preparations for war. One of those urbanllta
is Paul VirUio, who claimed that, "There are two great school. of thought on urban
planning: for one, the origin of the crystallisatlon of the city. of urban sedentarlnell
is mercantilism; for the other -the minor one with Philip Toynbee· It's war, commerce
only coming afterwards" (Vlrillo, 1983:3).
The Middle East; the so-called Fertile Crelcent and Mesopotamia, hive
witnessed man's first transition from a food hunter Into a food producer lOme 10,000
years ago. Thus moving from cave mouths and temporary hunter'. camp Into lelf·
built, permanent habitations, that formed the nuclear settlements for a village and
later on, for cities and an urban culture. As those permanent lettlements grew In
population and activity, as well as in wealth, the inhabitants felt the need to protect
themselves and their property from the aggressive Invention. of others. who were
either less·fortunate and envlou. or who had till then, led a nomadic way of IIfe. Thul
they surrounded their settlements with walls.
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The Middle ust accommodates man's earliest-known permanent stone
fortiflcetions, built in Jericho around 8,000 B.C., over-looking the river Jordan. A tour
across the Region reveals its rich culture of defensive architecture that belongs to
different eras and ages. Some of the cities such as Jerusalem, are still surrounded
by defensive walls that were built over different periods of time. In other cases such
as Baghdad and Damascus, one can see the remains of great walls that once
surrounded the whole city.
However, the physical protection of the city, by surrounding it with w811s,W8S
not necessarily the only means of defence, location played a crucial part. The cities
of K8r8k in .Jcrdan and Mousel in Iraq were built on top of hills, depending on their
location as their main defensive means. Thus, the need for defence played a crucial
role in selecting the locetlon of 8 newly established city; it was as important as the
need for a fresh water source or a commercial route on which urban life depends. In
this context Petra, in the south of Jordan is a good example.
Even before the invention of explosive shells and the rifled gun-barrel in the
nineteenth century that flnally rendered the concept of built fortifications less valid,
some of the settlements in the Middle East during certain historical periods, did not
need fortifications at all, as they depended on the concept of regional security. A
concept that is not new, it W8Sknown and practised in ancient Egypt, as well as
during some periods of the Islamic Empire. De La Croix (1972) cl8ims that, 8lthough
the Egyptians were familiar with fortified towns, their cities as far as is known, were
not fortified. Probably this ancient concept of regional security is the closest to
today's understanding of defence, where there is no particular need to fortify a certain
city, (8 process that is almost impossible given today's advanced offensive
technology); thus attention h8S been directed towards the formation and up keep of
8 18rgemllit8ry force. Nowad8Ys, the 18rgepercentages of national budgets devoted
to natlonel defense, suggests that 8lthough man has widely given up built
fortifications, still his age-old fears have remained the same, and defence is still
absorbing as much of his attention, time, effort and capital 8S ever.
However, many observations can be recorded in the Middle East and else
where, where twentieth century modern military considerations have influenced the
design of various elements of the built environment. In his le8ding article Disasters
as Agents of Change, Ian Davis (1983), listed some of the influences the Second
World War has had on architecture and city planning in Europe end America. Where
he claimed that, the autobahn network built by the German Third Reich in the 1930's
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was intended to aid the rapid development of the troop.. HI. claim I. baaed on
Barlow's conclusion that the location, the width and the foundation of the network,
reveals that they were designed to facllitate tank tran.portation 12.
The other influence indicated by Davis (1983) is In relation to the concept of
urban decentralisation, where the fear of air bombardment of the denae and
concentrated urban centres, has been used by town planner. and urban reformers to
advocate the dispersal of both. industries and the indu.trial population, In the fonn
of 'new towns' or 'satellite towns' based on the concept of 'Garden Citie.'. The .ame
author also pointed out. that the 1950. Interstate Expre••way. In the USA, were
stimulated by the need to evacuate large cltie. In the antiCipation of nuclear attack.
Finally. Davis (1983) observed the very important political fact that: "..there I. no
better way of obtaining finance for a favourite project than to claim It as an urgent
response to a military threat, whether real, a.sumed, or even Imaginary" (Davll,
1983:301 ).
The significant difference in the impact of military considerations on town
planning in the Twentieth century and that of the earlier example •• eems to be that,
the defence considerations at that time, were counted in the con.titution of the city.
Thus, they were part of the preparation for war rather than the war itHlf, While
today, except in a few cases that are mainly In the developed world, the means of
defence started to affect the built environment, either during or after a war. As a
matter of fact. it is easier to observe the Impact of armed conflicts and political
instability on architecture and city planning in countries were they are either
threatened by war. or even living through It. Almost all countrlelln the MIddle Ea.t
can be categorised under one or the other.
In Europe, probably. Northern Ireland. reprelents the most long standing cale
of political instability. A study carried out by the author on the city of Belfast,
revealed that the civilunrest that hal been going on for so long. ha. not only affected
the built environment of the city. but hal actually .haped Its urban life. Right from
the physical segregation of the two communltie •• marked by the so-celled 'peace
lines'. to the influence it had on the design of buildings to with.tand bomb attacks.
particularly the governmental enes".
12 Barlow, M. (1939), (Chairman) ROIJ4' CornmIMIon In U,.".n DeucIopnWtII. London.
13This study was conducted InMarch 1990. It dllcUllti the effect of the 'troubles' In Belfa.t on Itl
architecture and planning and IIpart of Chapter 8.
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In general one can say that military buildings; bunkers, blockhouses, anti-
aircraft shelters, anti-aircrafts defences, submarine bases, etc. are all kinds of
reference points or landmarks demonstrating the extent to which war, with its reality
and myth, occupies from our daily space.
The effect of a war is not necessarily reflected only by military objects and or
even civil defence structures on their own. It could be reflected by every day
structures such as housing (for more detail see the author's study on housing design
in Belfast). The settlements built by the Israelis to accommodate the Jewish settlers
in the 'West Bank' and the 'Gaza Strip' are clear examples, where housing has been
designed as a defensive 'castle' on hill tops, with strictly controlled access. Such
deSigns are meant not only to provide protection for the settlers but also to generate
fear in the hearts of the indigenous Arab populauon".
Following its war with Iran, Iraq was faced with the difficult and significant task
of destroying and removing the defensive fortifications, constructed during the eight-
year war. Especially those close to the inhabited areas, in the outskirts of Besrah.
These fortifications were described by O'Ballance (1988:101), as follows:
"The Iraqi defensive trench system came to be studded with
bunkers, weapon emplacements and dug-out shelters for the
infantry, ever-ready to repel an enemy attack... Behind this
strong frontal trench were communication trenches leading
back to large underground shelters used for sleeping, feeding
and resting... In front of the main defensive trench were
jumbles and lines of barbed wire fencing and entanglements,
fitted with booby-traps, sensors and other surveillance
equipment" .
One of the defensive measures used in modern warfare is minefields, in which
vast areas are planted with thousand or millions of land mines and in some cases, as
in the Iran-Iraq war, water mines. Normal life can never return to the mined areas
until they are totally cleared. A very difficult and expensive task that has been
proved In Vietnam, where hundreds of people are said to have been killed or injured,
since the end of the war, by mines left by the Americans.
During the Iraq-Iran war, another technique with devastating environmental
consequences has been the deliberate flooding of vast areas of desert plantations.
One of these areas was 12 miles to the east of Basrah, on the east bank of Shatt
ai-Arab, known as Fish Lake. "The main obstacle within it was a deep half-mile wide
14 Barakat, Sultan (1988), The Martyrs Neighbourhood; the Rehabilitation of an Historical Quarter
in the Old City 0{ Jerusalem, B.Sc. thesis, submitted to the University of Jordan, Amman.
Effects of war and stages of recovery.
64
channel that ran along the length of the lake, which was itself covered by flve Itrong
defence Unes"l~ (O'Ballance 1988:194). Such a Iwamp. if left. could be another
threat to the environment of Balrah which il already surrounded by them.
Other methods were used, such al destroying large tracts of date palm
plantations by both IraqiS and Iranians. This, for instance. wal done by the Iraqis to
deny their use as cover by the Iranian 'human waves'. Some of the.e plantationl
were hundreds of years old and a considerable section of the local population of
Basreh region were economically maintained by that industry. The harvelting and
shipment of dates provides jobs for a large labour force at harve.t time 16. It II
almost an impossible task to replant the lost palm trees, although the Iranians have
done a good job on thatl? However, part of these plantation. are unlikely to be
replaced, as they were Intended for the new urban population of Fao. scuth of Besrah.
Finally, during the Iran-Iraq war it was common to see ma .. concrete bamera
placed on pavements In the streets and around the main public places. Some of
these were destroyed a few months after the cease-fire. In fact. the author was one
of those who recommended doing so, as they could be seen al obstacles in the face
of a return to normal urban life. Nobody at that time could predict the American
bombardment of the Iraqi cities two years later. On the other hand, air-raid sheltera,
bunkers, and anti-aircraft defence towers have all become and stUl are feature. of the
main cities in Iraq, such as Baghdad, Belrah and Mousel.
2.6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
In this Chapter we have tried to argue that the effects of war can be seen to fall
Into three overlapping categories, in term. of Impact and time: Immediate impact,
indirect effects and side effects. We then explored each of the categorlel In more
detail to conclude that war, unlike any other disaster, leaves multi faceted effects on
society, affecting its four bounds of stability: the community, the state, the market
and the environment. Thl. examination provided a basic framework that can be
consulted and used as a check list to en lure that none of the awful effects of war are
I~ According to Edgar O'Ballanee (1988). the work on the FI.h Lak. hid begun In 1982. It WI.
littered with under-water barbed-wire entanglements. mlnet. electrodeslnd "MOrt.
16 Unpublished report. Basrah DelJelopment Plan, 1975, The third RttpOrt. preplred by
Llewelyn-Davies Weeki Forestler·Walker & Bro. For the Ministry of Munlclpllltiel, Baghdad.
17 From a personal observation during a vl.lt to the war-damaged lrel. In Irln. from )·1' JlnUiry
1991.
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over- looked when planning for reconstruction.
Furthermore, in an attempt to explore the different phases of recovery leading
to reconstruction this Chapter introduced the notion of the sub-culture of war. The
development of this sub-culture during the war brings to the surface the underlying
basic pre-war problems and shortcomings of a certain SOciety. They will undoubtedly
be assoclated with the very motives for the conflict itself. In this sense, they can
indicate popular feelings which in some instances can be considered positive, if
handled in a constructive way. War as a cultural experience manifests itself in every
aspect of the daily life of e society living at war through people's attitudes, to
literature. poetry, songs and the media. Of course there are many issues associated
with a free press that we can't go into here, but governments have a responsibility to
pursue comprehensive, wide-renging reconstruction planning that should try to
reconcile differences, meet grievances, release the energy of people and regenerate
hope.
One could argue that the war sub-culture, for instance in Iraq, has had some
long-term positive consequences; its technology can be said to have advanced more
rapidly. Although most of this was within the military, other industrial sectors in Iraq
have benefited too, such as textiles, petrochemicals etc. If part of our definition of
culture has to do with modernisation and the consequences of industrialization and
urbanlsatlon, then certainly, any increase in productivity as a result of the war. can
be put to good use by e responsible power structure. Also the changes that usually
take place in the role of women in society. is a similar phenomenon, and both need
to be encouraged and sustained after the war. Part of the post-war phenomena is the
problem of mending the hearts end minds of those who have so terribly suffered. The
parelysis that comes with despair due to loss of loved ones or the equally debilitating
need to seek revenge for the family or community loses must be healed. Here there
is a need to understand the exact nature of the sub-culture that has developed during
the war.
The formetion of this 'sub-culture of war' can be a new beginning for the
devastated societies. If it was not for the Iraqi invasion of Kuweit and the subsequent
liberation, Kuwait would probably never have seen the light of political and social
reform and witnessed its first steps towards democracy. Moreover, the recent
dismantling of the Ministry of Local Government in Iraq may be seen as a step
towards decentralisation and possibly a wider administrative and political
restructuring. Reviewing the post-war reconstruction experiences of Western Europe,
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Japan and South Korea, there are many examples that support such a notion. In the
Middle East, Israel seems to be such an example, and also Iran. which achieved an
outstanding degree of industrial and agricultural self-sufficiency. mainly during their
war with Iraq, much out of necellity, It has to be said.
••••
The coming two Chapters (3£,4) will explore In more detail the activity of
reconstruction, which is the main concern of this dissertation. They will do 10 by
introducing cross cultural perspectives of the current context of thinking on the
planning and management of post-war reconstruction.
Chapter Two.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONTEXT OF THINKING ON THE
NATIONAL PLANNING OF POST·WAR RECONSTRUCTION:
Cross cultural perspectives
3.1. INTRODUCTION
To reconstruct Is to construct or form again; l.e, to recreate something that
existed before and was at a certain stage lost or damaged. The question of whether
reconstruction differs from development has been addressed several times.
Amirahmadi (1989) claimed, "As yet we still have no real idea how war
reconstruction differs from normal development the subject remains in its infancy".
However, it is misleading to enter the dilemma whether reconstruction differs from
development or not. Post-war reconstruction, to the author's mind, is the first step
that has to be taken in the development process after war. Reconstruction could be
distinguished from any other form of normal building or development by the level of
complexity involved in its process (emotional energy; righting wrongs; rebuilding
lives; solving differences to achieve national goals, etc.), and the magnitude of the
task that has to be undertaken in the most preSSing and demanding economic,
political, social and cultural circumstances. Jeffery Diefendorf (1990: 1), rightly
wrote, in the context of WW2, "...reconstruction was one of the greatest tasks ever
faced by planners, town authorities, and regional and national politicians, as well as
by private citizens in their capacities as renters, property owners, architects and
workers".
National Planning of Post-war Reconstruction.
The word 'reconstruction' is generally understood as 'physical rebuilding' of
destroyed settlements. Furthermore, it is not unusual, in some literature, to find
'reconstruction' being used interchangeably with 'housing'. (Azimi-Bolourian, 1986).
However, from reviewing the different effects of war (see the previous chapter) It
became evident that physical rebuilding Is just one segment of a wider process of
reconstruction following war which involves economic, social and psychological
readjustment, and that housing constitutes a significant part of that segment.
Advocating a comprehensive and self-reliant reconstruction strategy forwar-damaged
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areas in Iran, Amirahmadi (1986: 122) wrote, "..the term reconstruction refer. to the
totality ofmental and manual activities directed toward relieving the victims, mending
the damages and improving the quantity and quality of the pre-disaster structures.
operations and relationships".
In the context of natural disasters, the reconstruction phase seems to be better
defined, perhaps because reconstruction after natural disaster Is seen as an
opportunity for future risk reduction and reform. Thus, reconstruction Is a clear stage
in which attempts are made to introduce preventive mealurel that are based on
hazard, vulnerability and risk analyse •. (UNDRO, 1982:3). On the other hand, In a
post-war context, the 'prevention' of another war Is widely left to politicIans and
peacemakers. Thus, post-war reconstruction tends to become absorbed by planning.
After WW2 for example, when a reoccurrence of war was inconceivable, continued
vulnerability to Its impacts were not considered, and thus reconstruction was
combined with development and evolved into 'planning'. This fact can be
demonstrated through the experience of post-war reconstruction in the (Jnlted
Kingdom, when the establishment of the Town and Country Planning Act In 1947
aimed at the improvement of amenity by rebuilding what had been destroyed, but not
in order to make the impact and effects of another war less severe. (leWiS,
1988b:26).
The aim of this chapter is to provide, as clearly as possible, a picture of some
of the different dilemmas which could possibly be Involved In the context of planning
for reconstruction, in order to clarify some of the vast complexity of the process itself.
To appreciate this complexity, one should imagine him or herself being faced with
the task of reconstruction during or immediately after a war. When would one start
thinking and acting for reconstruction? Where? and How? What are the priorities -
political, economic, social restructuring or physical reconstruction? Who would make
the decisions - private individuals, town authorities, or regional and national
authorities? How is It possible for a devaltated polt-war economy to recover?
Concerning the physical rebuilding, how would the rubble and debris be cleared
and who would pay for it? Would it be easier and cheaper to abandon the devastated
settlement and to start planning a new one? Howwould building material and labour
be made available in the market? Would they be imported or would it be pollible to
produce them locally? How could building materials be allocated and who would
finance reconstruction? Howcould the demand for immediate housing for a suffering
population be reconciled with the time needed to design and construct permanent
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housing? Should temporary shelters be provided? What about historic cities and
monuments, should they be rebuilt in a way that retain and recapture their traditional
character? If so, which historic buildings should be rebuilt in such a way? Are the
building and property legislations adequate to gUidedecision-makers? Furthermore,
how is it possible to tackle the social problems that resulted from the war - disability,
homelessness, destitution, prostitution, etc. and what is the role of the architect and
planner in all this?
3.2. THEORY AND LITERATURE BACKGROUND.
"Whilereconstruction following natural disasters has received serious attention
from academic communities and various international relief organisations, the same
can not be said about reconstruction after war. As a result, there is little conceptual
understanding of the many complicated issues that are involved in post-war
reconstruction". (Amirahmadi, 1991). This statement is particularly true concerning
the reconstruction after war which has taken place in the last 50 years. However,
reconstruction after the Second World War has been researched and documented in
a number of studies, and as early as 1943, in the United Kingdom for instance. (eg.
Tyerman, 1943; Purdom, 1945, etc.) I.
In 1956, although the reconstruction in Europe was not completed, Leo Grebler
published the first survey of the reconstruction of the bombed cities of Western
Europe in which he described the shape that reconstruction was taking, seen by the
eye of an outslder" Grebler's survey only touched the surface of physical
reconstruction - housing, streets, and monuments. In the same year, an important
conference took place in Erfurt, in the German Democratic Republic on the subject
of urban planning and reconstruction in historic cities.
According to Diefendorf (1990:2-3), interest in research on the experience of
post-2WW reconstruction in Europe was not revived until the mid-1980s. However,
"Most of this work consists of detailed studies of development in single cities or
countries, but some consists of comparison of the developments in different cities or
countries" .
I Tyerman, Donald (1943) (eel) Ways and means of rebullding, a report of the London Conference
of the Town and Country Planning Association, Faber and Faber, London; Purdom, C. B. (1945) How
should we rebuild London?, J. M. Dent & Sons, London.
2 Leo Grebler (1956) Europe's Reborn Cities, Urban Land Institute Technical Bulletin 28, Washington,D.C.
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To write this Chapter few years ago, the author would have faced a number of
difficulties, due to the following reasons: 1) lack of documents on the subject (Davis,
1988b; largar, 1989b, El-Masri, 1992); 2) the fact that most of the available
literature deals with the aftermath of Second World War in Europe. Consequently,
"...the Significant differences between the contexts of damaged European countries
with the present devastated nations such as Iran, Iraq or Lebanon, drawing
conclusions from then for the present situation, is not without difficulty". (largar,
1989b:427); 3) the absence of a satisfactory conceptual framework for the study of
reconstruction after war. (largar, 1989a; Amirahmadi, 1991; EJ-Masri, 1992).
In order to bridge some of these gaps a comprehensive literature search was
conducted over the last 3 years. This search had two main aims in mind: 1) to
develop the author's knowledge on issues of post-war reconstruction, which included
an understanding of the previous work and research carried out in regard to the topic.
It played an important role in informing the author as to the main findings of other
studies and identifying ways in which this dissertation can relate to previous research;
2) in doing so, there has been a conscious attempt to avoid 'rediscovering the wheel',
thus this literature review was meant to march in formation with those who have
already left useful research signposts. The best strategy was to talk with colleagues
and professors Who have done work in the area, obtaining the benefit of their
knowledge about sources of information. The Bibliography on Settlement
Reconstruction After War, prepared by Dr. Akbar largar, in 1989, served as a base
from which to start an intensive library research (index, the Dissertation Abstract
Intemational, On line Search and Computer search of a number of UKlibraries). The
result of this was to add a number of items to largar's Bibliography. However, it has
to be said that many of these items were collected during participation in workshops
and conferences related to the subject.
The la.t decade has witnessed a particular growth of interest in the subject of
post-war reConstruction. We can see the start of this development at the Beirut
Symposium in October 19823• This event represented the first academic concern
with the subject and was followed in March 1986 by the International Conference on
Reconstruction Of the War-damaged Areas, organised by Tehran University and the
3 Symposl\,lJ'11on the Rebuilding of Beirut, organised by the American University of Beirut and the
Goethe Institute '.See Friedrich Ragette (Ed.), Beirut of Tomorrow; Planning {orReconstrucUon, American
University of BeINt, Lebanon, 1983.
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Iranian govemment4• In June 1987 a conference was held in Bellagio, Italy, in an
outstanding attempt to study the European experience of reconstruction after WW2'J.
This study was the first serious attempt since the work of Leo Orebler in 19566•
In 1988 and 1989 the Flrst and the Second York Workshops on Settlement
Reconstruction were held at the Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies,
University of York. The two workshops brought the subject of reconstruction into
focus and identified the different dilemmas facing those concerned? Also in
November 1989, Iraq held its First International Symposium on Post-war
Reconstruction in Basrah and FaoB• Research in post-war reconstruction was
acknowledged and the issue of 'War as a Disaster' was highly recognised at the
International Conference, Disasters and the Small Dwelling, held in Oxford,
September 19909• In his key paper Review of Twelve YearsExperience of Disasters
and Small Dwellings, Fred Cuny (1992:23) considered reconstruction following
armed-conflicts as an important issue that was highlighted during the 1980s, when
he said: "... in terms of milestones there are the continuing conflicts around the world
- Lebanon, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Iran-Iraq. We learned a lot there about how
difficult it is to provide reconstruction when wars continue ... We need to look more
at dealing with conflicts and how we cope with reconstruction afterwards ... there are
some good case-studies of those conflicts mentioned". (Cuny, 1992:26).
In January 1991 , Iran held its Second International Conference on
Reconstruction, at which over 80 overseas representatives were invited to present
their papers. The latest in a series of international events was the Third York
Workshop, held at the Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies in July 1991. (For
4 The proceedings of this conference were published in International Conference on Reconstruction
of the War·damaged Areas. University of Tehran. Iran, 1986. An English version was first published in
1990.
5See, Jeffry M. Diefendorf (Ed.), Rebuilding Europe's Bombed CWes,Macmillan Press Ltd, London,
1990.
IIQrebler, Leo. Europe's Reborn CWes.Urban Land Institute. Washington D.C.
7 See Lewis, James (Workshop Convenor) Settlement Reconstruction Post·war: Report of Two Day
Workshop. 16-17 May 1988, and Cockburn fi Zargar (Workshop Convenors) Settlement Reconstruction
After War: Second York Workshop 16-18 May 1989; Full Report and Guidelines, both published by the
Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies, University of York.
• The FTrstInternational Symposium on Post·war Reconstruction in Basrah and Fao, Ministryof
Culture and Information and Ministry of Housing and Construction, Baghdad, 18-20 November 1989.
II The international Conference, Disasters and the Small Dwelling, Disaster Management Centre,
Oxford Polytechnic, Oxford, 2·6 September 1990.
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details on some of the conferences in which the author has participated. see Chapter
5: Field Work and Learning Tools: Methodology).
It is important to note that these events have witnessed a number of attempts
to identify a conceptual framework and to draw attention to the dilemmas faced by
reconstruction planners following war. The most significant of these attempts have
been made in the writings of Ian Davis (1986; 198821; 1988b; 1989b) where a
number of assumptions and observations concerning the different dilemmas of
reconstruction were Identified. Another significant contribution to the issue has been
made by Hooshang Amirahmadi (1986; 1989; 1990: 1991)10. These attempts
revealed that the real challenge is to grasp the different social, cultural, political and
economic dimensions of reconstruction in order to be able to formulate a
comprehensive conceptual framework. This dissertation has accepted this challenge
and as far as possible reconstruction has been treated as a multi-dimensional Issue.
In conclusion, the recent developments in the subject and the growing number
of conferences and workshops helped to overcome some of the earlier Identified
difficulties. This Chapter focuses on the various aspects and dilemmas involved in
the process. In writing it two conscious attempts have been made: 1) to refer to
some of the most recent research on the subject: 2) to divide the literature into two
periods according to when the war took place, in order to take account of the
previous experiences plus the type of damage, weapons used, economic
circumstances, etc. It is suggesting that in order to reach a comprehensive planning
strategy for reconstruction of war-damaged areas, it is important to establish a cross-
cultural perspective in which one can identify a number of reconstruction dilemmas,
which, when put into a particular context, can be used as reference points for the
formulation of a conceptual framework for deriving the reconstruction policy.
In suggesting so, this Chapter draws on cales from Europe and elsewhere
followingWW2,mainly, Britain (Gibson, 1941: Rigby (, Boyne, 1953: Beazley, 1962;
Johnson-Marshall, 1966; Hewitt, 1965; Tyrwhltt, 1991, etc.) Belgium (Uyttenhove,
1990; Puissant, 1991) Czechoslovakia (Noemiller, 1991), flnland (Paloj6rvl, 1990;
Vennamo, 1990); France (Baudoui, 1990; Bauer, 1991); West Germany (Dittmann,
1989; Bosma, 1990; Gutschow, 1990); East Germany (Wimmer, 1989; Beyme,
1990; Paul, 1990); Greece (Doxiadis C,Vafejadis, 1977); Holand (Johnson-Marshall,
10 Professor Hooshang Amlrahmadi Is the Director of the Middle Eastem Studies at Rutgers
University. USA. He is originally from Iran and currently conducting research on the economics of post-
war reconstruction.
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1966; Benevolo, 1971; Taverne, 1990; Budok, 1991) Italy (Faludl, 1991); Japan
(Shimizu, 1989; Beard 1991; Ishimaru, 1991; Wildes, 1991): Norway (Tvinnereim,
1988): Poland (Ciborowski, 1956; Zachwatowicz, 1955; 1965; Ghilhome 1988;
Karsten, 1988; Cobb, 1991; Jankowski, 1991; Nowicki, 1991, etc.); Tunisia (Emery,
1991); USSR (Blumenfeld, 1991); Yugoslavia (Peschich, 1989).
Most importantly, it explores the reconstruction experience of a number of
countries following more recent wars (1960s-1990s) in the Middle East, Asia, Africa
and Latin America: Afghanistan (Leslie, 1990); Egypt (Halcrow et al., 1976; Culpin
et al., 1976); E)-Salvador (Martinez, 1992; Vasquez-Velasquez, 1991); Ouaternala
(Margoluis et ai, 1989); Iran (Amirahmadi, 1986; 1987; 1989; 1991; Zargar, 1988;
1989; 1991; Parse, 1988; 1989; 1991; Pour, 1988; Saebi, 1991, etc.); Iraq (Barakat,
1989a; 1989b; 1989d; 1990; 1991; 1992: Ohazala, 1989: AI-Zubaidi, 1991; Khalil,
1991): Kuwait, (Al-Behar, 1991); Lebanon (Peterson, 1983; Khalaf, 1983; Mallat,
1983; Willerval, 1986; El-Masri, 1988; 1989; 1991; 1992) Uberla (Jeff, 1990;
Johnson, 1990; Tawiah, 1990); Mozambique (Prince, 1989); Nigeria (Awatona,
1991); South Korea (Huh, 1989; Shim, 1989); Sudan (Saleh, 1991); Syria (Saad,
1991); Vietnam (Nguyen, 1989) and Zimbabwe (Awatona, 1991).
The gathered experiences from a wide range of cross-cultural case-studies,
suggests the existence of a number of common issues and dilemmas. These issues
must be carefully considered when formulating a reconstruction strategy and they
should also be observed during the process of reconstruction, in order to reduce
possible undesirable outcomes.
To help formulate a framework, these issues are to be considered in this
Chapter at the national and in the following Chapter (4) at the local or regional levels.
At the national level, they include the organisational form of reconstruction, the
definition of national goals and objectives, national economic revival and financing
methods, public - private relationship and their roles in reconstruction, etc. At the
regional and local levels they include: damage assessments, identification and
mobilisation of available and potential resources, people partiCipation in the process,
compensation, etc. In other words these issues could be considered under two
headlines: formulation of poliCies (Chapter 3) and implementation (Chapter 4).
All these issues are considered, while keeping in mind the existence of a
number of factors that inevitably shall regulate and in some cases dictate the
reconstruction strategy and its outcome. These factors include the continuation of
the war, the prevailing national politics and ideologies and intemational politics and
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relations. The last two factors have been extremely underestimated in some of the
recent examinations of the subject, and in some cases deliberately ignored. The
author feels strongly that these factors attempt to should be 'obJectively' examined,
and that post-war reconstruction in any MiddleEastern country should be seen within
the pragmatic national/international political and economic spheres.
3.3. REOULATINO FACTORS OF RECONSTRUCTION POUCIES.
3.3.1. The continuation and the intermittent recurrence of attacks.
Undoubtedly reconstruction is very much affected by the continuation of war.
In fact, in some cases, reconstruction may never begin before the total termination
of hostilities (eg. the reconstruction of Basrah and Fao in Iraq). Even when it does,
reconstructed projects still run the risk of destruction. Amirahmadi (1986: 129) cited
the Oeneral Administrator of the Central Headquarters for the Renovation and
Reconstruction of War-damaged Zones in Iran, who said during the war: "..a
Significant part of the repaired and reconstructed sectors by the Headquarters were
again destroyed, and the extent of the damaged areas increased by the Iraqi missile
attacks and bombardment at the end of 1363 (1984) and beginning of 1364 (1985)".
During war, understandably, most of the country's resources would be directed
towards military expenditure. This concern is actually reflected in the small amount
of reconstruction work that takes place during the continuation of a war and which
is generally directed towards the benefit of the military or at the best to raise the
public moral. Of course, this is also dependent on how 'popular' the war is.
During confrontation between two countries, one can identify three types of
regions in which reconstruction is required: Firstly, regions that are still involved in
war. Secondly, liberated regions and finally, threatened regions.
Regions involved In war. obviously, the main concern would be to offer logistic
and engineering services to the military forces. (Karnrava, 1986:76). In this context,
reconatruction fl principally attentive to the re-e.tabli.hment of water and power
networks, telecommunication facilities, roads, bridges and the censtructlon of
buildings necessary for military services. Most of such reconstruction work is usually
carried out by MilitaryEngineering Divisions. As far as the civilians are concemed,
"Requirements for protection and for survival must be distinguished and both
provided for in efforts to reduce social vulnerabllity". (Lewis, 1988b:10). Hence the
evacuation of civilians from war zones becomes apriority.
Liberated regions: Experience from Iraq and Iran showed that during their elght-
Chapter Three.
75
year war, the priority in the reconstruction of liberated regions was given to the
reinforcement of military defensive positions. Thus, the construction of fortifications
is done first. The second step would be to try and encourage people who have left
the region to return, in accordance with the rule that 'uninhabited regions are
invitations to the occupier'. For this to become possible, a clearing operation is
required, which is often undertaken by the military. The aims of such operation are:
the removal of dead bodies of soldiers and Civilians,the removal of damaged military
vehicles and equipment along with the clearing of mines and military booby traps,
and the cleaning of polluted rivers and water resources. All this is undertaken with
the view that the region is still under threat, which means that no great investments
are committed.
The threatened regions: These are mostly adjacent regions to the war zone that
occasionally come under air or missile attack. Usually, many military installations
and army support units are located in these regions. (Karmava, 1986:76). Hence
reconstruction effort is only directed towards damaged installations and buildings that
are supporting the military.
The threat of further destruction must shade the thinking of politicians and
planners alike not only during war but also immediately after cease-fire, when there
is no permanent peace agreement. "A lasting reconstruction also needs a lasting
peace" (Amirahmadi 1989:46). A situation of 'no peace-no war' will not only slow
reconstruction, it will also lead to inefficient use of the scarce resources in
restructuring the defence sector. On the other hand, a lasting peace requires proper
reconstruction and development, something that has recently been recognised by Dr
Boutros-Ghali in his first press conference as Secretary-General of the United Nations,
which was given in New York on 19 March 1992, when he said "..we will not be able
to have real peace without development". He went on to reveal that in places such
as Cambodia and EI Salvador, "..economic, social and technical assistance to be
given to the protagonists of the dispute once peace has been reached". (UNA,
May/June 1992)11.
3.3.2. National pontles and Ideologies.
Post-war reconstruction is a highly political and ideological issue. Inmany ways
reconstruction after war has a much deeper political dimension than reconstruction
II United Nations Association (1992) New World, May / June 1992, London, UK.
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subsequent to natural disasters, although it has been argued that any examination of
disasters in the context of development automatically becomes political. This effect
occurs mainly because war is waged and halted by politicians and reconstruction is
bound to follow the political trend. In the same way, war and politics cannot be
separated; reconstruction can not be divorced from politics. This fact coincides with
the view of Amirahmadi (1991: 12) who wrote: "Reconstruction tends to become
politicized". Wers ere fought usuelly because of some perceIved injustice - this needs
to be 'reconstructed' too.
Although the inter-relation between reconstruction and politics is wIdely
recognised its role has been played down by researchers and writers from the Middle
East, for different reasons. The author has the advantage of being something of an
outsider and (hopefully) impartiel from politics in all of his casestudies (Iraq, Iran,
Yemen and Northern Ireland) and thus he intends to try to give more of a pragmatic
view of reconstruction issues.
The political dimension of reconstruction can be seen as three fold: (1) the
conflict between a raised expectation on behalf of the effected communities and the
inability of the state to deliver. The situation is usually made worst by the state
assuming full responsibility and the need for urgent actions to meet these
expectations, which in turn tends to provide cheap solutions; (2) the delays in taking
political decisions that are crucial for reconstruction and have to do with economic
and military restructuring; (3) the reinforcement of the ideology and politics of the
ruling party, by employing the physical form of reconstruction (l.e. city planning, war
memorials and constructing monuments).
War in general raises expectations for post-war economic uptum (Amirahmadi,
1991; Saebi, 1991). Expectations are further increased by promises continuously
made by politicians and Heads of State. Statements such as ""every destroyed
house built of mud will be replaced by a modem one" (Saddam Hussein, 1988 in
Basrah): and "Our reconstruction shall be an exceptional experience for history .." We
have proved the contrary, we can build as well as destroy our enemies" (Hashlml
Rafsinjani12, 5 January 1991) are exemples of the initial raising of expectations.
However, soon after the cease-fire in a time of economic crisis and shortage of
almost everything, politicians begin to recognise that the promises are too expensive
12 Personal note, during the Second International Conference on Reconstruction of the War-damaged
Areas, held in Tehran, 5-15 January 1991.
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to achieve and social tension between people builds. This social tension and
dissatisfaction adds pressure on the state for implementation of immediate corrective
measures, which are often temporary and cheap solutions.
Amlrahmadi (1990:261) observes that the factional struggles over poUtical
power in a largely fluid post-war period, as well as the economic crisis, encourage
disagreements over a reconstruction strategy. Thus, too much time reduces the
political will for reconstruction of war-damaged areas, while it tends to support the
regeneration of the national economy. The same author sums up with the view that,
"Political factionalism tends to prolong the disagreements and prevent practical
Initiatives to be implemented. Thus, It Is not surprising that while in recent years the
need for reconstruction of war-damaged areas has increased throughout the world,
the political will for it has diminished. Most governments tend to regenerate their
national economies at the expense of reconstructing war damage". (Amirahrnadi,
1990:261 ).
Such political struggles over decision-making that must have led Beard
(1991 :88) to write, "In fact, the experience of London, San Francisco and Tokyo raise
the question whether any modem city can be planned except under a dictator! I do
not refer to the mere construction of costly civic centres so dear to the hearts of Main
Street. or grand boulevards such as Haussmann cut in Paris or Burnham laid in
Chicago. I refer to city planning in the broadest sense, including every phase _
transportation, housing, railway terminals, markets, factory zones, street plan, public
works, parks, public buildings, and monuments showing forth the national spirit". In
short, dominant political intervention, at the national level, tends to postpone the
reconstruction of the war damaged areas.
In almost all post-war situations one senses governments' reluctance to take
decisions that undermine the strength and the domination of the mllitary, even if
such decisions are crucial for the reconstruction efforts. For instance, the decision
to integrate military personnel into some kind of vocational training in the fields of
masonry, welding, plumbing, carpentry, surveying and mapping, reinforced concrete
work, irrigation, etc., could lead to an astonishing miracle in the success of
reconstruction schemes. In addition, the replacement of military service with
voluntarily service in reconstruction, could make a greater use of the countries' young
engineers and technicians. But as long as there is little or no political will to openly
discuss the future of the military, it remains frequently impossible to Implement any
of these ideas and to make better use of the enormous man power and technical
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capability committed to the military.
Finally, post-war reconstruction must account for some very critical politicOI
issues. These issues include managing the post-war military and para-military forces
and of factionalism within the state. Reconstruction of intra-state relations Is not an
easy job, particularly in societies which suffer from a dominating political culture. It
is even more difficult to reconstruct the state-society relations, particularly those
between the state and its opponents, both inside and outside the country. While
democratization and public participation are often prescribed as the only means for
creating political legitimacy, most post-war states are too fragile and unstable to
allow for their full implementation in the short-term. Thus it is not thus surprising that
most post-war societies are characterized by political discord and intemal conflicts.
Yet, "..there is no alternative to national reconciliation if reconstruction Is to be
successfully implemented". (Amirahmadi, 1991:10).
In terms of employing the reconstructed environment to Mrve hidden polltlca.
agenda., cities around the world are full of ancient and modem examples, as
illustrated by the reconstruction of Fao city, in Iraq and Hoveizeh in Iran. In an
attempt to capitalise on the opportunities created by war-destruction to emphasis
national ideology, Mousavi, Prime Minister of Iran, put emphasiS on the fact that,
"..we should not merely stress the physical structure of urban and rural areas.
Rather, by close observation and evaluation of what has occurred, we should seek
appropriate methods compatible with the principles and values of our Islamic
Revolutionary country. Such methods should be feasible and practical with the
existing political policies and economic circumstances of Iran". (MOUHVi,1986:22).
Today's Paris owes its admirable urban pattern to the architect of Napoleon,
Haussmann, who considered city riot control as one of the advantages of his
proposed new straight wide street layout, beside other major aims such as slum
clearance and traffic improvement. Ukewise Belfast is one of the last European cities
where riots and civil strife are taken into consideration during planning or
construction. (see the Chapter 8).
Beside aiming at urban modernisation, German Reconstruction during the 2WW,
was influenced by the dominating ideology and "..provision was still made for
speclflcally National Socialist characteristics: parade streets, party buildings and the
like". (Diefendorf, 1990:7).
On the other hand, there is a growing recognition that the Interest of local and
national governments and that of their people do not always coincide. It seems that
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through war and its resulting need for relief, and later on reconstruction, many
regimes maintain their status: using reconstruction as both a means to punish some
communities and to reward others, as illustrated by the sharp contrast between
reconstruction and development in Central and Southern Iraq, in comparison with the
Kurdish North. A similar example can be found in Iran, where the Western Central
regions received more attention than the Northern Kurdish regions or even the
Southern Arab-populated regions.
One could find in Germany and in countries occupied by Germany during the
2WWthat reconstruction was used to heal the 'unhealthy' urban environment. But
for them the term 'unhealthy' was used in a social and political sense. In other
words, "..planners believed that crowded, contaminated housing produced, on the one
hand, e poUticelly redlcallsed working class, end on the other hand, a biologically
weakened working class that could not make its proper contribution to the
fatherland". (Diefendorf, 1990:6).
We all agree that Germany during the war represented the most extreme views,
nevertheless, Diefendorf 1990, claimed that even Le Corbusier, during his Vichy era
propose Is for new cities demonstrated similar lines of political thoughts. Niels
Gutschow, 1990, points out that some German planners almost welcomed the
destruction of the Metropolis, arguing that the great industrial city was already a
'dead' social form of human organisation. Such planners" ...suggested building either
a number of smaller new cities, or greatly spreading out the old city in such a way
that the city was dominated by the natural landscape, the soil, rather that the other
wey ereund". (Diefendorf, 1990:6). They strongly opposed rebuilding the cities as
they had been laid-out, even if technical improvements were to be made.
Warsaw represents an outstanding example of political, social and ideological
reconstruction, in response to its systematic destruction by the Nazi which was
planned to erase its historical and cultural traces. They also planned to rebuild the
city, but this time it was to be replaced with a much smaller German city, with non
of its original Polish and Jewish features. Later on, after its liberation, Warsaw went
through a symbolic reconstruction, that was taken to the extreme of rebuilding the
Old City exactly as it looked before the war.
However, it is important to note, that some of what might appear to be political
reconstruction strategy, would be nothing more than an enthusiasm of a planner or
an architect to implement his revolutionary ideas. For instance, Martin Wagner,
based at Harvard University along with Walter aropuis, urged planners after the war
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to abandon the ruins and start again with smaller new cities. From their point of view
this was the solution for modem town planning and better urban environment.
Certainly, it seems, they were not aware that their proposals coincided with some of
the most extreme proposals put forward under Nazi Oermany, as we showed in the
previous Sections.
The issue of monumental reconstruction to serve political agendas wlll be
discussed further In the coming Chapter (6) on Reconstruction in Iraq. To conclude,
it is important to recognise the political dimension reconstruction can have and what
frustration that might generate among reconstruction makers. The only
recommendation one may have is "..the struggle is bitter and victories are few. One
must pacify, temporize, agree and in general like a fire: be ready to dampen down,
reduce only to advance later". (Puissant, 1991: 14).
3.3.3. International alliances and politics.
In the case of natural disasters international assistance is normally available or
at least offered, even with the absence of diplomatic relations, (eg. the June 1990
earthquake in Iran), while in the case of reconstruction after war "International
assistance will strictly follow political alliances". (DaviS, 1986:49).
In a proud national struggle for survival some war-devastated countries may
attempt, at least publicly, to refuse the assistance of lome ccuntrles, which they view
as being allies of the enemy. For example, "..the Nigerian government insisted, at
the beginning of the relief and reconstruction task, that it did not want any assistance
from France, Portugal, South Africa, Rhodesia, Oabon, Ivory Coast, the Joint Church
Aid, the French Red Cross and the Nordic Red Cross, amongst others. They had all
been accused of supporting 'Biafra', the breakaway Eastern Region of Nigeria
(Awatona, 1991:19).
Economic blockades and embargoes by the industrialised nations against the
poorer ones, have always constituted one of the main obstacles in the face of
reconstruction. For instance, it has been claimed that one of the reason. why
reconstruction in Iran is continuing in a very slow manner is becau.e of the political
relations between Iran and other industrial nations. It has been claimed by the
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran that, the frozen allets of Iran In USA and
other European countries, have made reconstruction much more difficult. Thus they
are not only depriving Iran of aid and assistant but also putting obstacles in its way
to obtain international fund and blocking its trade. Something that has lead the
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Iranian President to say, "We do not want help from the international community,
because there are other people more in need than us, we just ask them to leave us
alone and to alow us to stand on our feet, and we will never be a burden on other
people,,!3. (H. Rafsinjani, 1991).
The most recent example that can be used to demonstrate the extent in which
international politics plays a role in national reconstruction is the Gulf War (1991),
where a sharp contrast can be seen between international assistance and technical
aid given to Kuwait and the continuing international embargo against Iraq. Iraq is
said to be recovering very slowly from the devastating war, depending entirely on
local resources and power, while Kuwait has almost returned to normal within 12
months from the end of the war in February 1992. (More about Iraq's reconstruction
in Chapter 6).
Today there is a greater need than ever to consider the role of international
politics in reconstruction and development in the Middle East and elsewhere in the
South. With the collapse of the Eastern Block, and the world-wide rush towards a
market economy, a 'New World Order' is currently under restructuring, where the
developed Western Countries are moving the Berlin wall into a North/South divide.
Such a hidden agenda embodies another threat for the war-tom developing countries.
On the one hand, it has strengthened the position and the role of the United
Nations. Today, we are seeing the USA, UK, France, and Russia etc. refusing to
publicly interfere in conflicts in the Middle East and Eastern Europe on a bilateral
basis. It seems they are ready to act only under the flag of the United Nations.
Another characteristic of this decade has been the growing international
environmental consciousness. Never before has there been such a global
understanding, if not commitment, t~ a single world living on a fragile planet. Some
governments ~ave become very much aware that what happens in one part of the
world is ultimately having an impact on the rest of the planet. Unfortunately, it
appear. to have taken a number of catastrophe., for environmental consciousness
to gain worldwide support. Among them, the irreparable damage caused to the
ozone layer and the scientifically supported phenomena of global warming, due to
chemical emi.lionl. This consciousness, however, still lacks an understanding of the
associated human dimension and in which social and economic inequalities between
n Personal note from an opening speech, during the Second Intemationa I Conference on the
Reconstruction of War-damaged Areas, Tehran, 5 January 1991.
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North and South are overlooked. Basically, a Northern consciousness that claims all
ecological problems to be 'global' is, in a sense, making the whole world responsible,
overlooking the fact that it is the, "Industrial countries such as EC members [that]
account for 70% of carbon dioxide emissions and 84%of chloro-nuoro-carbon (CFC)
production" (Kelly & Bastian 1992:10). Thus it may seem that 'global' solutions are
sought by pushing the entire responsibility and burden of adjustment on to the South.
The climax of this one sided consciousness, was brought out in Rio de Janerio In
June 1992, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
«(JNCED).
On the other hand, there is 8 threat that most of the international fundi will be
directed towards the reconstruction of Eastern Europe, rather than the reconstruction
of war-tom developing countries. A demonstration of that is the establishment of the
European Reconstruction and Development Bank. Parsa (1991: 11) went further to
suggest that even the funds of the rich Arab 011 States wouid probably be redirected
towards investment in Eastern Europe.
It seems that more than ever, the South has to empower itself by cooperating
to meet these apparently aggressive roles of the North. "Certainly development must
mean improvement in living conditions, for which economic growth and
industrialisation are essential. But ifthere is no attention paid to the quality of growth
and to social change one can not speak of development." (ICIDI,1980:48). For the
South, the economic forces of the North are a strong current to swim against. Aid
does not necessarily imply development, it simply increases dependency. The North
is again safeguarding its immediate interests and position of power by two means, the
aid 'carrot' on the one hand, and the 'stick' of sanctions on the other. Instead of only
being dependent on the North and Northern institutions, the South has to become
organised within itself in the different fields of education, culture and economy.
Education, seems to us, has to be the key issue; investment in mutual education and
cultural programmes would lead to a better understanding and toleration of cultural
diversity within regions in the South; and this in tum to trading with each other, in
place of fighting each other.
Thriving regional economies, based on direct cooperation among Southern
States, could in part be one way of economically empowering the South. without
having to entirely submit to the over whelming domination of the intemational market
by the North. Regional economic communities are needed to ensure the survival of
the South in a world that is increasingly becoming economically polarised.
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In a jointly written paper with Aylln Orbasli, the authors suggested a number of
Prerequisites for a more even future, which is necessary if a country is to get on with
its reconstruction.
• "The achievement of equity and social justice between rich and poor in one
country, between nations and among generations.
• Greater satisfaction of basic human needs, allowing more attention to be paid
to improving the environment.
• The education and role of architects and planners in the North and South should
be reformed to acknowledge cultural diversity, and to build on peoples
creativity and capacities. What is needed is to join forces with and support
existing worldwide human right groups to ensure 'urban justice'.
• The need for more responsIble attitudes from governments to insure that local
resources are controlled, safeguarded and managed by all sectors of society.
• A radical change in the present international economic order, which
impoverishes peoples and generates a dramatic and in most cases irreversible
environmental deterioration". (Barakat & Orbasli, 1992:6).
3.3.4. National Economic aspects of reconstruction.
Unlike most natural disasters, war affects the whole economy of the country.
Thus, post-war reconstruction Is dependent on the state of the national economy
following war. However, the state of the economy is itself dependent on a number
of factors: 1) pre-war economic conditions; 2) the extent of damage to economic
installations and the degree of commercial and industrial opportunity and productivity
losses; 3) the short, medium and the long term potential for revival of the economy;
4) the availability of national and international resources; 5) the degree of adaptation
needed, as a result of population displacement, mortality and occupation of
territories.
In general, "Wars generate budget deficit next to a huge private liquidity,
inflation, unemployment, and poverty among other problems". (Amirahmadi,
1991 :6). More importantly, one of the after effects of war is the intensification and
acceleration of economic tendencies operative during the war. (AI-Zubaidi, 1989;
Saebi, 1991). One of these tendencies can be observed in the industrial sector
which, due to tariff and trade barriers, is likely to have shifted emphasis from export
to home markets, an aspect that must be addressed followingwar. Another tendency
could be the central government's approach to provide people of the war damaged
areas with direct contributions in cash and food, etc. This approach could be
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expected to change once the war is over, and the government should shift emphasis
from direct contributions to revitalising the economy of the war-damaged regions by
improving the economic Infrastructure, activating productive sectors, and creating
employment. (Azlmi-Bolourian, 1986:64). This issue is more urgent to consider, In
countries where there is little or no formal infrastructure to distribute income or even
aid (eg. social security). Thus, the only way for money to reach the unemployed
would be through labour intensive projects and this approach requires an
organisational capability and speedily available investment. This would also help to
control inflation and even out consumption.
However, "Before the preparation and implementation of post-war
reconstruction plans, the general economic ground must be surveyed afresh, and
agreement as to what it is that needs to be planned and how it should be planned,
must be accomplished. This involves a new investigation and analysis of facts and
a comprehensive study of traditional habits, customs and ideas". (Seebi, 1991:1).
Immediately following war, there is a need for the collection of statistics on a
nationwide scale, in order to help identify areas with urgent economic and social
problems, as well as to up date the knowledge on avallable resources and the
condition of the people.
Saebi (1991:3-6) cited five categories in which various kinds of statistics need
to be gathered, which can be applied to meesurement of economic trends and used
in assessment of the success rate of economic policies of reconstruction of the war
damaged areas: employment, national product, national expenditure, prices and
finally finance and money supply. The same author emphasises the importance of
having up-to-date information and statistics during the different stages of
reconstruction planning and implementation.
Next, it has been argued that one of the roles of the state is to achieve
economic 'normalisation'. "This is usually achieved in two stages: (1) bottleneck-
removing stage; and (2) capacity utilization stage. Only after the war economy Is
normalized can the government set to achieve economic growth. Among the
bottlenecks to be removed first are shortage of foreign exchange and shortage of
skilled labour force. These two bottlenecks are critical because they form the prime
condition for increasing the utilization rates of the existing productive units.
(Jnderutilization of these capacities is the main cause of decline in the war economy.
These considerations force the government to plan for foreign cooperation, export
earnings, and education". (Amirahmadi, 1991:3).
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Post-war governments will be faced with the task of creating sound economic
policies that are directed toward generating more public revenues, redirecting the
available cash toward productive use, encouraging investment, creating jobs, and
undertaking redistributive reforms. (Amirahmadi, 1986; 1988; 1990; 1991; Green,
1991; Parse, 1989: 1991). One of the major requirements for a smoother return to
economic activity in the post-war era is, of course, a careful control of the monetary
system to help prevent continuing unemployment and increasing inflation. The other,
just as important, is the problem of the urban conjunction and refugees. Furthermore,
in a regional context, it has been claImed that these objectives could be better
achieved through, both, taxation (on those who benefited from the war) and
incentives (to those who lost).
Commenting on the taxation approach Amirahmadi (1991:6) wrote: "Past
experiences Indicate that a progressive tax pollcy is particularly helpful". A clear
example supporting this statement, can be found in the French approach after the
Second World War, where the government imposed a national reconstruction tax to
redirect part of the windfall profit that some businesses and individuals had made
during and because of the war to finance the reconstruction. (Baudoui, 1990). A
similar measure has been introduced by the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the other
hand, the government package of incentives for the private sector could include soft
loans, loan guarantees, subsidized business services for export-promotion, import-
substitution strategy based on domestic resources to save foreign exchange, etc.
Time Is needed for industries within the war damaged areas to recover and to
provide employment, mainly because of the heavy cost of renovating industrial
infrastructure (roads, railways, airports, ports, high and medium tension power-lines.
"The high cost of such a recovery calls for careful planning through which utilization
of economic, financial and manpower resources could be optimized". (Azimi-
Bolourian, 1986:64).
Experience gaIned from reconstruction after war indicates that the most healthy,
most simple and practical way of creating quick employment is activation of the
construction industry, which includes building materials production, contractors and
builders. (Azimi-Bolourian, 1986; Davis, 1989; Cockburn, 1990). Reviving the
construction industry will create immediate employment to able-bodied persons,
generate income, stimulate people to improve their own environments and encourage
the young people to enter technical vocations. This view has been echoed by Outi
Berghln (1992:2), when she wrote: "Construction in general and housing construction
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in particular acted as an engine for development of the whole economy [post·WW2].
Even afterwards shelter construction has been used as an instrument to level off the
ups and downs of economic cycles". The same author further claims that, "At
present building construction still plays 21 central role In the economies of the
industrialised countries. About half of all fixed capital formation take. place In thl.
sector. If civil works are included, the share of the entire construction sector is two
thirds" 14.
3.3.5. Social and psychological aspects of reconstruction.
"Man is the principal factor in development, no matter whether this development
takes place in 21 virgin land or in an area destroyed by an act of war". (Azimi-
Bolourian, 1986:65). During war the survival of people becomes the main priority
of governments through their emergency and civil defence plans, becaule People are
the essential resource for recovery and reconstruction. (lewiS, 1988:28).
Furthermore, it has been argued that the survival of people must be induced,
facilitated and planned as the foundation of reconstruction and development.
Following survival, 21 number of steps have to be taken in order to enhance,
enrich and improve the society and its ability to contribute to the reconstruction
efforts. Thus," ..the whole reconstruction process should be seen a. a meanl by
which exalted human values should be enhanced ...al such the government's
responsibility does not end with reconstruction of the city'l physical structures and/or
infrastructural system". (Azimi, 1986:65). This consideration is particularly Important
if we are to change the conventional attitude of viewing the war-survivals as
recipients of aid, rather than 215 agents of development (Cuny, 1983; Lewis, 1988,
etc.). Reconstruction texts are full of political slogans that emphasis the role of the
people in reconstruction. As the Iranian Prime Minister said, "Our greatest asset in
reconstruction is the powerful faith and unchangeable determination of our people.
In the future, as in the past, the government will trust in the inexhaustible power of
the nation; which is ever ready for self·sacrifice and reconstruction, rather than
depending on the annual budget allocation alone". (H. Mousavi, 1986).
In order for this people power to extend into production for the sake of
reconstruction and prosperity, "Social poliCies would have to include considerations
14 Bergh611,Outl (1992) International Experience on Shelter and Economic Development, paper
presented at the Nation,1 Conference on Shelter ,nd Economic Development held In Kampala, 14·16
January 1992.
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for the provision of baslc needs in such areas as health, education, housing, and
recreatlcn''. (Amirahmadi, 1991). In general these are long-term policies which
should be implemented in perallel to the reconstruction efforts in the war damaged
areas. (Milijkovic, 1986). On the other hend, social development is an issue that was
considered crucial to the reconstruction of 21 number of Africen countries following
their wars for independence. It was seen to assist with a more even way of handling
inter tribal frustrattons. It wes felt that in 21 tribal or ethnically divided communities,
"Sociel development plenning must be given considerable importance if a
comprehensive end useful blue print to guide the country's progress was to be
created". (Awatona, 1991:4). Though this sounds right it does not replace the
underlying need of equality end justice from those in power.
However, there ere 21 number of scctal needs that have developed exclusively
due to the wer end its consequences. Some additional organisations may have to be
provided to support those who have suffered in the war, particularly, the physically
and mentally dtsabled populetlon, amongst whom are the disabled war veterans and
ex-servicemen, as well as children. To achieve this there would be more flexible
approach to building regulations end the modification of existing buildings to
accommcdate the dlsabled, (Ghazala, 1989; Davis, 1989b; Amlrahrnadl, 1991).
Dealing with refugees and displaced people is another important aspect of
reconstruction and soclal development. Policies that make the refugee population
and other war-inflicted groups become used to a victim's mentality should be
avoided. The critical point is that wherever possible state pollcies should increase
independence rather than increase dependency.
3.4. FORMULA nON OF RECONSTRUCTION POUCIES:
The estabUshment of a national strategy.
The esteblishment of a suitable reconstruction strategy, is a major aspect and
occupation of countries that have just emerged from war. Amirahmadi (1991:1),
defined reconstruction stretegy es "... that body of knowledge which helps determine
the most important tasks that have to be implemented et each stege of
reconstruction, the type end amount of resources needed, and the locauon of
reconstruction projects. A stretegy involves defining goals and objectives, setting
priorities and tergets, making plans or faciliteting market mechanlsms, and
formuleting pcllcles for implementation".
However, from reviewing the past experience of a number of countries, it
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became evident that not all post-war governments had a reconstruction strategy
established and ready for implementation in the sense refereed to by Amlrahmadl.
Some countries such as Jordan and Syria, followingtheir war with Israel in 1967 and
1973, returned to their pre-defined development plans. Recovery and reconstruction
was slow and painful for the inhabitants of the war-damaged areas of AI-Karama in
Jordan and Al-Qunitra in Syria. Three observations are evident from past-
experiences relating to national reconstruction strategy: 1) the need for a national
strategy directly depends on the nature of the war itself and the extent of the damage
inflicted on the society; 2) establishing a strategy seems to require a long time, as
lengthy and arduous debates are bound to erupt, particularly in contexts were
different ideologies and social groups, have to be catered for; 3) while each nation's
strategy for post-war reconstruction may be unique and relevant to that country only,
a framework might be developed from the different issues and discussions that are
common to all post-war nations.
3.4.1. Administration and organisation.
To identify the planning and the implementation machinery for the various
programmes of reconstruction Is the first step in a national reconstruction strategy.
It is important to determine who takes the decision to build what. in which priority
and when and who controls and directs the resources for reconstruction; patterns of
administration and organisation are of the most significant issues. The available
literature does not throw much light on the 'model of administration', 10 we will.
Modell: Toestablish an Independent body with an executlue role.
This option is widely accepted following disasters in general and wars in
particular. Itvery much reflects the centralised decision making nature of the pre-war
or pre-disaster government. The independent body could take the form of a Ministry,
a Supreme Council (eg. Yemen) or even just an Executive Office. The French
MiniStry of Reconstruction established following WW2 is one of the outstanding
examples, where the Ministry had the responsibilities not only of preparing
reconstruction plans but also of financing them and supervising the Implementation.
The most recent example is the establishment of the Croatian Ministry of
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Reconstruction in April, 199215• Being a newly established body, this model usually
enjoys the advantage of having a clearly defined set of tasks, coordinated in a single
agency. But, it suffers from the following major disadvantages: 1) it takes away
recovery and reconstruction tasks from a wide variety of ministries, who are likely to
be more capable of dealing with such tasks within their own responsibility (eg. the
Ministries of Urban Planning, Health, Agriculture, Economic Affairs, etc.); 2) it lacks
operational experience of planning and implementing construction programmes.
Hence such a model may be more appropriate in a context where the disaster is
recurrent and experience can be accumulated in the field. For example, in a country
like Turkey with a continuous vulnerability to earthquakes this model has been
established since the late 1960's; 3) finally, it usually has a short life-span.
Consequently, its employees are often more concerned about the future of their jobs
than the future of the reconstructed settlements.
Model 2: Toestabllsh an independent authority with a coordinating role only.
In Japan, until 1945, the Ministryof the Interior controlled city planning, but for
post-war reconstruction planning an independent organisation, the War Damage
Reconstruction Agency was established. The agency gave directions for war
damaged cities to make and institute their own plans, under the guidance of the
Agency. This model was highly acknowledged by lshlmeru (1991:5) when he wrote:
"It can be said that Japanese technical bureaucrats, in a sense, played extremely
efficient professional roles". Similarly, following the Nigerian civil war in 1970, the
Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction was established with
the task of coordinating the allocation of resources. The various government
ministries were allocated implementation responsibilities. For instance, the Ministry
of Works wal responsible for the designing and actual reconstruction of roads,
bridges, water supply undertakings and buildings. Ministry of Agriculture was
responsible for agricultural projects including tree crops, food crops, live-stock,
fisheries and forestry.
This model of administration avoids the shortcomings of Modell, in the sense
that it does not take responsibility from the concerned ministries, on the contrary it
co-ordinates between them. But, being equal to any other ministry, it does not have
I~ In fact. In a few months time this Ministry was abolished and the reconstruction responsibillties
were transferred to the Ministry of Building and Environment. (Matija Salaj. Zagreb, September 1992).
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the decisive power to solve conflicts or problems arising in the field, either between
ministries or between government and communities. This can cause problems unless
it is closely associated with the head of the government.
Model 3: To establish a reconstruction authority within an existing Ministry.
InEgypt, followingthe October War of 1973, the Ministryof Public Housing was
re-structured, in order to accommodate the arising reconstruction needs and was
renamed as the Ministryof Housing and Reconstruction. The main problem wal the
emphasis that was given to providing public houling on the account of other needs
of reconstruction. (Culpin, 1976).
An example, is the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) created
in 1977 as an agency of the MiniStryof Public Works, In Lebanon, with the talk of
supervising all reconstruction and rehabilitation work. Such a CouncIl has the
advantage of building on an existing experience of dealing with public works and it
is not seen by other ministries as a competitive body. On the other hand, it takes
away part of the traditional responllbiUty of other departments, and it doe. not
usually have the necessary authority.
Model 4: To form reconstruction cells within each appropriate ministry.
"This approach has the advantage of keeping relponlibiUties where they belong;
but the major problem is one of coordination and demarcation lines between the
ministries, who often compete for resources and roles in the reconstruction process".
(Davis, 1986:50). Iraq's experience in the reconstruction of Basrah and Fao (lee
Chapter 5) is very close to this model, despite the fact that the role of the Supreme
Council for Reconstruction was to co-ordinate between the different ministries, when
it came to implementation, great confusion took place due to overlapping of
responsibilities.
Model 5: To form a Reconstruction Planning Offlce at PresidenUal or Cabinet level.
The government of Jamaica has adopted a similar model in which, "Each
relevant ministry provides personnel on a secondary basi. to form an integrated
planning team, which wlll be under the Prime Minl.ter's or Pre.ldent'. authority. In
this way his rank can reduce the problems of competition or faIlures of co-ordination
between ministries" (DaviS, 1986:50). This is e rather comprehensive model that has
the advantage of coordination and power. This is particularly true if the role of such
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an office does not include implementation as was the case in Yemen following the
1982 earthquake.
Remark- The problem with the five mentioned models is that they represent an
extreme centralised view of reconstruction. They lack the possibility of coordination
at regional and local levels, also they do not allow enough space for local
communities to participate in the process of decision making. The fact that
reconstruction can be an enormous and costly task that willstretch the public sector
at all points, means that allocation of roles to a wide range of governmental
departments Is essential, as well as the delegation of authority to non-governmental
bodies. (Davis, 1986:46). Thus what is needed is a model which can provide for the
following: 1) Central co-ordination of all efforts of reconstruction on a national level
carried out by the central government and its agencies; 2) Regional co-ordination,
carried out by a number of administrative units in all war damaged areas, that can
be coordinated by a central regional authority; 3) Communal/local administrative
structure that would look after the immediate concerns of the people living in war-
damaged areas. Some of the reconstruction needs are best addressed by local
bodies, such as: housing, relocation / resettlement, local infrastructure and health.
(Herz, 1991:6).
The organisational pattern of the Iranian reconstruction agencies could serve as
a model, in which regional as well as local coordination are accounted for. The
Iranian model has the following hierarchy: 1) The Supreme Council, which consists
of the Prime Minister, Minister of Interior and a representative of the Imam, this body
is in charge of all important policy decisions; 2) The Central Reconstruction and
Renewal Committee, which consists of the representatives of 14 ministries, chaired
by the Minister of Interior, whose responsibility is to report to the Supreme Council.
This committee is responsible for execution of any reconstruction work with national
importance; 3) Reconstruction and Renewal staff in every affected province. The staff
is headed by the Governor-General and is composed of director-generals of the
executive agencies at the provincial level; 4) Finally, a similar but auxiliary staff is
formed In every province throughout the country, in order to provide back-up support
to the reconstruction efforts. In provinces not directly affected by the war, the
auxlliary provincial steff in each province are in charge of rebuilding of one particular
city, town or rural area in the war-damaged regions. For example, Tehran and
Mazandaran Provinces have assumed reconstruction of Khorramshar and Susangerd
respectively. These staffs also provide manpower and material support to the
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concerned cities. (Chamren, 1986:39; 1991). Supporting provincial staff is organised
under leadership of the provincial Imam and is voluntary. A number of public, sernl-
public and volunteer institutions playa role In the reconstruction.
The existence of too many organisations could be as confusing and cause as
many obstacles as the non-existence of any organisation at all. Amirahmadl (1989)
gave institutions in Iran, as an example of overlapping responsibilities and confusion.
when he wrote: "The latest addition to the list is the Council of Policy Making for
Reconstruction, which is duplicating the Government function in drawing up a plan
for reconstruction of the nation Is economy. The Council and the Ministryof Planning
and Budget are separately drawing up plans. while the other ministries are still going
ahead with their own projects and programmes. Before reconstruction can be
launched the problem of parallel organizations must be resolved. perhaps eliminating
some and integrating others. So far. attempts in this direction have failed. and
perhaps the way to tackle this problem is not to address them individually but as part
of a complete reorganisetion of the state structure in the direction of a more
controlled centralism". (Amlrahmadl, 1989:45).
However, experience has shown that whatever the model of reconstruction
organisation end the number of groups participating, there are four basic
requirements in order to act effectively. "Each assisting group needs: Authority to
act; competence to act; resources to act; acceptance by the community in question ...
Often governments are at fault since they clearly have the authority and resource.
to act, but often lack the vital knowledge needed for the tasks at hand. This is hardly
surprising in view of the lack of prior experience they may have in war reconstruction.
This highlights the need for detailed preparedness planning". (Davis, 1986:46).
3.4.2. Damage assessment and resource evaluation on a national scale.
Having a notional knowledge of the extent of damage to the economy.
infrastructure and settlements is the first important step towards drawing a national
strategy for reconstruction. Equally important is to evaluate the surviving resources
and the conditions of the people. This naticn- wide operation, has surfaced in most
of the reviewed casestudies. Militaryreports usually playa decisive role in estimating
damage. particularly during war. (eg. the experience of South Korea. Shim, 1989;
Syria, Saad. 1991). Underestimation of announced 10lles is a common
phenomenon. in order to maintain the public moral and deceive the enemy.
However, in most cases this survey was conducted at the end of the war. For
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instance, following the Nigerian civil war 21 survey of damage was conducted over a
year (1970-71) by the Building Branch of the Ministry of Works, Housing and
Transport. "This exercise was, however, far from being comprehensive as it was
limited to publicly owned buildings". (Awatona, 1991:9). Such approach meant that
only damage to health centres, schools and Federal Government buildings, etc. was
assessed, leaving residential and private property out of the exercise; and
consequently the bulk of the reconstruction was limited to public buildings and
conducted by 24 selected contractors. (Awatona, 1991: 10). In this particular case
lack of funds was given as reason for the rather selective assessment, in other cases
urgency as well as the great scale of damage were the reasons. (eg. demaqe
assessment in Iraq following the Qulf war, 1991, see Al-Zubidi, 1991).
In fact it is understandable that at a national level it might be impossible to
conduct a detailed (door-to-door) damage and needs assessment. In order to draw
a national strategy without having delays, it is sufficient to have an overall view of the
scale of damege and of the surviving resources. A more detailed assessment has to
be conducted at local level, when it comes to planning and implementation of
reconstruction.
3.4.3. Deflnlng goals, objectives and priorities.
Following the establishment of an administrative body for reconstruction and
after surveying the extent of damage and needs, as well as identifying the available
resources, the logical step is to establish 21 list of goals and objectives to be achieved
over 21 certain period of time and according to a particular priority. To help clarify
this point, let us take the list of post-war reconstruction objectives, drawn by the
Nigerian government following its civilwar in 1970, as an illustration. The objectives
read, (Awatona, 1991:5-6):
1. The rehabilitation of the war-damaged areas of the country and the
reconstruction of the economy as 21 whole.
2. To achieve a high rate of growth of output per head of population. (This may
entail the adoption of appropriate national population policy and family planing
programmes) .
3. The creation and the maintenance of job opportunities.
4. The realilation of Itructural and inltitutional changes that would help to
lncrease lelf-reliant and lelf-generated growth of the economy.
5. The maintenance of a balanced development of the national economy by
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concentrating on growth points and productive capacities, without excluding the
provision of subsidised social services in the economically backward areas of
the country.
6. Investment in technical and higher education to produce high-level and
intermediate Nigerian manpower.
7. The provision and maintenance of a satisfactory level of social services which
the economy and the people can bear at any given time.
Comparing this list of objectives with what has been achieved 20 years later
(see Awatona, 1991), one concludes the following points concerning establishing
objectives and priorities:
1. In setting objectives, the government should be realistically modest and not
utopian, accounting for resources, needs, perceptions, expectations,
potentialities, and constraints. (Amirahmadl, 1991 :3). More Importantly they
have to be realistic in terms of accounting for global trends, as well as
international and national constraints and opportunities.
2. It is important that the reconstruction goals can be read In their economic,
political, ideological, social, cultural, etc. constructs.
3. To implement such goals, however, "..they have to be decomposed into
workable, feasible, and specific objectives at social, sectoral, and territorial
levels, covering all spheres of the society's political economy". (Amirahmadl,
1991:3).
4. To achieve these objectives they have to be arranged in order of priority order,
reflecting immediate needs, long-term goals, and/or resources availability.
The fact that no country or society can afford to accomplish everything at once,
makes it impossible to avoid deciding on an appropriate sequence of the tasks which
have to be implemented over a period of time, using the available resources.
However, reconstruction priorities differ from one country to the other and from one
kind of war to another. What has been established is that "An effective priority plan
will involve: Determining, at a regional scale, whether to rebuild all damaged
settlements during one phase, or in a phased sequence determined by local
authorities. Establishing a priority list with tasks defined In sequence of their
importance. There are various ways in which in priority listing could be defined".
(Davis, 1986:48). Priority could be given to the reduction of risk of further damage
by reconstructing the military first; or repair or demolition of dangerous structures;
re-establishing lifeline resources (medical facUlties, water supplies, drainage, etc.);
or vital administrative facilities; community services; buildings of symbolic
importance for the community; key economic installations that will generate work,
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etc.
Reconstruction in Finland (1945-1975) can be given as an early example of
defining priorities, where their plan of priorities were: 1) the reconstruction of
destroyed public buildings and communications; 2) the construction of houses for the
Karelian refugees (15% of the population), and returning soldiers; 3) construction for
the new industry, to supply goods for war debt payments. In a later example, the
Government of Zimbabwe's Plan of Reconstruction after its Independence, had the
following priority: 1) Infrastructure (commercial: agricultural; water development,
tourism and energy). 2) Land settlement and agricultural development (intensive dry
land resettlement; irrigation schemes; rural health; educational and infrastructural
facilities; etc). 3) Capital investment in training programmes. 4) Reconstruction of
government buildings; rural infrastructure; education; health; forestry; animal disease
control and minefield clearance. 5) Refugee programmes. (Awatona, 1991:33).
While the Iranian government's priority programme as in May 1989 was: 1) Oil
and energy: the reconstruction and development of oil refineries and petro-chemical
complexes and power stations. 2) Agriculture. 3) Reconstruction and restoration of
factories producing building materials. 4) Housing: first priority is with those units
which require restoration and repair. Priority is also with housing of families with
employment. 5) Reconstruction of industries that can provide maximum employment
and production and requires minimum foreign currency. (Zargar, 1989b:725-726).
From the above examples and from reviewing many other cases, one can see
the priority economic reconstruction enjoys after war. Which is not necessarily the
case after natural disasters. Usually, the reconstruction of the national economy after
war is followed by the priority to reconstruct the war damaged-areas (the physical
reconstruction): and finally the correction of social imbalances caused by the war.
"Too often authorities assume that the need is to rebuild homes, factories, roads
and infrastructure. They are right, but they may be incorrect in assuming that their
first task is to initiate such physical reconstruction. There are normally pre-requisites
to attend to first, such as: reconstruction of the economy, which when buoyant will
produce wealth that willinitiate recovery initiatives, thus taking pressure off the public
sector; reconstructing the building industry. Radical changes may be needed to
modernise this industry and all the product supplies that service it". (Davis,
1989a: 14). In giving priority for economic reconstruction a number of issues
have to be explored. This seems to start by identifying Industrial sectors of growth,
and revenue generating activities and supporting them. For these sectors to flourish
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they need a certain degree of infrastructure. The issue of reconstructing and
improving infrastructure becomes important. Increasingly, today's wars leave their
most devastating impact on infrastructure. The most significant example is the
devastation of Baghdad following its bombardment between 16 January and the 25
February, 1991. Thus, well-designed infrastructural policies are usually considered
the most needed for a more successful reconstruction. "Yet, infrastructure projects
are costly and have to be prioritized end undertaken in stages. Even then, as the
past experiences indicate, a bottleneck-removing policy should be followed. It must
be also noted that specific economic sectors and regions have their own (what may
be called) life-line infrastructures, without reconstruction of which they may not be
successfully reconstructed". (Amirahmadi, 1991:8).
Other commentators recommended that, "Infrastructure and social community
services must parallel and be integrated with building reconstruction". (Lewis,
1988:10). Inmost cases while exposed infrastructure (roads, bridges) suffer the most
damage, underground infrastructure (water pipes, electricity, etc.) suffers less
damage than say, buildings. Underground infrastructure seems to deteriorate more
because of lack of maintenance during the wer, than because of direct damage.
In a more comprehensive view of economic recovery and physical
reconstruction some experiences such as that of Finland, USSR and Britain related
directly the economic recovery and productivity to the bullding industry. An
approach that has been recently acknowledged by Davis (198921:14) when he wrote:
"Before rebuilding towns and cities, it is necessary to analyze and rapidly expand the
capacity of the local and national building industry to cope with the enormous task
of reconstruction. This will relate to contractors, craftsmen, the work-force, building
supplies, and the relevant professions -engineers, architects and planners". Scarcity
of building materials, that are usually required in considerable quantities following
war, is often the cause for delay or even abandoning reconstruction projects. Too
often, governments' plans to import building materials are also hindered by shortages
of funds and foreign currency. Thus, a common recommendation has been made to
strengthen the local building industry in order to meet promises of housing supplies
and reconstruction. Applied research on suitable local building materials and ways
of developing the role played by contractors, builders and craftsmen are well
established needs. (Cockburn, 1990). Developing the building industry should aim
at creating the much-needed employment quickly and increasing the range of
materials that would be locally available at different demand points. This would
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reduce transportation costs and rapid price increases.
Nevertheless, there are some cases, where the role of the building industry was
not considered. Post-war reconstruction in Nigeria is such a case. (Awatona,
1991:31). Shortages of building machinery is another issue that was faced in the
USSR after WW2, where In some places despite the availability of local building
materials the lack of machinery made the task much more difficult. (Bluminfeld,
1991 :25).
In terms of priorities some commentators put issues of political democracy,
women rights, land and tax reforms and social security as prerequisites for any
reconstruction, on the basis that "People who do not feel secure can not contribute
to the development of their community, so reconstruction must commence with the
resolution of the social security problem of the nation before successful rebuilding of
the economy can begin". (Amirahmadi, 1989:45).
Finally, one should draw attention to the often hidden agenda of reconstruction
priorities. In many countries, reconstruction of the national defence system was the
first priority for post-war rebuilding. Astronomic investment, badly needed for general
recovery and reconstruction, is redirected towards purchasing weapons and training
soldiers, on the basis that force is needed for security, without which no long-term
investments and reconstruction can take place.
3.4.4. Reconstruction and Development.
"Development is the complicated pattern of economic, social and political
change that takes place in a community or a society as it changes from a traditional
status. The transformation to modern status includes social and political
consciousness, division of labour, literacy, urbanisation, industrialisation and a broad
general participation in the overall development activities at national, regional, local
and village level". (Poostchl, 1986: 1). This definition of development implies that
development Is a precess, with a kind of change that embodies improvement of
forces of production: liberation from dangers of nature; modernity: Industrialisation
and expansion of freedom, etc. Furthermore. it has been argued that development
is 'not to develop things but to develop people', (UNESCO), which means that
development should aim at the advancement of the whole human being: spiritually,
morally and materially. Palojirvi (1990) cited that "Development is to improve the
position of a nation or a selected part of it... The position may be defined in terms of
certain standards, e.g. health, nutrition, education, mental well-being, population
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growth, etc.".
Considering the above definitions in the Ughtof the fact that wars do not just
destroy part of what exists; they also prevent the society from making new
investments, to utilise its production capacities and reseureee, and to develop its
skUll and technical capabilities, proves the strong relationship that Ihould exilt
between reconstruction and development. Therefore, developmental reconstruction
may not be concerned with damaged items but deficits that would remain after
rebuilding all destroyed structures.
At the beginning of this Chapter we claimed that post-war reconstruction is the
first step that has to be taken in the development process after war. Other
commentators saw a slightly different relation between development and
reconstruction. For instance, Zargar (1989:742), in relation to natural disaltera,
identified three modes of development: first, not to consider the development
dimension at all, but rather the re-establishment of the status quo. Secondly, to work
towards reducing vulnerability (eg. to strengthen buildings to withstand future
hazards), and thirdly, to believe that there is a greater opportunity to initiate
development programmes after disasters, on the basis that more resources will be
available (in the form of aid) and that the survivors are ready to accept change.
While, Amirahmadi (1991:18-20) perceived development after war as part of
reconstruction. In fact, he divided the process of post-war reconstruction into two
stages: the 'replacement stage', the aim of which is to retum to the status quo and
the 'developmental reconstruction stage', which should focus on developing the
society beyond the pre-disaster level.
Reviewing past experiences of post-war reconstruction, reveals that
governments perceive the relationship between reconstruction and development,
more as we identified it earlier. Recognising the magnitude of the talk and the need
for social and economic reconstruction followingwar, governments attempt to review
and adjust their pre-war development plans, interrupted by the war, rather than
drawing new reconstruction and development plans. For instance, following the
Nigerian civil war (6 July 1967 • 15 January 1970) the Second National
Development Plan was reviewed and announced, to serve as an immediate
reconstruction plan" ..designed primarily for the rehabilitation of personl, eenstrucuen
of infrastructural facilities and economic activities, as well as for the complete
reconciliation and reabsorption of the indigenous of East-Central Stete within the
Nigerian community". (Ministry of Economic Development, 1975 in Awatona,
Chapter Three.
~
-"':_:-:,1~.
~
~
99
1991 :3). At this point, let us mention that the last aim is of particular importance
followingcivilwar (eg. Lebanon, Yugoslavia, Croatia, EI-Salvador, etc.). An aim that
is usually ignored or forgotten in the drive towards physical reconstruction.
Of course, thinking of reconstruction as a step in an ongoing development
process is no easy task, as it involves recovering the war's opportunity costs and then
going beyond such recovery. "Reconstruction at this stege enters the field of
development and becomes concerned with socio-economic transformation in the
direction of broad national goals. Long-term comprehensive planning and strategic
thinking becomes the most urgent, as does government financing and international
assistance. For example, decisions must be made regarding what is useable and
useful from the past and of the old structures some of which have to be preserved,
while others ought to be scraped or restructured". (Amirahmadi, 1991: 19-20).
3.4.5. Resource moblllsation.
Past experiences show that resource mobilisation and allocation for
reconstruction is a decisive element in formulating a reconstruction strategy.
Unskilful mobilisation and utilisation of resources following war has often led to
delays in reconstruction. (eg. Iran, Parse, 1991). Resources in general have to go
through three stages of identification, mobilisation and utilisation. The importance
of resource identification without waste of time, has been discussed in a previous
Section along with damage assessments on a national level.
In order to better identify resources both existing and potential, it is helpful to
think of resources in terms of types: (1) human; (2) material or physical: (3) services
and (4) financial or credit. All these resources have to be identified in terms of their
immediate and long-term exploiting possibilities. Furthermore, it has been claimed
that resources could also be identified in terms of "... quality (e.g. inter-institutional
cooperation and coordination, skilled workforce, training institutes, dynamic and
modem sectors), amount (e.g. abundant, scarce and sufflclent), distribution (e.g.
concentrated in certain areas or in the hands of a few families), costs (cheap,
expensive or competitive), function (e.g. local leadership), ease of use (e.g.
accessibility, availability and convertibility), and impact (e.g. dependency or self-
suffiCiency). Finally, indigenous resources must be distinguished from external
resources and these latter must be carefully identified in terms of the foregoing
characteristics, their national origins, and the conditions attached to their purchase,
transfer or adaptation". (Amirahmadi, 1991:19-20).
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Reading through the different case-studies one can see how different types of
resources have been emphasised in different countries followingwar. For instance,
most of the literature dealing with Westem European reconstruction, highlights the
Importance of mobilising financial resources, while that from Eastern Europe,
emphasises the role of human resources. Inmost recent literature on reconstruction
in the Middle East, the issue of services and military sectors as a resource has been
identified.
"The Identified resources have to be mobilized before they can be utilized and
mobilization aims at widening accessibility to resources. Resource. mobiilzation Is
a largely government-led and organized action but private groups are equally
indispensable". (Amirahmadi, 1991: 19). In conclusion, cross-cultural experiences
over the last 50 years shows that resources can be mobilised in different ways,
depending on the local cultures and on the organisational pattern of reconstruction
administration. The following are some demonstrations of how resources can be
mobilised.
Human resources- Surprisingly, almost all the case-studies have shown that
people can be mobilised for reconstruction using the same machinery that was used
to mobilise them for war, i.e. official propaganda machines. Ministries of Information
and Culture employing the ever growing media used nationalism, patriotism, and
democratic practices to mobilise the population toward. reconstruction. Thus
slogans were created to serve the same purpose of mobilisation. In the Soviet Union,
slogans such as "aids to the liberated areas" and "producing for the reconstruction"
became part of daily life (Blumenfeld, 1991). Similarly, in Britain "Homes fit for
Heros" in WWl, and most recently in Syria, "We fight by a hand and build by the
other". (Saad, 1991). Further mobilisation can be achieved through means of
popular organisations, self-help projects (eg. USSR, Finland), incorporation of
women's inputs into the reconstruction process, and twinning between regions and
cities, so that those who were not directiy affected can help rebuilding the damaged
areas, have been equally important. The latter was a characteristic of reconstruction
in USSR, and later on Iran.
Military - and para military is another important aspect of resource mobillzation
to playa role in reconstruction. The role played by miUtary forces In clearing the city
of Warsaw of debris is a well established example, also the role played by the Iranian
and the Iraqi military in the reconstruction of war damaged settlements and the
restoration of infrastructure. Equally, there is a great role for ex-service men, but this
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role has to be planned carefully, as it involves a sensitive transition of these forces
from fighters to reconstructors. In 1988-1989, the return of ex-service men from the
Iraqi-Iranian border area to the streets of Baghdad and Basrah, did not help
reconstruction as was anticipated. On the contrary, they caused all sorts of social
problems and unrest. What would we expect from people who have spent 8 years
in the army, who were taught nothing except killing, and on their return to their
homes found that Egyptian workers have taken over all the jobs and in some cases
their families.
Financial resources - and the way they have been mobilised is clearer in the
literature dealing with reconstruction after WW2, than in that dealing with
reconstruction in developing countries. Mofid(1989) suggested three ways, that can
be pursued by governments to mobilise financial resources towards removing funding
constraints on post-war reconstruction. These are: self-help, regional help and
international help. Under self-help, one can list a number of methods that have been
used in different countries, including 'War Loan Drive', selling government
reconstruction bonds, and facilitating self-finance by the people.
Another phenomenon was the financial framework created and developed to
accomplish reconstruction especially in the Western European cities, where privately
initiated redevelopments were largely encouraged, especially in the city's central
areas with aid given from the government in the form of low-interest long-term loans.
This added an impressive momentum to the reconstruction undertaken by the
government and its public agencies, all under general city-planning regulations.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was established in
1944, with two main aims; "... to provide the capital so urgently needed to assist a
war-tom Europe to recover once the fighting ended. Afterwards. it would tum to
economic development around the globe" (Urban Edge December 1988). By 1949,
according to Edward Mason and Robert Asher, The International Bank for
Reconstruction was not able to cope with the growing demands of finanCing post-war
reconstruction. "Inresponse. the United States created the Marshall plan to assist the
financing of European recovery" (Urban Edge, December 1988).
Still, in many cases the absence of appropriate financial schemes was largely
behind the delay of the reconstruction projects. For instance, in the East End of
London, Walter Bor (1989) emphasised that, "Appropriate financial and man power
resources should have been made available to complete the reconstruction within the
scheduled 20 years".
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Material resources - "..may be mobilized by expanding mineral exploration and
exploitation activities, extensive use of local materials and simplified techniques,
particularly in construction works and in energizing small factories, workshops, farms,
and services. Creating proper communication channels and transportation networks
are particularly important for resource mobilization". (Amirahmadi, 1991: 15-17).
3.4.6. To centrallse or localise decision making.
We are all aware of the disadvantages of over-centralised planning systems,
which weakens public accountability, local capabilities and often results in planning
and architectural decisions being taken at the centre, imposed on the local people,
and not meeting their real needs. (More on this Issue in Chapter 9). Cities, UkeFao,
in Iraq and Hoveyzeh in Iran are recent examples of reconstruction by decree, In
which no consultation with the local survivors took place. The result was the
rebuilding of ghost towns.
The dilemma of centralisation versus local decision-making i. not confined to
today's reconstruction. Following the Second World War, planners in European
countries such as France, Belgium and Germany faced with the problems of
reconstruction, looked back to the experience gained during and after the First World
War in hope of deriving some lessons. Thus in Belgium, for inltance, planner.
concluded that "..the absence of strong centralised planning had resulted In a failure
to modemise during rebuilding in 1920s". (Diefendorf, 1990:6). Uyttenhove (1990),
went even further to claim that some of the planners who were involved in the
rebuilding after 1919, and particularly those who were tryIng to draft strong planning
legislation in the 1920s seized the opportunity presented by the German occupation
during the Second World War to put their earlier concepts into action. It is claimed
that reconstruction in Belgium was largely based on centralised town and regional
planning. Such centralised approach dominated not only the wartJme planning but
also the post-war planning approach until the early 1960. This resulted in the
widespread application ofmodem planning concepts that practically shaped post-war
reconstruction.
In France too, as Baudoui (1990) shows, reconstruction was centrally directed.
A reconstruction ministry and several subordinate agencies were established aiming
to rebuild and at the same time providing a strong legal framework for post-war town
planning. The Netherlands was not an exception either, Middelburg city is a clear
example of reconstruction by decree that was directed from the Hague. Moreover,
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"In Nazi occupied Norway, centralised reconstruction planning began in June 1940
under Norwegian leadership but with German supervision". (Diefendorf, 1990:7).
One can lIl50 lIrgue that it was the war that created central planning lind
reconstruction agencies in Britain and consequently itwas the war and the centralised
reconstruction thet made it possible for Donald Gibson to realise his dreams of
modem Coventry. Nevertheless, Post-WW2 reconstruction experience also showed
that in places where the pre-war planning system enjoyed a degree of
decentralisation, at least at the planning level in city councils such as Coventry and
Rotterdam, made it possible for reconstruction to start lifter a few days of the
bombardment in the form of clearing debris, and planning for reconstruction.
Reading through different case studies of reconstruction after war it became
evident that total decentralisation, is almost impossible, particularly In places where
centralisation Is a strong culture. However, and because of the importance of
involving the local communities and "Since the planning on a communal level is
essential for the policy of reconstruction (if only to regulate the relocation and
resettlement processes)" (Herz, 1991), it is vital to have communal planning
authorities to implement the measures whlch other centralised units consider
necessary. Thus, the so-called 'controlled decentralisation' concept came into
existence. (eg. Iran, Amirahmadi, 1989:46). Controlled decentralisation is seen as
a half-way solution that could meet the needs of the centre and to some extent those
of the people.
On the other hand, it is believed that the rebuilding of communal administration
should not attempt to establish the former structure but to build an administrative
structure especially fit to deal with the problems of reconstruction. "Effective
management of the efforts to reconstruct the war damaged areas requires political
and economic development of an organisational structure which promises to redress
communal grievances and satisfy communal identity needs" (Herz, 1991:6). The
immediate goal of this type of administrative reconstruction is to assess interactively
and objectively what is at issue in the situation of the war-damaged areas, and to
differentiate needs from interests. This process is important because once the
different basic needs of the varioul communities can be identified, and each of them
acknowledges the validity of the needs of the others, then a constructive and co-
ordinated process of reconstruction can commence, and the groundwork for a more
comprehensive reconstruction might be established.
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3.4.7. TIming of actions and phases of reconstruction.
The most important observations in relation to timing and phases of
reconstruction centres around three points: (1) inevitably, reconstruction has to go
through stages of 'restoration and repair', 'planned reconstruction' and 'development',
reflecting the availability of resources and patterns of organisation; (2) the question
of when to start reconstruction has always been a matter of debate, (Dittmann,
1989); (3) similarly speed of reconstruction has also been a matter of debate; (4)
still, the reconstruction of war damaged cities took decades to accomplish, and in
some cases 50 years after the Second World War, reconstruction is still going on.
(East Oermany, Wimmer, 1989).
The issue of formal and informal reconstruction is another significant
observation that relates to timing. While most countries during WW2did not wait for
the end of the war to start Phase 1 (restoration and repair) of formal reconstruction,
most cases from developing countries did, (Iran might be an exception). On the
other hand, there seems to be an on-going informal reconstruction in all cases during
the war.
In the USSR while the war was still in progress, as areas were liberated from
Oerman occupation, urgent measures were taken to restore their economic and
cultural life. IIFirst, with army aid, roads and railway lines were rebuilt, water and
power provided, and bakeries opened to save the population from starvation. Civilian
reconstruction started with factories, schools, hospitals and health centres.
Prefabricated barracks for 300 people, which could be assembled in four to six hours,
served as primary emergency shelters. The repair of homes was commenced
immediately and a network of factories for building materials and prefabricated units
was established. (Blumenfeld, 1991:21). It has been claimed that during the war,
from 1941 to 1945, about one million dwelling units were built, of which 400,000,
evenly divided between apartments and single family houses, were in cities.
(Blumenfeld, 1991:26). The experience of WW2 showed that ".. one must not see
the end of the war in 1945 as the starting point for reconstruction ... Clearly people
began to think, and In some case. act, on reconstruction almost a. soon a. the
destruction happened; they did not wait until the end of the war. Some of this activity
was official. The damage often required immediate action, such as clearing streets
of rubble, sealing off or dynamiting buildings that might cave in, repairing utility and
water lines, repairing lightly damaged housing, and the like". (Diefendorf, 1990:5).
Actually it has been claimed, that it was during the war that a lot of reconstruction
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experience was gained, and later on put to use after 1945. Against this view, some
commentators believe that the best time to reconstruct is after the war, when the
people are retuming or have retumed (so that they can participate in the process)
and in order to avoid further damage and double reconstruction. (Davis, 1988;
Amirahmadi, 1986; 1989; 1991). Others believed that "Nothing positive, however,
could be done during the war except the tasks of clearing away the rubble, the
demolition of derelict buildings and erection of temporary shops for the bombed out
shopkeepers" (Johnson-Marshall, 1966:296).
However, everybody seems to agree that the best time to plan reconstruction
is during the war so that the nation is ready for a rapid reconstruction when the war
Is over. (Hewitt, 1965:9). According to Diefendorf (1990), during the Second World
War, planners, architects as well as private citizens without architectural training,
composed essays, made sketches and thought about what the reconstructed cities
should look like. It is such approach for reconstruction planning that allowed
planners at Tokyo municipal authorities to begin drafting plans for reconstruction on
the very day Japan surrendered, August 13, 1945. (Emerson Wildes, 1991:90).
Speed of reconstruction is a clear area of debate. On the one hand, fast
reconstruction is seen as an essential factor "..to capture political will and public's
enthusiasm which are the most critical for allocation of the ever decreasing resources
to reconstruction". (Amirahmadi. 1991:17). Also. it is needed in order to catch up
with the speed of people's retum to their own settlements. In Tokyo. it was warned
that. "Every day that passes without sharp decision makes the task of city planning
more difficult; for every week sees ten or fifteen thousand houses going up in the
ruined district. It is not likely that citizens who have restored production and business
in wooden houses will readily consent to tear them down to make room for a new
street and park plan". (Beard. 1991:83). On the other hand. it is believed that
gradual reconstruction, allows more space for local people to participate and most
Importantly. It helps to develop the needed local skills internally. thus. there would
be less need to rely on so much outside help. Nevertheless, experience showed that
it may take years and decades for a city to reconstruct after devastation of war. (Poor
s Zargar, 1991).
3.4.8. Training, education and research.
The lack of trained professionals (eg. policy makers. economic and physical
planners, architects, engineers, managers, local leeders, public work officials, credit
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administrators, producers, and builders, and intermediate personnel to assemble
information on the population and its disruption), is often an obstacle for any
reconstruction strategy. This is particularly true in Third World countries. Thus,
special attention should be given to training Issues and to what could be called
'reconstruction education'. In some cases a specialised Government branch has been
established to look after training activities, as in the case of Nigeria. In addition
reconstruction education should facilitate technical training for ex-service men to
equip them with skills that could help in transferring them form fighters to builders,
thus making their future employment easier.
Finally, cultural policies have to be thought through carefully. Part of these
poUcies have to do with preserving cultural physical symbols that allows cultural
continuity. More importantly cultural poUeles of promoting peace, tolerance and
mutual understanding through education are needed.
3.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLOSION.
This Chapter started by defining the term post-war reconstruction. It briefly
reviewed the existing body of knowledge about the reconstruction context.
emphasising the fact that despite the obvious lack of Uterature, a recent growth in
knowledge on the subject can be observed. The last decade has witnessed a
particular growth of interest in the subject. That has been symbolised by the holding
of a number of national and international conferences and the publishing of a number
of documents.
Aiming at providing a picture of some of the different dilemmas which could
possibly be involved in the context of planning for reconstruction, this Chapter
identified two areas of concem. Within each area, the experiences and observations
of other authors were evaluated and grouped under 'main headings' of issues, which
it is felt the reconstruction process should consider at the stage of formulating a
national reconstruction strategy.
• Regulating 'actors or constraints.
These are factors that inevitably shall regulate and in lome cases dictate the
reconstruction strategy and its outcome: The continuation and the intermittent
recurrence of attacks; national politics and ideologies; international alliances
and politics; national economic aspects of reconstruction; social and
psychological aspects of reconstruction.
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• The establishment of a national strategy.
In order to formulate a national strategy a number of issues should be
considered: Administration and organisation; damage assessment and resource
evaluation; defining goals, objectives and priorities; reconstruction and
development; resource mobilisation; centralisation versus local decision
making; timing of actions and phases of reconstruction; training, education and
research.
• •••
In the next Chapter, a further analytical review of knowledge will be presented
to highlight two areas of concern:
• Settlement reconstruction planning.
• The implementation of physical reconstruction.
The issues or headings that are being highlighted in these two Chapters willbe
further discussed and developed in the case-studies Chapters and in the concluding
Chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ISSUES OF POST·WAR SETTLEMENT
RECONSTRUCTION PLANNING & IMPLEMENTAnos.
4.1. INTRODUCTION.
In the previous Chapter a number of common issues and dilemmas of post-war
reconstruction planning at a national level were derived. This Chapter is a
continuation of Chapter 3 and focuses on Issues of post-war reconstruction at
regional and local levels. It sets out to explore two areas of concern: (1) settlement
reconstruction planning and (2) implementation. Using the same methodology as in
Chapter 3, this Chapter aims at drawing out a number of issues and dilemmas that
are often faced during settlement planing and Implementation.
4.2. ISSUES OF SETTLEMENT RECONSTRUCTION PLANNING.
In considering the issue of settlement reconstruction planning it is crucial to
keep in mind two main points:
• "Reconstruction planning inevitably reflects whatever planning process is
the 'norm' in a given country at a given time". (Davis, 1988b).
• Not necessarily all the problems faced by reconstruction planners have
resulted from the war. Many problems and issues" ..were present in the
pre-war town or city, or its administration and the war damage (like a
surgeon's scalpel) has exposed such deficiencies and weaknesses".
(Davis, 1986:45).
Concerning the first point, it is safe to say that in most of Europe the pre-war
approaches of planning, as well as the war-time approaches of rebuilding continued
after the war. In fact no country was starting from scratch, at least on the planning
level, which really helps explain the rapidity of reconstruction in many places. This
also explains the delay and the waste of resources that characterised reconstruction
in a number of newly Independent countries and developing ones because of the
absence of an appropriate planning mechanism. Recent examination of
reconstruction following WW2 revealed that, "ViewingReconstruction as a post war
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phenomenon, the scholars of the 1950's overlooked the extent to which wartime
developments continued into the postwar period". (Diefendorf, 1990).
The pre-war / post-war continuity of patterns, attitudes and mechanism is not
limited to planning. Amirahmadi (1991) claimed:
"To begin with, reconstruction is an orderly and predictable
process. For example, damaged cities and industries are
rebuilt on the same sites, the pre-disaster trends in population
and urban growth continue during the reconstruction period,
and dominant economic sectors and social groups continue to
be dominant. The tendency for the pre-war trends to continue
is reinforced by two powerful forces: uncertainties attached to
changes in policies and the biases of the existing institutions
In restoring the pre-war order. It is also easier and faster to
restore the old than to recreate the new... It must be
recognized that it is impossible to completely maintain the
status guo as it is impossible to implement a tabula rasa".
For instance, Post-WW2 reconstruction planning in the USSR "..was not
something started in an ad hoc way, but was a resumption _ with modifications based
on wartime changes _ of the previously established planned development of the
productive forces of the USSR". (Blumenfeld, 1991 :21). This observation supports
the general feeling that planning patterns are bound to continue, but there is a need
to introduce some changes and adjustments. Davis (1986:46), wrote, "It is likely that
normal pre-war planning procedures and building approval mechanisms will need
urgent reappraisal, to make them applicable to the challenge of reconstruction
planning. Unless reconstruction plans are on a small scale, it will be necessary to
review all normal planning procedures for the very much more demanding context
of reconstruction planning. In particular, existing tendering procedures for road
building, infrastructure and building may not be appropriate if rapid rebuilding is
required. In lieu of these patterns, negotiated contracts and approvals will prove
more effective".
Concerning the fact that war adds to and exposes already existing problems and
defects, the Nigerian experience following its civil war serves as an illustration.
Awatona (1991: 12), claimed that, "The acute shortage of high-level and intermediate
manpower was one of the major factors which made the implementation of
reconstruction policy objectives difficult, or in some cases impossible" (Awatona,
1991: 12). A deeper examination of the issue established, that such sudden lack of
professlonelly trained people, is in fact a pre-war deficiency which was only
exacerbated by the civil war.
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Finally, some planners have warned of the danger of associating immediate
detailed construction with planning, claiming that plans should be achieved by the
continuous guidance of current development and thus "..they require both courageous
imagination, (for who can foresee tomorrow) and a tenacity of purpose that must
never degenerate into obstinacy". (Tyrwhitt, 1991). Inpost-war reality this approach
seems to be too relaxed.
4.2.1. Crisis and opportunity.
The reconstruction literature is full of reference to the fact that war creates a
number of opportunities to improve on the pre-war situation, and that usually among
the survivors there is a great hope during, and immediately after the war of a better
future. These claims were made on the basis that, "To the survivors who take the
opportunity to learn from their experiences, the world changes from being a simple,
manageable, predictable place to a place of change, a place of increased possibilities
created by war". (Stewart, 1988:85).
Other commentators, went further to claim that war is an opportunity to
introduce major and radical physical and social changes, based on their belief that
"Only two circumstances might bring fundamental changes: total war - or total
peace". (Blumenfeld, 1991:39). What is apparent in the literature is that there is a
lot of generalisation concerning 'to whom' war is considered an opportunity. In some
references it is claimed that reconstruction after war is an opportunity to everybody,
as it represents the future and there is no return to the past; "..the dead can not come
back from the grave". (Stewart, 1988:85). Such a generalisation is very much
apparent in literature dealing with reconstruction after the Second World War.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that much of what was publicised as an opportunity
and better future during WW2, was part of a calculated policy to strengthen public
morale. (Whittick, 1950:148).
In a more recent literature, building upon experience gained mainly in situations
of natural disasters and to a less extent of war in the Third World, authors came to
the conc:lusion that in every disaster there are two groups of people; those who gain
from the disaster and those who loose. "There is a galaxy of people, agencies and
commercial enterprises that gain from disasters: airlines companies, trucking
companies, relief agencies, rellef goods suppliers, the Insurance indultry, media
(even academics such as myself). The losers are .. those who die or are injured, and
their relatives. National and local governments loose heavily, with the impact being
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felt on lives, hospital care, and direct and indirect economic losses". (Davis,
1989a: 13). Such observations, supports those who claim that the ultimate winners
are those who are rich already, and suffered the least, while the losers are usually the
poor, making the position of the disaster victims more unequal. (Cuny, 1983)
In Europe, "Almost everywhere town planners viewed the bombing as
unprecedented opportunity to introduce radically modernising changes in the urban
fabric on a scale that had been almost impossible in existing built-up cities"
(Diefendorf, 1990:5). Thus war and reconstruction were vehicles for physical change.
Rebuilders could, and for the first time, go beyond what Haussman had done for
nineteenth-century Paris. "Generally speaking planners wanted to use reconstruction
to heal the 'unhealthy' metropolis left by the age of industrialisation, housing
speculation and rapid unplanned growth. At the same time, reconstruction planning
often looked back to earlier conceptions of ideal urban forms; it was shaped by pre-
existing institutions and laws and was guided by individuals with pre-war or war time
experience in reconstruction planning" (Diefendorf, 1990:5). For instance in
Coventry and Northern France, "..this idea of healing the ills of the metropolis was
expressed primarily in technical terms. That is planners wanted to modernise the
technical infrastructure of the cities to provide better streets, sanitation systems and
modem housing with air, light and modern equipment ... planners wanted to give
rebuilt cities functionally distinct zones. Housing, industry, culture, government,
recreation: each was to have its own separate location. This sort of thinking was
found all over Europe during the war, in fescrst and democratic countries, and it is
certainly a part of the modem town planning movement" (Diefendorf, 1990:5). In
other places, it was an opportunity to introduce smaller changes. Grebler (1964:475)
cited that, "War destruction made it possible to replace the main rail station of
Rotterdam and a secondary station in Milan (Porte Garibaldi): the latter has been an
obstacle to full development of the Centro Dlrezlonale, Milan's new business centre
on a site of partial war damage rounded out by deliberate urban renewal".
Others saw reconstruction as an opportunity to reduce settlements vulnerability,
not only, against natural disasters but also against man-made disasters, such as
wars, urban fires end industriel accidents. Davis (1986) advocated the opportunity
to take a number of plenning measures such as, "The decentralisation of potential
bombing targets. Building wider streets to provide access for rescue and fire fighting
services efter the collapse of buildings. Land use control to avoid the development
of residential eccommodations and school adjacent to factories, producing vital
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commodities, etc. In addition, it is vital to consider secondary risks such as fire-
spread in new urban planning and building design, as well as mitigation measures
against natural hazards, l.e., earthquakes or fiood risk zones". (Davis, 1986:48).
Such opportunities were fully exploited in Japan, where the Reconstruction
Council of August 1945, decided upon a number of fireproofing, decentralisation and
zoning measures, as well as earthquake resistant building laws, which have affected
both fire and earthquake vulnerability ever since (see Emerson Wildes, 1991).
Reconstruction also provided opportunities to architects and planners to experiment
with their ideas and the latest fashions of urban and regional planning. The new city
of Bizerte, Tunisia can be given as an example. Under the French colonial power and
during the 2WW, the city suffered 77% damage and a decision was taken to build a
new utopian city near by to replace the old Arab city. P.A. Emery (1991:75) wrote,
"The experience was exhilarating. For the first time in France it would be possible to
plan an entirely new city according to the most recent accepted city planning
principles ... Bizerte was to be the first of the garden cities of French reconstruction".
4.2.2. To repUcate what existed before the war or to reform urban envtronment.
Michael lvanovich Kalinin, the post-war USSR President, was reported (in
Blumenfeld, 1991:30) to have said "Now the question arises - how to rebuild. We
may simply restore the buildings on the foundation of the old plan, or we may
provide a new plan. It seem to us that all creative forces of our architects and
builders should be devoted to the matter, and, in the first place, the adequacy of the
old plan should be subjected to review.... It may be objected that the replanning of
cities complicates and even delays building and that this measure is achieved at
rather high cost. I agree completely, but I still think It has to be done. After all, cities
are rebuilt for centuries, and therefore monetary expenses in this matter have to be
approached without stinginess". This statement portrays the attitude that swept
across Europe during its reconstruction. Where the general policy was not to
reconstruct any heavily damaged building if It interfered with the new city plan, while
preserving slightly damaged buildings, if they do not interfere with the pian.
The main phenomenon that distinguished and influenced the process of
rebuilding the war-damaged cities in Europe was 'Urban Renewal', a concept that had
already started in the (Jnited States as an articulated national program for the renewal
of its cities and towns years before the 2WW. It was well developed and understood
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by 1949. This concept was defined by the American city planner Leo Grebler
(1964:13):
"Urb~mrenewal refers to a deliberate effort to change the
urban environment through planned large scale adjustment of
existing city areas to present and future requirements for urban
living and working. It extends to non-residential as well as
residential land uses. The process involves the re-planning
and comprehensive redevelopment of land or the conservation
and rehabilitation of areas which are threatened by blight, or
are to be preserved because of their historical setting and
cultural values, all in the framework of an over-all plan for a
city's development".
Such concepts combined with the 'modem movement' in architecture and the
fashion of 'open planning', guided and influenced the reconstruction process in many
European cities, at different scales. "Many architects and town planners, as well as
other voices said that the response to the challenge of the destruction should be to
create a 'City of Tomorrow' which has nothing to do at all with the old. That rubbish
had fortunately been blown away by the bombs ... Such a reconstruction plan was the
Marcel Lods' plan for Mainz designed in the attitude of Le Corbusier's 'Vision Plan of
Paris 1925' (Breitling 1983:51), in which a vast stretch of the traditional 'rive droite'
was to be demolished and replaced by straight motor-ways, skyscrapers and linear
buildings, with careful isolation and preservation of the main historic monuments,
such as the Royal Palace.
In many cases the above underlined part of the urban renewal definition was
totally forgotten. For example "The completion of Coventry's new centre, requires
considerable demolition of buildings spared by the bombs (despite its historical
importance) and a new layout rounding out the rebuilding plan and there are
numerous similar cases" (Grebler 1964: 15). As a result, we have a series of
anonymous mass apartment and office buildings, widely spread over the cities
replacing their traditional buildings and transforming their medieval skyline and
character.
Later on, "The tendencies of modem architecture ... were more and more
criticised... many architects and politicians have regretted that they followed Le
Corbulier'l advice, 'II faut tuer la rue corridor' and that they had dropped the
wall-to-wall pattern" (Breitling 1983:57). In the rebuilding of the European bombed
cities, an 'International' style was very much visible, this resulted in the loss of
identity and character of the cities. "Unidentified photographs would rarely enable
the observer to spot the country or the city; a Parisian project might be in San
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Francisco or London; a Stockholm project might be in Chicago" (Grebler 1964:44).
LewisMumford (1966:4), wrote in his introduction to Johnson-Marshall's book
'Rebuilding Cities': "Many seemingly Ideal Images conjured up during the last
generation have proved, on experiment, aesthetically depressing and socially
value-less, despite their sanitary or technical excellence and superficial order.
Among the latter, I would count many of those multiplying high-rise flats, no matter
how widely spaced, whose excessive first costs and equally extravagant upkeep have
no valid justification. Except, perhaps, the dubious one of furnishing larger profits to
the contractors and suppliers of materials, larger fees to the architect, or larger
ground rents based on excessive densities, to the land owners".
Nevertheless, there are some cases in which the important and beloved parts
of the destroyed downtown were kept and restored despite their high cost either for
their religious, historical or cultural value. On the other hand, and mainly in the
Eastern European block cities, political expressions guided the reconstruction and
shaped the urban environment to express socialist power and nationalism, as well as
to remind people of the damage caused by the war and the success brought by the
new political currents, through the restoration of some identical buildings and the
preservation of others as ruins.
Itwas only in 1981 that East Germans resumed reconstruction on the old urban
structures. Before that monumental socialist architecture "... that corresponded to
the 'Theses of the Athens Charter', dominated the reconstructed urban structure,
resulting in bold structures, but no actual buildings" (Wimmer 1989:6). Particularly
during the first phase of reconstruction, that was Identified by Wimmer (1989:5) to
be from 1945-57. He also claimed that even during the second phase which lasted
until 1971 "... the city's streets and squares continued to be overdlmensloned". Such
cases could be found in Dresden's Altmarkt (Old Market) and in Berlin's streets;
Rathau (, Liebknecht'.
However, attempts were made to modernise damaged towns while using local
building styles, something that actually started after the First World War. Diefendorf
(1990:7) claimed that during the reconstruction after the Firat World War planners
and architects made up local styles where they did not exiat, or no intereating local
style can be identified. The same author also claimed that auch an approach of
emphasising local styles" ..became the basis not only for small-town reconstruction
I According to the author's own observation In a visit conducted In September 1987.
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during the First World War but also during the Second World War". Claiming that
architecture during reconstruction after the 2WWtook a subordinate place, Diefendorf
(1990:8) accused the wartime reconstruction planners of being "..first of all
technocrats and bureaucrats interested in technically modem cities". He also argued
that "They generally felt that their work - obviously necessary given the destruction -
stood outside politiCS and was part of the European-wide trend toward urban
planning. When architecture played a role it usually followed a conservative aesthetic
and resulted in the endorsement of regional styles. Even here, these styles were
sometimes artificially concocted historicist facades, behind which stood relatively
modem buildings made up of standardised elements". (Diefendorf, 1990:8).
Side by side with the reconstruction and comprehensive redevelopment of inner
cities bombed areas, the post-war planned decentralisation of new towns and the
concentration on planned suburban development were largely applled, as an answer
to the severe shortage of housing and other real estate facilities and as "reception
stations for the people and activities to be dislocated later by urban renewal" (Grebler
1964:19). InWarsaw, Stolica (1954:6) claimed thet "...in addition to the residential
areas in the centre of the City... , new settlements have already sprung up in the
suburbs".
The new and increased demand for facilities, which were to be located in the
central areas, demanded the reconstruction and the expansion of the existing centres
in a totally new design. In other cases the creation of entirely new planned centres
at a distance from the old ones became an acceptable approach. "Hamburg,
emerging from sever destruction ..., is planning a new centre, 'City Nord', in an area
about ten miles from the old ..., the new centre has been designed for more than 5
million square feet of offices and a labour force of 30,000-35,000" (Grebler 1964:40).
Walter Bor (1989)2, gave a description of post- war planning in Europe as
whole, and in Britain in particular:
"Itwas seen simply as: survey, analysis, plan the one and only
plan, ... the main emphasis was on physical planning, which
was derived from transport planning".
The same author, pointed out some lessons from his experience in post-war planning
in London's East End, "The planning philosophy at that time was Simplistic and
2 Bor, Wolter (1989). "Reconstruction of London East End After War Damage". A paper represented
In the Second York Workshop, on Settlement Reconstruction Post-War; Institute of Advanced
Architectural Studies, University of York.
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deterministic, too physically oriented with inadequate regard for social and economic
aspects, ... social policy should have been more flexible, to cater for a wider range of
incomes and allow for co-operative and self-built housing". He also emphasised the
fact that there was too much pulling down and rebuilding and not enough
conservation and rehabilitation.
In short, "The experiences of thirty years post-war city development and
architecture had created a complete change of mind. The anti-historic, progressive
approach to planning as exemplified by Brasilia has almost disappeared. Interest in
the human values of heritage and environmental awareness have risen enormously"
(Breitling 1983:64). "The great mistake of reconstruction in Europe after 2WWwas
the fact that these elementary human requirements were not taken into account"
(Euggn Gross, 1983)3.
"However, it is necessary to recognise that despite the Utopian aspirations of
would-be reformers, there are normally very limited opportunities for major reforms
in urban planning on account of previous investments in services which will be very
costly to replace or relocate, and due to the highly complex patterns of land
ownership". (Davis, 1986:45). Of course, besides depending on the scale of pre-war
investment the reform opportunities depend also on the degree of damage. The
contrast between the two approaches of reconstructing Basrah and Fao in Iraq, can
be given as an example. Where in the case of Basreh, and because of its long history
and high level of investment, the opportunities to reform were rather limited, while in
the case of the relatively young city; Fao total reform was applied. (More about
Basrah and Fao in Chapter 6). Rotterdam is a case where the reconstruction scheme
"...was based largely on the old city pattern, but proposed a considerable number of
new streets, street widening, and the opening up of public spaces in front of existing
and proposed public buildings". (Johnson-Marshall, 1966:320).
In short, the rising opposition between those who want to rebuild the settlement
to its pre-war form and those who want to capitalise on the opportunity to reform and
modernise, should be seen as a healthy sign for any reconstruction programme. The
challenge is to achieve a balance, retaining what was good in a settlement with a
cultural or symbolic value and at the same time, use the opportunity to improve the
3 Gross, Euggn (1983) An Organlc Approach to Urban Planning, in Beirut of Tomorrow Planning
and Reconstruction. American University of Beirut.
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built environment.
4.2.3. Conservation of historic towns, districts and monuments.
The Issue of protecting cultural property in the event of armed conflicts was
raised by the Hague Convention in 1954. At the time of the Hague Convention a
particularly Important UNESCO publication was issued: Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Museums and Monuments VII, Paris,
UNESCO, 19564• Furthermore a number of publications can be found in which the
issue of conservation after war-damage has been thoroughly researched, the latest
of which and within a Middle Eastern context is that of AL-Hasani & Weiss (1988),
Methodology (or conservation of war-damaged structures in downtown Beirut,
published in Icomo. Information. April/June, no.2. (also see, Pane, 1950; Rhodes,
1974; Burr, 1982; Jones; 1988). Most of the references refer to mitigation measures
to protect monuments and art objects. These documents could be useful in the case
where war is building up gradually. Nevertheless, war continues to destroy cultural
monuments and damage historic towns. Most recently, this issue was thrown into the
spotlight by the terrible bombing of Dubrovnik, Croatia. Being on the World Heritage
list, the Dubrovnik experience highlighted the limitations of the World Heritage
Convention in protecting historic sites during war. (see Williams, 1992:16).
Moreover, during post-war reconstruction, concern for the preservation of
historic cities and monuments might seem somewhat marginal with respect to more
urgent and pressing problems. (Galdieri, 1986:60). In many cases, the losses in the
architectural heritage sustained during the 2WW, were strengthen by other losses
during the reconstruction process, where the medieval buildings of bomb-damaged
cities, such as Coventry, Canterbury, Frankfurt and many others have been replaced
by modem 'International' brutalist concrete structures, a fault that has been
recognised and criticised in the mid 60's and was largely behind the growing attention
4 See also Burr. N.R. (1952) Safeguarding our cultural heritage: a bibliography on the protection of
museums, works of art, monuments. archives and libraries in time of war, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.: Jones, B.a. (ed) (1986). Protecting historic architecture and museum collections (rom
natural disasters, Butterworths. Boston; Del Cid, D. (1986) Emergency protection to damaged structures
In Jones, B.a. (ed) (1986); Pane. R. (1950) RestoraUon of bull dings after the war, Museum.3, (1), pp.
78·89: Rhodes. P.S. (1974) The structural assessment of bulldings subjected to bomb damage,
Structural Engineer. 52. 9.
5 The proceedings of the 'Post-war Reconstruction and Conservation in Croatia Conference', held at
the Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies, York, 23-28 November 1992, represent the most
comprehensive knowledge so far available on post-war conservation in Croatia.
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given to conservation and rehabilitation of historic towns and city districts in the last
three decades. Moreover it made people In Europe more conscious of the historic
continuum embodied in the urban scene of previous eras.
This was not always the case, emphasis on restoration was apparent in the
rebuilding of some war-damaged cities. The main objective was to preserve their
cultural heritage and it was seen as an answer to the emotional needs of the hurt
people. The conservation and reconstruction of historic and traditional buildings
served as a demonstration of national pride and self confidence. Ciborowski
(1967:43) wrote:
"The reconstruction of historic Warsaw satisfied a social need
that was not of a material, but of psychological nature. The
rebuilding of the Old Town was a protest of the Polish people
against the barbaric destructive forces of Fascism. Inthe eyes
of the inhabitant of Warsaw it was a symbol of the historic
continuity and everlasting life of his own city, the city of his
fathers and of his children".
Thus, considerable resources were devoted to the reconstruction of historical
and architectural landmarks in Italy, Spain, Britain, Leningrad and in both east and
west German cities. The largest single project of this type can be found in Warsaw.
In some other cases such as Rotterdam, the reconstruction schemes were
largely based on the old city pattern but with new architectural expressions,
Considerable number of new streets were proposed, as well as street widening and
the opening of new public spaces in front of existing and proposed public buildings
(for more detail, see Johnson-Marshall, 1966:319-348).
After forty years of reconstruction, the European experience showed clearly
that, "...those cities which kept and restored at least some important and beloved
parts of their destroyed downtown got not only the approval of their inhabitants and
visitors, but were economically the most successful" (Breitling, 1983:49). InMunich
the centre was reconstructed without any substantial change. It was subjected to
criticism for neglecting the contemporary architectural thinking. But," ..within less
than ten years Munich had become the most appreciated big city in Germany, a
'metropolis with a heart', 'Germany's secret capital'. While most of the other cities
already were loosing population, Munich grew and grew, increasing from about
700,000 to 1,3 million inhabitants" (Breitling, 1983:53).
Consequently, during the last three decades conservation has been seen as a
method towards town regeneration and economic development, this perspective
largely encouraged conservation and restoration and made it possible to be financed
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by its own economic yield.
This European recognition of the values of its architectural heritage and the
damage It sustained, was recently confirmed in the announcement of the European
Award for the Reconstruction of the City, by the Philippe Rotthier Foundation in 1982.
This award came as "...a reaction against the neglect to which the city has been
subjected, first as a result of war time bombing and subsequently by brutalist
concrete constructions" (Philippe Rotthier, 1987). This prize was last awarded to
Ernst Schirmacher, for what was described by the jurye as, "the heroic reconstruction
of the Saturday Square in Frankfurt, ... this restitution shows a total mastery of
traditional construction techniques and the architectural vocabulary of the German
city". Ernst Schirmacher reconstructed six houses in this square, with their
half-timbered frame construction based on a massive stone ground floor. Still they
were not constructed exactly as they were before the 1944 destruction. It is well
worth quoting some of his reconstruction principles:
I. The reconstruction should occur exactly on the old site in the handed down
forms, it should be historically as correct as possible in its forms, materials and
construction.
11. All changes which would have been necessary in the restoration of the pre 1944
houses should be allowed in the reconstruction; we are talking about the interior
arrangements and above all about the restitution of the historic halls.
III. Each house has to be thought of and planned as a unique and individual house.
IV. The houses have to be conceived in such a way as to allow the creation of;
separate apartments of high quality and commercial premises on the ground
floor corresponding to their traditional use.
Although we might agree or disagree with his principles, which might be seen
as an attempt to hold on to time and create a museum, such an approach shows us
the degree in which today's Europe regrets its neglect of the cultural heritage in its
post-2WW reconstruction.
In brief, nowadays Europe is living a new era of architecture and planning
generated from it post-war experience. As Leonardo Benevolo, said: "formerly we
had tried to change the old city in accordance to the models of the new city; now we
have to improve the new parts of our cities according to the values we have
I The Jury of the European Award for the Reconstruction of the City 1987, wa. composed of Marc
Breitman, Dan Cruickshank, Maurice Culot, Miguel Garay, Jean Philippe Garrie, Leon Krier and Francois
Loyer.
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re-discovered in the old".
4.2.4. Public and private roles and Investments In reconstruction.
Almost in all of the reviewed case studies, including some cases of what used
to be known as Socialist countries, the state hal come to recognise that because of
the scale of the task of reconstruction the public sector on its own can not cope with
the growing demand. A simple conclusion that took time to realise. For instance it
was only in the mid 1980's that Vietnam recognised this fact and allowed private
investment in reconstruction. (Nguyen, 1989). Elsewhere, a mixed approach for the
implementation of reconstruction programmes has always been an attractive
proposition, (eg. South Korea, see Huh, 1989:13-1.5; Shin, 1989:5-7). It must be
noted, however, that there has not been a fixed formula for such a mix, as the
amount of the ingredients in the mix have varied from case to case and time to time.
However, issues such as, the degree of burden of the public sector and the
dominating ideological and political structure, as well as the availability of private
resources for investment, influenced the formula of such a mixture.
In conclusion, there have always been attempts to develop private initiatives
through 'market mechanisms', particularly in sectors that are seen as attractive
investment opportunities, requiring moderate investment with high returns. Such
attempts were apparent in Japan followingthe 2WW,where as part of 'democratising
its economy', Japan was forced to implement radical reforms in land ownership;
liquidation of big and central enterprises and the enactment of a Labour Act, allowing
more space for private and small investment in economy and reconstruction.
(Shimizu, 1989:8). Despite the fact that these reforms were introduced as
"..fundamental measures for the eradication of Japan's mllitarf.ation, ... they had a
far-reaching positive impact on the framework of Japan's economy". (Shimizu,
1989: 10).
Commenting on the issue of market mechanism, Amirahmadi (1991 :4-6),
touches on a sensitive issue and that is the association of the market with capitalism,
which has been for a long time rejected in a number of countries, and nominally still
is in other countries in the Middle East, when he wrote: "It Is only unfortunate that
the 'market' gets always associated with 'private' cause and is considered
'capitalistic' while it could equally contribute to a public cause and be part of a
broader social policy. A good example is the West Germany's 'social free market'
experience in the post-war period. Gorbachev's perestroika also recognizes this new
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conception of market mechanisms". (Amirahmadi, 1991:5).
4.2.'. Housing provision.
The housing crisis is world-wide, particularly so in the developing countries.
Shelter being second to food as a human necessity it is almost always (rightly) seen
as a reconstruction priority. What has been and needs to be questioned further, is the
fact that housing is seen as a finished product that needs to be urgently delivered to
war-devastated areas.
During and immediately after war the housing criSis becomes even more acute.
This is partly attributed to war destruction, partly to migration and refugees, and
partly to the legacy of the almost total cessation of civilian building activity during
the war.
Often, arguments over the need for temporary shelter are bound to be raised.
Conventionally, it was believed that the right approach is to provide temporary
housing for the displaced population allowing time to rehabilitate industry,
accumulate building materials and to draw up overall plans and organise the means
of financing the physical reconstruction. "In considering housing in this post-war
period it is necessary to separate schemes of an emergency nature, some of which
were of a temporary character, from hou.e. built in conformity with long-term
planning. In trying to provide houses quickly it was not always possible to wait until
fairly extensive plans for residential areas could be put into operation". (Whittick,
1950:141-142). This has been the general feeling following 1945.
However, following more recent experiences the attitude has changed to
recommend, "In situations where there is acute time pressure to satisfy immediate
shelter needs arising from housing losses, there may be no altemative to such a
policy. But, it is worth noting that it is a very costly option amounting to a 'double
reconstruction'" (Davis, 1986:49). Furthermore, it is common today to read
arguments that discourage the provision of temporary housing altogether. (eg.
Peterson, 1983).
Arguments against providing temporary housing centre around three issues.
Firstly, whether the survivors are capable of sheltering themselves in one way or
another, following the disaster, or the war-destruction. Secondly, that temporary
building. have a tendency to become permanent. Experience as early as the First
World War suggest this. Describing Belgium's experience, Puissant (1991) wrote:
"..as soon as all the population had been 'housed', that is to
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say, once it had found shelter, reconstruction was considered
accomplished and many temporary structures continued to
house families. This situation was perpetuated during the
inter-war years and still exists now (1950s]. to the disgrace of
some human settlements fl.
Thirdly. temporary structures proved to be exceedingly expensive and that at
a little additional cost and effort permanent buildings could be constructed. Of
course. temporary housing is even more expensive in countries where houses have
to be imported.
In general, the evidence suggests that world-wide reconstruction experience
supports the notion of investing directly in permanent housing these days. Of course
in some cases. where the situation was such that it was impossible to wait and that
it was necessary to utilize temporary shelter. either for climatic or even political
reasons. a limited number of temporary housing where provided', In these cases it
has often been recommended that such structures "...should be built not at the
periphery of urban areas but in the heart of the cities fl. (Puissant, 1991:9) in order to
make use of the existing public utilities (water mains. gas, electricity, and sewage)
and most importantly to adapt them to the existing social and economic patterns and
not to attempt to create new communities. However. in most calel in the immediate
reconstruction period. no significant steps were taken towards the rebuilding of
permanent houses and the people had to undergo a period of hardship.
For instance. in Vietnam the stipulated rents established in 1958. were not
related to salary, thus the rents now are too low compared to salaries. At present
they are considered irrational and insuffiCient for the minimum costa of housing
administration and maintenance. "This results in old housing not being repaired or
renovated for a long time and the quality of housing construction is falling day by
day, ... still new housing is not sufficient to meet the needs of the growing population
and the replacement of the destroyed houses. the financial investment into the
renovation of old houses is too small. The administration and use of houses is neither
rational nor efficient, which accounts for the diminishing housing stock" (Nguyen
1989:4).
Recently. in an attempt to find a better solution for the housing problem in the
context of the country's economic and social conditions, the Communist Govemment
7 It might be the case that a temporary housing policy Is enforced on the State by aiding countries.
The political pressure put on Croatia to accept German prefabricated houses can be given as an
illustration. This information was obtained during the authors field visit to Croatia in September 1992.
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directed its policies towards 'self-help housing' and joint activities with the people and
the local governments. Nguyen (1989:8), claimed that "Self-help has a very
important role to play in the strategy of the contemporary transitional stage towards
socialism". In this approach the provision of the physical infrastructure, such as;
water supply, electricity, roads.... are the responsibility of the local or central
government, for which the user pays an annual land tax.
The same conclusion has been reached by other researchers. In the context of
housing reconstruction in Beirut, Peterson (1983:43-44) recommended four basic
principles for Government to pursue:
"First, if possible keep people where they are. When a
disaster is a man-made, political one, this is not always easy.
Many will want to seize the opportunity to redistribute the
population, but as much as possible, people who want to stay,
should be able to do so.
Second, followthe concept of 'appropriateness' as it has come
to be used in the last decade. That means using materials and
methods that are appropriate to the situation.
Third, self-help: give as much responsibility to the people as
poeslble, but be sure the necessary supporting facilities are in
place and functioning: financial resources (grants or loans),
materials availability, transport, infrastructure. That is, use the
aided self-help concept ....
Fourth, try to avoid temporary housing if at all possible; it
drains resources and energy, though the immediate
distribution of tents or plastic sheeting can save lives".
More recent experience of reconstruction in Iran (Amirahmadi, 1990; 1991) and
Afghanistan (Leslie, 1990), suggest that in a post-war context the role of central
government concerning housing provision should be preparative only, (i.e. mobilizing
and directing the needed resources toward housing construction]. These arguments
are based on the assumption that if government directly commits itself to the actual
construction of housing projects, it would practically take away funds and other
resources from more important purposes. And that, "The concentration of scarce
resources in the housing sector would create shortages and bottlenecks in other
secton. Given secure employment and adequate means for construction of low cost
housing, people will do the rest themselves". (Amirahmadi, 1991).
The current emphasis all over the world on housing quality, beside the
traditional issue of quantity, supports the latter arguments; more involvement of the
local population is needed in the housing and reconstruction process.
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4.2.6. legislation and Issues of land.
Having thought of different aspects of reconstruction planning, reconstruction
planners, economists and politicians, almost always, reach the conclusion that there
is a great need for proper legal frameworks in terms of new laws and enabling
legislation, for their policies to be implemented and reinforced. Thus," ...it has
become evident that the reconstruction plans, which are not supplemented with a
strong development control, produce 8 rise in land prices and speculation that can
make all plans uncertain" (Breitling 1983:58) and in most cases, a legal frame work
had to be created or adjusted to address issues of town planning, urban zoning,
building laws, land ownership, compensation, etc.
In terms of town planning the introduction of the 1947 Town and Country
Planning Act represents one the most significant pieces of planning legislation, that
has had a strong impact on planning in Britain ever since. At the time the planners
were not very optimistic due to the shortage of resources from the war effort, a fact
that can be found in Tyrwhitt writings: "Here, at long last, we have within our grasp
the means to plan, in the shape of the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, and it
turns out to be but a mirage -an image of what can be- one day, but not now, not for
a long time yet. And yet you across the Atlantic, with the economic means but
lacking the law, you must in your way, feel as frustrated as we do". (Tyrwhitt, 1991).
However, it is worth noting that in order to change and develop planning laws,
urban zoning, etc., there has to be the motivation by Government to invest in capitel
works and thus to increase the demand for construction, which may not necessarily
be immediately possible. For instance, lack of Government investment in
reconstruction in Nigeria meant that there were "..very few requests for new planing
and design projects received by MiniStryofWorks, Housing and Transport" (Awatona,
1991: 14), this meant among other things that the planning procedures, building bye-
laws, codes, zoning etc. from the colonial era remained unchanged. When the
urgency of post-war period could have acted as a stimulus for radical change.
Price control legislation, along with a proper compensation procedure, to make
available to public authorities an adequate proportion of low cost land, would help In
bringing to life the hoped for reconstruction and redevelopment plan. In Rotterdam
for example, such development control helped to make It possible for the Dutch to
reconstruct the port with the finest modem equipment and facilities, tuming It into
one of the greatest ports in Europe (see Johnson-Marshall 1966:326).
Tendering procedures for infrastructural and building construction have to be
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accurately evaluated to match the post-war demand. It is very often the case that
pre-war contracting procedures are ill-suited to reconstruction needs often leading to
lack of control and corruption. Commenting on the Nigerian context, Ikoku (the
State Rehabilitation Commissioner, 1970) noted: "There is a lot of corruption in our
rehabilitation work and we admit it openly. Control is very slack, direction in vital
areas is almost non-existent ... profiteering in rehabilitation materials has gone on,
there have been loopholes in the award of contracts which has led to substantial
losses". (quoted in Awatona, 1991:15).
Land ownership and other related issues such as future speculation, can often
be one of the obstecles facing reconstruction, particularly in urban areas. A striking
example is Tokyo's experience, where the reconstruction plan had the ambition of
providing the city with vast areas of municipal parks and a 'green belt'. Later on,
because of the complex ownership patterns and because landowners failed to
volunteer the hoped-for co-operation (due to lack of resources, the city could not
afford to buy the land), today Tokyo's five municipal parks total three acres.
(Emerson Wildes, 1991 :91).
However, land reform and ownership readjustment did playa crucial role in the
implementation of other reconstruction plans, in other cities in Japan, for instance in
Hiroshima. Following ideas of land reform that were generated originally in
Switzerland and Germany, Japan esteblished its unique system 'Kukaku Seiri' (see
Ishimaru, 1991). Basically, because of lack of finance, land for streets, parks and
public urban spaces are not purchased, but an agreement Is worked out by redUCing
the amount of land owned by Individuals, on the basis that the value of what is left
of the land goes up because of the increased convenience and environmental
improvement brought about through street and open space replanning. In cases
where the new price is not high enough to cover the old price, compensation is made
in cash. Equally, if the new price is higher then a levy is imposed. However, this
method has come under recent criticism when Ishimaru (1991) wrote: ".. the land
readjustment method creates very unequal situations for each landowner, ... and the
right to property is, in some cases violated".
Land acquisition by city councils has been a common practice all over Europe
during and immediately after the war. In Coventry, "The Council's policy has been, ..
to buy up all the land needed, using powers of compulsory purchase more as a
matter of convenience than anything, In order to let land, as separate building Sites,
on long leases, and to meet all reasonable objections to its proposals, which do not
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lead to sacrificing a principle of policy or of design". (Rigby & Boyne, 1953:439).
Compulsory land acquisition was also practised in Rotterdam (Johnson-Marshall,
1966:320). More recently it has been practised in Fao, Iraq (Barakat, 1992) and in
Khoramshare, Iran (Mohandes, 1991).
While in rural areas, the most significent post-war land reforms took place in
Japan, in which the parasite landlordism was abolished and egricultural lands were
distributed to tenants. According to Shimizu (1989 :8-13), the main points of the
reform were: (1) All tenant lands owned by absentee-landlords and exceeding the
limit of holding by resident-landowners (1 hectare on average) are compulsorily
expropriated by the state and distributed them to tenants at value; (2) Maximum
areas of holding land for land-owning tillers was limited to 3 hectares on average; (3)
The way of paying farm rents was unified and they had to be paid in money; (4) The
Implementation of the reform should be completed within two years. These land
reforms had two main consequences for post-war Japan's economy. "One impact
was the increase of production in agriculture... Land reforms stimulated owner
farmers to do their best to increase agricultural production... The other impact was
the expansion of the domestic market, particularly in the rural areas, through the
increase in agricultural incomes". (Shimizu, 1989: II).
4.2.7. Issues of resettlement.
Following war, the question of whether or not to rebuild a settlement on its
original site sometimes arises, especially if it was severely damaged. One of the
reasons most often cited for resettlement after war is the continued or expected
threat. For example, following the liberation of the Syrian AI-Qunitra Province in
1973, occupied by Israel in 1967, a decision was made not to rebuild the severely
devastated city of AI-Qunitra, but to leave it as a reminder of the Israeli occupation
and the subsequent liberation. Near by, about 6 km, Ba'ath city, named after the
ruling party of President HafizAI-Assad, was planned and 600 houlel for government
employees were constructed along with the main service buildings (Sead, 1991).
Similarly, the German invasion of USSR in 1941 made it necessary to evacuate a
substantial part of its industry mainly, armaments, chemical and machine-building
factories eastward to Siberia, beyond the range of destruction. Thus, new settlements
were built to house the factories and the workers communities. In addition, new
mines, and oil wells had to be opened, steel mllls constructed, and so forth, which
transformed what used to be an agricultural region, into one of the greatest industrial
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bases of the USSR. It has been established that the success of these settlements is
in part due to the fact that housing followed industry instead of the opposite, where
settlements are built first and jobs are brought in second. (Blumenfeld, 1991:21).
Inanother case, the extensive damage and the extremely high cost of rebuilding
the city of Khoramshar, in the south west of Iran, were given as reasons why some
people believe the city should not be rebuilt on the same site. (Azimi, 1986:66; AI-
Mohandes, 1991). In such cases resettlement is maybe seen as a cheaper and
quicker solution for reconstruction.
However, the author believes that too often issues other than future threat and
immediate economic benefit lie behind some decisions of relocation. Wars may
provide convenient pretexts for population concentration, control, the conglomeration
of population groups to achieve national or regional plans of minorities integration,
or even as a means of dispersing large communities that may participate in political
unrest. The decision to relocate a number of Kurdish villages in the North of Iraq can
be interpreted as such. In taking such a serious decision, one should consider not
only the extent of damage and the feasibility of recovery, but also the role of the city
in the region, its historical importance, and the role played by its people during the
war. And most importantly the degree to which the inhabitants are ready to accept
such relocation, and to perceive the new settlement as their home.
Rebuilding a new settlement adjacent to the old one is a very serious decision
that stands very little chance of immediate or even medium-term success". For
instance, the French attempt, in Tunisia after WW2, to rebuild a new Biizerte across
the bay from the old city was not a success. Despite the exciting images of
modernity, people did not leave their old settlement. Basically, because the
rebuilding of the new city took years and as the aim was not to allow people in until
the architectural dream is complete, people mean while restored their own homes to
acceptable standards and quickly accustomed themselves. Also, because there were
heavy investments in the urban and industrial land of the old town and many people
did not look favourably on such a sweeping planning project, from which land
speculation was entirely excluded. Emery (1991 :80) Justified these results when he
wrote, "..an operation as delicate as the transfer of an existing city without the
possibility of rapid action or of profiting from the psychological shock of war on a
I We have to keep in mind that the concept of 'success' is subjective and time related. The issue
of resettlement success is dJscussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
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displaced population demands great prudence and much discernment". The same
author went further in explaining that: "Administrative, legal and financial questions
relating to the status of the land of the new city and of the property of the citizens
raised complex problems and it is not certain that the new and daring solutions
proposed to the administration, which would help to accelerate the work by
interesting private initiative, wlllbe immediately understood and adopted either by the
administration or by public opinion unfamiliar with the mechanism of city planning".
(Emery, 1991:81-82).
Another dangerous practice in terms of resettlement has to do with the myth
that grouping villages into bigger settlements willreduce costs, speed reconstruction
and improve agricultural productivity. Amirahmadi (1990; 1991 :9) is one of those
professionals who advocate such an approach, apparently from a purely economic
viewpoint. He wrote, "An integrated rural policy should focus on regrouping smaller
dispersed villages into larger settlements with social service areas and marketing
centres". In our study of reconstruction and resettlement in Yemen we came to the
conclusion that unless such resettlement policies are approached from a socio-
cultural as well as a material perspective, the chances for success are minimum.
4.2.8. Attracting pre-war population back.
Although the natural tendency among people is to return to their home towns
and villages when the war has ceased, it could be the case that the population do not
return at the speed desired to revive the settlement, this is mostly the case in pro-
longed wars were people having left their home settlements and established
themselves somewhere else, find it very difficult to move back. In such cases direct
incentives might be needed to attract at least the younger people. These incentives
could take the form of creating employment opportunities; ensuring employment and
income; provisions for home ownership; providing job placement facilities for war
veterans; distributing land for housing, developing small-scale industries; creating
share holding opportunities in public industries through long-term and easy credit;
and providing provisions for educational facillties, etc. (for more details on this issue
see Azimi, 1986).
In Iraq, in an attempt to avoid the problem of people not returning to their own
settlements, special Province population registrars were estabUshed. These registrars
kept records of the inhabitants of each location, who were allowed to travel and
migrate across the country, but without having the right to buy property outside their
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home-Province. Thus insuring that people willeventually return to their settlements.
As lrnportent is the issue of attracting back the service sector such as,
businesses, banks, insurance companies, small workshops, etc. This suggests more
investment in infrastructure, financial and physical security, as well as socially stable
conditions.
4.2.9. Reconstruction and clvU defence.
Baker (1978), claimed that during the 2WWno attempts were made to provide
anything more than emergency shelters, in Britain. These shelters took different
shapes and materials, from steel trench shelters to reinforced concrete ones, as well
as surface shelters strengthened with timber or pre-cast concrete".
"For those engaged in post WorldWar IIreconstruction it was inconceivable that
war would ever occur again" (Lewis, 1988b). The 2WWwas seen as the end of all
wars in Europe, so not many reconstruction projects took into consideration the
possibility of a new start of the war, ignoring the need to make the impact and effect
of any other possible war less severe. Nevertheless, Ian Davis (1983), argues that
the concept of 'urban de-centralisation' and the building of the 'New Towns' in Britain
after the 2WWwas an example of considering the possibility of a new war. Itwas in
the 50's that Europe started to recognise the possibility of a nuclear war. In countries
like Switzerland, Norway and Sweden the provision of nuclear shelters became
compulsory in every house, school and public building (see, Building DeSign,
February 18,1983:6).
On the other hand many commentators agree on the fact that, "Reconstruction
after war should take account of continuation and recurrence of war and the need to
survive, as in reconstruction after earthquake and tropical cyclone" (Lewis, 1989).
especially in cases were the war has no declared end'", It has been concluded that
"...the location and design of settlements and their shelter can all contribute in
increasing the protection of civilians should war occur. Factories, power stations, fuel
storages, government headquarters and barracks are most at risk and therefore it is
better to avoid locating them in highly populated areas. Two basic measures can be
taken; evacuation and shelters" (Zargar, 1989b).
II For more detail, see Baker (1978) Enterprise Versus Bureaucracy. Also see Mallory & Otter
(1973), Architecture of Aggression.
10 The Iran-Iraq war is one such, they only reached a cease-fire in August 1988. The possibility of
a new start of the war is still there.
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4.2.10. Traffic problems and solutions.
This is an issue that was highlighted in reconstruction cases in Europe. During
the post-war period a large increase in automobile ownership occurred in all West
European countries. Street patterns in most of the European cities and specially in
their old centres were not convenient to the motion and parking needs of the motor
vehicle. Consequently, the adaptation of the streets to the vehicles became an
important need and the destruction of the war was seen as an opportunity to do that.
"European response to the invasion of its cities by the auto-mobile has taken two
main forms, both of which involve a great deal of urban renewal. One is to adjust the
street pattern, the other to expand mass transit facilities" (Qrebler 1964:25). The first
approach included many measures, such as, widening existing city streets, laying out
parallel streets, enlarging plazas, designing traffic circles, building urban expressways
with more or less limited access and the introduction of ring roads. The concept of
building parking structures in strategiC locations was widely applied in most of the
cities. The other main approach to traffic solutions, was the strengthening of public
mass transportation. Subway systems were widely introduced to serve the downtown
areas emerging from the reconstruction, as in the case of Rotterdam, Milan and
Hamburg. War destruction made it possible to relocate some of the railway station.,
offering remarkable opportunities for urban redevelopment on newly available and
centrally located sites, such as in the case of Rotterdam.
As a whole, cities with long term, over-all traffic strategies and balanced traffic
and pedestrian needs as well as good public transport, had the most satisfying
solutions to their traffic problems. Nowadays, "...business tumover in pedestrianised
streets rose 25% to 100% and the proportion of commuter travel made on public
transport to 80%" (Breitling, 1983:57).
4.3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PHYSICAL RECONSTRUCTION.
When it comes to the implementation of reconstruction in a particular
settlement a number of issues arise, such as: damage and needs assessment; local
participation, compensation; speed of reconstruction; choice of building technology;
quality control of environment; and finally monitoring and evaluating the results. All
of these issues are related and interdependent. For instance, the damage assessment
is needed if compensation is to be given. Similarly, speed in reconstruction is bound
to affect quality and the role of the local population. In the following section we will
explore each of the issues in detail, based on a review of the available literature.
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4.3.1. Local needs assessment.
In a previous Chapter we explored some of the possible effects of war on local
communities. We reached the conclusion that they are vast, diverse, and complex,
necessitating a multi-facetted approach to post-war reconstruction. However,
planning for reconstruction and managing resources and implementation without a
proper assessment could lead to waste of resources and long-term social problems
within the community.
"Whilst a survey of the survivors' needs is an obvious
necessity, there is persistent evidence that such surveys are
either cursory reports or often omitted with total reliance on
the opinion of officials of what they believe people need.
(Davis, 1986:45).
Davis's remark made during the First International Conference on
Reconstruction of War-damaged Areas In Iran, is based on years of experience of
dealing with reconstruction and rehabilitation after natural disasters. His criticism of
such a 'top-down' approach for assessing damage and people's needs, reflects the
general awareness conceming the need for more appropriate survey methods to
collect the type of information that would reflect the real needs of the local
population. This awareness has developed, largely, during the early 1980's. Authors
such as Taylor (1981); (JNDRO (1982) and Cuny (1983), have established the
foundation for such developments. Their arguments have been based on the fact that
traditional ways of surveying people needs, depending mainly on collecting
quantitative data suffers from a number of shortcomings. El-Masri (1992)
summarised the traditional inadequacy in three aspects:
1. Lack of familiarity with the local situation: housing conditions and processes
(finance, connections, arrangements) construction methods, habits and culture,
people's resources, household characteristics, location characteristics, etc.
2. Inappropriate techniques of assessment: quantification of needs (counting the
number of houses damage and families affected), no distinction between 'needs'
and 'wants'.
3. Weak management of assessment: exaggeration, lack of a proper definition of
the objectives of assessment, lack of co-ordination between different
intervenors, assessment based on intervenors self interests and available
resources.
On the other hand, in the literature dealing with reconstruction after war two
main issues are apparent: first, the fact that emphasis is put on national damage
assessment, rather than local assessment, contrary to most literature dealing with
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natural disasters. This is, probably, because of the difference in the nature and scale
of war damage and the relatively limited losses due to natural disasters. Secondly,
assessment of local damage tends to be mostly concemed with physical and
structural damage. A typical example can be seen In the writings of Amlrahmadl
(1991), who, although he acknowledges the different types of war damage, end. up
highlighting the physical losses.
"Different types of war damage may effect human, material,
institutional, financial, cultural and historical resources. They
may have been damaged beyond repair or may be repairable.
Moreover, different types of damage are repairable or
replaceable at different costs and with different degree of
difficulty. War damage also differs in terms of their age
structure and importance to nation, locality, family, and
individual. Finally, the ownership is a critical matter. The
damage item could be publicly or privately owned and it could
belong to a wealthy or a poor family. The ownership
consideration is particularly important since wars usually
create confusion about ownership while reconstruction tends
to restructure the old property arrangements in damaged
areas". (Amlrahmadi, 1991).
Talking about physical damage, it is helpful to know that there are a number
of useful documents In this field. (eg. Rhodes, 1974, dealing with the structural
assessment of buildings subjected to bomb-damage in Northem Ireland: Lok et al.,
1989). Reference to more documents is given in the Chapter dealing with Belfast.
However, recent examples of literature can be found, in which attempts have
been made to derive techniques of assessing damage and measuring people's needs,
based on a mixture of quantitative and qualitative research methods in post-war
situations. (eg. in Iran, Zargar, 1989; in Afghanistan, Leslie, 1990; in Lebanon, EI-
Masri, 1992). Still, these attempts suffer some confusion as to who could do the
assessments, and when, how and what are the skills needed.
Conventionally, govemment or mUitary engineers would carry out the job of
assessment. Their work seems to have the following characteristics: first, their main
concern is "..to find competent and well experienced assessors who will be able to
determine whether a given building needs to be: (a) repaired with minor measures
by the owner or a local contractor; (b) repaired with major structural improvements;
or, (c) demolished due to its unsafe condition". (Davis, 1986:45). Secondly, they are
mostly concerned with assessing damage to public buildings and infrastructure. In
few cases where compensation was given, these surveys were extended to include
private buildings and dwellings. Thirdly, aerial photographs can play a Significant
)
\
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role in such surveys but are often not available. (eg. United Nations aerial survey in
Afghanistan, Leslie, 1990). Fourthly, Governments play down the scale of losses in
order to avoid a decline in public moral.
Another alternative for conducting damage assessment has been advocated,
and that is, to employ an independent agency, to do the job. Amirahmadi (1991)
wrote:, "A careful record of all variations of damaged items should also be kept,
preferably by an independent agency with specialized branches. The condition of
independence may be guaranteed by institutionalizing different representations within
the organization".
Recently, communication skills of assessors have been given a greater
importance. Damage assessment should go beyond counting destroyed structures
and the number of deaths and injuries, to determine the extent of damage, type,
importance to the local communities, ownership, local priorities for reconstruction,
and most importantly, opportunities and difficulties of replacement, and financial
value. An interesting example is the Mission Report, written by Jolyon Leslie (1990)
for the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) on the impact of war
on the rural and urban settlements in Afghanistan. In his report Leslie (1990)
emphasised the importance of surveying the surviving resources that can be used for
reconstruction. Thus he looked into building materials supply, building skills, water
supply, drainage and sanitation, electrical supply, roads and transportation, public
buildings (medical, educational and religious). Still, he fell short of evaluating the
surviving administrative structure, means of enforcing legislation, the justice system,
etc. This shortcoming represents one of the most typical attitudes by intervenors,
who too often assume that the local systems are either non existent or at the best
unable to cope with the reconstruction programme.
Finally, a Significant gap exists in the literature in terms of the desirability of,
for instance, record- keeping of damage assessment and the up- dating of such
information, despite its importance in determining compensation for the war victims;
matching available resources to needs; and in setting objectives and priorities for
reconstruction.
4.3.2. The promotion of local participation In reconstNction using local resources.
This particular issue is very controversial within the available literature. In some
studies such as those dealing with reconstruction after the Second World War, self-
help construction of housing seems to have been dominant in almost all European
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Countries including the USSR, more perhaps due to the lack of public resources than
concern about the role of the population, it has to be said. For example, because of
the great demand on housing that could not be met by the state on Its own,
encouragement was given in the USSR to urban citizens to rebuild their own houses
(rural populations had to reconstruct their own houses anyway). A popular
pamphlet, 'How to Build Your Own House' was widely distributed. The pamphlet
contained not only the usual information on traditional building methods, but also on
the making of gypsum blocks, earth bricks and brick vaults, on the utilisation of brick
rubble and on simple material tests. It has been claimed that almost 15% of the
reconstructed urban houses were built by this method. (Blumenfeld, 1991 :28).
Furthermore InFinland, where Government propaganda claimed there was "No
iron, no steel - but a lot of land and timberl No capital wealth, no foreign exchange -
but plenty of muscular arms and a desire to workl" (Vennamo quoted in Palojirvi,
1990:6). the mobilization of the maximum rate of self-help housing construction,
combined with land reclaims and improvement of infrastructure, combined to achieve
50% of the nation's housing need within 10 years of the end of the war. People were
given free manuals on how to cut timber and construct houses. Most of these houses
are still in use. (Palojirvi, 1990:6; Bergh6U, 1992).
Nevertheless, in more recent examples of reconstruction after war in developing
countries, where the reconstruction of cities have been perceived a8 an opportunity
for political propaganda and ideological reflections, and because of the patterns of
planning and development that were inherited from the colonial era, a number of
cities have been rebuilt without any involvement of the local population. (eg. Ba'ath
City in Syria; Hovizah in Iran; Suez in Egypt; Fao and Basrah in Iraq, etc.). In rnost
of these countries the debate over reconstruction was almost exclusively limited to
governmental bodies. Uttle or no attempts were made to Involve the local population
at the problem-defining, decision-making or the implementation stages. The
consequence of such attitudes was, "..the poor and the low-income families were at
a considerable disadvantage because their interelts were collectively undefended".
(In Nigeria, Awatona, 1991:19). In reaction to such practices, commentators, with
experience based on working in post-disaster situations, such as Davis (1986; 1988a;
198921)and Lewis (1988b; 1989), expressed caution of suspending the role of the
local population during the reconstruction process. For Instance, Davis (1986:46)
wrote, "There is an acute danger of responding to the challenge of reconstruction by
bringing in external resources to reconstruct peoples' homes and settlements. Past
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experience, from numerous locations, have indicated that the surviving population
have often become mere spectators, while others rebuild their town or city. Extemal
help will almost always be needed, but it must be provided in a supportive role to
strengthen what already exists rather than supplant the local resources of skills,
manpower and knowledge". The findings of our study of the reconstruction
programmes in Yemen, following the Dhernar earthquake 1982, coincides with such
an observation. But, what should be noted is the fact that natural disasters cause to
a large extent limited damage, in comparison with war and at the same time attract
large amounts of external help and resources, (although it never exceeded 30-40%
of the total amount needed, Cuny, 1983). This factor alone encourages governments
and their professionals to take over the whole responsibility of reconstruction.
Other commentators went to the extreme of suggesting that "..the role of the
government should be limited merely to provision of technical and indirect assistance
such as mobilization and extension programmes, subsidizing construction of small-
scale brick factories and the needed fuel, etc". (Azimi, 1986:65). The role of the
state and the local population will be discussed in more detail In Chapter 9.
4.3.3. Compensation.
Paying compensation to Individuals and families for the loss of their homes and
positions during war is a common policy that has been followed by a number of
countries. Similarly, it is a common practice that people, small businesses and
companies would expect and wait for government's decisions on the amount and
nature of compensation paid for war damage. It is interesting to note that insurance
companies do not cover losses due to war and civil strife, in the same way they do
for natural disasters. Thus, over time, compensation has become to be established
as a governmental responsibility.
However, when it comes to paying compensation a number of dilemmas arise:
(1) In most cases the initially promised 'full compensation', is never realised,
government. alway. end up paying a fraction of what they have promised to pay (eg.
Iraq, Barakat, 1989; Iran, Saebi, 1991; Belgium, Uyttenhove, 1990; France, Baudoui,
1990, etc.); (2) Different models of compensation have been followed in different
countries in terms of type (finance, building materials, land, etc.) and in terms of
methods of distribution. For instance, in Belgium followingWW2, "The government
has finally decided to compensate in full all war damage sustained by a category of
people classed as 'economically weak' and to compensate in part, damage sustained
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by those economically more secure. It is likewise understood that material assistance
will be given to the dispossessed by setting up collective work projects and
cooperative societies". (Puissant, 1991: 13); (3) Relating the amount of compensation
to the degree of damage, may lead to families inflicting further damage to their
property in order to qualify for larger compensation, something that has been
observed by the author in the traditional quarters of Basrah, and coincide with an
observation made by Davis (1986:45); (4) There is growing opposition to the idea
of direct compensation to the survivors (victims), Azimi (1986:64) wrote: "..funds
allocated by govemment to the region should be infused into the areas not in the
form of direct cash payment to people, but rather in the form of wages and fees. In
other words, govemment money should create employment and be placed at the
service of redevelopment and reconstruction": (5) One should be aware of the issue
of inflation following war and of the national financing system. In most cases, and
because of inflation the announced amount of compensation looses its value by the
time it has been distributed and by the time people start reconstruction; (6) It could
be the case that compensation for personal belongings and houses is never given to
individuals, such as in the case of post-war Nigeria, simply because it is too
expensive to administer; (7) Companies, industries and small businesses need to be
compensated too, but their compensation does not necessarily take the form of cash.
For instance, it could take the form of cuts in income tax and machinery import tax,
proportional to the degree of damage.
4.3.4. Speed of reconstruction, buDding technologies and quality control.
The time factor plays an essential role in reconstruction. The conventional
approach has been to assume urgency. Hence the desired speed in reconstruction
called, in a number of countries, for the industrialization of the construction sector,
especially for housing and service buildings. Inmost cases, it was thought that speed
of construction could only be achieved through the application of industrialised
building technologies, prefabrication and mass production.
Vietnam's experience in this field gives us a very good example to learn from.
Since the end of the war there, it is said that in Hanoi, many multi-storey,
prefabricated housing projects were built, using the 'montage' building method of
large wall sized concrete panels. Although this method demonstrated, like elsewhere,
the possibility of supplying a high number of square meters of living spaces in a short
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time, It failed to answer the local economic and social conditions of Vietnam.
Over the last three decades, the long-term problems associated with
industrialised building systems became well established; these tend to be highly
dependent on imports, and a high quality transport infrastructure maybe needed to
move the finished panels. Also inexperienced management of large, high-tech
industrial plants is hampered by government restrictions. On the other hand,
conventional methods use 'local' and appropriate building materials and can be more
ealily upgraded to meet modem needs.
Today, many people and some professionals have lost faith in prefabrication
and over-industrialised construction techniques. However, what seems important to
learn from those experiences are the essential properties of industrialization. This may
include the simplification and mass production of building components; speed of
construction, advanced management techniques, etc. (see Azimi, 1986:67). Parse
(1988; 1989) in relation to building technology in Iran, argues that what is needed
in reconstruction is the employment of appropriate technology, which does not mean
"..elementary or primitive technology". He went further, to assume that the term
appropriate has to do also with the local values and beliefs. Recent research has
concluded that if a new technology is to be introduced to a certain community and
is to be adopted, the intended users must not only understand it but also consider it
to be a good idea by their own criteria. Thus, according to Dudley (1991), it has to
be reasonable: a new Idea must be amenable to reason. It must fit in with the
people's view of the world; recognizable: before someone can make a reasonable
evaluation they must have a clear idea as to what it 15; and finally, respectable: a new
technology or practice will only be adopted when it is seen as "..something which
people like us do".
Again, Vietnam's experience, is a good example that demonstrates the shift in
emphasis in reconstruction from prefabrication to more appropriate technologies.
After yearl of reconstruction, the Vietnamese construction industries could not
provide the ever growing demand on cement and imported steel. Thus, they had to
depend more on locally available materials; burnet and sun dried bricks, tiles, lime,
timber, bamboo and small reinforced concrete components are mainly used these
days. According to Nguyen (1989), more research is taking place aimed at
producing light weight walls and floor panels from pressured cement and tree fibres,
to replace the commonly used reinforced concrete. But the main lesson the
experience of Vietnam suggests is that, "Building materials are no longer produced
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and provided only by the government as they were in the past, but may now be sold
in the market place as a consumer good" (Nguyen 1989:4).
This approach towards appropriateness has influenced even the prefabrication
industry where it continued to exist; although aDR like elsewhere in Eastern Europe
have not given up industrialised housing systems, still, "...panel construction
introduced in 1956, has as from 1981 been differentiated for purposes of downtown
area reconstruction, in such a way as to permit both adaptations to existing
architectural styles and completely new and modem replacement construction"
(Wimmer 1989:9).
It is important to note that following WW2 and despite the improvement in
building technology, the reconstruction of cities took much longer than was
anticipated. For example, 10 years after the war Coventry still looked damaged
(Johnson-Marshall, 1966), as well as Rotterdam (Benevolo, 1971b:740). On this
basis, some authors argue that gradual reconstruction maybe more appropriate as
it guarantees quality and satisfaction. "Qiven that there will be internal political
pressures, as well as external forces advocating the priority of fast reconstruction, it
is important to balance this desire against other needs that may be in conflict with
a rapid response such as: the need for a well-planned environment; the need for well-
built buildings; the need for safe building." (Davis, 1988:48).
Other commentators went further to claim that speed in reconstruction can only
be achieved at the expense of quality control, standards can easily be relaxed by
builders, craftsmen and inspectors. For example, Amirahmadi (1990:263) cited that,
"Reconstruction tends to be an emotionally charged process during which pressure
for quick response is high. Safety considerations therefore are usually relaxed for
speedy satisfaction of needs and emergencies".
4.3.5. Monitoring and evaluation.
In general, supervising the implementation of reconstruction programme.,
monitoring the progress and collecting feedback, as well as documenting the process
and the final product are all areas of studies that have not been given appropriate
consideration. This is apparent in the limited number of studies available in which
a proper evaluation of reconstruction has been carried out, even in Europe following
the Second World War.
A great number of mistakes would have been avoided during the reconstruction
of cities in Iran and Iraq, if a monitoring system existed and continuous feedback was
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available. The main problem is that govemments see the moment in which they sign
contracts as the end of their role, and if any feedback is to be collected in the field
then it is either technical or administrative.
An interesting example can be found from post-WW2, where experimenting in
modular houses was a common feature of reconstruction projects. For instance, in
France, the Ministry of Reconstruction in 1946 undertook a number of experiments.
The 'Cite d'Experiences' at Noisy-le-Sec, near Paris was one of the sites where
samples of prefabricated houses from all over the world were erected to be studied
and evaluated. Of course this allowed only for technical evaluation and not the way
the houses would function over the years when put into their living context.
On the other hand, it hal been argued that emphasis should be put on
implementing some of the theoretical reconstruction schemes and allow for their
evaluation in order to adjust and develop any newly proposed schemes, keeping in
mind that, "A planner is no different from any other form of artist. He can only
develop through creation, creation in his own four dimensional medium with the raw
materials of men, trade, bricks and trees and the sequence of seasons, not on paper
pinned on a board". (Tyrwhitt, 1991:17-18). Innovation in town planning is also
important. The post-war French government" ..allocated war-devastated towns to all
the prominent architect-planners Inthe country, Including Le Corbusler, Lurcat, Perret
and others, and retained them to prepare reconstruction plans, again with a
maximum of individual freedom". (Bauer, 1991:41-42).
In conclusion, "Reconstruction should be carefully documented and evaluated
and results published periodically in various forms and places. This is needed for the
better management of reconstruction and for the transfer of the experience to the
general public (to encourage participation), academic communities (for theoretical
development), and to practitioners in other countries and in the future. An
information bank has to be established along with well-defined evaluative criteria.
While govemments should be involved in documentation and evaluation of
reconstruction activities, these are best and most accurately achieved by independent
agencies outside the govemments' sphere of direct influence. Such agencies should
have access to key data and poUcies and be operative at all govemmentallevels".
(Amirahmadi,1991:20).
The evaluation and documentation of reconstruction plays a crucial role in
assessing the long-tenn implications of reconstruction on the socio-cultural and
economic life of the community. Part of the long-term impact could be a reduction
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in physical vulnerability to future wars (Ledbetter, 1988:75) and/or to natural
disasters (Davis, 1986; 1988b) and/or to social unrest (Stollard, 1989). All of these
side effects or impacts need to be registered and in fact planned for in future
reconstruction. Most importantly, reconstruction programmes are bound to have
some kind of long-term economic impact, through the massive construction activity,
which could on one hand, have a positive impact on the local economy, and on the
other a negative one on the on-going building activity outside the reconstruction
areas. Another side effects could be that, the migration of workers and their families
into the affected areas would result in an extra burden on the already stretched local
services and accommodation. "In many post-earthquake situations: Skopje,
Yugoslavia 1963, EI-Asnam, Algeria 1980, Popayan, Colombia 1982, the pre-disaster
population doubled within a few years of reconstruction activity". (Davis, 1986:49).
All these issues need to be observed and detected as they appear and reconstruction
pollcles should be adjusted accordingly, thus comes the need for flexible
reconstruction policies.
4.3.6. The role of the media In supporting reconstruction programmes.
Talking about mobilisation of human and material resources, we touched on the
crucial role played by the media as a propaganda machine. Moreover, the media
plays an important role in educating the population in areas of civil defence, mines,
reconstruction, building materials, etc. It could also play an international role in
attracting funds and support from neighbouring countries. Furthermore, a humanely
social role for planners could be made more effective through the media.
4.4. SOMMARY AND CONCLOSION.
This Chapter gave a taste of the different dilemmas that reconstruction planners
are inevitably going to face when drawing up plans for particular settlements. The
issues that were argued varied from whether the planner should see reconstruction
as a crisis or an opportunity, and whether to replicate what existed before the war or
reform the environment, to drawing attention to questions that have to be addressed
during reconstruction. These can be categorised under the following headings:
conservation of cultural heritage in reconstruction; public and private roles and
investment; housing provision; legislations and issues of land; resettlement polices;
attracting back the pre-war population; reconstruction and civil defence; traffic
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problems and solutions.
Conceming implementation, this Chapter gave rise to a number of arguments
that have to do with: local needs assessment; the promotion of local participation;
compensation; speed of reconstruction; building techniques; quality control;
monitoring and evaluation, and finally the role of the media. All these arguments will
feature again in the coming Chapters on casestudlee, where we will explore in more
detail the governmental and local attitudes towards reconstruction in Iraq, Yemen and
Northern Ireland.
• •••
The coming Chapter (5) presents the main research methods that have been
used in the preparation and development of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FIELD WORK AND LEARNING TOOLS:
METHODOLOGY.
5.1. INTRODUCTION.
In this chapter, two main research methods that have been used in the
preparation and development of this dissertation, besides the literature review, willbe
introduced. These include: (1) a number of workshops, conferences and short
courses, that were used as learning tools over the period of this study (1989-1992)
and; (2) field-work case studies.
5.2. LEARNING TOOLS: WORKSHOPS, CONFERENCES AND SHORT COORSES.
Due to the limited amount of published information on the planning and
management of reconstruction after war and because of the evolving nature of the
subject, it was agreed, with the supervisor of this dissertation, that one way of
developing the knowledge concerned with this issue, would be through attending and
participating, as well as organising a number of national and intemational events.
These workshops, visits, conferences and short courses have played a significant role
in the development of this study over the last 4 years. In some of these events the
author presented papers, in others he acted as the convenor.
This section will report briefly on the most significant of these events,
emphasising the ways In which they contributed to the overall development of the
subject of reconstruction after war and to the particular development of this
dissertation.
,
r
The Second York Workshop on Settlement Reconstruction after War, 16·
18 May 1989, York, OK.
This Workshop is very well documented and reported elsewhere (see Cockbum
& Zargar, 1989a). The value of this workshop to the author can be seen in three
5.2.1.
I
jways: Firstly, it was the first specialised event, on the subject of reconstruction after
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war, in which the author participated. Thus it represented a good chance to meet,
for the first time, a number of experts, only previously known through their writings.
Itwas en opportunity to exchange Ideas and develop the focus of his doctoral work.
Secondly, 22 papers were presented, including one by the author, entitled
'Consideration of cultural heritage In post-war reconstruction - the case of Basrah,
Iraq'. Most of these papers were crucial for the development of this work and are
referred to in one part or another of this dissertation.
Thirdly, one of the main outcomes of this workshop was the introduction of a
set of Guidelines, addressed to responsible authorities, for the reconstruction of towns
and cities devastated by war. (edited by Dr. Ian Davis, 1989b). These guidelines are
discussed in-depth in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, where they are also used as a
general· framework to evaluate the Iraqi experience in reconstruction.
Natlonalldentlty In Contemporary Arab Architecture Conference, 14-16
October 1989, Baghdad, Iraq.
The proceedings of this conference ere well documented elsewhere. (Iraqi
Ministry of Housing and Construction, 1989, in Arabic). It was attended by more
'.2.2.
that 60 delegates from all Arab countries representing academics, government
officials and Independent professionals. This conference came about as an occasion
to represent the Iraqi government's great desire to reflect the so-called 'Arabic
identity' in their newly built settlements.
A desire that was emphasised in the form of a question, when the President
addressed the members of the Association of Engineers and Architects on 10 October
1984: "..where 15 your own identity and architectural character of this era, that is to
be inherited and talked about by the coming generations? ..". In feet, this very
question was taken as the slogan of the conference.
A number of interesting but unrelated studies on Islamic - Arable architecture
were presented by well know Iraqi and other Arab professionals. The author's own
contribution was a paper entitled 'Opportunities to achieve nationalidentlty through
post-war reconstruction '. However, he was the only speaker to really address the
subject of the conference to the needs of reconstruction in Iraq. But the greatest
value of this conference was that it was the first time that the Iraqi government
announced its reconstruction plans for the cities of Basrah and Fao.
Finally, it was e great opportunity to develop relationships with Iraqi officials
and academics that proved to be crucial for carrying out the reconstruction case
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study on Besrah and Fao.
5.2.3. International SemInar on the Preservation and Rehabllltation of Historic
Districts, Towns and Monuments in some Developed Countries and their
Relevance to Developing Countries, 1-15 November 1989, 1M Santo
Kirlko Creativity Centre, Bulgaria.
Organised by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS
Habitat) and International Academy of Architecture (1M) this seminar aimed at
addressing the two-fold problem facing governments in developing countries; of how
to provide the population of big cities with suitable shelter, while preserving and
rehabilitating historic and architecturally significant areas.
Under the chairmanship of Professor PierreVago of France, Honourary President
of the International Union of Architects, nine internationally recognised lecturers,
representing the 'developed world', were invited to present their experiences, followed
by twelve speakers from the 'developing countries' presenting their country reports.
The author was the only representative of II university and presented a paper entitled
"Conservation versus reform in post-war reconstruction: the case of Basrah, Iraq".
Despite the fact that this event had the unfavourable flavour of the 'developed'
preaching to the less-developed, it was a perfect forum for the author to table the
problem of war-damage to national and international heritage (in the developing
countries) and the reconstruction dilemma that follows, of whether to restore what
has been damaged or to construct new structures.
The two-week seminar ernphaslsed the slogan 'inventory, protection,
conservation, rehabilitation and maintenance' of the historical and architectural
heritage (IPeRM). It was hoped that "..the dissemination of the 'developed worlds'
experience to the 'developing world' will help their governments in the
implementation of the IPCRMof their heritage, within the framework of their national
shelter strategies ". «(JNCHS, 1990: 1) 1 •
The conclusions of the seminar centred around the importance of establishing,
in each country, "..an effective body at governmental level responsible for the
elaboration, implementation and monitoring of Its IPeRM poliCies regarding their
national heritage". The responsibilities of such a governmental body were envisaged
to be the following:
{
i
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I
,
\
1) It should encourage financial and technical support for the Implementation of
I For more detail see PreseruaUon and Rehabilitation of Historic Districts, Towns and Monuments,
UNCHS Habitat, Nairobi, 1990.
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IPCRMprogrammes.
2) It must be responsible for the training of national experts, the elaboration of
national IPCRMprogrammes, and coordinating national and Internatlonel co-
operation between different institutions and organisations on a national level,
or within the framework of bilateral or multilateral co-operation.
3) It should also encourage community participation in IPCRM programme
implementation.
What was interesting is the pragmatism with which issues were raised and
discussed, something that is not necessarily reflected in academic and NOOs
meetings, where Idealism seems to dominate. This must have been due to the fact
that each government was represented by a governmental official. Finally, the event
was long enough to encourage informally exchange of ideas and develop
relationships, as well as helping to establish long lasting friendships between the
participants.
The First International Symposium on the Reconstruction Campaigns of
Baarah and fao, Baghdad, Iraq, 18-20 November 1989.
For the purpose of organising a number of international seminars on the issue
of post-war reconstruction In Iraq, the High Committee was formed in 1989. This
Committee was chaired by the Minister of Housing and Construction and its
5.2.4.
membership included a number of Under Secretaries of State for various ministries,
Head of the Engineering Department at the Presidency Diwan and four Director-
Generals of the ministries that participated in the reconstruction programmes of
Basrah and Feo, In addition to the Ministry of Culture and Information.
Under the slogan 'The reconstruction of Basrah and Fao Is an honour
complementary to that of their defence' (Saddam Hussein, 1989), the First
International Symposium was convened in Baghdad during the period 18-20th
November, 1989. The aims of the Symposium were:
1) To demonstrate the outcome of the Iraqi experience in post-war reconstruction
of Basrah and Fao, and
2) to acquire knowledge of similar previous international experiences.
It was attended by 550 speCialists from Iraq and abroad representing
government officials, planners and city mayors from 26 countries. The author, who
was one of nine invited international speakers, delivered a paper entitled "Some
Recommendations for the Reconstruction of Basrah and fao" (Barakat, 1989f). The
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rest of the speakers represented the experience of reconstruction in Vietnam, East
and West Germany, Britain, Japan and South Korea. Speakers also included
representatives from UNCHS (Habitat) and UNDP. From the Iraqi side each ministry
presented its own experience during the reconstruction of Basrah and Fao, beside a
number of studies on the history and development of the two cities. Altogether, 23
studies were presented during the main sessions of the conference.
Before that, on the first day, all the participants were flown to Besrah on a day
visit, where they saw the war-damaged areas and the reconstruction that had taken
place, both in Basrah and Fao. The outcome of the Symposium, based on the
author's evaluation, can be summarised in the following points:
1. Although, in general, all countries that have been involved in war during the last
five decades have witnessed the long term effects of war (human casualties.
physical destruction and social and economic disruption). the reconstruction
policies differed from one country to the other, depending on the particular
circumstances of that country. It has to be noted that, in some countries.
reconstruction pcllcles and processes were largely responsible for transforming
that country's economy from that of ell developing to a developed one. (eg.
South Korea).
)
!
2. The Iraqi post-war reconstruction experience had the following distinctive
features:
a. The total dependence on national resources through out the stages of
planning. implementation and finance.
b. The timing of reconstruction that exploited the national feeling for defence
and reconstruction.
c. The role played by the leadership at all levels, from the President to the
executive engineers on the reconstruction sites, which encouraged and
gave moral support for the hard pressed workers.
d. Innovation in planning, management and technical means to implement
what seemed to be an impossible task. within a pre-determined time-
table.
e. The adaptation of the competitive tender between the different executive
authorities, which was intended to aid the speedy completion of projects.
f. The considerable marginalisation of the local population in all the stages
of planning and implementation of reconstruction.
i
r
3. The Iraqi experience seems to suggest that:
a. Reconstructing. maintaining and improving the infrastructure of war-
devastated cities, particularly those where a considerable portion of
population continued to live in them. such as the city of Basreh,
encourages the return of those who fled the city during the war.
b. The employment of the public sector in its full capacity, combined with
a central command, to reconstruct a city that has political, economic and
social importance. proved to be efficient beyond dispute, compared to the
more conventional and slower pattem of planning and implementation
usually employed. (This does not mean that it was successful from the
'users' point of view).
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c. The use of a pre-determined timetable, along side competition between
the different implementing bodies, proved reconstruction miracles can be
achieved.
d. The exclusive use of in-country resources did help to accelerate the
implementation.
e. The special attention given by the President to the reconstruction
campaigns, represented by fieldvisits to the construction sites, along with
the continuous presence of high ranking officials and professionals on site,
helped to resolve all bottle-necks as they arose and 'encouraged' the
workers.
4. The First tnterneuonal Symposium recommended the evaluation of the
reconstruction of Basrah and Feo in the longer term, to determine the value of
these achievements on an administrative, planning, preparation, design,
implementation and supervision of the construction programme .
.5. The Symposium recommended the use of the regional and intemational
experience available in the field of reconstruction.
6. The Symposium reinforced the authors' doubts that, while infrastructure and
buildings were achieved, consideration of cultural appropriateness were not.
Oxford Programme of Disaster Management, Disaster Management
Centre, 16 June - 20 July 1990, Oxford, UK.
This .5 week course has, probably, contributed the most to the development of
this study and to the author's general knowledge. The course attempted to equip the
participants In three main areas of knowledge. The first was concemed with various
stages of natural-disaster management including preparedness, emergency,
rehabilitation, and mitigation planning. The second concentrated on management
skills, while the third area was mainly concerned with developing the participants'
abilities to design and run training courses, in an attempt to disseminate the
knowledge. The main focus of the course was the importance of 'mitigation planning'
to reduce 'vulnerability' to natural disasters, and the fact that these measures should
be incorporated in all reconstruction programmes.
Thus, the course covered different topics that included: post-disaster issues;
needs assessment and field survey techniques; the role of NOO's in an emergency;
risk assessment for preparedness planning; mitigation planning; post-disaster shelter
and reconstruction case-studies; setting up public awareness programmes;
management skills; self management; training and communication skills; designing
and running workshops. Some of the knowledge received during this course has
contributed to the development of Chapter 2, on the effects of war and the stages of
recovery.
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course directors Ian Davis and Y. Aysan gave full encouregement to the author to
relate these topics to the area of post-war disasters.
Disasters and the Small Dwelling, Disaster Management Centre, 2·6
September, 1990, Oxford, UK.
This international meeting was conceived as e follow-up to a previous
conference on the same topic held at the Oxford Polytechnic in 1978 (see Davis,
5.2.6.
1981). This time more than 65 delegates from all over the world came together with
the intention of producing a series of practical recommendations, to help establish
the Agenda for the next meeting of the International Decade for Natural Dllalters
Reduction, 1990-99 (IDNDR).
In the afternoon of the last two days the meeting broke into four informal
discussion groups. The headings under which dilcuSlionl took place were: rilk
assessment; emergency planning; risk mitigation and training and education.
The author's contribution was a paper entitled 'The rebuilding of Pea city, Iraq:
a case of central government post-war reconstruction'. The importance of this
conference was that it reviewed twelve years' experience of disasters and small
dwellings and was the first international event, In recent times, at which war was
recognised as a disaster and the issue of reconstruction after war was considered
alongside similar issues concerning natural disasters.
This conference emphasised the need to view issues of vulnerability, mitigation
and reconstruction within e socio-cultural and behavioral context. Thus the main
input towards the IDNDR'sAgenda centred around three themes: process, realism and
knowledge.
Knowledge gained during this conference has fed directly Into Chapters I, 2 and
9 of this dissertation. The full proceedings have recently been published (see Aysan
& Davis, 1992, Disasters and the Small Dwelling: Perspectives for the UN IDNDR).
l•
l
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5.2.7. The Second International Conference on the Reconstruction of War·
damaged Areas In Iran, 5·15 January 1991, Tehran, Iran.
Organised by the Central Council for the Reconstruction ofWar-damaged Areas
and the University of Tehran, this conference was the seeend of It.kind to be held
in Iran. The first was in March 1986, and its proceedings were published both in Farsi
(1986) and in English (1991). The Second International Conference was opened with
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a welcoming speech by the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, and was attended by other high ranking politicians, officials,
scholars and experts from Iran and representatives from twenty-two countries.
The announced aims of the conference were to exchange experience and
technical information; review and evaluate reconstruction achievements in Iran and
to propose ways of dealing with the existing and future problems relating to the
reconstruction of the war-damaged areas.
During the general assembly of the Conference 23 papers were presented, the
subjects of which covered a wide area that included: urban and regional planning
policies; reports on reconstruction efforts in Iran; case-studies from other countries;
organisation and implementation of reconstruction; technology and construction
methods; economic and financial aspects; relocation and resettlement, as well as the
psychological and sociological aspects of reconstruction. The author's contribution
came in the form of two papers, the first entitled 'Be reallstlc, demand the Impossible:
an eualuatlon of the reconstruction of Fao, Iraq', and the second 'Community
prosperity through reconstruction management', co-authored withCharles Cockbum.
The afternoons of the second and third day were devoted to three specialised
workshops on the following subjects: 1) Planning, urban design and architecture. 2)
Infrastructure and building technology. 3) Economic and environmental aspects of
reconstruction.
The conference included a rigorous four-day tour of the war-damaged regions
in South-west Iran and the reconstruction projects going on there. These areas
included Isfahan, Abadan, Khoramshar, Susangerd, the villages and cities of
Dehlavieh, Tinikhie, Bostan, Bint Kwar, Howeyzeh, Subhaniyah, and Dezful, in all of
which the reconstruction in progress was closely observed. The following conclusions
and recommendations were the outcome of the conference.
1. Reconstruction is a multi-dimensional issue that requires an overall view and
il not jUlt a matter of physical and material reconstruction; normall1fe must be
encouraged to return to the affected area.
2. The conference strongly recommended the building of social and physical
infrastructure in urban areas, as well as preparing an agricultural base as a
means of employment prior to housing reconstruction. Setting up the
production of local building materials, needed for reconstruction, in the same
areas where they will be utilized to reduce costs, is imperative.
3. Reconstruction is primarily for the people, therefore, their traditions, beliefs,
aspirations and pertlcipetion must be seen as an integral part of the
reconstruction process.
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4. The use of modem building technology and prefabrication may be necessary
to accelerate the reconstruction process, .. The type of modern technology
should be parallel with the needs and aspirations and at the service of the
people.
5. Every reconstruction programme should reflect the 'spirit of defense and heroic
resistance' of the people, as a memorial to the loss of life and destruction.
6. The return of the people to their land willshape and influence the reconstruction
programme, which is inevitably a continuous and gradual process. This should
not be interpreted as an opportunity for delay or hesltatlon in the progress of
the whole.
7. Islamic archltecture in lran has e high value, but unfortunately it hes not been
properly recognised as a basis for reconstruction plenning and design.
5.2.8. \•The Third International York Workshop on Settlement Reconstruction
after War, 21·23 July 1991, York, UK.
Following the recommendations of the two previous workshops on Settlement
Reconstruction after War held at York in 1988 and 19892, and building on their
conclusions, the Third International York Workshop on Settlement Reconstruction
Post-war was organised at the Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies, University
of York, 22nd-24th July 1991. This workshop was fertile ground for the author to
develop his doctorel research. He had the chance, under the supervision of Charles
Cockburn, to develop the themes thet were to be discussed during the Workshop, to
act as the Chairman to some of the sessions and finally to write the final report; all
of which were very useful to the development of this thesis.
The Workshop had four main aims; to provide an international forum to discuss
the possible implications of different reconstruction policies; to receive reports on
recent experiences, developments and advances in reconstruction and to review
interdisciplinary thinking on the subject; to explore reconstruction issues of particular
research interest (settlement planning, outside intervention, local participation, socio-
cultural and economic dimensions and environmental impacts); and to reach
conclusions on ways of involving governments and international bodies in the
development and application of sound policies that would help to promote better
reconstruction practices. Moreover, this workshop was planned with the wider
aspiration in mind; namely, to make the reconstruction pouae» of governments more
responsiue to the needs of people. through encouraging a network of future
2 For the previous reports see Disasters, Volume 12, Number 3, pp. (209·211).
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workshops and study centres to promote such policies, disseminate knowledge and
monitor practice across the world. More than 40 delegates, from twenty countries
attended the workshop and 25 papers were presented.
If the previous two Workshops succeeded in raising the importance of the
subject and explored the multidimensional impact of war as a disaster and provided
the opportunity to explore some of the more sophisticated aspects of reconstruction
planning, which may have been previously over looked by architects, planners and
engineers; this Workshop helped to prove the growing international interest in the
subject and succeeded in getting even more people involved in the development of
reconstruction planning issues. In particular it attracted, for the first time, some
decision-makers, whose decisions in reality are shaping the reconstructed
environment. The presence ofMr Manoochehr Mohandes from the Industrial Progress
£, Development Company of Iran, who is undertaking the programming of the
reconstruction of Khusistan Province under a five year plan, and the contributions
received form Mr Saad Al-Zubaidi and Mr Khamees Muhammad form the IORISI
Centre for Engineering Consultancy, Baghdad, Iraq, added a special dimension to our
meeting). Furthermore, it strongly identified a number of issues that were not given
proper attention in post-war reconstruction poltctes, such as the environmental and
cultural Impacts of war and their role in the subsequent reconstruction.
The main conclusions and recommendations to emerge from the Workshop
centred around three issues: (1) the preparation of a 'Reconstruction Charter',
embodying principles of 'good' government practice; (2) the creation of a network
of study centres, to be coordinated by the 10MS and devoted to the collection and
dissemination of information on the planning and management of post-war
reconstruction; (3) the need to address issues of environmental sustainability at every
stage of reconstruction work and long-term planning.
The Reconstruction Charter has been produced and developed as part of the
this dissertation (see Chapter 10). It was presented at the following events. (For
more detalls on this Workshop and the Charter see Barakat, 1992; Barakat £,
Cockburn 1992b).
1We regret the fact that Mr AI-Zubaidi and Mr Muhammad, were not able to reach York on time for
the Workshop because they were refused visas at the British Embassy in Amman, despite the fact that
the University has done its' best to facilitate this matter with the Home Office. Nevertheless, having to
do a 19·hour journey from Baghdad to Amman, where they stayed for a week, Mr AI·Zubaidi and Mr
Muhammad managed to send their contribution in the form of a video film and a full paper.
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5.2.9. Roots of the Future; a Global NGO Conference In Relation to the 1992
Earth Summit, 16-20 December, 1991, Paris, France.
The Paris conference Roots of the Future brought together more than 860
representatives of citizens' groups, social movements, grassroots groups, as well as
environment and development NOOs from 150 countries. The conference was held
at La Villette, Paris (the science and industry city), 16-20 December 1991 and was
funded primarily by the French government.
This event is part of the ongoing world-wide consultation between NOO's to
draw out their common strategies and agendas, concerning environment and
development for the Earth Summit in Rio de JaneIro, June 1992". The first
conference in this series of international NOOs meetings was held in Tebrak, Tunisia,
December 1988, where the issue of the deteriorating state of the environment was
brought to light. As a direct result of this meeting an inter-regional consultation
process started (comprising the regions ofAfrica, Asia, the Caribbean, LatinAmerica,
North America and Europe). In June 1989 a second conference took place in
Manila, in which the present international economic: system and development model
were identified as the principal causes of the deteriorating environment. A common
conclusion was reached, and that is:
"Only sustainable development, development which caters for
the needs of today's generation without compromising the
ability of future generations to use the same resource base,
can save humankind from the impending catastrophe. Such
sustainable development, can only be possible if it is people-
based". (ELCI,91)5
In early 1990 the Environment Uaison Centre International (ELCI), Nairobi,
Kenya, circulated among the NOO community a ProposedGUidelines Towards 1992,
which also included a proposal for the establishment of an NGO International Steering
Committee for 1992. Thus, the Steering Committee came into existence and since
then a number of preparatory meetings have taken place in which scores of NOO
representatives have participated (in Bergen, May 1990; Nairobi, August 1990; in
Cairo, November 1990; in Geneva, March 1991; in Nairobi, May 1991; and in
Oeneva, August 1991). The Paris Conference was considered the summit of these
4 The Earth Summit is also known as the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development UNCED. In June 1992 the world's leaders met In Rio to agree 'Agenda 21': a programme
of planetary and human survival into the 21st Century.
5 ELCI (1991), "Justice Between Peoples . Justice Between Generations". Synthesis of Citizens
Movements Responses to Environment and Development Challenges.
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meetings, which was meant to be the most comprehensive NOOs meeting ever held
and the most universally represented. This conference was followed by a meeting in
New York, in March 1992, where the final version of the Paris Agenda was agreed.
The Paris Conference had the following objectives:
1. Toshare Information and experience for achieving equitable development and
environmental sustainability.
2. Topromote networking and solidarity among NOOs and people's organisations.
3. Toactivate NOO strategies for impacting the Earth Summit.
4. To adopt an NOO strategy for action: AOENDA YA WANANCHI (Citizens'
Agenda).
It also had the wider aspiration of strengthening civil society around the world
"...in the hope of gradually transforming the way in which our societies are organized
and the way that decisions are made on issues which affect the well-being of all".
(ELCI,1991).
AGENDA YA WANANCHI, is the main document to emerge from the
Conference and is also known as the Citizen's Action Plan (or the 1990's. It is
claimed that the document takes its roots from suggestions and materials submitted
by citizen's movements from all over the world over the year 1990-91. However, it
was in fact drafted by an international committee, dominated by specialists from the
North and ELCI. It focuses on the challenges facing both govemments and citizens,
with the central theme of the active participation of citizens in building the new world
order _ "..a world more socially just and ecologically sound than the world we have
today". It can be seen, in an optimistic mind, as an important statement produced
by groups of diverse backgrounds or just another piece of wishful thinking.
For the author's part, it was surprising to find that the document no where
acknowledges war as a disaster facing both government and citizen. Neither does it
mention the challenge due to natural disasters, or the need to evaluate the worth of
the enormous resources spent on reconstruction and mitigation, in at least 60
countries.
Although the document was open for debate, the very formal nature and
structure of the meetings did not allow for the time and participation required to
express the real concerns of the participants. The hierarchical structure of both the
plenary sessions and the workshops", the lack of translation particularly during the
I Every afternoon the conference split Into six working parties over a period of 16 working hours.
The issues discussed at these workshops were: Human Settlements, Forests, Ocean and Coastal Areas,
Mountain and Hilly Areas, Financial Mechanism and Transfer of Technology and Perspectives on the
Industrialised Countries and Group of n Countries.
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workshops, the pre-detennined choice of topics and the highly sectoral approach, all
meant that it was very difficult for the participants to Influence the Agenda. The
workshops were mainly dominated by elite-experts, whose mother tongue was also
the language of the workshop. However, by the end of the conference a number of
adjustments were presented at the Concluding Plenary Session and were adopted by
the participants, part of which were our concems about war and reconstruction. The
final version of the Agenda VAWANANCHIwas presented to governments at the
Earth Summit in Rio, June 1992. It is also hoped that this document wUlbecome
means of lobbying for NOO's beyond Rio, and well into the 1990's.
Supported by and representing the Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies,
University of York the author participated at this conference. Ooing to Paris we had
four objectives in mind, all of which were actually achieved to a certain extent. These
objectives were:
1. Topublicise the work that is being carried out at the Institute on the subject of
post-war reconstruction.
2. To receive endorsement of the York Charter for Reconstruction after War at an
intemational level.
3. To gather infonnation concerning international organisations involved in the
same area.
4. To receive critical feed-back on both the Charter and the establishment of a
Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU)at the Institute in York.
We distributed the York Charter, some Institute reports and publications and
exhibited panels documenting the effects of war and the different approaches for
reconstruction. This self explanatory exhibItion proved useful, as it allowed the
author to also attend the Workshops. More than 25 individuals and organisations
signed the Charter.
Our contribution was more obvious at the three-day Workshops dealing with the
issues on Human Settlements. The author drew attention to the fact that, while a
considerable amount of NOO involvement followed natural and man-made disasters,
the Agenda VAWANANCHImade no mention of either or of their consequences.
Ukewise, no mention of reconstruction after war, as if we were living in an ideal
peaceful world, faced only with the problems of progressive development. T his
argument was well received and the York Charter wal circulated between the
participants. On the second day of the workshops, the author was allocated half an
hour to clarify the issue of post-war reconstruction and to explain the work that is
been carried out at the 10MS. Following a debate on the content of the Charter, the
author was voted on to the Drafting Committee, which consisted of the workshop
Chapter Flve.
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chairperson, the moderator, the secretary, the reporter and two other participants.
The Drafting Committee had the task of adjusting the YAWANANCHIAgenda
in accordance with resolutions reached by the participants at the Human Settlements
workshop. Being on the committee gave me the chance of working with a number
of well-known participants, as well as the chance of ensuring that our concerns were
being included in the adjustments to the Agenda.
In conclusion, attending the Paris Conference was a great experience, from
which the author gained new knowledge and established a number of future contacts.
He also managed to Influence the Agenda YAWANANCHI,to include a recognition
of war as a disaster and governments responsibilities towards it. Also included was
an appeal to all govemments to establish international commitments and procedures
to address the complex problem of reconstruction after wars and to recognise the
entitlements of civilian non-combatants suffering from war damage to their built
environment.
5.2.10. BuUdlng for Safety, Disaster Management Centre, 29 March - 3 AprU
1992, Oxford, UK.
This event was part of a project funded by the Overseas Development
Administration, ODA,United Kingdom, jointly undertaken by Cambridge Architectural
Research and the Disaster Management Centre, Oxford Polytechnic. The Building for
Safety Project, 1991-1993 is developing a range of guidelines for building
Improvement programmes for low-cost construction In 'natural' hazard-prone areas.
The outputs of the project Include:
1. Building Principles for Safety: technical principles and details of low-cost
hazard-resistant construction. This willbe presented In the form of 5 volumes,
each concerned with one type of building construction; Building Safely in Brick
Masonry; Stone; Earth; Timber; Reinforced Concrete.
2. Communicating Building for Safety: guidelines for methods of communicating
technical information to local builders and householders.
3. Programmes for Building Safely: guidelines for setting up and running
programmes, including the organisation of training programmes and financial
options.
4. Building for Safety Compendium: an annotated compendium of information
about building improvement programmes.
5. Building for Safety Case-studies: case-studies of previous builder treining
programmes.
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\The author was invited to this event as one of the case-study writers, where he
contributed on reconstruction inYemen, along side other case-studies fromColombia,
Jamaica, Vietnam, Guinea, Iran, Turkey, Guatemala, El Salvador, Ecuador, India and
Peru. Although reconstruction and mitigation of natural disasters is not a main
concern of this dissertation, the discussions and exchange of ideas left the author with
many valuable insights.
The following points are a summary of the valuable observations obtained at
this meeting: Firstly, the idea of introducing general guidelines for reconstruction was
criticised, on the basis that it is, yet, another attempt to enforce universally applicable
solutions. However, as the discussion developed further, it was felt that the existing
gap in knowledge about designing training programmes justifies such guidelines.
This observation meant that we should be careful in the way we approach the
production of 'post-war reconstruction guideHnes'. Secondly, it was felt there was
little justification for producing technical manuals, as there are already many
volumes. Particularly in that the technical information provided may not be
appropriate to the place in question. It was argued that, if the target group, as is
claimed, are householders and small builders, then the information may be too
complicated. Equally if the target group is to be engineers and architects, then it is
too simple and may be humiliating for them to read. This brought to mind the fact
that any recommendations or guidelines should address a specific audience.
Thirdly, the idea of establishing an annotated compendium of information about
building improvement programmes, along side producing a book on case-studies of
previous builder training and general improvement programmes was well received.
This helped to support the assumption of this dissertation that ..people and
authorities, faced with the great task of rebuilding their settlements from the ashes,
do not need yet another 'outsider' to suggest ready solutions, on how, when and
what to rebuild. They would rather recetoea wide range of euidence on others' past
successesand failures In reconstruction. Thus the role of thil study therefore, should
be to draw attention to a number of aspects and issues that ought to be taken into
account when conSidering the task of rebuilding and rethinkIng future settlements.
Finally, the vital need to introduce communication as a component of any
reconstruction programme. Thil il an element for developing the concept of people
particIpation in reconstruction. In short, the Building for Safety GuideUne.
recommends that: (1) Improvements have to bemade to buildings. (2) Householders
and builders need to know: why to change, who to tum to, what are the options, and
I
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how to do it. (3) Development workers need to present options which in the eyes of
the Intended beneficiaries are: reasonable; recognizable and respectable. (4) The
designer of a communication strategy needs to consider the target group who will
deliver the message, what tools will be used and whether the intended beneficiaries
have understood the message.
5.2.11. International Forum on Habitat, Poverty and Environment, 20·23 Aprll
1992, Tunis, Tunisia.
This event was organised jointly by END... Tiers-Monde (Environment and
Development in the Third World), based in Dakar, Senegal, and Habitat International
Coalition, based in Mexico. This was the last NQO preparation meeting before the
opening of the Earth Summit in Rio in June 1992. The author's participation in this
event came as a direct result of his contribution to the Paris Conference: Roots of the
future, in December, 1991. He presented the second edition of the York Charter for
Reconstruction After War.
The presentation was followed by a discussion that revealed the extent of
international constraints faced by developing countries, not only to purposeful
reconstruction after war but also on the development process as a whole. It was
widely agreed that reconstruction after war, along side other development issues,
may best be considered at a global level, on the long journey to becoming accepted
practice.
This meeting drew the author's attention to the environmental dimension of
reconstruction. Furthermore, the Housing Rights Charter, which is currently under
preparation by a specialised group of Hie, can be used to further develop the York
Reconstruction Charter.
5.2.12. The 7th International Seminar on Earthquake Prognostic, 22·26
September 1992, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thalland.
Organised by the Disaster Preparedness Centre at the Asian Institute of
Technology, this seminar focused on four main areas of concern:
a. Earthquake prediction: Why is it worth doing? how can it be done? and how
much effort and resources should be devoted.
b. Earthquake insurance.
c. Risk analysis and seismic hazard assessment.
d. Measures of Protection.
It was very interesting to participate in such a highly scientific forum, and to
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observe the way in which groups of geologists, engineers and researchers were
fighting over their share of the internationally available resources for earthquake risk
reduction, each claiming that their area of specialisation was the most important.
However, this seminar was particularly useful to the development of Chapter 7
of this dissertation. The author presented a summarised version of that Chapter on
the reconstruction in Dhamar. It has to be said that the author's conclusions came
as something of a shock to a number of particlpants, who had been involved in the
planning for the Dhemar reconstruction.
5.3. CASE-STUDIES AND THE FIELD WORK.
In order to support the argument of this dissertation in favour of general
recommendations and approaches, it was felt necessary to conduct fieldwork in four
countries: Iraq, Northern Ireland, Iran and Yemen, respectively. Each visit had its
own objectives that have tried to embrace our overall objectives and was concerned
with particular findings to support a certain thesis. In Iraq, the author visited the
war-damaged areas of Basrah, soon after the cease-fire in August 1988. Later on,
in Novernber 1989 when he was invited by the Iraqi Government to participate in the
'Arst International Symposium on Post-war Reconstruction in Basrah and Fao' he
conducted his second field visie. The third field visit took place in April 1991
following the announcement of a cease-fire between the Allied and the Iraqi forces.
The field visit to Belfast, in Northern Ireland, was conducted in March 1990'. The
field visit to the war damaged areas of Iran came as part of the author's attendance
at the Second international Conference on the Reconstruction of War-damaged Areas
in iran, 5-15 January 1991&. The field work in Yemen was conducted between the
9th and the 23rd of November 1991.
When in the field, a main concern of this study has been to devise a method of
research and analysis by which the physical, social, cultural and political reasons
underlying the central government and the local inhabitants responses to the post-war
conditions and housing provisions could best be ascertained. This section presents
,
i
,.
7 The invitation included travel and accommodation expenses.
8 Accommodation and travel expenses were covered by the Third World Studle. Course at the
institute of Advanced Architectural Studies, University of York, to whom I am thankful.
g Travel and accommodation expenses were covered by the Iranian Govemment.
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Figure /5·1J Countries where /feld visits were carried out: Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Northern Ireland and Croatia.
the research methods used, both before and during the field work. In general, the
research methodology for each case-study was developed in the conventional three
stages of:
a. Review of existing knowledge on the subject.
b. Conducting a field study and data collection.
c. Analysis and documentation of findings.
The fact that each case-study had different objectives from the others, and the
fact that they were not intended as comparative studies, has meant that there is no
need to restrict oneself to the adoption of a single research method. Furthermore the
nature of each specific case-study and the availability of information and access to
data, largely dictated the methodology of collecting and thus the analysis of the data.
'.3.1. Review of existing knowledge.
Prior to each field visit comprehensive research, interviews and discussions
with experts and literature reulew was conducted In order to expand the author's
knowledge of the context, as well as to prepare the ground for each field visit. It is
important to note the different degrees in which this stage has been useful to the
research. For instance, in the case of Yemen, virtually all the references that have
been published on the Dhamar earthquake and its reconstruction were consulted (and
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number of individuals in the U.K. who have been involved in the reconstruction
projects at one stage or another: Yasemin AysanlO (visited the area in December
1982 and carried out a needs assessment study); Jolyon Leslie" (Oxfam's Officer
for the Contactor Training Programme, M.ay1983 - December 1988); Professor Cor
Dijkgraaf (Director of the Institute of Housing Studies, Rotterdam and a consultant for
the Dutch government on the Self-help Programme): Andrew Coburn (from the Martin
Centre at Cambridge University, who carried out an evaluation study on the Building
Education Programme) etc. M.oreover, the International Conference 'Disasters and
the Small Dwelling' held in Oxford, September 1991 provided an Ideal arena to meet
a number of experts on the Yemeni reconstruction. One of the disappointing facts
was that none of the 10 letters addressed to Yemeni officials were answered,
including those addressed to the Executive Office. The outcome of this phase was
a written report that encompassed a careful review of the consultants collective
experience on the subject and the literature available. Thus covering the level of
destruction, casualties and damage to property, emergency relief and shelter
provision, and the actions taken by the Government to rehouse and relocate the
affected communities. It also included a brief historical insight into the social and
cultural life of Dharnar Province. This report highlighted a number of issues that
needed to be observed during the field visit, as well as a number of questions that
lacked answers.
Similarly, researching about Belfast, many references were discovered that
enabled a comprehensive study to be conducted beforehand. Uterature has been
used here in two main ways. The first has been to furnish the needed historical and
architectural background, by reviewing certain books and articles. Although,
academic papers specifically on the subject of the research are rare, some published
articles and unpublished papers and dissertations were consulted, such material
provided the second main usage of the literature. At this point the author
acknowledge the help received at the Ubrary of Queen's University and more so at
the Unen Hall Ubrary, where access was permitted to their 'Political Collection',
which contained unique material on the 'troubles' in Northern Ireland. Furthermore,
I,
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10 Y. Aysan is Director of the Disaster Management Centre, Oxford Polytechnic, Oxford, U.K.
I I J. Leslie currently working with the UNHCS in Afghanistan. Besides written communication with
him I have meet him in Tehran, Iran, January 1991 and in London, August 1991.
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contacts were made while Iwas stili in York, that facilitated the arrangements for the
visit. Before going to Belfast, Dr. Paul Stollard from the 10MS was consulted.
On the other hand, in the case of Iraq, and due to the absence of information,
data and officialdocuments concerning the war damage and the reconstruction at the
time of the field visit, the author was limited to gathering information by interview.
In those days, few people outside Iraq knew what had taken place in terms of
reconstruction or after the Iraq/Iran war, what the Governments policies were and how
they were implemented.
5.3.2. Conducting field studles and data collection.
To help establish a general research methodology a number of primary as well
as secondary sources were reviewed. The writings of Gardner (1978): Bell (1980);
and most of all Adam (, Schvaneveldt (1985) present researchers with a clear and
general understanding of research methods in the social sciences. Casley (, Lury
(1981 ) discuss some particular problems and difficulties usually faced by researchers
in Developing Countries. They also draw attention to a number of issues that have
to be observed by researchers while collecting data in Developing Countries. The
writings of Chambers (1983; 1990): Chambers et al, (1989) and McCracken et al.
(1988) introduces the Rapid Rural Appraisal research method, and the Chamber's
'set of biases', or what is referred to as Rural Development Tourism. All of these
references had an Influence on the author's general understanding of research
methods for this study. Some of them were more useful in particular contexts than
others. For instance, the Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and the Chamber's methods
were found very useful during the field visit to Yemen. Furthermore, recent
publications on research methods gave the author some insight into qualitative
research and evaluation, e.g. Patton (1990) and Shaffir (, Stebbins (1991).
Most of the available academic research on post-war reconstruction so far, has
restricted itself to literature review and in some cases in-depth examination of one
particular location, in an attempt to reach conclusions on how to rebuilt that
particular place or region. We have in mind the work of my close colleagues Souheil
El-Mesrl (1992, AI-Burjain village in Lebanon) and Akbar Zargar (1989, Khusistan
region in Iran). By contrast this study attempted to explore the issue in a number of
different contexts and over a number of years, using the author's objectivity as an
'outsider' in all cases. Thus attempting to introduce an international perspective into
the subject. hopefully. without falling into the trap of 'universally applicable solutions' .
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It is believed that avoiding this trap is possible through a meticulous understanding
of the cultural, social and economic context, for each case-study.
Reading through each of the case-studies, and from the way the data has been
collected in the field, one can see that the approech to data collection did not attempt
to be highly structured, in which questionnaires or set strategies were imposed;
rather it was primarily relying on observation and informal interview. In fact, the data
collected throughout the dissertation has been very much influenced by the empirical
approach of social research in which the researcher" ..'goes into' the social world and
makes observations about how people live and behave", (Adam & Schvaneveldt,
1985:19).
To e significant degree, carrying out research requires having a clearly defined
purpose and access to useful data. In these terms, Adams & Schvaneveldt
( 1985: 103) cited that "Two very common designs in the study of social institutions
and human behaviour are the exploratory and descriptive research designs"12.
Because of the different nature of each case-study and what is required from it, the
two approaches for designing a research method, identified eerller, were used. The
first visit was exploratory research, as in the case of researching the reconstruction
of Basrah and Fao, where of the author's cultural affinity helped to seek out new
insights, ask questions, add knowledge to the area of study by registering, often it
seems for the first time, what actually took place In Iraq following Its war with Iran.
Up till that time there was virtually no published information about the scale of
destruction; the reconstruction policies and cempaigns; or the people's reactions, etc.
Hence the study had to be flexible enough to seek knowledge and insight wherever
possible. The author was able to build an analytical methodology that could be used
later on in subsequent visits, in a more tightly designed way. (For example a long-
term evaluation of the reconstruction of Fao City, from the users point of view).
On the other hand, a descriptive research method was employed to evaluate the
reconstruction programmes that have taken place over 9 years in Dhamer, Vemen.
This was necessary because the goal of this particular study was to investigate and
portray as accurately as possible. people's reactions towards their reconstructed
settlements. The end result of this study was an attempt to conclude why they had
that particular reaction, in relation to the reconstruction poliCies. Such an approach
,
t
I
•
12 For a detailed description of the two designs as well as their areas of strength and weakness, It Is
recommended to read the writing of Adams & Schvaneveldt (1985: 101-117).
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for research was suggested due to the many previous reports and published
information that was available beforehand, concerning for instance the scale of
damage, the reconstruction policies, the general context, etc.
Of course, employing a descriptive research technique, in the case of Dhamer,
does not mean that the study was a highly structured one concentrating on
quantitative data. In fact. it was the opposite. emphasis was put on qualitative data.
Furthermore. the large scale of the Dhamari study. and the limited time available
gave a validity to the examination of locations by observation, that characterises
much of today's anthropological and development research. What it means is that
the author went to Yemen, with a predetermined idea of what he was seeking to
know, with an intension to visit a number of identified villages. for different purposes
and to question the way people had adjusted their new homes provided by the
government.
In Belfast the research looked at the effects of civil unrest on the urban life of
the city. and used both the explorative and descriptive approach. There was a
considerable amount of information available to the author, before going to Northern
Ireland that had to be explored and the situation there had to be described before
conclusions could be drawn.
In summery, in order to conduct the different field visits appropriate data
collection techniques were used, to satisfy the different explorative and descriptive
needs for each piece. They maybe summarised as follows:
The possible: 'The art of the possible' for the author. as an individual
researcher was to learn about the highly political context that
in tum would dictate the way the research was conducted.
L.
Be flexible: Be flexible to change (my visit to Yemen was delayed for more
than a year), adapt to different cultures. follow social customs,
exploit ad hoc opportunities and interview everyone in the
field. for everyone has a point of view.
Few resources: Funding my field work has always been a great problem.
Much time was spent raising funds. Preparation. contacts in
advance and making the most of what was available in the
circumstances influenced my work.
Make opportunities: With only three years to finish this study in four different
countries. time in the field was going to be limited and difficult
of access. While in the field. every opportunity to interview
people and observe the situation had to be taken.
Acceptable practices: Use of techniques that are acceptable to the locals. For
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instance, while officials did not mind me using a tape recorder
in Belfast, it was impossible to do so in Iraq.
Be innovative: The one off nature of this study does not permit highly
structured research for every occasion. Pursuing the innovative
approach is also important.
Thus, an attempt was made to come up with a series of research procedures
that met the above conditions and hopefully enabled investigations to be rigorous in
the pursuit of the truth and perhaps go beyond the boundaries of conventional
quantitative research methods. This was based on meetings with officials and key
informants, observations and finally conducting semi-structured interviews with local
people and community representatives in the reconstructed settlements.
Finally, it is important to emphasise again that the author enjoyed a
considerable advantage as an Arab-Muslim in Iraq, Yemen and in the war-damaged
areas of Iran (Khusistan is mostly Arabic speaking). All previous studies on
reconstruction in Yemen, for instance were carried out by Westerners, who applied
western derived anthropological, architectural and economic research methods. Most
of whom could not communicate directly with the locals, neither could they analyze
or justify their findings, without reference to the questionnaire form. This was
obviously not the case in Belfast, but the fact of my clearly not being a Westerner,
did, I believe, elucidate from my interviewees a certain 'realistic' response to my
questions.
5.3.2.1. The timing of the field visits.
It is important to note that in terms of timing of the field visits, although there
has always been an attempt to pre-determine the visits' time, the author did not have
full control because of a number of minor reasons. However, the timing of any visit
has some impact on what the researcher Is likely to experience and how. For
example, the first visit to Basrah and Fao came in December 1988, a few months
after the August cease-fire with Iran. At that time, rubble clearing had not started,
people were just beginning to return to their settlements. The date of the second
visit, (November 1989) was organised by the Iraqi Government. This visit was a few
months after the completion of the Fao and Basrah reconstruction programmes. The
period between October-January (beginning of winter) is considered the best time in
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tenns of climate in Southern Iraq. Thus the author milled the summer, when
temperatures could easily reach 500C In the shade, with no electricity to run the air-
conditioning units.
The visit to Dharnar, Yemen, (November 1991) was nine years after the
December 1982 earthquake, and consequently at least two to three years following
the completion of the latest reconstruction project. However some projects were
completed 4 and 5 years ago. In additionally, it was just after the harvest season
(September-October), which made it polsible to interview both men and women in
the same family. Thus, overcoming one of the handicaps identified in the evaluation
of the Self-help Programme by a Dutch team, who conducted their visit in September
1988 during the harvest season. (see Dijkgraaf, 1989: 15).
Thirdiy, the visit took place at the beginning of winter to counter the fair season
bias. Although the winter is dry and might seem a suitable season for visitors, it is the
hardest season faelng the locals, when dry and dusty winds fill the place. It is very
cold at night, reaching -3 or -4°C below zero. It is also the season when food is more
rare. 1991 was particularly hard because the last three rainy seasons were not as wet
as usual. Fourthly, the visit came a year following the Qulf War, that meant a new
'dimension' had to be considered: the retum of a million migrant Yemeni workers
from the Qulf States. The impact of this was particularly evident in the Dhamar
region and its reconstruction projects, as we shall see in the coming Sections.
Finally, the visit took place at a time when the Executive Office for Reconstruction
(EOR) was in its last days before being abolished in December 1991. This meant that
the staff and their vehicles could devote more time to help the euthor'".
Still, conducting the visit in winter had the handicap of a very short day and
since most of the settlements were in remote areas over bad roads, it was almost
impossible to travel after sunset, yet there were no hotels.
On the other hand, and because of the accelerated poUtical events since August
1990 (the invasion of Kuwait), the author's third visit to Besrah and Fao that was
planned to take place in August/September of that year, had to be re-scheduled
several times and eventually cancelled. While his visit to Iran was planned as part
of an international conference that was timed by the organisers to take place during
the belt season to visit the Khusistan area.
13 On 22 November 1991 an earthquake struck the region of ibb to the south of Dhamar. I learned
recently that the Oovemrnent took the decision of maintaining the EOR.
Mehodology.
-.~..~
166
5.3.2.2. Meetings with officials and key in{onnants.
Due to the strong formal and informal political character of the topic of this
dissertation and of the reconstruction programmes investigated in the case-studies,
it was important to understand and respect the local political and social structures,
in different contexts and to try and operate within them. Meeting officials was one of
the basic methods used, not only to collect information and to have an insight into
the situation, but more importantly to pave the way for the coming field work and
gain access to the damaged and reconstructed areas. Meetings with officials ranged
form embassy officials In London, to field architects and engineers, to Ministers and
Mayors, as in the case of Basrah.
Access to officials varied, depending on the way they perceived research. The
word 'evaluation' or 'investigation' was never used. For instance, in both Iraq and
Yemen the author was made welcome as an Arab, while In Belfast, although the
author was generally welcomed some people thought that Iwould do better studying
a Middle Eastern context. Of course, different officials in different countries, showed
different degrees of co-operation over information and documents. In many cases
eventual co-operation of some officials was only possible as a result of pressure put
on them by more influential figures.
Diplomatic observation of the local etiquette and customs enabled the
researcher not only to 'integrate' himself but also to learn more about local customs,
values and beliefs. Diplomacy, as employed in the Yemeni, Iraqi and Iranian visits,
includes everythIng from observing local customs, to adopting local dress and In the
case of Yemen joining the men chewing 'qatt': the local substitute for alcohol. These
latter proved good occasions to question and listen. As are the invitations to eat and
drink endless cups of coffee, a means of bridging the gap between researcher and his
host. In Belfast, assimilation was not possible. Although Imet the locals in the pubs,
the fact that I do not drink alcohol did inhibit our discussions.
I
5.3.2.3. Personal Observation.
"Information about processes and about invisible structures is not readily
derived from counting things". (Peattie, 1983 quoted in Hamdi, 1991 :82). All the
case-studies required gathering data by informed observation. Furthermore
observation was used because "... quality of information is sought first by
observation, analysis, and explanation of what is seen and told. Observation provides
a check on explanation and, vice versa, one interpretation may be refined by another
i
}
I
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until some consensus is reached over the issues or problems in question". (Hamdi,
1991 :82).
In Yemen, the author developed a check list, based on an appropriate
framework. This made it possible to register and cross check some of the rather
dubious remarks made by the various interviewees. In Belfast, first-hand
observations took the form of systematically walking or driving with the interviewees
around the Inner city areas with a large scale map and camera, noting and
photographing features like barriers, bricked-up buildings, wall murals, etc. One
result was the 'classification of barriers' at the 'interface lines', recorded in Chapter
7. The observation technique was similarly employed In Iran and Iraq. However, In
Iraq and in many places in Iran photographing was not allowed. Making sketches
helped to record a number of Significant Images.
5.3.2.4. Semi-structured Interviews.
The semi-structured interview was appropriate to gather qualitative information
on a wide range of questions, in a short time, with the limited resources available.
They were conducted with engineers and architects, local organisations'
representatives, as well as local inhabitants and beneficiaries of reconstruction
programmes (users). Also, the interviews included those with local influence, such
as community leaders (sheiks), school teachers, etc).
In Dharnar this type of interview and discussion was carried out with officials
during evening gatherings in the 'Diwan'14and proved to be of a great value. Away
from the official atmosphere of the office, sharing dinner or chewing 'qatt', allowed
the conversation to progress more revealingly, creating an ideal opportunity for
obtaining genuine expressions about the advantages and the shortcomings in the
management and administration of the Reconstruction Project.
The questions and conversations carried out during the interviews were
structured differently to give an insight into the physical, social and attitudinal factors
that corresponded to the aims of each case-study. This proved to be useful for
obtaining underlying beliefs and thoughts. One final point about how the interviews
were conducted in Belfast, is that they were held with the use of a tape recorder when
ever possible. This had many advantages for me al an outsider. The following
14 In Dhamar 1was kindly offered accommodation in the Executive Office's Dlwan. The Diwan is 8
separate room within the camp of the office, where the engineers and managers gather to chew qatt In
the afternoons.
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sections discuss some additional issues that have to do with the use of interviews:
a. Language.
Although the basic language in Iraq, (Khusestan) Iran and Yemen was Arabic
at the beginning it was difficult to understand the local dialect. Particularly as each
locality has its own expressions. (For example, in Dhamar, the term Dhaima is used
instead of Matbakh to denote a kitchen, and Haar is used to denote an animal shed).
Again, in Yemen, the fact that there was a daily Jordanian film on TV, meant
that people watching it in Dhamar city and some other towns, found it interesting to
talk to a Jordanian. This experience showed the need to spend one or two days in the
field getting used to the spoken dialect. This point makes me wonder how was it
possible for non-Arabic speaking researchers to conduct their surveys and interviews
with comments having to pass through a translator? Especially in situations where
one meets a group of people and more than one expresses his or her point of view
at the same time, some of whom might be quickly silenced by the man dominating
the conversation. In some particular cases, the intervention of my companions in an
attempt to explain what people intended to say, proved to be a handicap, particularly
when he became carried away trying to interpret on their behalf.
Similarly, in Belfast, I found it difficult, at the beginning to understand the Irish
dialect. To keep asking people to repeat what they have said does not allow for
continuity in the conversation. Thus, the use of the tape recorder was helpful, for
analysis and documentation of the findings.
b. Suspicion, Fear and Expectations.
In a few cases, particularly where people have a reason to fear either the
authorities or the military, (for instance in Dharnar, where other than those intended
in the reconstruction programme had squattered the reconstructed houses), there was
suspicion and uncertainty as to why we were visiting their settlement. Some
expressed their fears that we might be there to re-possess the house. In a single case
we were asked to swear to 'Allah' that we did not intend any harm. Itwas necessary
to say that we were there to learn from their experience of reconstruction, in an
attempt to avoid repeating similar mistakes in the rebuilding of the war-damaged
settlements in Iraq. Their strong feelings and association with the suffering of Iraqi
people provided an opening topic of conversation that turned the focus from the
'outsider', to the problem of war destruction and the subsequent reconstruction. The
t
i
Chapter Flve.
169
" way these conversations developed, counters, in the author's experience, the
assumption by many researchers, that the people's knowledge is in some way limited
and less valuable.
Similarly, while in Iraq it was important to explain why we were there. The
above explanation also helped the people not to develop any potentially damaging
expectations as to why we were there. We made it clear that we were not there to
offer any material help. The informal atmosphere of talking to people without a
questionnaire, helped to 'integrate' the author with the people living through the war.
They had, it seems, filled in many questionnaires in the hope of compensation.
During the conversations we had to be careful not to discuss people's political
preferences, or their views about the war.
l,
5.3.3. Analysis and documentation of flndlngs.
For the purpose of documenting and analyzing the findings of each case-study,
a separate frame work was formulated to serve the aims and objectives of that
particular study. Furthermore, following each visit, a full report was written, on the
basis of which a number of conference papers and articles have been published (see
bibliography) .
In the case of reconstruction in Iraq, the 11 Underlying Principles for
Reconstruction after War~ (Davis, 1989b editor) referred to later in Chapter 6 are
used as a general framework to evaluate their experience. While in Yemen, the aims
were: to reach conclusions concerning the assumed efficiency of centralised project-
based reconstruction; to highlight the Importance of culturally sensitive approaches;
and to derive a reconstruction management model, based on the direct involvement
of the local people. Here a framework was needed to measure the degree of
acceptance by the population of their reconstructed settlements, in order to assess
the success or otherwise of the programme. (Chapter 7). The findings of the field
visit to Belfast were documented and analyzed under certain headings appropriate to
this study such as, the impact of the 'troubles' on urban design; the effect on
construction industry; reconstruction compensation, etc. (Chapter 8).
Finally, although the findings from the field visit to Iran are not included in a
separate chapter of this dissertation, they are referred to and used to support a
I~ These principles were derived by participants at the Second York Workshop on Settlement
Reconstruction, held in May 1989. at the Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies, University of York,
UK.
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number of arguments throughout the dissertation, such as in discussing the context
of thinking on the planning and management of post-war reconstruction. (Chapters
3 (4).
5.4. Summary and conclusion: methodological observations.
It seems appropriate to conclude this Chapter by listing a number of
obselVations concerning the research and research methods in the subject of
reconstruction after war. Hopefully, by considering some of the following
observations, researchers can in the future carry on with further studies on this
important topic of reconstruction after war.
1. War, whichever way you look at it, is a disaster of the greatest magnitude, with
multi-dimensional effects, it is difficult to gather accurate information or to
assess the damage in a comprehensive way. It is recommended that small
case-studies are carried out over a wide area.
I
2. 'Truth is the first victim of war'. The researcher should structure his/her
research to check the propaganda against the facts.
3. The nature of the subject, requires the researcher to be discreet when carrying
out field work.
4. Conducting field work can be dangerous. The aftermath of war lives on long
after the event; ruined buildings, buried mines and physical disability.
5. People's response to questioning is certainly affected by fear and suspicion. ,
f
6. The degree of confidence the researcher enjoys, being an outsider or insider,
plays an important role in conducting research.
7. Objective research is needed. Certainly being an outsider may help, but the
scenes and stories of suffering make It difficult. The more one becomes aware
of political facts and history, the more difficult it maybe to be objective,
especially when looking into the role of the state and their reconstruction
policies. 1
I
j
8. Cross-cultural studies are important to help present reconstruction at an
international level. The format in which the findings are written or published
has to be carefully considered, in order to reduce the natural bias in all of us to
be interpreted as favouring one side or another.
••••
The coming three Chapters (6, 7 & 8) will present the field work carried out in
Iraq, Yemen and Northem Ireland respectively.
t
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CHAPTER SIX
POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION IN IRAQ;
THE CASE·STUDY OF BASRAH AND FAO.
6.1. INTRODUCTION.
This Chapter examines the reconstruction campaigns of the southem cities of
Basrah, the second largest city after the capital, Baghdad, and Fao carried out by the
Iraqi government following their devastation during the eight-year war with Iran
(1980-1988). It also touches on the reconstruction of Baghdad following the
American-British bombardment (16 January-25 February 1992).1
The author visited the war-damaged areas of Basrah soon after the cease-fire
in August 1988. Later, in November 1989 he was invited by the Iraqi Government
to participate in the 'First International Symposium on Post-war Reconstruction in
Basrah and Fao' and conducted his second field visit. The third field visit took place
in April 1991 following the announcement of a cease-fire between the Allied and the
Iraqi forces. The reconstruction campaigns were completed in record time, based on
a predetermined time-table, despite having to work in adverse weather conditions and
the remoteness from the points of supply. Besrah's reconstruction was started in
February, following two months campaign of rubble clearing, and lasted until June
1989, when the work on Fao started. This city was rebuilt in a surprisingly short
time; 114 days. While reconstruction in Basrah did not go beyond repair of the
infrastructure and street beautification, Fao was totally rebuilt according to a new city
plan.
This study sets out to examine the reconstruction approach and the effects of
pcllclea on Implementation. An attempt is made to identify some of the positive as
well as the negative aspects, hopefully in a constructive criticism. It concludes by
listing a number of observations and assumptions concerning centralised government
reconstruction. The author understands that wars are generally imposed on people
I Another air-attack by the Americans was carried out against Iraq in January 1993.
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by their governments, with all the trauma of life dominated by the centre. But he
does not feel that the post-war period, in the 1990's and beyond. need necessarily
be exclusively dictated by the exclusive needs of the government.
Besides displaying many of the dilemmas that have been discussed in the
previous chapters, this case-study sets out to test the main hypothesis of this
dissertation that 'Settlement reconstruction should be an integral part of a nation
wide development, ..., reconstruction that takes the form of a series of centralised
projects (infrastructure, housing and publlc buUdings) Is unlikely to be resource
ef/lcient or culturally sensitive'.
6.2. WHY BASRAH AND FAO?
The Iraqi reconstruction study is the first In e number of casestudles that are
Intended to help formulate a 'set of recommendations for the planning and
management of reconstruction after war'. The reconstruction of Basrah and Fao wes
selected as a case-study for the following reasons. Firstly, it is the only planned
programme of reconstruction that has been implemented in Iraq followingits war with
Iran. The other organised reconstruction cempaigns that are currently being
undertaken in Baghdad and Besrab ere due to the Allied attack in January/February
1991. Secondly, they are an example of the tote 1 domination of the State, where in
theory the central government was keen to assume full responsibility for every aspect
of reconstruction. However, in the view of this author, the government, by its actions.
was not able to deliver in an appropriate manner.
6.3. AIMS s OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY.
The aim of this exercise is to investigete how a State emerging from war,
confronted by a massive need for rehabiIitetion end reconstruction responds to such
extreme circumstances in the short-term. It emphasises the fact thet the State needs
reconstruction as much as reconstruction needs the State. The study also attempts
to highlight some of the successes and feilures of the reconstruction campaigns of
Besrah and Fao, by employing the 11 Underlying Principles for Reconstruction after
War2 (Davis, 1989b editor). By so doing this study sets out to achieve two
objectives:
2 These principles were derived by participants at the Second York Workshop on Settlement
Reconstruction, held in May 1989, at the Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies, University of
York, UK.
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a. To stress the importance and the extent of the political dimension in
reconstruction after war.
b. To reach conclusions concerning the assumed efflclency of centralised project-
based reconstruction.
In reaching the above objectives It is necessary to make the following two
declarations. Firstly, the author is trying to learn some lessons from the Iraqi's
experience in reconstruction, so that those who suffered from the war may benefit.
He in no way means to understate the achievement of the Iraqi Govemment in the
reconstruction of Basrah and Fao. He simply suggests that, in general what has been
built should not be seen as an end in itself. On the contrary, it should be seen as a
first step in a long process of rebuilding. At the same time, reconstruction should be
considered as an open experiment for local discussion and involvement, not least for
the govemment planners. Secondly, this study is based on a short-term evaluation,
and thus concerned more with the government policy aspects of implementation and
decision-making. It is appreciated that in order to make a more objective evaluation
of the rebuilding of Basrah and Fao, there should be a certain period of time within
which the good and bad results will 'float to the surface', as a result of practical and
realistic interaction between the built environment and its users: the people. In fact
this was the main objective of this study, and a field visit was planned to take place
In 1991, two years after the completion of the reconstruction of the Basrah and Fao.
But unfortunately because of the dramatic events that have taken place since then;
the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait from August 1990 until February 1991, it became
virtually impossible to conclude such a study within the time target of this
dissertation. Nevertheless, we have gathered sufficient indicators that can be used
for this short-term evaluation and can be helpful in guiding us in future reconstruction
work.
6.4. THE CITIES OF BASRAH AND FAO: GENERAL CONTEXT
AND THE SCALE OF DAMAGE.
6.4.1. The Province of Basrah
This Section will discuss Basrah; the Region, with its different geographical,
environmental and demographic data. Later, it will concentrate on the two major
cities of the Region: Basrah and Fao.
The city of Basrah is the main administrative centre in the southern
macro-region (province) of Iraq, where, there are four macro-regions; Northern,
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FIgure /6-1J Basrah Region, the location of the CLUes of Basrah and Fao.
[Source: Llewelyn·Davies 1973: 1B, 1st Report/.
Middle. Western and Southern Region. Basreh is the administrative capital of Basrah
County (Mouhafada) which is one of the 16 Counties in Iraq. Balrah County includel
7 Sub-Regions (Qadha); Basreh, Abu al Khassib. Al Qurna. Al Fac, AIZubair, Shatt
ai-Arab and AI-Madina3• The total area of the Basrah Region is 19,702 km2•
According to statistics in 1977, the region's population was 1,008,626 which
Is 8.4% of the whole Iraqi population. Out of this population 79.4% were urban
inhabitants living in the main city of Basrah and the other smaller towns spread
3 Unpublished report (1975). Basrah Reglonal Plan. (Arabic), prepared by the Regional PlaMing
Committee, for the Ministry of Planning, Baghdad.
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through out the region", However, according to more recent statistics conducted in
1987, due to the war, the population of the region has dropped to 872,000.
The Southern Region gained its importance because of many factors, which
continued functioning until the beginning of the war: firstly, the Region
accommodates the main part of the Iraqi industrial investments, including the Oil
industry'. Secondly, Its strategic importance as the only Iraqi port and gate-way to
the rest of the world, which gave it a great commercial importance; thirdly, its
importance as an agricultural centre, especially palm plantations, vegetables and
seeds. As well as the factors mentioned above, the Region has an extensive
infrastructure network, including railway lines, roads, highways, port facilities,
electricity and water supply systems", However, these same factors caused the
region's suffering and destruction during the war.
a. Geography and Climate
The Basrah Region is part of the Mesopotamia lower delta lands. The term
Lower Delta means the area from al-Amare south-wards to the Arabian Gulf. The
Region is covered by the 'tails' or vagrant tributaries of the Euphrates and Tigris
rivers, and is the cause of the deltaic mud of the Shett-al-Areb and the Marshes
(swamps) Hor-al-Hammar, with low lying alluvial deserts on either slde". The whole
Region was covered with water during the early geological centuries and a large area
of the Region is still covered with water, such as the Marshes.
The earth of the region, and especially in Basrah city, is salt-sedimented delta
earth; throughout the year stagnant water remains because the level of the ground
water is very high8. In order to reach this water it is necessary to dig only a few
meters. The soil in this area justifies the construction methods of traditional houses,
..Unpublished report 1985. The Basic Design of Basrah City. (Arabic), prepared by the Urban
and Regional Planning Team at the Ministry of Local Government, Baghdad.
~According to the Uewelyn·Davies (1973) planning report, among the industries invested in
Basrah County are the following: 011 and gas production, heavy engineering, ship building and repair.
chemical fertilisers. petro-chemicals. paper, construction materials, power and water treatment.
fishing. agricultural services and warehousing.
• Unpublished report, Basrah Regional Planning. 197~.
7 Unpublished geographical handbook, Admiralty (1944) Iraq and the Persian Qulf. Prepared by
the British Naval Intelligence Division.
• AI.Ani, Khatab (1972) The Agricultural Geography of Iraq. (Arabic). Baghdad.
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as we shall see later. However, the spreading water canals and creeks are reducing
the level of this ground water. The cross section of the upper ground level is of three
layers; the surface is 2.5-6 meters deep and it is hard muddy earth, the second is a
very soft weak muddy layer 10-20 meters deep, the third level is sand and is the
most compact". "The whole area is unsuitable for multi-storey structures, since
sizeable buildings must have raft foundations. The use of piles Is restricted by the
cost of sinking piles to the great depth required" (Uewelyn-Davies 1973:118, First
Report).
Basrah is built entirely on alluvial mud laid down by the river, while the whole
area is flat without any notable topography. Nevertheless, in Old Basreh and Ashar
and along the Ashar river, the ground level rises up to about 6.00 meters above sea
level, while at Fao the ground level varies between only 1.00 and 1.80 meters above
sea level. Throughout, the region roads and railway lines have been mainly
constructed on bunds at elevations between 1.80 and 2.50 meters.
"During the floods the water levels of Hor-al-Hammar, the Gurmat Ali and the
Shatt-al-Arab rise considerably above the general ground level of the surrounding
land, causing inundation of large areas" (Uewelyn-Davies 1973:115, First Report).
Almost the entire municipal area has been surrounded with dams to protect the city
against these inundations. However this protection can not fulfil its purpose
completely, because of the uncontrolled creeks, through which the high water level
will expand over the city. Shatt-al-Besrah, a recently built canal linking the
Hor-al-Harnmar to the Khor-al-Zubair at the Arabian Gulf, is intended to work as a
flood-way, discharging the flood water. However these flooded areas represent one
of the main obstacles for any suggested expansion of the city.
The climate is sub-tropical, hot and moist in summer and mild with rare falls
of rain in winter. The monthly mean temperature rises from 12°C in January to 34°C
in July, the mean yearly temperature being 23.9°C. In Fao, temperature could easily
reach 500Cduring July and August. The average humidity may reach 47% in Basrah
City during August, due to the surrounding water areas; the marshes and
Shatt-al-Arab waterway and the Qulf. "The highest mean relative humidity occurs
in January 81% and during summer it does not fall below 46%" (Uewelyn-Davies
1973:116, First Report). On average it rains for 32 days a year during winter
II According to a personal interview with luad Sami, Conservation Architect In Basrah. January
1989.
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(November-March). The highest fall occurs in December 36.7mm. The mean annual
rainfall amounts to 162.5mm, but can be as high as 302mm. or as low as 70mm.
"The prevailing wind direction is North-West, followed by westerly winds. Winds
from North-East, East, South-East and South are relatively rare. Winds during the
hot season, June-August, rarely blow from East, South-East or South; whereas in the
cooler seasons, winds from those directions are more frequent" (Uewelyn-Davies
1973, First Report, p.ll6). Dust storms are quite frequent, where particles of sand
and dust from the arid terrain are blown by the wind high into the air and remain
suspended there. The climatic conditions as described above were fully understood
by the previous generations of Inhabitants. Their understanding was reflected in the
shaping of the traditional built environment, a privilege that does not exist in the
newly developed areas.
b. Population, culture and Religious structure.
The only distinction to be felt in terms of race in Iraq is that between Kurd and
Arab, otherwise the fundamental distinctions are not those of race, but of religion.
About 93% of the people are Muslims, and Islam is the official religion of the State,
but Muslims are of two sects Shia and Sunni. The Sunnis are split by the racial
distinction between Kurds and Arabs (see AI-Kalaf 1965).
Within the small non-Muslim minority, the largest single group is the Christians
and they are divided into many churches and sects. Previously, a minority of Jews
lived in Iraq, especially in Baghdad and Besrah. They then controlled a great part of
the economic life of Iraq, as traders and money lenders, owning some of the
traditional houses both in Baghdad and Basrah. However, all of the Iraqi Jews left
for Palestine, after the announcement of the Jewish State on the land of Palestine in
1947.
The former religiOUSdistribution of the population is reflected very clearly in the
city of Basrah, both in terms of social and physical pattems. Although the city and
its Inhabitants have been Westemised, the traditional areas have retained their
culture, which predominates even in extemals, such as dress and food. Here you still
find both men and women in their traditional dress with their traditional need for
privacy. On the other hand, in the modem part of the city and especially in the
Comic he area of Shatt-al-Arab, one can see the decline of social identity and
religious values. In the modem part of the city there are a number of modem hotels
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with bars and night clubs, which are now the substitute for the old Coffee or Tea
Houses as social gathering places in the traditional areas.
c. Local economy.
The role of Basrah as a cultural, administrative, service and distribution centre
of the Region is fairly clear. Commercial activity provides the main characteristic
of the city, due to its location and the fact that it is the main Iraqi port. The greater
part of the local population is maintained directly or indirectly by commerce and the
activities of the port, as well as the date palm industry. The packing and shipment
of dates provides jobs for a large labour force at harvest tlrne'". The commercial
character is also reflected by the high concentration of shipping companies,
commercial agencies, international banks, as well as the Magi! port and its railway
headquarters.
Although Basrah Region is the location ofmassive industrial investments, which
were supposed to provide about 60,000 jobs up until 1990 in both industrial plants
and port facillties", Basrah itself is not the location of major industrial plants. Still,
there are some local crafts within the city itself which are necessary for its urban life:
metal-workers, carpenters, masons, bricklayers and blacksmiths, as well as some
light industries, such as food processing. There are also a considerable areas of
warehouses. As a whole, Basrah's industries are mainly concentrated in two zones:
near Shatt aI-Arab on the way to Abu-al-Kassib and on the way to AI-Zubair.
On the basis of data from the 1947 and 1957 census and from the 1973
Household Survey, the Uewelyn-Davies report, stated that only 20% of the population
(or sample population) were actually employed in 1973. The ratio of women actually
working to the total female population is reported in the same study to be 2.7%. This
low participation by women in the work force can be expected to increase because
of the war and its results. I
\,
10 AI-Kalaf, Jassem (1965) Demographlcal. Economic and Natural Geography of Iraq. (Arabic),
Baghdad.
II llewelyn-Davies Weeks Forestier-Walker f, Bor (1973). Basrah Development Plan. Third
Report. Unpublished report prepared for the Ministry of Municipalities, Baghdad, Iraq.
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~ Date groves-~
FTgure{~2/ The general layout of the City of Basrah.
{Source: The Mun(c(pallty of Basrah. 1gag/
6.4.2. The City of Baarah.
Basr2lh city is situated on the western side of Shatt-al-ArabI2, in the Southern
Region of Iraq, 80 km to the north of the Arabian Qulf and 600 km south of the
capital Baghdad, to which Basrah is connected by two roads, a highway and 21
r2lilway line. "The City lies within the area of the date groves, which form 21 narrow
fertile strip of an average 7km width on either side of the Shatt-el-Areb"
(Uewelyn-Davies 1973:114, First Report).
With 21 population of 452,102 in 1977, Basrah city has 44.8% of the Region's
population, with this population Basrah is considered the second largest city in Iraq
after Baghdad. The following are the population assessments calculated by the
Basrah Regional Planning Committee in 1985, based on average growth rates of 3.7
% per annum 13:
12 Shatt.al.Arab waterway. flows from the confluence point of Tigris and Euphrates rivers at the
town of Quma into the north welt tip of the Arabian Qulf. at the city of Fao.
13 This assessment ignores the effect of the Iran-Iraq war, although it was made during the war.
The average growth rate and the age and sex structure should be expected to change substantially
after the war. Also the number of migrants from the surrounding destroyed rural areas have a
significant impact on the city's growth.
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Year Population
1977 452,102
1980 509,883
1985 616,700
1990 733,818
2000 1,055,297
Table 6,1. The estimated population growth of Basrah.
The above projections and assessments have been revised in a population
census that was carried out in 1987, which estimated the total population of the city
at epproxlmately 350,000, with Ddeereese ofmore than 100,000 over the eight years
WDrwith IrDn14.
"The land use pattern of Basrah is characterised by the scettered historical
development of the city with its polarisation around several centres; Old Basrah,
Ashar and the port of Magil" (Uewelyn-Davies 1973:118, First Report). Nowadays,
the pre-existing vacant land and date groves between the various traditional centres
are very much reduced, Ashar and Old Basrah form almost one settlement.
The oldest residential areas are Old Basrah and AI-Ashar. Houses here belonged
to the former wealthy merchant class and most of them are of the 'treditional
courtyard' type, while the Corniche (on Shatt-al-Arab west bank) and the area
immediately behind, were developed as a wealthy residential aree. The other old
residential district is to be found in Magil, which has developed since 1916 for
Europeans running the Megil port. There houses were of lerge executive type built
of yellow brick in the Anglo-Indian style. In between those settlements the less
fortunate people lived in sun-dried brick houses. After the 2WWthe sartfasl5 started
to appear, on the boundaries of the residentiel areas.
Housing schemes in Basreh started es early as 1951, when the municipelity
began the development of 'Jamhooria' district. The houses were set back to beck
in blocks and built of low standard local bricks. The second attempt to solve
Basrah's housing problem was in 1955-59, when the Ministry of Housing built the
r
I
14 Information gathered during the Rrst International Symposium on the Reconstruction of Basrah
and Fao, November, 1989.
I~Sariras are squatters houses constructed with reeds and can be waterproofed with mud. A
sarifa house generally consists of one or two rooms and a small open yard encircled by a tall reed
fence.
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Figure /6-3) The traditional architectural style, Ashar Creek area.
(Source: The author, 19B9)
'AI-Asmai' housing scheme. The houses were arranged in blocks of greater size and
better community facilities than 'Jamhooria,16. A large terraced-housing project
was built in Maqil in 1958.
(Ba'ath City) to the north of 'Hat-al-Husseln', was another scheme to house the
sartfas people and to provide them with basic amenities, which was part of the
clearance programme in 1965. Hai-al-Hussein was laid out in regular plots on which
they built their own houses. Streets were left unpaved until the mid 70's, when
electricity was supplied and water was provided at public taps. However, the most
recent residential areas were developed in the form of suburban houses around the
14th of July Street and on both sides of Ashar-Maqil Highway. Most houses are of
the detached villa type for middle class families.
On the other hand, the main commercial area is concentrated in Ashar. The
'suq' is located in the narrow streets of the traditional area and extends into the
surrounding area. The new business district in Ashar is located around 'Thowra'
Street, behind the Corniche area. "The Old Basrah Market is located in the centre
of Old Basrah. A traditional suq with vaulted alleyways did exist in Old Basrah, but
10 Both of the housing areas were characterised by the Uewelyn-Davies (1973) study 85 run
down areas, although the majority were less than 20 years old.
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it is now almost completely in ruins" (Uewelyn-Davies 1973: 119, First Report). Other
secondary commercial areas are located in the newly developed districts such as
'Khamsa Mile' and 'Jamhooria'.
Finally, it is important to note that Basrah has always been known for its fine
traditional architecture, to the extent that It has been reported that, "The areas of
traditional housing in Basrah must have represented the largest and finest of their
kind in the MiddleEast" (Uewelyn-Davies 1973: 122, First Report). These areas have
suffered the most during the war. Additionally, no attempts have been made to
protect buildings of architectural value during the war. Moreover, they became
threatened from the reconstruction and renewal plans. (For more details see the
author's MA Dissertation: Conseroation of Architectural Heritage in Rebuilding the
War-damaged Areas, the Caseof Basrah, Iraq, 1989).
6.4.3. The City of Fao.
Although the word teo in Arabic indicates a wide gap between two mountains,
it is strongly believed that the city name of Fao is derived from Fauo, which means
a flat piece of land open to the viewers or more generally a narrow strip of a territory
being enclosed between two obstacles. A similar word; Fay is still used by the local
inhabitants of the region to indicate the same previous meanlnq".
AI-Fao was founded by the military leader U'ttobha bin Ghazzwan during the
Caliphate of Omar bin AI-Khattab. It has always been historically closely associated
with the city of Basrah, that was established in the 7th century. However, some
archaeological excavations revealed that the town probably dates back to the 25th
century BC.
The city of Fao lies 90km to the south of Basrah's city centre, on the western
bank of Shatt-al-Arab waterway, very close to the Arabian Gulf. The administrative
area (Qadha) of Fao stretches to constitute a triangle, with its head on the Arab Gulf,
its base on the Dhuwaib creek to the north with Shatt-al-Arab forming its eastern
border, with a total area of 1220 km", Because of its geographic location Fao Is
considered of great strategic importance for Iraq.
.
I
I
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Culture end Information, Department of Information.
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Fee's pre-war population of 25,600 inhabitants was maintained mainly from
agriculture, where the area was famous for its fertile flelds'". Before the war the
palm tree plantations dominated the region for ages. Its date product represented
20.6% of the gross product of Besrah and 4% of that of the country. Fao owed a
great deal of itl wealth to its leading port and crude oil exporting terminal, by which
Fao became the only Iraqi access to the sea and its main gate way towards the rest
of the world. Ironically, this strategic commercial importance became the cause of
its suffering and destruction during the war.
The modem city of Fao is relatively new, with very little architectural character.
The exception, however, are two main mosques in the centre of the city that are built
of mud-bricks. The rest of the structures were either built of sand brick or concrete
blocks, of one or two storey height.
6.4.4. Basrah and Fao during the war (1980·1988).
Basrah and Its entire Region were seen by the Iranians as main targets, because
of their economic and strategic importance as the only Iraqi port. Thus the entire
Basrah Region was situated in the war zone from the beginning of the conflict in
September 1980. (see Stork, 1986:19).
On the second day of the war (23 September), Iran's air force made their first
attack on Basrah (see W.O. Staudenmaier, 1983:43). These attacks lasted for the
whole period of the war. It was reported by Edgar O'Ballence (1988:37-38) that,
"...by 3 October 1980, the oil storage tanks at the Basrah refinery, across the
Shatt-al-Arab were on fire. The oil terminal at Fao was deserted and partly destroyed
by Iranian artillery fire, and resulted in 70,000 people being evacuated". These
attacks were mainly against industrial and port targets. Joe Stork (1986: 19),
claimed that, "In the first days and weeks of the war, Iran managed to shut down
Iraq's main export facilities, near the port of Fao on the Gulf",
This destruction of the industries and port facilities, affected Iraq's economic
structure as a whole and Basrah's in particular. The overall damage to the
infrastructure in Iraq from September 1980 until July 1988, was estimated by
Kamran Mofid (1989) to be of $126.0 billion. This figure does not include oil
revenue losses. Nevertheless it includes losses in industry, agriculture, energy,
material damage to the 011 sector, telecommunications, housing and health.
II Iraqi Central Statistics Body (1977:24). In Arabic.
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The same author claimed that the total economic cost of the war to Iraq
(including oil revenue losses, GNP losses, military costs, ..etc.) during the above
period was $512.0 billion. Mofid (1989:1), indicated that this sum represented only
the monetary cost of the war. "It does not include inflationary costs, the loss of
services and earnings by the many people killed, the depletion of national resources,
the postponement of crucial development projects, the cost of the delayed training
and education of the young people. And finally, it does not include the cost of
payments to the thousands injured in the war who are not able to contribute fully in
the creation of wealth for the national economy".
Furthermore, the total economic cost of the Iran-Iraq war for both countries was
estimated by Mofld (1989:2) to be $1,156 billion, "..the cost of the war exceeds the
total oil revenue which Iran and Iraq have received throughout this century. From
1919 to July 1988 in Iran's case and from 1931 to July 1988 in the case of Iraq, the
total joint oil revenue earned is the sum of $418.5 billion".
The war affected the greater part of the local population of Basrah, who were
maintained directly or indirectly by industry", commerce and the activities of the
port. Moreover it led the Government to give up the economic role of Basrah and to
shelve its current Five Year Plan, only the projects which had already begun would
be continued on an annual review basls20• Nevertheless, Abdel-Wahid AI-Qamawi,
the Mayor of Basrah claimed:
"Despite the current economic situation, there are some big
projects which we managed to accomplish during the war,
such as the new international airport 35km to the north-west
of Basrah and Shatt Al-Basreh project".
Many attempts were made by Iran to cut Baghdad-Basrah road, in order to
surround Basrah and capture it. One of the main attempts took place on 18 June
1982, in the form of five large 'human-waves' and lasted until 3 August, but each
wave was either held or counter attacked by the Iraqis (see Edgar O'Ballance
1988:93).
However, until 1984 the Iranians mainly shelled the outskirts of Basrah, which
was justified because of the special consideration given to the Shia majority of
Basrah's population. Iran had been confident that the Basrah Shiats would eventually
I-,
}
I
I•
,
,
18 These Industries were planned to provide 60,000 jobs by the year 1990.
20 According to a personal interview with Mr. Namir Zenal, Chairman of the Regional and Urban
Planning Department, in the Ministry of Local Oovernment, Baghdad.
Chapter Six.
l 185
heed to the call for an uprising against the Iraqi Government, but they did not
respond to lranlen appeals. "On 12 February, heavy Iranian artillery fire was directed
onto the city of Basreh, really for the first time, killing ten civilians and injuring many
more. This unexpected bombardment caused alarm and refugees began to flood
south-wards towards Kuwait"(see O'Bellance 1988:93-142}.
Since that day and for the last four years of the war until the 20th August 1988
cease-fire, Basrah was subjected to a daily heavy bombardment, in some cases 400
shells per day21, leading to the destruction of some areas of the city and its
outskirts. Detailed information or estimates about the scale of damage or the number
of casualties are not available. However, it was reported by the 'Guardian' (15
August 1989) that according to the Govemor of Basreh, nearly 2000 people were
killed and many more were injured. Almost 95% of all homes, offices and shops were
either demolished or badly damaged and entire areas of traditional architecture were
destroyed and subsequently left to deteriorate during the eight-year war.
Luckily as Dr. Fu'ad AI-Mu'amin22 stated, Basrah suffered less than other
cities, such as Fao, Halabja and a series of border villages ranging in size from
200-1000 inhabitants, which were totally destroyed and reduced to rubble. On the
other hand, Basrah suffered more than Baghdad, where the damage was mainly
caused by isolated missile attacks and air-raids. The scale of damage in Basrah was
equivalent to that which occurred in AL-Sulimania, Khanaqin and Al-Amare. It was
mentioned by Mr. Hammid Turki, the Head of the Planning Division at the
Govemorate of Besrah, that in general, the areas that are near Shatt-al-Arab suffered
the most, followed by those close to Important strategiC sites, such as the oil pipe
lines, the old airport, the harbour and the Governorate23.
In respect of the traditional areas and according to the author's personal
observations, both AI-Ashar and Old Basrah sustained a great deal of damage from
the bombardment. The scale and nature of the damage was greatest in At-Asher,
because of its situation closer to the border. Various types of damage occurred to
different buildings; some of them were totally destroyed. However, since the
,
I
21 According to a personal Interview with Mr. Adel Said. Chief Architect at the Department of
Local and Regional PlaMlng in the Ministry of Local Government. Baghdad. In January 1989.
22 (Civil Engineer) Chairman of the Consulting Engineering Office at the Technical University,
Baghdad.
23 According to a personal interview with Mr. Hamrnid Turki, the Head of the Planning Division at
the Governorate of Besreh. In January 1989.
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Figure f64} The devastation of the Corniche Area of Stiett-el-Atsb. Basrah.
[Source: The author. 1989J
traditional area was constructed as a homogeneous entity, in which each house was
structurally reliant on the neighbouring buildings, the damage to some units could
affect the stability of their surroundings.
In addition to the destruction in the traditional areas. severe damage occurred
in the modem part ofthe city, especially in the Corniche Area of Shatt-al-Arab. This
caused the destruction of many buildings belonging to the period of the sixties and
seventies, which were unsympathetic to the local style of architecture.
The government had a policy of compensation for the victims each according
to the scale of damage. It was reported by the 'Guardian' (August 15, 1989) that in
Basrah, "Compensation of about 1.000 dinar per family ($2800 at the official rate)
is being paid to cover the cost of repairing houses, replacing furniture and dead
animals". In the same article it was also claimed that "... thousands of poor people
were given free parcels of land on which to build homes". During the war the people
themselves moved to other parts of the country, either to live with relatives or on their
own depending on the amount of money given by the govemment24•
24 According to a personal interview with Mr. Adel Said. Chief Architect at the Department of
Local and Regional Planning in the Ministry of Local Government, Baghdad, January 1989.
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Figure /6-5/ The total delJastation of the city of Fao.
[Source: The author. J 989)
Finally we ought to mention that Basrah managed to resist the Iranian
occupation because of its strong fortifications. In addition to Shatt at-Arab the major
obstacle between the Iranians and Basrah, the Iraqis had flooded a large area, about
16 miles wide, known as Fish Lake, on the east bank of Shatt ai-Arab. It was
claimed by Edgar O'Bellance (1988: 196), that by 26 February, the Iranians were
closer than ever to Basrah (about 6 miles from its outskirts) and their position
enabled them to bombard the city's environs with artillery.
On the other hand, Fao was one of the most important strategiC targets to be
occupied by Iranian forces. It was under cover of darkness on the night of 9/10
February 1986 that Iran attacked Fao peninsula with a great number of forces. They
managed to occupy the whole triangular area, taking the shape of a bridgehead and
protected on the sides by salty marshes and soft soil, thus cutting Iraq's access to the
sea. This occupation was seen by Iran as the first step towards occupying the city
of Basrah.
Eventually, the whole city of Fao. was razed to the ground. It's people and
buildings suffered terribly during its two year occupation, both from Iran and later
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during its liberation from the Iraqi forces. The city is said to have been struck by an
unbelievable seven million shells during the period of hostllltles'".
'Blessed Ramadan,26 or the so-called 'The Battle of all Battles', was the huge
Iraqi operation that was suddenly launched on 17 April 1988, by the 'Seventh Army
Corps' supported by the 'Presidential Guards', which reached deep into the Iranian
defences at Fac. It was a successful 35 hour operation that drove the Iranians out
of their positions and terminated two years of occupation. This operation had a very
decisive impact on the course of the whole war. Iraqi sources claim that it was this
battle that eventually forced Iran to accept the cease-fire that was declared by the UN
Security Council Resolution 598 in August 1988.
According to Iraqi estimates the number of Iraqi troops killed in the battles for
Fao, from 1 September 1980 until 18 April 1988, were 52,984. The same sources
also claimed that Iran lost 120,000 soldiers during the occupation of Fao and more
than 30,000 during the Iraqi Uberation27• Thus almost 200,000 people excluding
clvmans were killed in less than 26 months.
6.5. THE RECONSTRUCTION CAMPAIGNS OF BASRAH AND FAO.
Nothing was declared or published by the Iraqi government regarding the scale
or the nature of war-damage during or even after the eight-year war with Iran. The
issues of war-damage and reconstruction were, and probably still are considered
highly political and no doubt controversial and can only be addressed and discussed
by Iraqi officials. An exception to this policy of secrecy and obfuscation was the
publicity material that suddenly flooded Baghdad, after the completion of the
reconstruction campaigns of Basrah and Fao.
A period of six months of complete silence about the effects of the war and the
plans for future reconstruction followed the announcement of the cease-fire in August
1988. The author visited Iraq in December 1988 when most people were still
reluctant to talk about the war or even reconstruction. "Most of the officials that were
interviewed refused to supply any document or official paper or even copies of old
reports and maps on security grounds" (Barakat, 1989). It was not until February
I~
I
)
25 As It is stated on the memorial Gate of AI-Fao.
26 After the Islamic holy month of fasting; Ramadan.
27 "Fao, the City of Sacrifice and the Gateway for Great Victory", a publication of the Ministry of
Culture and Information, Department of Information.
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1989 that the subject of reconstruction became a public issue, when the President
paid a visit to Basrah and announced that the city was to be reconstructed. Before
that, four Army Engineering Units had worked for two months on a comprehensive
clearance campaign of the city.
Suddenly, and due to the war, Basrah gained a special degree of sympathy and
support, generated by its resistance and stand against the continuous attempts to
capture the city. The situation doubled its importance for the country and gave a
flying start for its reconstruction and development. This fact was felt by the author
during his meetings with the Iraqi officials and public. It was also reflected in the
huge amounts of Government aid and public donations and gifts, collected by the
Basreh and AI-fao Reconstruction Committee. Nowadays, Basrah is seen as a
symbol for the Iraqi strength, pride and honour. It has been given many different
nick- names such as 'Basrah al-Samida' (The Everlasting City) and 'Madinat
al-Modoun' (The Greatest City or the City of Cities). These official names, that were
mostly derived by the MiniStry of Culture and Information, were claimed to have
helped to generate enthusiasm from the local" inhabitants to rebuild the city.
Similarly, fao was given its second name, The City of Sacrifice and the Gateway for
Great Victory, symbolising the great sacrifices that were made to liberate the city
following its occupation for almost 2 years (1986-1988).
6.5.1. Planning of reconstruction.
following the cease-flre in August 1988 the Supreme Committee for the
Reconstruction of Basrah and fao (SCRBf) was established in a Presidential Decree
and was headed by the President himself. This Committee consisted of the Prime
Minister,Ministers of Local Government, Housing and Construction, Defence, Industry
and Military Industrialization, Transportation and Communications, Agriculture and
Irrigation. It also included representatives of the General Establishment of Post and
Communications and the General Establishment of Iraqi Ports, as well as the Mayor
of Baghdad and the Governor of Basrah,
In December 1988, the Committee took the decision to rebuild Besrah within
3 months starting on the 13 March 1989, and later to rebuild the city of Fao within
a similar period. The Committee also took the decision to employ only the
government's construction capabilities, depending mainly on local experts and
resources, and thus turning down hundreds of foreign contractors and businessmen,
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who flew into the country immediately after the cease-fire in anticipation of
participating in the great effort of reconstruction.
In order to better understand the reconstruction efforts and evaluate them
objectively, it is important to explore some of the announced, as well as the
underlying aims behind the campaigns. It was declared that the reconstruction of
Basrah and Fao within a short period, using Iraqi skills, had two main directions:
• An indication of Iraq's great power and its determination to restore peace
through the reconstruction of cities that are still practically under the threat of
war.
• An effort to attract families back to their original settlements, in an attempt to
further emphasis the first aim.
Other aims can be read through the lines of different official papers. as well as
unofficial declarations during interviews by the author. For the Iraqi Government the
reconstruction of Basrah and Fao, within 90 days each, was seen as:
• A symbolic representation of the heroic stand of the two cities against the
Iranians continuous attempts to capture them. (AI-Majed. 1989). "The
reconstruction of Basrah and Fao is an honour complementary to that of their
defence". (Saddam Hussein. 1989).
• A way of saving millions of dollars. According to the Ministry of Culture and
Information. initial estimates of the profits that would have been made by the
foreign companies if they were to participate in the reconstruction, stood at
hundreds of millions of US$. (Ministry of Culture and Information, Arabic.
1989).
• A declaration of the Iraqis' outstanding creative ability through which, a lesson
was to be given to the rest of the Iraqi people and the world. (Al-Hadlthl, 1989).
• A proof that the Iraqi mentality is not a backward one. and it has never been.
either during war or peace.
I
)
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• An emphases of "..the deep meaning for the leadership of President Saddam
Hussein, as a hero of war and defence as well as of peace and reconstruction
within the great cultural Iraqi renaissance ... to build the new Iraq". (Ministry of
Culture and Information. Arabic, 1989).
i
l
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Although all of the official documents, publications and presentations referred
to the effort as the 'reconstruction campaign of Basrah and Fee', what actually took
place in Basrah was merely the beautification of the city's streets and public spaces.
with little improvement of infrastructure. However. in Fao it was a campaign of
physical reconstruction which included infrastructure, public buildings and a few
houses.
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The Ministry of Local Govemment became the planning body of the SCRBF,
responsible for transforming the wishes and the decisions of the Committee into
workable plans. It was responsible for the preparation of plans and architectural
designs for the different sectors of the city of Basrah, as well as the plan of Fao.
Thus its staff produced Master and zoning plans for Basrah and Fao; designs of the
intended 'Tower of Basreh' and the 'Three Gates' (never implemented). It also
prepared contracts, time targets and bills of quantities for other Ministries,
participating in the execution of reconstruction.
Additionally, the Supervision Department was created as an independent body
reporting directly to the Supreme Council. This Department was based in Basrah and
headed by the Oovemor of Basreh and comprised of technical and administrative
staff. It was charged with the task of:
Co-ordination between the different executing authorities.
Close supervision of the quality of work-in-progress.
Evaluation of performance and reporting on progress being made.
The Supervision Department worked in close co-operation with the National Centre
for Construction Laboratories, which was responsible for quality control.
6.5.2. Reconstruction Implementation In Basrah.
a. Clearing the rubble.
In effect, the implementation of the reconstruction started when the Military
Engineering Units began clearing the city on the 19th December 1988, in a manner
that reflected the immediate concem of the govemment to clear the city.
Abdel-Wahed AI-Qamawi, the Mayor of Basrah emphasised that:
"Our main concern nowadays is to clear the city and the
suburbs of the rubble and ruins, to fillthe swamps, to clean the
small rivers and creeks and to maintain the infrastructure of
the city and the civilian services (schools, hospitals ..etc.)".
Within two months (19 December 1988 - 14 February 1989), the army
removed 3,000,000 m' of rubble and ruins; filled in 3,430,000 m2 of swamps around
the city, including some defensive swamps; and removed 6,000 damaged vehicles,
weighting 14,000 tons of scrap metal.
The Ministry of Defence reported that the army demolished 2,500 unsafe
buildings and removed the front line fortifications at Shatt-al-Arab. The destruction
of mass concrete barriers began, which had been placed in the streets and around the
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main public places during the war.28necessity of clearing the destruction, as a start
to the rebuilding of a damage city, is one of the most significant issues highlighted
by the case of Basrah. When the war was over and Iraq's resources were directed
towards reconstruction, one of the major tasks facing the Iraqis (in order to bring
back normal life to the city), was the destruction and removal of the defensive
fortifications, constructed during the last eight years, especially those close to the
inhabited areas on the outskirts of Basrah. These were described by O'Ballance
( 1988: 101) I as follows:
"The Iraqi defensive trench system came to be studded with bunkers,
weapon emplacements and dug-out shelters for the infantry ever-ready to
repel an enemy attack... Behind this strong frontal trench, were
communication trenches leading back to large underground shelters used
for sleeping, feeding and resting ... In front of the main defensive trench
were jumbles and lines of barbed wire fencing and entanglements, fitted
with booby-traps, sensors and other surveillance equipment".
The next project was the clearing of wide areas of minefields on land and in
Shatt-aI-Arab waterway. Thus, by January 1989 the government already had a
contract with a private company to clear Shatt ai-Arab waterway29. Because of
political differences with Iran over the position of the national borders and because
of the dramatic events that took place since the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990,
it was only possible to clear part of Shatt-al-Arab, namely the part that passes
through Basrah.
Then, the next task was the reclamation of vast areas that had been flooded as
a defensive method. One of these areas was 12 miles to the east of Basrah, on the
east bank of Shatt al-Arab, known as Fish Lake. "The main obstacle within it was
a deep half-mile wide channel that ran along the length of the lake, which was itself
covered by five strong defence lines,,30 (Edgar Q'Ballance 1988:194). Such a
swamp if left could be another threat to the environment of Basrah which is already
surrounded by marshes, such as the great marsh of AL-Hammar.
(
28 According to an announcement made by the Ministry of Information in an Iraqi 1V programme,
on 11 January 1989.
29 According to a personal interview with the Mayor of Basrah. In January 1989, Basrah.
30 According to Edgar O'Bailance (1988), the work on the Fish Lake had begun in 1982. It was
littered with under-water barbed-wire entanglements, mines, electrodes and sensors.
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FCgure {6-6} One of 10 rebuilt pedestrian bridges In Basrah.
{Source: The author, 1969}
b. Reconstruction and Beautification.
In order to implement the reconstruction plans drawn by the Ministry of Local
Government, the City of Basrah was divided into three working sectors, each
allocated to one of the implementing ministries. The first sector consisted of the
central and southern parts of the city, which were mainly residential areas and was
the responsibility of the MiniStryof Local Government. The Ministry of Housing and
Construction was allocated the second sector: northem and western parts of the City.
Finally, the third sector which was mainly the commercial area was the responsibility
of the Municipality of Baghdad. Each of these authorities. in their tum, sub-
contracted to a number of govemment contractors and was charged with
reconstruction, maintenance and beautification of its sector. Typically, this work
included paving roads; rain water disposal networks; paving side-walks; earth filling;
planting of trees, particularly palms; restoring and extending drinking water networks;
traffic works, which included designing and implementing intersections and traffic
lights and sign posts; rebuilding pedestrian and car bridges. as well as installing and
painting street furniture.
On the other hand. the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation was charged with
the clearance and treatment of the main rivers penetrating the city (Jubaila, Rabat,
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Khandag, Khora and Saraj!). The Ministry had previously prepared detailed studies
to develop these rivers in 1980, which included dredging, linking those close to each
other to allow better water circulation, stone paving, and construction of retaining
walls. But, these studies were not carried out because of the war.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Industry and MilitaryManufacturing was charged,
along with the Ministry of Transportation, with the responsibility of replacing and
extending the electricity and telephone networks. At the same time, the rest of the
ministries and public authorities were charged with the rebuilding and beautification
of all the buildings and facilities that belonged to them within the city of Basreh. As
an example, the Ministryof Religious Affairs, was to rebuild all the damaged mosques
and churches. While the Ministry of Education was to rebuild all the damaged
schools, the Health MiniStrywas to rebuild and guarantee the functioning of all its
clinics and hospitals. The General Establishment of Ports was responsible for the
clearance of Shatt-al-Arab, and the re-opening of Megeal Port. a job that included
surfacing and removing several ships, pontoons, ferries and concrete blocks.
c. Competition between the implementing Ministries.
One of the distinctive characteristics of the campaign was the competition set
by the Iraqi Central Government (represented by the SCRBF's Supervision
Department) between the different implementing ministries and authorities, in which
the Municipality of Baghdad won the first place followed by the Ministry of Housing
and Construction. The Ministry of Local Government was in the third place. The
main aim of this competition was to evaluate the finished work of each authority and
consequently to evaluate the whole campaign.
This evaluation was intended to achieve three objectives; firstly a high quality
of construction that meets international standards, secondly, a high speed of
construction and thirdly to try to ensure the economic goals of the reconstruction
programme. The Supervision Department allocated 30% of the grade to each of
these objectives, leaving 10% for the consideration of obstacles facing the execution
of plans of each authority.
The competition results were announced by the Central Government during the
First International Symposium on the Reconstruction of Basrah and Fao (October
1989). In which, Baghdad Municipality achieved the first place with the grade of
90.2% of the overall results, 87.3% in quality of work, 100% in speed of
implementation, and 100% on saving on the cost. The Baghdad Municipality saved
I
}
I,
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10 2,138,000 on the overall work allocated to it, from the initial cost of 7,516,000 set
by the Supervision Department. The Supervision Department believed that this
saving was due to the following factors3!:
• The high level of co-ordination and planning for resources and functions, also
the administrative unity on all levels played a crucial role.
• Cuttings in the number of machines (construction vehicles) and personnel
employed by the municipality, where the number of vehicles did not exceed
600, while the number of personnel did not exceed 1500.
• The total dependence on its own resources and working force abilities. Thus
it did not hire any independent contractors. The only contractors involved
where those needed to produce cement and sephelt for it was impossible for the
Municipality to move its plants from Baghdad to Basrah.
?
• It did not depend on one source for as a building materials supplier, also it used
the railway as an exceptionally cheap means of transport.
• Good maintenance of its machines and vehicles and the availability of a good
amount of spare parts.
• The municipality made use of its long previous experiences with similar work
of beautification in Baghdad.
The Ministry of Housing and Construction, was awarded the second place,
where it scored 85.5% of the general evaluation, which was made of 77% work
quality, 94% speed and 87.3% cut In expenses.
The final cost was higher than the initial estimation by 103m.
The Ministry used a huge number of vehicles and personals, where the number
of machines used exceeded 2800 while the total labour exceeded 11,000.
6.5.3. The reconstruction of flO.
Following the announcement of the completion of the reconstruction campaign
of Basrah on 14 June 1989, liltwas decided, upon instructions from the President's
Office, that the same Ministries who took part in the Campaign for the reconstruction
of Basrah might proceed with the same competitive method for the reconstruction of
Fao". (MCI, 1989:21). This meant that the same model of management of
implementation was to be used, despite the great difference between the two
contexts. The context of fao differs from that of Basrah as follows:
31 For more details see Basrah. the City of Cities; Facts and Figures, the Iraqi Ministry of Culture
and Information publication in Arabic. Baghdad. 1989.
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1) The city was totally destroyed during the war and later on was levelled by the
Military Engineering Units. Thus, it had no inhabitants, no ready shelter to
accommodate the workers.
2) It lost its two main sources of income: the crude-oil exporting terminal and the
palm plantations, without which it can never revive; especially because the
nearest urban centre, Basrah, is 90km away.
3) AI-Fao is located in a relatively remote area far from the points of supply of
building materials and was no more connected to Basrah or to Baghdad by
railway. Also it had no drinking water supplies, or electricity supplies or even
communications.
4) The work was to start at the beginning of summer and continue through the
hottest season of the year, where temperatures could easily reach 500C in the
shade.
Nevertheless, it was for the very reasons we mentioned above, that the Iraqi
Government saw the reconstruction of Fao as a challenge and insisted on rebuilding
the city on its original location. The SCRBF (1990: 75) reported, "The decision to
rebuild Fao on its original location and to a better standard that it had been, ..is an
acknowledgment of the blood that has been shed by Iraqi martyrs on Its sacred soil".
Thus, Fao was to be rebuilt as a symbol of liberation and victory. Millionsof dinars
were set aside for that purpose.
a. The design of the city.
The MiniStry of Local Government was aSSigned the task of preparing the
structural plan of the city. InDecember 1988, the Ministry announced a competition,
limited to its planners. to design the city of Feo, "..in a manner that reflects its
symbolic value" (AI-Vamori, 1989). Five proposals were produced within 45 days
and exhibited in a special ceremony for the President and the Committee to chose
their favourite. Consequently, one designed by Planner Mozafar Al-Yarnorl was
chosen". Mr AI-Vamori admitted that the competition time allowed only for a one
day visit to the site. Of course the very short period of time that was given to the
Planners to plan the city meant that the plans were not thought through carefully
enough.
Later "..the government asked private architectural offices to contribute to the
effort of rebuilding, by not charging for their design services, ... the Ministry of Local
Government arranged for them to visit AI-Fao" (Barakat 1989b:63-64). Mr. Namir
I
}
I~
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32 Mr AI-Vamori died in an accident. on the construction site. during the Implementation of Fao.
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Zenal, Chairman of the Regional and Urban Planning Department at the Ministry of
Local Government, had talked to Al-Qadessia Newspaper on 20 October 1988, about
the new design and planning of AI-Fao city. He said that they took into consideration
the political importance of the city as a symbol of liberation, as well as its economical
role as a secondary port for the Besrah Region. He also said that another four plans
were completed for new residential settlements around AI-Fao, as a substitute for the
villages destroyed in the war.
In terms of urban design and the overall image of the city, the government
attempted to reflect the Islamic and Arabic identity in the newly designed areas. This
desire was expressed by the President when he addressed the Iraqi Association of
Engineers on 10 October 1984: "...where is your own identity and architectural
character of this era, which is to be inherited and talked about by the coming
generations'? ... "33.
But, this concern can be and was interpreted in different ways in AI-Fao, where
reconstruction was based on large scale clearance. The author drew attention to this
aspect in 1989 when he wrote" ... the intended reconstruction plan of AI-Fao has at
its centre a great open space, surrounded by the city's main administrative and
commercial buildings. Within this space the two surviving mosques are to be
preserved as a memorial to the war and another modem civic monument,
representing the Iraqi victory is to be added. This paved open space will function,
'apart from a vast heat store', as a festival square with a small green area, plus a
military museum, cinema, theatre and restaurants. It is also the place in the city
where the roads from Basreh and Shatt al-Arab crosslt34• All very symbolic but
whose symbols, from where and why? They are certainly nothing to do with Islamic
or Arabic architecture and do not in any way provide any reassurance to the
President's question concerning the future generation" (Barakat 1989b:81).
The city plan was divided into several self-contained zones each
accommodating 2,000 residential units. The major dominating features of the city
are the 'Festival Square', the 'Martyrs Memorial' and the 'Triumph Gate'. The square
occupies the heart of the city and takes the shape of an octagonal star with a
3) This quotation w.. considered in October 1989 the theme of the 'Symposium on National
Identity in Contemporary Arab Architecture', held at Baghdad. Where the design and planning of
Fao was released publicly for the first time.
34 According to a personal interview with Mr. Mozafar Al-Yarnorl, a senior planner at the Ministry
of Local Government. Baghdad. In January 1989, he proposed the structural plan of the new city of
AI-Fao.
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Figure /6-7/ The master plan of the reconstructed city of al-Fao.
{Source: The Ministry of Local Govemment, J 989}
diameter of 170m surrounded by a pre-cast colonnade with 92 columns. The
Memorial represents the focal point of a huge space built between the governmental
buildings and is surrounded by water. The Gate contains two main arches for
vehicles, each 8. 1m high and another two pedestrian arches each 6m high. The
30,000 pieces of stone that cover its concrete structure, along with a specialised
team of engineers and technicians, were brought from YemenI.
Concerning the residential buildings the Government adopted, as we mentioned
earlier, the idea of independent sectors, each of which will be called after an Arab
country and believe it or not, the houses of that sector will represent the traditional
houses of that country. For this purpose. the design of the housing were imported
from; Jordan, Palestine. Tunisia. Egypt, Ubya, Syria, Saudi Arabia. Morocco and
Yemen. Mercifully, these designs are said to have been undergoing some
modification. in order to ensure they are suitable for the local environment. It should
finally be said. that these designs will be imposed on the people who will have to
implement them to ensure the final Intended image.
(
}
I
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FTgure f6-8/ The 'Festival Square' In al·Fao.
(Source: The Ministry of Local Oovemment, 19891
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b. Implementation.
As In the case of Basrah, Fao was divided into three implementing zones:
Northem, Central and Southem. The MiniStryof Local Government was responsible
for the Southem zone and its work mainly included the implementation of water and
sewage networks, as well as traffic engineering and road paving. The Municipality
of Baghdad was responsible for similar work in the Northem and Central zones.
However, it was the duty of the Ministry of Housing and Construction to
implement all the required buildings in AI-Fao city. In its tum this Ministry divided
the work, on a competitive basis, between four contracting companies owned by the
Ministry. At this stage it is important to note the change of attitude in allocating
work, for in Fee the Ministries were implementing work that was closer to their
Case study: reconstruction in Iraq.
200
- .,J,;. ......
-..~-~ _ ......." _ _..... .. - . . __. . .
. .' .. - _:::.~,- ~_.. • .A _ _ - - _.__.. .. -... •
• .. _ ... ~~ ...... ..Ii_
l
I
j
t,
I
{
!
t
I
.~.-::..-~..~~..~
Rgure {6-9J views (rom the reconstructed elty of al-Fao.
(Source: The author, 1989)
experience. The following is what has already been built when the city was officially
opened by President Saddam Hu.sein and his guests (Arab and World leaders), on
23 October 1989:
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Contracting Company Buildings implemented I Area m2 I
Al Farouk The Main Gate 250
The Main Hospital (50 beds) 5,000
Women's Union HQ 840
Ba'ath Party HQ 1,500
Nursery school 1,650
Primary school (12 classrooms) 1,350
Poular Army HQ 2,100
Al Rashid Fire Station 1,560
Civil Defence Centre 2,300
Cheif Administrative Officer Building 3,300
Trade Unions HQ 1,250
Shopping Centre 2,700
Three primary schools X 12 cl. 1,500
Sport Stadium (4000 spectators)
AI Mutasim Primary school (12 classrooms) 1,350
Festivel Square 20,000
Fao Monument 1,200
17 houses for Govemment officials
(250 m2 each). 4,250
Al Tariq 10 houses for Government officials
(250 m2 each). 2,500
Secondary school (12 classrooms) 1,500
Court of Justice 2,500
Cultural and Social Club 4,000
t
I
Table 6,2 The oolume of reconstrucUon carried out by each contractor.
The Ministry of Transport and Communications was charged with the task of
installing a telephone network, an electronic exchange and connecting Basrah and
Fao with a microwave communications system. While the Ministry of Industry and
Military Manufacturing supplied the construction site with temporary power supply
and later on supplied the city with its electricity network. Finally, the Ministry of
Agriculture and Irrigation excavated 17 rivers totalling 50km in length.
By taking over the Individual properties in Fao, the Iraqi government ensured
that any future urban reconstruction was freed from land speculation. This approach
might be one of the issues towards a successful post-war reconstruction, if it is seen
as a means of rationalising the land use, in order to create an environment favourable
for daily life and production. Alternatively, it will reinforce the authorised central
planning while not only underestimating, but actively threatening the people's role.
Here the centralised approach was focused on new construction instead of upgrading
and development.
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6.6. IRAQ'S RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING THE 1991 WAR.
.. "
It would be incomplete to write about reconstruction in Iraq without, at least
mentioning the last war; Its effects and the rebuilding that followed. In order to do so
the author conducted a field visit to Baghdad in April-May 1991. Once again despite
the comprehensive international media coverage of the war, destruction and
reconstruction were given a very low profile, and in Iraq itself, by the time the Allied
forces left the country, Iraq's misery was forgotten, as was even that of the Kurds.
Whatever one's political views of the war in the Gulf, it is virtually impossible
to remain unmoved by the scenes of destruction and human suffering, brought about
as a consequence of that conflict and its aftermath. One side of this painful scenario
is taking place in Iraq, a suffering that is no longer page one news.
During 39 days of the relentless bombardment of Baghdad and many other Iraqi
cities, civilian life was for a time totally paralysed. What has been known as the
'heaviest air bombardment in history' brought a new dimension to the art of
destruction. Today it is possible to destroy settlements without having to cope with,
or even justify, the images of death and destruction. Despite the intense media
coverage, those conducting the war made it seem as if it were "..made up of televised
sound effects and images only barely improved on those that 50p could buy on a
computer games' machine" (The Guardian, 21 January 1991).
Although the initial intention of this Section was to provide an integral picture
of the impact of war destruction, in terms of human casualties, physical environment,
disruption of communications and consumer goods' supplies as well as economic
losses, the nature of the war and the political instability that was still surrounding it,
at the time when this Section was written, made the task very difficult. In fact, the
author has reached the conclusion that it may be impossible to provide a full picture
of the final and long term results of the war, simply because the consequences are
the cumulative effect of all the damage inflicted on the above mentioned sectors and
because the final result of a war on any nation, critically depends on the
interdependency of many individual actions, some of which may not be immediately
obvious. For example, one of the side effects of the psychological impact of war may
be a reduction in man power, which in its tum would prolong the economic recovery
process. Equally important is the side effect from having a considerable percentage
of handicapped people in the remaining population. Thus, this analysis is an attempt
to quantify the scale of damage in the country in rough percentage terms, rather than
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precise figures. Nevertheless, some figures are included as they were given by the
Iraqi authorities, during the author's visit to Baghdad.
The further complication one faces when researching the effects of war is that
some effects can be explored in much more detail and more easily than others: as
an example, the damage to buildings and the numbers of dead and injured, can be
assessed quantitatively. Thus figures produced by the authorities have tended to
dwell on these outward and visible signs. However, the author feels that
psychological, social, economic and political damage are equally and possibly more
important in the long run, although much less easy to calculate.
Those who conducted the 1991 war understood exactly how the nature of the
city is a complex of Interrelated physical and social functions. More and more the
city is becoming a highly complicated network of many relationships between
individuals, groups, and physical parts. In other words, a living relationship between
families, communities and the other functions of housing, markets, transportation,
working places, cultural activities, and food supplies. During a war, one or more of
the above relationships will be affected, and in most cases all of them, bringing
disruption to the entire function of the city. And this is exactly what happened in
Baghdad, Basrah and many other Iraqi cities, where the housing sector was relatively
undamaged, while the services and infrastructure were devastated.
Today, the use of high-technology warfare that allows pin-point bombing
accuracy, means that it is possIble to select and destroy one or more of the above
components, while keeping the rest 'physically' untouched and yet still paralyse a
whole city.
6.6. t. The scale of the damage.
Crossing the border from Jordan to Iraq (April 1991), the first signs of damage
are seen on the motorway connecting the AI-Rutba border point with Baghdad, which
was once considered as one of the best transportation routes In the Middle East. In
Baghdad, the signs of destruction are everywhere, with the bombed public and
administrative buildings as the most obvious. The Ministryof Local Government, the
National Assembly, the Prime Minister's Office, the Presidential Palaces, the Interior
Ministry, the Ba'ath Party Head Quarters, the Air Force and Army commands, and
many other targets within and around Baghdad have all been devastated. It is also
the case with some residential areas, where 'smart' bombs have failed to reach their
targets, as well as with a number of strategic bridges.
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The destruction of residential areas, hospitals, schools and manufacturing is
much higher in towns and regions outside Baghdad, where they suffered not only
from the Allied bombardment, but also from the looting and vandalism carried out by
the rebels and later on from the confrontation between them and the governmental
forces.
The human and social cost of the war. Even before the controversy over the
degree of physical destruction erupted, a fiercer controversy ensued (and rightly)
over the human cost, particularly to civilians. This cost took the form of direct
casualties; death and injuries, displaced people and refugees in the southern and
northern parts of the country, and others suffering indirectly in other cities and
regions because of the refugees in their region. It is very difficult to arrive at a
reasonably accurate figure for the dead, the wounded and the homeless, because one
has to accommodate three sets of figures: one provided by the international agencies
(UN, Red Crescent, etc.). whose role was very small in assessing damage in Iraq in
comparison with Kuwait; another by the Iraqi sources. who have tended to exaggerate
the civilian casualties while keeping the military casualties low; and a third by the
Allied forces, who were keen on keeping not only the number of their casualties low,
but also that of the Iraqis, especially the civilians. in an attempt to give the image of
a 'just' war, and to avoid any division in public opinion and support. However,
estimates of Iraqi dead range from 50,000 to 100,000, while 200 Allied soldiers were
reported killed. At the height of the crisis Iran hosted 1.200.000 Kurdish refugees,
while Turkey hosted a further 500,000 (Stanton. 1991 )35. There was a time when
the mortality rate amongst the refugees was estimated at 600 a day (as reported by
Medecins Sans Frontieres).
It has been claimed by Iraqi sources that hundreds of residential areas all over
the country were bombed, either directly, or indirectly because of their close posltton
to targeted buildings. Moreover, 20 hospitals, (ranging from 250-400 beds each) were
damaged, as well as civil defence centres and civilian shelters. The offensive that
outraged public opinion in the West was 'AI-Amiria' shelter, in which hundreds of
people died, and the other site known to the author as the 'Al-Sheb' shelter in
Baghdad. Furthermore, health and educational systems and facilities were severely
disrupted.
3S Stanton, P. (1991) Intervention following user- a case history: A promise to a Kurdish Chfld,
paper presented at the Third International York Workshop on Settlement Reconstruction Post-war,
22-24 July 1991,IoMS, UK.
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Beside casualties, destruction has been most widespread in the infrastructure
and industry sectors. The following is an assessment of the damage revealed for the
first time by the Iraqi authorities, and observed by the author during his visit to Iraq.
Electrical power sector:Within the first few days of the bombardment, the pre-
war Iraqi electrical generating capacity of 8585 Mega Watts was reduced by 91%.
Altogether 32 thermal, 45 gas, and 18 hydro-electric power generating plants were
totally destroyed. In addition, a number of transmission sub-stations, high tension
and mobile stations, as well as a considerable section of power transmission lines,
were also damaged.
Although the initial cost for the reconstruction of power stations and other
electricity services was put at US$ 3 billion, the real cost is much higher because of
the consequent damage caused to other sectors dependent on electricity, of which
the most devastating were the cuts in water supplies, irrigation systems, sewage
disposal as well as the disruption caused to hospitals, industries, traffic and
residential areas.
011Sector: The economic embargo caused the termination of Iraqi crude oil
exports and its byproducts, and subsequently the national income from that sector.
Due to the bombardment, the sector suffered 100%damage to the oilwells, refineries,
transport lines and storage. The largest of these refineries was 'Al-Dawra' near
Baghdad. It remains very difficult to estimate the cost of the losses suffered by this
sector.
Communication and Transport Sectors: These installations were targeted
throughout the country; 50%of the pre-war communications capacity of telephones,
telex, fax and satellite services were annihilated. Total destruction was inflicted on
14 telephone-exchanges with the capacity of 210,000 telephone lines, the biggest of
which was the 'Al-Mamun' exchange, and the Office building of the Central Post,
Telegraph and Telephone Administration, designed by Rifat Chadirji in 1971.
Another 13 telephone-exchanges with a capacity of 140,000 lines were partially
damaged. The two ground-satellite stations were totally ruined, as were the national
and international microwave networks.
The damage to the railways included 50% of the railway network of 1,200 krn,
which was made inoperable; within the first few days 15 railway stations and 17
railway bridges were destroyed by bombing.
Other installations such as ports and civil airports came to a stand still, firstly
because of the economic embargo and secondly, from the direct damage they
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suffered when Baghdad and Basrah were attacked from the air. Saddam International
Airport. in Baghdad, and the recently opened International Airport in Baarah. were
damaged. while Al-Muthana National airport was damaged beyond repair. Also, 30
sea-port platforms were damaged and 30% of their equipment was lost. Moreover,
a considerable number of ships, oil tankers and river boats were destroyed.
The bombing of 124 bridges paralysed land transport and its alternative roots
during the war; including 78 steel or concrete permanent bridges, 26 Pontoon
bridges, 18 railway bridges and two flood regulating bridges. Although most of these
were in the southern part of Iraq, three of Baghdad's 9 bridges were bombed. the
most significant of which were the AI-Moalaq (the suspension bridge) and the AI-
Jumhoria bridges. connecting the busiest parts of the Iraqi capital. Leading to AI-
Tahrir Square, which is considered the heart of Baghdad. AI-Jumhoria bridge was
given priority for reconstruction. The preliminary estimates of the total losses in the
transport and communication sector was put at US$ 4 billion.
The Industrial Sector: beside the losses inflicted on both public and private
manufacturing capacity due to the damage of life lines and infrastructure, 30% of the
industrial sector's capacity was lost by direct bombing. The petro-chemical,
phosphate, aluminium and cable industries were 100% damaged, cement 45%,
Figure 1~10J 'Al-Mamun' exchange, one of 14 telephone-exchanges bombed.
{Source: The author, 1991/
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besides a number of food and textile industries. Until now no figure has been given
for the loss in the industrial sector because of its complex interrelationship with other
sectors. The construction sector, particularly needed after the war, had been already
stretched to the maximum during the reconstruction effort following the earlier eight-
year war with Iran, and was further incapacitated.
Cultural losses:Unsupported claims published in the West, stating that historical
sites were used as 'antiquities shield', by placing radars and anti-aircraft installations
and rocket launchers within the borden of these sites or nearby. Thus air attacks
were conducted against some sites, especially Babylon. The exact nature of damage
has not yet been disclosed. However, the Baghdad Museum, which is across the
street from the Baghdad telecommunications centre, and close to the city's domestic
airport (AI-Muthana) as well as near to the Presidential Palace, was slightly
damaged36• The author visited the Museum, where the librarian claimed that the
museum authorities have removed small objects, records and the museum library to
safekeeping, as they were expecting the telecommunication centre to be targeted.
What they could not move were some massive artifacts such as the Assyrian lions
J6 The other three complexes were targeted and destroyed beyond repair.
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that were brought from a palace in Sargon and a temple facade from 300 BC.
Although all the antiquities that were difficult to remove were sand bagged, some
have suffered damage.
Environmental losses:An interesting examination of the possible effects of the
war on the geosystems of southern Iraq was presented in a paper by Drs. Koff and
Chesnckova" at the Third Intemational York Workshop. On the basis of
interpretations of a number of Soviet and American cosmic photographs, the authors
have determined that in LowerMesopotamia and the Southern Desert of Iraq a range
of genetic types of landscape were vulnerable. It was claimed that as a result of war
activities in the Persian Gulf, sharp deteriorations in the environment occurred. A
schematic classification of war impacts was presented, including those either due to
direct destruction, such as military traffic tracks, trenches, bombing, etc. or due to
'intoxication'. The 'intoxication' was classified into physical contamination, such as
radiation fields, thermal radiation, fires, electromagnetic, and chemical contamination
resulting from fires, gas, explosives and outflows of oil and other toxic materials.
Additionally, it was also suggested that the bombing of Iraq caused land movements
and aggravated the possibility of earthquakes in the Southern States of the Soviet
Union.
The analysis of the prerequisites of potential deterioration of landscapes shows
that war activities can result in rather large-scale desertification, regional migration
of contaminants, degradation of cultivated landscapes, with the consequent decrease
in productivity, in flooding of depressions, regression of pastures, and contamination
of waters. The lack of fuel supplies forced people to cut trees and use them for
cooking and heating, thus causing an environmental loss that may never be replaced.
Finally the disruption of the infrastructure, the cutting off of drinking water supplies
and sewage disposal caused the spread of epidemics including typhoid, cholera and
dysentery.
6.6.2. Planning for reconstruction.
During the war, on the 30 January 1991, a 'Reconstruction Supreme
Committee' was established. This Committee consisted of key personnel
representing all the service ministries. The Committee enjoyed a wide authority,
37 Both from the USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of Lithosphere, Moscow.
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enabling it to take and implement quick decisions to handle emergencies, such as
constructing alternative bridges, and so on.
Three weeks after the cease-fire the reconstruction process started by the
announcement that the whole Cabinet was to form the new Reconstruction
Government because of the scale of the task and the economic embargo. This was
followed by assessment of the damage, in which each ministry surveyed its own
sector, and at the same time estimated their own undamaged resources (material,
human and technical). According to these assessments reconstruction plans were
then defined. Priority was given to restoring essential public services and
infrastructure, not only because they were the most damaged, but they also form the
backbone of daily life and any reconstruction in terms of a return to normal life,must
be subject to the revival of these services.
The short-term, emergency phase of reconstruction was delineated as being
three months, starting from April 1991: the task during this period was to resupply
the basic services: electricity, water, fuel and transport. However, the Iraqi
Reconstruction Supreme Committee took an exceptional step outside the
conventional reconstruction approach of emergency, recovery and actual
reconstruction'8, when they announced that the emergency stage was to be followed
by a re-evaluation of the 1990-95 Development Plan projects, in order for it to fit
within the new reconstruction priorities. Each ministry would then provide 8
preliminary timetable and list of resources to fit its new 'balanced' development and
reconstruction plan projects for 1991 and 1992.
Under the international trade embargo, the lack of material resources and
imported technology made the task more difficult. However, it seemed 8
considerable part of what was planned for had been achieved during the first three
months, basically, by depending totally on the use of local resources and capabilities;
also by employing principles of motivation and competition between the different
ministries. These principles, which had been used before in the reconstruction of
Basrah and Fao (1989), end claimed to be positive, could also be very wasteful.
Power generating units allocated for emergencies, supplied part of the ordinary
power, and were used for pumping drinking water, operating sewage systems and
health services. Although the reconstruction plan aimed at restoring 50% of the
,. The validity of this approach is currently under question since in some circumstances, it can
lead to a waste of time and resources.
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energy capacity by the end of 1991, 35% had already been restored. Restoring the
rest of the capacity would be impossible under the current trade embargo, because
of the need for new plant, equipment and spare parts.
Following the cease-fire, undamaged oil emergency reserves were used to
provide fuel for basic use; this was accompanied by a quota-rationing system of fuel
and petrol for the citizens. Still, fuel supplies were in short supply until May 1991,
and by then, the restored part of AI-Dawra refinery managed to meet the local fuel
requirements. It is hoped that by the end of 1991 the oil sector willbe partly capable
of being exported".
The reconstruction plan aims at restoring 50% of the national transport and
communication sector by the end of 1991. However, according to Iraqi sources, 40%
of the national telephone network, post and telex has already been restored.
Part of the Baghdad - Besrah railway line has been brought back into public
service. Although the International Airport in Baghdad is said to be ready to operate,
it does not, because of the blockade imposed on lraq. Moreover, the plan almed at
repairing 67% of the damaged bridges during 1991, and the rest during 1992, so fer,
26 bridges have been restored, or provided as temporary bridges.
Approximately 15 hospitals are under repair and in need of being reequipped
(250-400 beds each), as are 8 telephone exchange buildings. Meenwhile 5 radio end
television transmission stations have been completed.
Under the current circumstances Iraq has had to develop reconstruction policies
that depend on maximising the use of locally available resources. In terms of labour,
skills and organisation there seem to be few obstacles. The intention so fer was to
depend entirely on local erchltectural end engineering consultants. Nevertheless, the
type of damage inflicted on the highly technical infrastructure and industry, made the
task almost impossible without some imported technology and material.
Finally, the fact thet it was a war aimed at the country's politicel and economic
structure, with the kind of losses and consequences it brought about, meant that
almost certainly reconstruction willbe centralised, as in the case of Kuwait. Although
centralised decision-making might be needed in order to develop effective policies,
the author feels that the irnplementetion of these policies should be decentralised.
The local government should provide opportunities for the salveging of local
3G Today (January 1993) the Iraqi oil sector Is fully capable of being exported. still under the
international trade embargo Iraq is not allowed to export its oil. However, oil is being sold to Turkey
for a very low price and exchanged with Jordan for food and medicine.
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economies. Decentralisation could be one way to help this come about. Similar
social and cultural mistakes were made in the reconstruction of Fao city in 1989;
lesions must be learnt, the people's rights must be met from resources that belong
to the whole nation and their needs are real and great. This time it is not sufficient
to rebuild ghost towns in record time for propaganda purposes. A possible indication
of some sort of decentralised decision-making may be seen in the recent dismantling
of the Ministry of Local Government, where all regional planning and development
decisions used to be taken.
6.7. ANALYSIS Of FINDINGS fROM THE RECONSTRUCTION CAMPAIGNS.
Based on the previous Sections, this one examines the findings of the field
visits. It attempts to highlight some of the successes and failures of the
reconstruction campaigns of Basrah and Fao. It also investigates if there has been
a change in attitude towards reconstruction following the Allied Iraqi war (1991 ). In
order to accomplish this, the 11 Underlying Principles for Reconstruction after War,
derived by participants at the Second YorkWorkshop on Settlement Reconstruction,
held in May 1989 (edited by Davis, 1989b) are used as a general framework to
evaluate the Iraqi experience. It is also seen as an opportunity to review the
Principles in order to develop our own reconstruction recommendations (Chapter 10).
The main outcome of the Second YorkWorkshop on Settlement Reconstruction
after War, held in York, 16·18 May 1989, has been the introduction of a set of 11
Principles directed to authorities responsible for the reconstruction of towns and cities
devastated by war. The Principles embodied 63 Guidelines. A draft of these was
produced by the participants including the author and a final version was edited by
Dr. Ian Davis, Director of the Disaster Management Centre at Oxford Brookes
University. This effort resulted from an attempt to filla gap and to produce practical
advice on the nature and the priorities of reconstruction after war.
Naturally, it was felt that because of the wide range of countries involved in war,
and because of the different types of wars, some of these guidelines were bound to
be less relevant to some situations. Thus, they were produced in the hope that
It .. officials will be cautious in the way they make use of this material, since local
needs wlll always have to be assessed in accordance with their own unique
characteristics". (Davis, 1989b:6).
The Guidelines had the following aims, (Davis, 1989b:7):
1. To provide a framework for the reconstruction planning process.
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2. To stimulate a range of actions that go beyond the conventional wisdom, or the
obvious immediate needs of damage clearance and new planning and building
construction.
3. To encourage local officials to produce their own guidelines or recovery plan,
that adapt these issues in the light of prevailing conditions in a given area.
The prime focus of these Principles was on the physical planning and the
rebuilding of urban settlements devastated by war in developing countries. The same
principle is the focus of this Chapter, as it deals with the reconstruction of the cities
of Basrah and Fao. Thus, this Section will start by introducing the 11 Principles and
then examining them in the light of the Iraqi experience. It concludes with a number
of observations of the success or other wise of the Iraqi reconstruction effort and on
the content of the Principles. The 11 Principles are:
1. It is vital to maximise locally available resources.
2. Effective reconstruction will only occur when it is comprehensive In Its scope.
3. The timing of actions is critical.
4. Do not wait for political and economic reform.
5. There are limited opportunities to reform the design of buildings and settlement
patterns in reconstruction.
6. It is vital to preserve the cultural heritage in reconstruction.
7. It is essential to introduce safety measures in reconstruction.
8. It may be possible to adapt sections of the war economy to reconstruction.
9. The needs of all handicapped people must be catered for.
10. Reconstruction should be regarded as therapy.
11. Knowledge needs to be documented and disseminated.
We shall now attempt to relate these Principles to the specific context of the
Iraqi reconstruction effort. (It is important that the reader should have read the full
text of the 11 Principles, see Appendix 1).
Principle 1: It is vitai to maximise locally available resources.
Based on the assumption that for an exhausted post-war economy to recover
and to reduce the costs of imported goods and services, the country should maximise
the use of locally available resources. These resources include skilled labour;
building materials; institutions and leadership.
However, reading through the Guidelines one becomes confused over a number
of issues. Firstly, the context in which the words 'local resources' are employed. Do
they mean immediate local resources? or regional? or even national 'local' resources?
Secondly, does the principle of 'maximising', imply compulsory exploitation? Thirdly,
the relationship between the scale of war and that of reconstruction, Indicates that
"Nonnally the State wages war, but the affected communities are often left to recover
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and in some instances rebuild on their own. Therefore the character and scale of war
needs to be met with a matching character and scale of reconstruction". (Davis,
1989b: 11). Although this recommendation is generally valid, in the sense that it
emphasises the responsibility of the State, it allows officials to assume that they have
to rebuild In the same manner in which they conducted the war, i.e. from the centre.
In what is normally a strong centralised planning system, such as in Iraq, local
is certainly understood as national, and such widely cast Guideline could be
interpreted as an invitation for a full-scale central government reconstruction. In our
review of the reconstruction of Fao and Besrah, we found that one of the aims of the
reconstruction campaign was to emphesls the strength of the country by depending
on local skills and resources. Nevertheless, the employment of national 'local'
resources organised from the Centre did not always allow local i.e. district economies
to recover through the participation of the local people.
This leads us to the other important issue discussed within this Principle: the
issue of Centralisation, top-down management and the local community Involvement
Where it argues that "Whilst the centre will have a key role to fulfil in reconstruction
planning, it is important to note the dangers of over-centralisation of power and
decision-making" (Davis, 1989b: 10). By now it is obvious that Basrah and Fao are
true cases of reconstruction by Central Government. Even from the beginning, four
military divisions were used to clear the city of rubble, a step which can probably be
considered as exceptional in its thoroughness." In addition, reconstruction plans
were drawn up in Baghdad. Similarly, when it came to implementation, skills,
resources and materials were brought in from the centre and Ministries executed the
work, using imported labour (mostly Egyptians).
In Iraq, faced with the problem of rebuilding their shattered cities, planners have
a chance to learn from other nations' experiences. It is evident that no matter how
well intentioned the plan, as long as it is exclusively the 'authorised' version, there
will be clashes between those who believe in it and the masses who know little or
nothing about it. Consequently, the plan and its execution will come into conflict with
democracy. In our view, there are many lessons to be learned from the momentous
events taking place in the world outside. In Gorbachov's USSR, with its pursuit of
'glasnost' and 'perestroika', freedom and restructuring, President Gorbachov has
admitted that to build without the active participation of the people is bad economics.
40 Warsaw may be another exception.
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Today, Mr YuriMurzin,Chief of the Architectural Department at the Central Scientific
Research and Design Institute in Moscow says "... for decades we have been ignoring
people's opinion and forcing our ideal dreams on them, and for decades we have
been faced with continuous failures"41•
Thus, the issue of public participation becomes very critical. Within this
Principle, public participation is recommended as a 'tool' to maximise local
resources. However, in the case of Basrah and Fao there has been no participation
of the local people in the rebuilding process, nor in the deCision-making. The
professional attitude has been "..we are dealing only with empty sites and rubble".
(Adel Said, city planner). A great emphasis in the Principle is placed upon the role
of women, identified 8S " •• 21 decisive factor in the mobilisation of local resources for
reconstruction". (Davis, 1989b: 13). It is true that women traditionally played an
important role in the provision and maintenance of housing in many countries, and
that their role would be further emphasised due to the war. Still, citing the role of
women in construction as a general guideline undermines a number of local cultures,
which does not see the role of women through the same perspective as that of the
Guidelines.
Another aspect of maximising local resources in reconstruction concerns
building materials, skills and techniques, which concerns the level of skills, as well
as what type of technology, that should be used in reconstruction. Accordingly, it Is
a relief to discover that prefabrication systems were not widely used in AI-Fao (they
were only used in the Festival Square). However, some housing apartment blocks
in Basrah were constructed with pre-cast concrete panel systems. Are they repeating
the mistakes of the Fifties, Sixties and Seventies? A careful look at previous similar
projects built in Basrah makes it quite clear that such building materials and
techniques are not appropriate either to the local environment or to the social and
cultural values of its people. Nevertheless, in the reconstruction of Fao as a symbol
of the government's glory advanced and 'impressive' construction technologies were
used, such as inflatable structures (Adnan Mosque).
Another important factor that should be considered, especially with such rapid
reconstruction that must have affected building quality, is the repair and maintenance
factor. It is strongly believed that by the time AI-Fao becomes an inhabited city, all
of the previously mentioned buildings willstart to need maintenance. Actually, some
41 From a personal discussion with the author during a meeting in Sofia, November 1989.
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signs of deterioration are visible now. We should be aware of the fact that,
reconstruction and repair work in many developing, war devastated countries
occupies a considerable space in their development plans. Yet at the same time
their reconstruction is challenged by additional factors, including continuous
population growth, political instability, internal strife, natural disasters, along with the
continuous challenge to improve living and working conditions.
Principle 2: Effectiue reconstruction will only occur when it is comprehensiue in
its scope.
"The planning process will need to be wide-ranging, covering such issues as:
Immediate post-war planning activities; the assessment of needs and damage; the
planning process: private and public roles in reconstruction; implementation of
reconstruction and long-term planning considerations". (Davis, 1989b:14). The Iraqi
experience was far from being comprehensive in terms of planning and
implementation. What has so far been achieved is more a kin to reconstruction on
a project basis. Following the war with Iran there has been no public emergency
action programme to return settlements to normality as quickly as possible.
This principle calls for a comprehensive assessment of needs and damage,
based on a full appraisal of the affected population and a survey of the physical
damage sustained in buildings and infrastructure, prior to the planning and
implementation of any reconstruction programme. Following the war, each Ministry
was responsible for the assessment of damage inflicted on its own sector. Thus, this
exercise was limited to publicly-owned buildings, infrastructure and industries.
Private properties and residential areas were not covered in the exercise. Interesting
enough, the same approach was again implemented following the 1991 war.
In terms of planning process this principle indicates that there has to be an
ouerall and flexible planning approach, which can make use of military as well as
clvilian skills and expertise. Certainly, the planning for Fao was far from being
integral, in fact It was a publicity hype In support of the Government that took no
consideration of the social and economic future of the city. To make it even easier
to Implement, issues of land ownership were eliminated by the government taking
over the whole city.
However, Long Term Planning Considerations, were given more thought during
the preparation for the reconstruction of Basrah. Commenting on the reconstruction
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planning in Iraq in general, Dr. Talal Muhammad42 said that, "Youcan not say there
is a certain policy to follow, but we have thought of different policies for different
areas in Iraq according to the different economic, technical and security
considerations". He also implied that they are at the stage of looking for a wide
ranging framework of policies and plans which willbe followed by more detailed and
specialised studies.
Dr. Muhammad's claim was supported by Mozafar Al-Yernorr", when he said
that, "...a decision was taken in August 1988 to limit the size of Basrah to the existing
city's boundary and only to develop new zones within this as and when needed". This
decision resulted from a study conducted by the Urban and Regional Planning Team
at the Ministryof Local Government, 'The Basic Design of Basreh the City, 1985', as
part of the process of reconsidering the original development plan already done by
Uewelyn-Davies Planning Office (1973); which ensured that the study was updated
in harmony with the emerging political and economic situation. This is an important
point which is often forgotten: the conflict interrupted and severely retarded pre-war
development plans and projects. Thus it is essential for reconstruction to ".. pick up
the pieces of such discarded plans and may incorporate those which remain relevant
into reconstruction plans". (Davis, 1989b:21).
The decentralisation policy in terms of the built settlements was also
emphasised by the Mayor of Basrah, Mr. Abdel-Wahed AI-Qarnawi:
"A general decentralisation policy is to be pursed within the
coming five years, a new satellite town (Saddam'iat el-Basrah)
is to be built 90km north-west of Basrah city. Another four
satellite settlements are to be constructed around the AI-Fao
city, each of 1000 housing units"".
Hamid Turki spoke about the priority of rebuilding the industrial sector. While
bearing in mind the pursuit of a policy to decentralise in the southern region, the plan
willemphasise the role of existing cities such as AI-Fao, Quma and Zubair and create
new secure cities, such as Saddam'iat AI-Basrah to the north-west of Basrah City.
42 Chairman of the Centre of Advanced Urban and Regional Planning Studies, at the University of
Baghdad.
43 A Senior planner at the Ministry of Local Oovernment, Baghdad. He proposed the structural
plan of the new city of Al-Fao, which was selected by the AI-fao Reconstruction Committee to be
carried out in the near future .
....This was also mentioned in a statement given by Mr Adnan Salman, The Minister of Local
Government, on 20 October 1988, to AL-Jomhoria Iraqi newspaper.
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Finally, we ought to emphasise the importance of Shatt-al-Basrah (Shatt-al-Basrah
is the new canal, in place of Shatt-al-Arab, to connect the Euphrates river to the Arab
Gulf, just next to the Kuwaiti border. It willalso contribute to the doubtful benefit of
reclaiming the Marsh lands).
The author believes that the Iraqis had the right priorities, for Implementation
of reconstruction for Basrah: rubble-clearing was followed by replanning and
rebuilding the infrastructure; streets, bridges, water supply, electricity, net-phones and
opening and clearing rivers. This campaign lasted for 4 months and encouraged the
city's inhabitants to return, rebuild or repair their houses and restart their pre war life.
However, Fao was different, perhaps because of the scale of devastation and the
previously mentioned moral, economic and political reasons.
Finally, the use of the military to reduce the time to clear the city, helped to
deny the participation of the people. A factor that has often been said to be of some
importance to the recovery of morale.
Prlnclple 3: The timing of actions is critical.
This principle clearly states that "There are critical timing considerations in
reconstruction that relate to the priority or sequence of required actions". (Davis,
1989b:22). When to reconstruct? In the Iraqi case reconstruction started, it seems
only, after the cease fire. There seems to have been no planning for reconstruction
during the war. In January 1989, the author met Mr. Adel Said, Chief Architect at the
Department of Local and Regional Planning in the Ministry of Local Government,
Baghdad, who claimed, "Youcan not say that we are pursuing a certain time-planned
policy of reconstruction at the national or regional level, but we do deal with each
case separately according to the scale of damage. That is because it was very
difficult to think or operate reconstruction during the war, especially when the site is
indefensible, like the city of Halabja, ... since the war did not come to an end, we are
living only a cease-fire and as long as there is no peace agreement, we can not start
rebuilding, at least not in the border sites". His claim represented the attitude at that
time (January 1989), which dramatically changed since. For political reasons, when
no lasting peace was forthcoming, the plans for Fao were made ready in 45 days and
the reconstruction took 114 days. This may come to be seen as a mistaken
Intervention. Such haste resulted In the following negative results:
1. Construction and maintenance operations else where In Iraq were frozen to
allow the construction power of the Ministries of Local Government, Housing
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2.
and Construction, Irrigation and Agriculture, Transport and Communication to
meet the dead line.
Very high labour costs, caused by competition between the different Ministries
to attract man power, particularly from abroad.
For the same reasons building materials, plant and equipment were at a3.
premium.
4. Confusion between the different authorities caused a huge waste of building
materials.
5. Consequently, it was very difficult to control the supply and storage of these
materials.
6. Ministries were obliged to provide extra equipment and vehicles, to replace
broken ones, because there was no time to repair them. This doubled the cost
along with the need to use expensive and advanced building materials and
techniques, instead of conventional ones, in order to finish the work on time.
This Principle recommends relating the timing of reconstruction to when people
have returned to their locality. It also recommends offering incentives for families to
return. In the case of Basrah this is what actually happened. The campaign began
six months after the cease-fire, which allowed time for people to return.
The last issue explored in this principle concerned phases of shelter
reconstruction (tents or temporary shelter, prefabrication and permanent) and rapid
reconstruction. In both Basrah and Fao tents and prefabricated houses were avoided.
Limited public housing was provided during and after the war, mostly for govemment
officials and military officers.
However, during the 1991 war, thinking about reconstruction started before the
bombardment (16 January 1991). Mitigating measures were taken including the
removal of equipment from telephone exchanges and power stations. This time the
Supreme Committee for Reconstruction was re-established during the war. Damage
assessments and reconstruction priorities were established immediately after the
cease-fire.
Principle 4: Do not walt for political and economic reforms.
This principle can be summarised in the following sentences of Otto
Koewnigsberger: "Waiting for - or linking resettlement with major economic or
political reforms, such as legislative changes in land tenure, taxation or local
democracy means losing the impetus for change which exists in the immediate post-
disaster period". This principle is structured in a very confusing way, in that it
reviews the different areas that need adjustment before starting reconstruction, while
currently recommending not to walt for change to happen. It considers legislation
and continues to include expropriation; compensation; agencies to manage
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reconstruction; efficiency versus equity; cash resources, and ends up discussing
economic factors.
Apparently, the Iraqi Government agreed with this principle, in the sense that
it did not wait for change to occur, neither did it encourage any attempt to develop
post-war legislation, administration, etc. In fact, it is obvious that they do not expect
change to happen. Whatever legislation was employed before the war will no doubt
continue to be in use after the war.
Nevertheless, some measures regarding compensation were approved. It was
reported by the 'Guardian' (August 15, 1989) that in Basreh, "Compensation of about
1,000 Dinar per family ($2,800 at the official rate] is being paid to cover the cost of
repairing houses, replacing furniture and dead animals". In the same article it was
claimed that "... thousands of poor people were given free parcels of land on which
to build homes".
Principle 5: Thereare limited opportunities to reform the design of buildings and
settlement pattems in reconstruction.
Unique opportunities for reform will arise due to war damage, nevertheless the
central planners should be cautious about 1) rushing into settlement relocation and
2) causing utopian expectations.
In terms of settlement relocation, the Iraqis luckily decided to rebuild Fao on the
same site, more as a political symbol of victory than for social consideration. In other
cases such as Halabja in the north of Iraq, decision was taken to relocate the city to
21 more secure site. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of Feo had to leave their homes for
more than 4 years, and then return to a city that no longer belonged to them, reflects
the same insensitive social and cultural aspects of relocation policies. (More about
this issue will be explored when dealing with the Yemeni case-study in Chapter 7).
Some of these issues have to do with social discontinuity; loss of existing investments
in settlements and land ownership.
The Iraqi government's heavy handed approach to urban reconstruction of Feo
may have avoided land speculation. It unfortunately reinforced centralised planning
and denied the people any role.
The reconstruction of Basreh and Fao raises the issue of pathological
monumentallsm in architecture and town planning. In Basreh, in a green park on the
bank of the corniche faCing the Shatt-al-Arab waterway, stands 99 lifelike bronze
sculptures on stone platforms, of officers and commanders who fell in the battles of
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Figure {~12} A view of the lifelike bronze sculptures poinUng to Iran.
{Source: The author, 1989}
Basrah (49 platforms on land and 50 in water). "This was a priority project in the
frenzied post-war rush to rebuild virtually from scratch the pulverised cities of Balrah
and Fao. Made from real family snapshots by a collective of Iraqi sculptors, they
depict those heroes in a variety of forms of dress, in combat gear or without. Only
one thing is common to all: every man's gaze is sternly fixed on the Iranian shore
across the Shatt, and each has an arm accusingly stretched out pointing in the same
direction". (AI-Khalil, 1991:29).
Obviously, with the rebuilding of Fao, Iraq followed in the steps of some other
so called Socialist countries: planning by decree, assumed needs and resources and
denial of the participation of the users. This strategy failed in Europe a. it will surely
fail in Iraq.
Principle 6: It Is vital to preserve the cultural heritage in reconstruction.
This principle argues that in order to "..re-establish the community's identity
and provide cultural continuity, it is imperative to preserve or rebuild selected
damaged or destroyed cultural landmarks" . (Davis, 1989b:28). Again, this principle
is argued the point of view of the community, while the govemment's concern is only
with economic and political aspects of conservation, often only with physical
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structures. Therefore, one feels the need to balance this with cultural aspects that go
beyond built structures.
"The conservation of the traditional areas is a very important issue, the
government is giving it its careful attention. But at the same time it proved to be very
expensive and without any economical yield". With these words Abdel-Wahed
Al-Qamawi, the Mayor of Basrah, in answer to the author's question about the priority
of conservation. As for the conservation policies that would be applied during the
reconstruction phase, Namir Zenal45 said that:
"The govemment is no longer ready to spend the amount of
money that it used to do in the past. Conservation of
architectural heritage is still considered a political
commitment, but the post-war economic situation does not
allow running large scale conservation policies. Nevertheless.
there is a strong desire to reflect the Islamic and Arabic
identity in the newly designed areas".
The fact that the traditional areas of Basrah have suffered a great devastation
due to the war, did not trigger any govemmental interest in their conservation. On
the contrary, it has been seen as an opportunity for reforming the traditional areas
and 'modemising' them.
The traditional areas are mainly within the Central Corridor. which includes the
AI-Ashar area on Shatt-al-Arab side and Old Besrah, especially on both sides of
AI-Ashar water way. luad Saml46 emphasised what was mentioned in the
Llewelyn-Davies Report (1973):
"The blight in Basrah started long ago before the war. because
of different factors. It was characterised by the deterioration
of the physical conditions, obsolescence. substandard
buildings, high incidence of vacancy and stagnation of
economic activity. Allthese factors impair values and prevent
the normal development of property".
In 1978 the Ministry of Tourism began restoring five houses and this process is
still not finished. Another house on the south bank of AI·Ashar Creek was restored
in 1972 and is used as a museum. At that time the houses needed minor repairs.
45 Chairman of the Regional and Urban Planning Department. in the Ministry of Local
Government, Baghdad.
46 Resident architect at the conservation site in Old Basrah, Ministry of Culture and Information.
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In the AI-Ashar traditional area at the river side, according to Hamid Turki47,
a new development scheme will begin in the near future. The whole area is now
government property and is badly damaged in some places. The government has
already decided to conserve 20 traditional structures out of hundreds and to replace
the rest with new modem structures, in order to enhance the value of the land in that
location, since AI-Ashar is considered the best commercial spot in Basrah City.
On the other hand, with more than 6,000 Iraqi sites listed in official records of
antiquities, Iraq has always given special attention to the archaeological sites. The
most recent example has been the controversial reconstruction of the ancient site of
Babylon, which was carried out during the war with Iran and cost the Iraqi budget
millions of dollars.
The second part of this argument is concerned with preserving monuments and
remains of buildings as a memorial of war. This concept was implemented in Faa.
where the only surviving structure (a mosque) was preserved in its state of damage.
surrounded by a round-about. It is important to make it clear that the aim should not
be to preserve buildings as dead memorials, but rather to have a 'culturally oriented'
approach for reconstruction. In which, whatever survived of buildings with cultural
value, could be rebuilt to the previous appearance if necessary, and even used as a
source of inspiration for the newly designed settlement.
Principle 7: It is essential to introduce safety measures in reconstruction.
When considering this principle. one can sense the influence which the studies
of natural disasters have had on the development of these Principles. This is not to
say that this principle is not relevant. It is important to note that mitigation in the
case of natural disasters is part of a cycle of events. which Is not necessarily, always,
the case in war. It seems important to distinguish mitigation during war from that
after war. Normally, following war only few countries would have reason to continue
feeling threatened. These countries, such as Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel would
continue to provide for and consider the threat of a future war in their settlement
planning and housing design.
The author, accompanied by Dr. Fu'ad AI-Mu'amin. visited Baghdad in 1989
and saw the nuclear shelter (above the ground) at the Technical University. Dr.
Fu'ad AI-Mu'amin claimed that it can provide a safe shelter for 40% of the students
47 The Head of the Planning Division at the Governorate of Basrah.
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and staff In case of nuclear attack. He also mentioned that there is one in every
(Jniversity or College in Baghdad. Two years later, a similar shelter (AI-Amiria) was
destroyed during the American bombardment of Baghdad in January 1991, with a
specially designed bomb. This experience reinforces the view that" ..apart from some
elements of dispersal planning and the overall location of settlements in particularly
vulnerable border situations, there Is not a great deal that can be done to plan a city
against attack from modem weapon systems". (Zargar, 1989).
In Besrah, underground shelters were provided for the public in the main open
areas In Old Basrah Market and in Suq AI-Ashar. Massive concrete barriers were
placed In the streets and around the main public places during the war. Basrah was
surrounded with very strong fortifications as well as an advanced anti-aircraft missile
net. All of these measures were provided during the war. Following the end of the
war, Mr. Al-Qamawl claimed:
"Some housing projects on the way to the new airport of
Basrah, were constructed with individual air-raid shelters, as
well as some community underground shelters part of which
were designed as nuclear shelters".
While in Fao mitigation was not an issue at all, despite the fact that Fao is
located in one of the most threatened zones. That may be because it was never
meant to be inhabited I This principle also calls for the incorporation of safety
measures against natural hazards and fire.
In short, It seems more sensible to invest in non structural safety measures: civil
defence planning, social preparedness and to try and reduce social and cultural
vulnerability (In the case of civil war) as well as economic and political ones.
Principle 8: It may be possible to adapt sections of the war economy to
reconstruction.
It is argued that the technology as well as the production capability of the 'war
economy' can be adapted into one that could produce essential building or
Infrastructure components needed In reconstruction. Two direct benefits can be
achieved In such a case: 1) badly needed building materials and components and;
2) avoiding unemployment. This is of course, if the end of the war meant the closure
of the military industry. To our mind, this Principle is too idealistic. For developing
countries such as Iraq and Iran, who have invested so much in their military industry
during the war, it is very difficult to suddenly transfer their industry. What is more
likely to happen is that, such countries will follow the lead of the developed nations
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and expand their industries to be able to export their products to the rest of the Third
World. In fact, this has been the Iraqi strategy since the end of its war with Iran. Iraq
held its First International Arms Fair in October 1989, where it announced its
production capability and identified its marketing opportunities. Iraqi officials argue
that investing in arms industry although in the short-term diverts what would normally
have been available for reconstruction to defence, would generate in the long run
hard currency that is badly needed as well as regional political influence.
Nevertheless, and as we explored in the previous sections the Iraqi Ministry of
Industry and Military Industrialization played an essential role In the reconstruction
campaigns of Basreh and Fao, where it supplied electricity generating units, medium
and high voltage networks and street lighting networks in a rather efficient way.
However, it is important to mention that following the Iraqi retreat from Kuwait
in February 1991, and its acceptance of the United Nations resolutions, the Security
Council refused to allow Iraq to adapt its military manufacturing capabilities to
civilian use. Furthermore, it insisted that all factories have to be demolished, a
process that is still going on until today (July 1992).
Principle 9: The needs (or handicapped people must be catered for.
This principle calls for special attention during rebuilding to satisfy the specific
needs of those who have become mentally or physically disabled due to the war, and
also the need for rehabilitation programmes that eventually would allow the disabled
people to function as normally as the disability may allow. This principle is highly
acknowledged in Iraq, partly because most of the visibly disabled are ex-service men,
and caring for the disabled is seen as a political commitment towards those who
defended the nation. It has been claimed that during 1989-1990, 25 Technical
Training Institutions have been altered to make them accessible for the disabled
(Qhazala, 1989)48. Still, more effort is needed in providing care, treatment and
training for the disabled as well as working opportunities. Additional facUities must
also accommodate those suffering form post-war psychological trauma.
Principle 10: Reconstruction should be regarded as therapy.
This princlple illustrates that "It is vital to recognise the therapeutic need to
closely involve war survivors in rebuilding activities wherever this is possible. They
48 Physical disability is the most common followed by hearing disability.
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should be regarded as active participants in the planning and implementation of
reconstruction rather than being mere spectators of other's actions". (Davis,
1989b:33). This issue relates directly to the issue of 'public participation', which has
been discussed as part of Principle 1, and will be explored in more detail in Chapter
9 of this dissertation. However, it became evident that the authorities and the
planners (in the case of both Basrah and Fao) were not aware of the role that
participation can play In the therapeutic readjustment of the affected communities.
Even if they were aware, the high speed in which they were required to reconstruct
made it impossible to involve the people in any degree.
To support this Principle, the Guidelines quote George Atkinson to have said
"Too often it happens, especially in poorer countries, that large numbers of able-
bodied men stand idle, living on relief, while outsiders get busy on reconstruction.
Not only is such a happening demoralising to the able-bodied, but it wastes much
needed resources". (in Davis, 1989b:33).
Principle 11: Knowledge needs to be documented and disseminated.
This principle calls for action in three areas: 1) Education, training and public
awareness. 2) Evaluation of reconstruction and dissemination of knowledge. 3) The
documentation of survival and coping abilities.
In terms of education, training and public awareness at the different issues of
post-war reconstruction, Iraq has done very little and reconstruction has always been
a predominantly governmental concern; an exclusive issue for the government's
officials and professionals. There appears to be little or no public knowledge about
the research into post-war reconstruction. There is no published literature about
post-war reconstruction plans. The impression given is that the government's attitude
to research into reconstruction is to consider that it is private. The author believes
that more research should be done on developing manpower resources, building
materials supplies and techniques, private sector investment and the general
refurbishment of the built environment, due to the trauma of the war and its
economic, social and demographic consequences.
Even in institutions of higher education, the fact that there has been a number
of wars and urgent needs for reconstruction has hardly affected the education and
training programmes offered. In 1989, Dr. AI-Bayati4e claimed that from the five
4g Professor at the Department of Architecture at the University of Baghdad.
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centres of post-graduate planning studies, in Iraq, there is not one student who is
involved in the subject of post-war reconstruction. This failure is mainly due to the
lack of encouragement as well as lack of information. The author asked Ms. Nasreen
Ghazala, an architect, from the Council of Technical Institutes, Ministry of Higher
Education & Scientific Research, Baghdad, about the role of the architectural and
planning students, both under-graduate and post-graduate, in the process of
reconstructlon'". She claimed that:
"We have enough experienced planners, to conduct the
reconstruction process, thus there is no need to bother the
architectural students with the problems and constraints of
post- war reconstruction".
Obviously, there are a lot of obstacles facing any researcher in this field. The
most important of which, after lack of encouragement, is the lack of information due
to governmental secrecy concerning anything that has to do with the subject. As it
is illustrated, during the three field visits to Iraq, it was very difficult to obtain any
maps. In order to get them, one has to address a request to the MilitarySurvey Unit
and this procedure will take at least three weeks, but they are unlikely to agree to
give away maps or aerial views because of security. It is almost as if the
government has something to hide; that decisions about reconstruction like those
about the war, are only the province of officials under orders from their political
masters. More open encoufagement and support should be given to the young
researchers, because the first step in solving any problem is to admit its existence
and then search for a solution.
Iran, contrary to the Iraqi attitude, has published a vast amount of information
and data that has enabled its researchers to proceed with their studies and to develop
the policies and programmes of reconstruction, concerned with physicel, social and
economic issues. Having said that, a change can be detected in the Iraqi
Government's attitude following the 1991 war, when It announced its agreement on
the establishment of a Post-war Reconstruction Study Centre at the University of
I
50 This question was addressed to her at the Second York Workshop, on Settlement
Reconstruction after War, 16-18 May 1989. At the Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies,
University of York.
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Baghdad, which will undertake research and documentation on the subject. (AI-
Zubaidi, 1991 }~I. It is still to be seen whether this is a 'genuine' approach.
Euaiuation of reconstruction and dissemination of knowledge has recently been
taken seriously following the reconstruction campaigns of Basrah and Fao. The
evaluation studies that have been carried out and announced during the First
International Symposium catered only for efficiency as it is typically understood by
a central government, In terms of figures and quantities, rather than qualities and
people's reaction to the reconstructed environment. The same symposium has been
seen as a tool to disseminate the Iraqi experience as evaluated by the Iraqi officials.
Nevertheless, these evaluations provided a number of publications by the Ministry of
Culture and Information the document the reconstruction process. (see
bibliography). However, nothing has been done on the documentation of damage,
and on research.
Finally, in relation to the last action area of this Principle (i.e. documentation
of survival and coping abilities), it is very difficult to imagine the government (any
government) giving a priority, whatsoever to the such recording. No matter how
valuable the insight on the way individuals and communities coped or survived the
war, it seems to be an area of pure academic interest and anthropological
excitement. In fact, the author wonders whether this Guideline should be omitted
from the Principle.
6.8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
In this Chapter we have reviewed the scale and type of damage suffered by the
cities of Basrah and Fao during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) and by Baghdad
during the Allied bombardment in January/February 1991. This was followed by an
examination of the different reconstruction policies and processes. We concluded by
an evaluation of the Iraqi reconstruction experience, using the Reconstruction
Principles prepared by participants at the Second YorkWorkshop as a reference. At
the lame time thil Chapter was seen as an opportunity to review the Principles
themselves. The conclusions from this Chapter willbe grouped under two headings.
a. Obseruatlons concemlng Iraqi centralised reconstruction; and
b. Obseruations concemlng the formate and the content of the Guidelines.
~I In a letter addressed to the author, 29 November 1991. Mr AI-Zubaidi is the General Director
of the IDRISI Centre for Engineering Consultancy in Baghdad.
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6.8.1. Observations concerning post-war reconstruction In Iraq.
i. The absence of a national reconstruction strategy following the Iran-Iraq war
was the main handicap for the reconstruction effort, resulting in limited
reconstruction campaigns being carried out in two or three cities, mostly
serving political aims.
ii. The closest the Government has been to establish a national strategy was after
the 1991 Allied bombardment, in which:
• Power was given to a Supreme Committee to take and implement urgent
decisions needed to remove bottle necks on a national scale.
• An attempt was made to readjust pre-war development (reconstruction)
policies, rather than drawing new ones.
• National damage assessment was carried out in which each ministry
surveyed its own sector, and at the same time estimated their own
undamaged resources.
• Action priorities were drawn.
iii. The Iraqi case study highlighted the extent to which reconstruction after war can
be constrained by international alliances and relations as well as by the
continuation of war.
iv. This case study showed how reconstruction can be used politically and how
communities can be manipulated. Reconstruction was far from being
comprehensive to tackle social, economic issues. Instead it was purely
physical and symbolic.
v. The urgent need for an intemationelly respected philosophy of reconstruction
is one of the main conclusions to come out of our study of reconstruction in
Iraq. Such philosophy should define the State's responsibility and the rights of
the people.
vi. The reconstruction campaigns of Besrah and Fao did not have any realistic
appreciation of the dynemics of reconstruction. Plans were drawn up in
Baghdad, they lacked flexibility and did not allow for feedback.
vii. The result was total alienation of the local population, their real needs and
ambitions were never understood.
Viii. During eight years of war, thinking of and planning for reconstruction was
discouraged, mainly because the govemment did not want to admit damage
and destruction.
• The issues of war-damage and reconstruction were, and probably still are
considered highly political and no doubt controversial and can only be
addressed and discussed by Iraqi officials.
• Consequently missing the chance of involving the public in discussions
over the form and priorities of reconstruction and of having ready plans
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for implementation followingthe cease fire, thus delaying the return of the
displaced people.
lx. In Fao no attempt was made to achieve a balance, between retaining some of
the cities feetures and modernising it. The city was totally cleared out by the
army; people were not allowed to salvage their belongings, and a totally new,
unrecognisable city was built.
x. The rural settlements surrounding the cities of Basrah and Fao were ignored in
reconstruction, en attitude that did not appreciate the fragile link between rural
and urban centres.
xi. The rebuilding of Besrah and Fao is an extreme example of reconstruction by
central government. This approach has been besically a reflection of the pre-
war planning pattern further reinforced by eight of war and military rule.
xii. The organisational pattern of the planning and implementation machinery
followed closely what has been identified in Chapter 3 as Model 5. However,
in this case planning decisions were made by the Ministryof Local Government.
The task of implementation was shared between different ministries. Although
not establishing a specialised ministry for reconstruction, seemed to be a
sensible decision, the Iraqi experience lacked co-ordination.
xiii. However, the response following the 1991 war was totally different, partly
because the Ministryof Local Government was bombed and all the records were
lost. Although a Reconstruction Supreme Committee was established, the
whole Cabinet was announced as a Reconstruction Government and each
ministry was ordered to plan and implement its own reconstruction
programmes.
xiv. The 'local' construction industry was not given the chance to develop itself due
to ministries stepping in to implement the reconstruction plans.
xv. Following Its war with Iran, Iraq set aside hundreds of millions of dollars for
reconstruction that were readily available. This meant that importing
machinery, labour and building materials was not an obstacle to achieve
reconstruction in 90 days, and we saw the result of that: wastage, top-down
approaches, etc. While following the allied bombing in 1991, the lack of
financial resources and the trade embargo meant that the Iraqis had to depend
totally on their local labour and building materials, thus debris were carefully
cleared and recycled.
xvi. The Iraqi experience was characterised for its overplayed compensations. At the
very beginning of the war compensation was given according to the scale of
damage, especially in importent urban centres such as Baghdad and Basrah.
As the war spread and the damage extended it became more and more difficult
to handle such system of compensation, thus a standard payment was made,
and not to all families.
• This method proved to have its own shortcomings due to inflation and
lack of building materials. Very few people invested their money in
reconstruction.
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• The provision of land in rural areas proved to be the most successful way
of compensation.
6.8.2. Observations on the Reconstruction Principles.
In this Chapter we have commented on the content of each Principle separately
highlighting its value and its shortcomings. However, the following general
observations can be made:
i. Obviously there is a case for having a set of reconstruction Guidelines.
However it might be more appropriate to have them written in the form of
'recommendations', as 'guidelines' imply that if they were followed they would
produce good results, something that is not certain.
ll, Somehow, there is a need to distance reconstruction recommendations after
natural disasters from those after war.
iii. Any recommendations have to be based on a certain morality. In the case of
war, this has to be the eventual benefit of the war suffering people. Thus the
guidelines should have the courage to spell out this fact. One way of doing that
could be by relating the recommendations to already established international
human rights and settlement declarations.
iv. It is important to understand how much of these recommendations are for the
sake of the people and how much for the sake of research development.
v. In general, the set of Principles are too idealistic, specially when it comes to
considering reconstruction politics.
vi. There is a need for a summarised version of these recommendations to be
widely disseminated.
vii. In some aspects of reconstruction, caution should be practised when it comes
to across-cultural generalisations. For instance, the role of women and people
participation in reconstruction.
••••
viii. There is a need for such Guidelines to be tested in the field and in different
countries, in order to highlight those issues that are relevant across-countries .
In this Chapter we have examined aspects of decision-making and
implementation of reconstruction at a national pollcy level, based on a short term
evaluation of the reconstruction of the cities of Basrah and Fao. In the following
Chapter (7) we willexamine beside the reconstruction policy the detailed process of
implementation and we will evaluate the reconstruction programmes in Dhamar,
Yemen, based on feedback by the local inhabitants.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
REBUILDING AND RESETTLEMENT, 9 YEARS LATER.
A CASESTUDY OF THE CONTRACTOR-BUILT RECONSTRUCTION
IN YEMEN, FOLLOWING THE 1982 DHAMAR EARTHQUAKE.
7.1. INTRODUCTION.
This study is based on a recent examination of the three different revival and
reconstruction approaches carried out by the Yemeni Government followingthe 1982
Dhamar earthquake. They were Repair, Contractor-built resettlement and Self-help
reconstruction I. In each programme, it was claimed, so called earthquake resistant
construction techniques were introduced. However, 9 years later, the author found
tens of settlements and thousands of houses were standing abandoned. The local
people it seems are still practising traditional building techniques that make them
vulnerable to the next earthquake.
The field visit, conducted in November 1991, covered 55 settlements out of
500, the smallest of which comprised 1 reconstructed house and the biggest 405
houses. The Self-help approach, though it seemed the most acceptable, still had
shortcomings; only 1000 houses were constructed (more about this approach in
Chapter 9). The Repair programme proved impossible to implement on a wide scale.
Of 18,000 cracked houses only 1,000 in the city of Dhamar itself were repaired. The
extreme difference. between the Contractor-built settlements and the traditional
lifestyles have severely tested each community's ability to adapt. Many have rejected
the new housing, some have resettled after altering the house and the settlement
layout. A few have accepted the settlements as they are and given up their
traditional lifestyle.
By concentrating on the Contractor-built programme inwhich more than 11,000
houses were constructed, this Chapter attempts to identify the reasons behind the
relative success of some reconstructed settlements and the severe failure of others.
It concludes by listing a number of reconstruction issues in which misjudgments and
unrealistic assumptions were made.
J With the help of the Dutch govemment. EEC and the UNDP.
Case study: Reconstruction of Dhamar, Yemen.
232
7.2. WHY DHAMAR?
l
I
IThe Yemen study is one of a number of cases designed to help formulate a 'set
of guidelines for the planning and management of reconstruction programmes in the
Middle East'. Though our main interest lies in the field of rebuilding human
settlements after wars, the Dhamar post-earthquake reconstruction programme was
selected firstly, as it is the only programme of that scale (needed nowadays In post-
war rebuilding in Iran and Iraq), in the region. Secondly, previous studies have shown
many similarities between reconstruction after wars and disasters, particularly after
earthguakes2•
"Whilst knowledge from flood and high wind situations is
relevant, it is apparent that the extent of building damage is
much smaller from these hazards than in the case of
earthquakes. Therefore, there is a primary point of similarity
between war and hazard damage related to the seismic
context". (Davis, 1986:44).
Thirdly, because it is another case, where, despite the special Yemeni and even
Dhamari cultural context, the post-disaster policy decisions have been similar to
other international situations, (in the stages of emergency, rehabilitation and
reconstruction). In particular, concerning those decisions taken by the centred
government and the international relief agencies).
Encouraged by a number of experts in the field; Ian Davis, Fred Cuny, Yasmen
Aysan, Andrew Coburn, Jolyon Leslie, Akbar Zargar, etc., the author decided to look
into the experience of Yemen following the Dhamer earthquake in December 1982.
Nine years after the earthquake it is possible to examine some of the long-term
effects of policies and management models. The idea of such evaluation was
encouraged by the fact that suddenly, everybody in the field seemed to have lost
interest in the Yemen reconstruction experience, despite the fact that at the time it
was considered as a leading example in the field of reconstruction and rehabilitation.
As was emphasised in F. Cuny's review of the 1980's achievements in the field of
reconstruction after disasters, (during the international conference 'Disasters and the
Small Dwelling, 2-6 September 199(J), when he said of the Yemen experience. "An
experience that proved that the NOO's can work together and that building
2 One of the recent studies was carried out by Dr. Akbar Zarger at the Instltute of Advanced
Architectural Studies, University of York, on the reconstruction of war-damaged rural areas of Iran.
3 A range of examples supporting this argument can be found in Anderson (, Wooddrow (1989)
Rising form the Ashes, UNESCO.
,
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settlements is not a statlc issue". (Cuny, 1990)4.
Keeping in mind that, "No disaster is a unique event of which no lesson can be
learned" (Michel Lechat, 19905) this study sets out to support the main hypothesis
of this dissertation that 'Settlement reconstruction should be an integral part of a
nation wide deuelopment, ..., reconstruction that takes the iotm of a series of
centralised projects (infrastructure, housing and public buildings) is unlikely to be
efflcient nor culturally sensitive'.
l YEMEN ARAB REP.
' .. ~·8~f#· ~ EarthQuake:;m%~I// affected;//P '// area, ,'/:0,/
Sana' a • Mareb
/
./
I,
,---, .,/
_f--' BEIDHAr-
I
),
,.'-"__... I
, --'"r'
4 Personal note.
5 Paper presented at the international conference 'Disasters and the Small Dwellings', held at the
Disaster Management Centre. Oxford. 2·6 September 1990.
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7.3. AIM sOBJECTIVES OF THE DHAMAR STUDY.
The aim of this exercise is to investigate how people affected by a disaster and
subsequently by a massive programme of rehabilitation, responded to extreme and
unfamiliar circumstances after nine years, thus concentrating on the long-term
implications of re-housing, by highlighting the successes and failures due to policy
shortcomings. This research aims to promote the following hypothesis:
The assumed e{flciency of centralised project-based
reconstruction tends to deny the importance of the culturally
sensitive approach to reconstruction, built on the direct
Involvement of the local people.
1
I
Acheiving the above aim will help the author to draw principles from the
reconstruction experience in Yemen, that could be generalised and applied in similar
situations, noticeably those of rebuilding after wars.
In order to measure some of the long-term physical and socio-cultural
implications, the main challenge was to understand and identify the implications of
some of the policy decisions that were taken at the different stages of emergency,
recovery and reconstruction. Thus, this Chapter starts by exploring the policies
affecting repairs, temporary housing, relocation, resettlement, housing reconstruction
and local economic recovery. Then, it investigates the different mitigation measures
(both structural and non-structural), to see if such measures have become part of the
local 'disaster culture' or if they have been forgotten and neglected.
The Dhamar reconstruction study contains the following main Sections:
7.4. A presentation of the research methods and field work conducted between the
9th and the 24th of November 1991.
7.5. A brief description of the Dhamari social, economic, architectural and cultural
context, including a review of the 1982 earthquake; its scale, the damage
caused and some general results, by reviewing other experts' documentation
of the incident.
7.6. Usting the different emergency and reconstruction policy-decisions and
approaches taken by the Yemeni government and the different relief agencies
that have been Involved.
7.7. A Discussion of the field work findings in relation to the implications of the
reconstruction policies, focusing on the physical, economic, socio-cultural and
attitudinal factors that might have affected the acceptance or other wise of the
reconstructed settlements.
7.8. ConcluSion, listing a number of recommendations concerning methods of
intervention, models of management and general reconstruction policies.
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7.4. CONDUCTING THE FIELD WORK.
The research methodology for this casestudy followed the general research and
data collection methods applied in the development of this dissertation and discussed
earlier in Chapter 4 based on the conventional three stages of:
a. Review of existing knowledge on the subject.
b. Conducting a field study and data collection.
c. Analysis and documentation of findings.
Prior to the field visit comprehensive research, interviews and discussions with
experts and literature review was conducted in order to expand the author's
knowledge on the context, as well as to prepare the ground for the field visit. The
review of existing knowledge on the Dhamar casestudy was described earlier in
Chapter 4 where it was given as an illustrative example, thus this Section will not
discuss it again.
The field work in Yemen was conducted between the 9th and the 23rd of
November 1991, with three main objectives in mind:
1- To find out how far the programmes' initial objectives have been satisfied,
in terms of quantity and quality. Particularly the contractor built and repair
schemes, as the self-help project is the only well documented and publicised
part of the Yemeni experience along side the training programme6• Also, how
far those programmes have been accepted by the users, and how successful
they were and why.
2- To measure some of the physical and socio-cultural implications of the
different reconstruction schemes carried out by the Govemment and other
international organisations. (For instance, the way people reacted by modifying
or extending their houses. In the social context, their effect, for instance on the
traditional family structure, the existing network of responsibilities and
leadership, etc.).
3- To examine the technical aspects of building improvements that have been
introduced, and their effect on the local building tradition. (In other words, to
find out if such techniques have become part of daily practice, or if they have
been restricted just to those projects built by the Government).
The field work started in Sana'a, where it was necessary to establish contacts
in order to be able to obtain the Executive Office's co-operation and support when
6 Although there were more houses listed as In need of repair than of reconstruction, all the
professional attention seems to have been given to the new houses. One reason for that might be the
fact that rebuilding has always been more interesting for the politician and the professional and easier
to manage and supervise.
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in Dhamar. In Dhamar the field work took mainly the form of predetermined visits
to a number of selected samples (villages and towns), representing the different
approaches of reconstruction that have been carried out; building new settlements
by contractors, self-help approaches and damage repair.
7.4.1. In Sanala: paving the way.
a. Meetings with otncials.
Due to the strong informal and formal political character of the reconstruction
programme it would have been a waste of time and resources to suddenly tum up in
Dhamar and to try and collect data. One of the early decisions of this study was to
understand and respect the local political and social structure and to try and operate
within it. Meeting officials was one of the basic methods used, not only to collect
information and to have an insight into the situation, but more importantly to pave
the way for the coming field work in Dhamar. A few hours following arrival in Sane's
the author conducted the first official meeting with Mr. Mohamed Al-Ashwal, Deputy
Minister, Ministry of Housing. Although Mr AI-Ashwal showed sympathy and co-
operation this meeting was a very frustrating beginning. The Supreme Council for
Reconstruction in Sena'a to which his letter of recommendation was addressed,
turned out to have been abolished a few years back.
My second meeting was with Mr. Ahmed Obaid, Information and Public
Relations Manager of the Executive Office of Reconstruction. After much hesltatlon,
he finally agreed to meet me in a local pharmacy in the evening, where he had to go
for some medicine for his sick father. His eventual co-operation came as a result of
pressure put on him by Mr. Humadi, an Influential figure in Yemen and the uncle of
my friend Abdel-Majid Haded". Nevertheless, we managed to have a constructive
discussion on why I was there and what I was trying to achieve from my visit. He
also gave me a general idea concerning the nature of the Reconstruction Project. As
a direct result of this meeting came my meeting the next day with the Minister Mr.
Mohammed Jaghman, a member of the Supreme Council for the Reconstruction of
Earthquake Affected Areas (SCREAA) and for the last 5 years the General Manager
of the Executive Office for Reconstruction in Dhamar. Mr Jaghman, who by chance
recognised a member of my family, showed complete understanding and support for
7 Abdel-Majid Hadad is a DPhii biology student at the University of York who was my only contact
on arrival to Yemen. lam most grateful for his help and hospitality. I also acknowledge the help of his
supervisor in York Dr. R. Ormond.
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my research, by offering the facilities of the Executive Office, including transport and
accommodation in Dharnar.
In short, all the obove mentioned meetings were crucial to eventually' open the
doors' of the Executive Office and its filing cabinets for my investigations. The
provision of an essential four-wheel-drive vehicle, a companion and a driver was as
a direct result of meeting Mr. Jaghman.
b. Diplomacy and Luck.
Behaving diplomatically by observing the local etiquette and customs, enables
the researcher not only to integrate himself but also to learn more about local
customs, values and beliefs. Diplomacy, as employed in the Yemeni visit includes
everything from understanding local culture and behaving accordingly, to adopting
local dress and joining the men chewing 'qatt': the local substitute for alcohol. These
are good occasions to question and listen. As are invitations to eat and drink endless
cups of coffee, all ways of bridging the gap between researcher and community.
There was the usual element of good luck added to some diplomacy, without
it this field visit would have been extremely difficult to implement. Also, no one has
control over his or her luck, thus it is difficult to account for it in the research
procedure, however it is important that researchers are aware of this positive
component when they experience it.
7.4.2.- In Dhamar: visiting the settlements.
The objective of the visits was to measure the degree of success or otherwise
of the Contractor-built Reconstruction Programmes. conducted by the Central
Government and that of the Self-help Programme, and to identify the reasons behind
any failures or successes. The intention was not to carry out a comprehensive study
of the rural and urban settlements in the Dhamar region.
The fact that the Executive Office for Reconstruction had no information at all
concerning which settlements are inhabited and which are not, as most of them were
never visited by officials after the completion of the contractors work, meant that the
field visits had to be extended to cover the largest possible number of settlements.
Consequently, one had to introduce a method that would make it possible to gather
information on a wide front, in a short period, with the limited resources available.
The initial finding of a considerable gap between the number of successes and
failures in the reconstructed settlements (some settlements were found totally
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uninhabited, while others were 100% inhabited) supported the need for more visits
as opposed to an In-depth examination of lndtvlduel locatlcns (as Idid before. In the
case of Fao 5 Basrah cities, Iraq). In this respect, the writings of Robert Chambers.
particularly his book, Rural Development: Putting the Last First (1983) influenced the
author to a great extent. Trying to gather the greetest amount of information
covering the widest area in the shortest time, one was always in denger of falling into
the trap of "rural development tourism /I as identified by Chambers (1983: 10-23).
Having his six biases in mind, the author tried to counter them as much as possible.
The six sets of biases identified by Chambers are: (1) spatial: urban, tarmac and
roedslde: (2) project: visiting only successful projects; (3) personal bles; (4) dry
season; (5) diplomatic: politeness and timidity end (9) professionel.
a. The Selection of Settlements.
In order to decide which settlements to visit, the author started with the help of
the Executive Office for Reconstruction (EOR) engineers in Dharnar by grouping the
affected settlements into three, according to the different approaches pursued. In the
process of selection an attempt was made to counter two of the blases identified
above, namely, spatial and project. We listed a number of settlements to be visited
in the coming two weeks. to achieve a balance view between urban and rural, small
and big and easily accessible and inaccessible. [see Table 1 for list of the visited
settlements and Figure 1 for settlements' distribution]. On the other hand, also
included were places recommended to the author by Jolyon Leslie. es being worth
visiting to have a clearer insight into the effects of the different reconstruction
programmes, when he wrote:
"As far as field work in Yemen is concerned .... perticularly
rewarding might be visits to AIJuma'a. to the west of Dhamar
near Jebel as Sharq, and the Magrib Ans area, around Beni
Mawalad where I spent a good deal of time. The villages
directly to the west of Dhamar on the plein show self-built
reconstruction at its best, while those like Risabah on the road
to Sana'a show how dependent 21 high-profile reconstruction
programme can make people. Dawran Ans might else be
worth a visit".8
The main handicap of such a selection approach was the presumption by the
EOR professionals that they totally understood my research needs, and thus tried to
8 From 8 personal letter addressed to the author In November 1990.
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select only those locetlons which they believed conformed to those needs. Thus
recommending mainly settlements with easy access from the road and insisting that
they "...2111 look the same". This difficulty was partially overcome by having more
than one person present during the site selection meetings; including a building
supervisor (Abu' Ahmed), who later on acted as 21 guide and the driver (AI-Raqas),
who had a better knowledge of the real condititons of the settlements. Although they
sounded very confident, tDlkingebout the settlements they reconstructed, it carne as
21 shock, leter on, to learn of the greDt number of uninhablted houses and that in
lome ceses fDmllieswere shDring their houses with their anlmals.
However, Dlthough the initiDIintention was to visit 20 Contractor-built and 5
Self-help settlements, with the unexpected cc-operation of the Executive Office9 in
Yemen, It was actually possible to visit 40 Contractor-built and 15 Self-help
settlements. Inmost cases the reconstructed settlements, as well as the Originalsites
were visited. In each settlement samples of inhabited houses built by contractors or
by the people were surveyed. Systematic observation and semi-structured interviews
were the main methods of InvestigDtion. However, two partlcular settlements were
studied in greDt detail (SDn'Dand Tinin).
b. Measuring the degree of acceptance.
Since stDrting this exercise, the euthor hDSattempted to identify the criterle by
which to judge whether 21 'rebuilt settlement' hDSbeen successful or not. The extent
of transformation achieved 2-5 years later, seemed to be the most sensible way of
measuring the success or otherwise of any reconstructed village or town. Thus, a
decision was made to look into physical transformation (growth and change) as an
indicator of people's acceptance or not of the houses provided by the Government,
either by centrector-bullt or self-help methods. It has been established thet "The
degree of success and acceptance of the new settlement should be judged by the
extent to which the settlement hDSbecome 21 self-reliDnt village In its own right or 21
viable partner with Its original village" (Coburn, et el, 1984:52), although there are
abvious doubts on the degree to which a settlement could be self-reliant.
9 When I planned my visit I was not counting on much co-cperatlon from the EOR, because they
never answered any of my letters addressed to them over II period of 14 months.
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Figure /7-21 Settlements visited, November 1991.
The growth and change in the new settlements involve various indicators.
Some of these indicators are physical and observable, others are less obvious.
However, these observable factors may not themselves be detenninistic in deciding
whether a settlement has been accepted or not; social factors and attitudes may also
be involved. Such social values and attitudes can be explored through interviewing
and mixing with the local community. This may be more revealing particularly when
the author shares their langauge, as well as a great part of their traditions and values.
The following are some of the observable indicators into the .degree of
acceptance' according to the priority in which they were observed and recorded,
during the visit to each settlement:
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The number of occupied reconstructed houses in comparison
to the total number of reconstructed houses provided by
government.
The emerging of new houses built by the people on the
resettlement site.
The use and maintenance of the local community facilities
provided by the government (school, clinic, mosque, etc ..)
On individual house scale:
Modification:
Main tenace:
Investment:
Any modification or extension to the 'new' housing.
The degree of maintenance and state of repair.
The commitment of investment in the enclosures of the plot
and tree planting, etc.
Using these features it was possible to grade the villages into three degrees of
acceptance: Class A, thriving villages with the majority of houses occupied (more
than 66%), well maintained, with community facilities in use. Class B being villages
with an average number of houses occupied (20-50%), with some gardens and
extensions. Class C having very few houses occupied (less thatn 20%), in a poor
state of repair, few gardens or extensions. Class 0 new settlements largely
abandoned.
In order not to limit our judgement exclusively to buildings as one form of
development, a more comprehensive list that examines some of the social values,
attitudes and traditions, as well as other forms of physical improvement, has been
developed and observed in the field. By adopting this method of classifying the
villages according to the degree of their acceptance and or rejection, one can later
on highlight some of the factors that influenced that acceptance; a very important
conclusion, Ifwe are to formulate a framework within which reconstruction polices
can be reviewed, not only in Yemen, but else where In the Middle East.
c. Obseruations.
In order to make the observations more systematic, the author developed a
check list, based on an appropriate framework within the overall context. This
framework proved to be of great value in the field, where it made it possible to
register and analyze some rather complex real situations that were not fully conceived
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before. It also provided a straight forward system for exploring the factors that are
critical to the planning and design strategies and implementation of reconstruction
programmes. While its value within the theoretical research work lies in highlighting
the crucial factors that have influenced the acceptance or otherwise of the
settlements, as well as, in illustrating the different relationships among such factors.
In designing the framework, categories of factors that might affect the level of
people's acceptance of the provided settlements were set out, along with a suggestion
on which order they should be considered in. The categories had to be
comprehensive enough to cover all the important variables, but at the same time few
enough, that they are easily managed and observed by the author, within the limited
time allowed for the field visit.
Thus in every settlement visited the following issues were observed:
1. The original state of housing as it was provided by the Government
between December 1983 and December 1989; the topography; the
number of houses; the percentage of the population they housed; the
relocation distance from the existing village; the relocation distance from
the agricultural land; distance from a main road; the supply of services.
2. Today's situation as was found during the field visit in November 1991,
at least 2 years after the completion of the reconstruction programme; the
number of houses that were occupied in the new settlement and the
degree of acceptance. (The way in which the degree of ecceptance has
been reached is explained in the following Section).
3. Some of the factors that we believe might have affected the degree of
acceptance. (These factors are also discussed in the following sections).
4. Survey of a representative sample of the occupied houses, to register the
way in which the new houses and settlements were modified to suit the real
needs of the people.
d. Semi-structured interviews.
In accordance with the overall methodology of this disseratetion, the semi-
structured interview technique was considered appropriate in Dhemar, as it allows
more flexibility to gather qualitative information on e wide front, in a short time, with
the limited resources available. The author's decision to exclude the use of the
structured questionnaire is for two main reasons; firstly, because the scope of this
study and its posltion within the author's doctorate research did not allow an
extended period in the field. Secondly, and equally important, was the advise of
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Jolyon Leslle'", who recommended not to use structured questionnaires as a means
of collecting information, when he wrote to the author:
"I would caution somewhat on the use of structured
questionnaires in the Yemeni context, having abandoned our
own neat format during the evaluation. The people to talk to
will be builders themselves, who are formed into an unofficial
guild in Dhamar ... My biggest lesson from the work in Yemen
was that unstructured discussion was the best means of
communicating Ideasorgetting useful information" . (emphasis
added).
The questions and conversations carried out during the interviews were
structured to give an insight what the physical, social and attitudinal factors are that
led to the acceptance or refusal of each reconstructed settlement. Thus the
interviews involved sitting, asking and listening.
This method had many advantages for the author as an outsider. On the other
hand it had its own shortcomings and limitations. Besides the limitations of
language, suspicion, fear and expectation, that have been discussed earlier in Chapter
4, the Dhamar casestudy displayed some unique limitations of collecting Information
using semi-structured interviews. These where mainly to do with limitations of time
and my travelling companions.
i. Limitations of time.
In the current study, the limitations of time presented an obstacle that was only
possible to overcome through designing a particular visiting technique, which
depended on driving, early In the morning, as far as possible on the paved road and
then driving back through the different settlements. Due to the limited resources
available to the author, it was only possible to spend 16 days in Yemen, two of which
were needed to establish contacts in Sana'a, with the rest in the Dhemer region.
The limitations of time became obvious after my first field visit to the study
area; it had the following shortcomings. Firstly, being accompanied by two members
of the EOR staff meant that we had to make our visits within the official working
hours, from 08:00 to 13:00. It would have been virtually impossible to visit any of
the remote settlements, such as (Tinin) as it takes at least three hours to reach there.
Secondly, it took at least an hour to get hold of the driver, to arrange for a
10 Jolyon Leslie, was the architect of Oxfarn's Building Education Project in Dharnar. He spent at
least 5 years In Yemen. during which he conducted 8 number of studies and evaluation reports.
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companion (a specialised engineer in this case) and to get an allocation of petrol for
the vehicle. Thirdly, by the time we set off, the driver and the engineer announced
that it was time for breakfast, (according to the habits of a Yemeni Government
employee). As Dhamar is considered the only place where one can have a decent
meal, our departure from the town did not effectively start till 10:00. By mid-day my
companions were hinting that the working day for them finished at 13:00 and thus
we should have to return. It seemed unreasonable to expect them to spend time
outside officialworking hours, particularly when they made it clear they were not paid
overtime. On that first day it was only possible to visit three settlements nearby
Dhamar.
Later on after developing a special friendship with Abu' Ahmed (building
supervisor) and Al-Raqas (driver) it was possible to spend more time in the field. We
made special arrangements to set off at 07:00 in the morning with our supplies of
food and water. We would try and spend the limited day-light hours visiting as many
settlements as possible in areas that are hardly accessable, thus returning to Dhamar
after sunset using the paved roads. The author soon learned that chewing 'qett' in
the afternoon, while driving back, provided some compensation for their willingness
to spend all day out on the road. II
ii. My travelling companions.
It was found that accompanied by a building supervisor (Abu-Ahmed), a local
Dhamari, the visits and the subsequent interviews progressed in a particularly relaxed
and informal way. From asking permission to entre the house, to thanking the family
and saying goodbye Abu-Ahmed had his own way, which for my taste appeared to
be a little bit rough and impolite. While accompanied by an official or an engineer
from the Executive Office, it was found that the recipients of the new houses
generally reported some satisfaction. Some of them went to the extreme of claiming
that the w.e. and the kitchen were in use as intended in the original design, although
they were obviously not. Others would show their gratitude to the Government and
the President for their help and would try to make sure that the official or the engineer
had their names. Often while seeing us off they would try and arrange a meeting with
the same official in Dhamar. Moreover, the engineer seemed to find it difficult to
Chapter Seven.
•
I
I
II I am most grateful to both of them for their patience and understanding. Following our first few
visits they surprisingly shared my concerns and showed genuine enthusiasm. In many cases we did not
arrive back in Dhamar till 9pm and set off again next morning at 7am.
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actually approach a house to obtain permission to visit it. It is well known among
Yemenies that the Dheman people are tough and that it is difficult to communicate
with them in a relaxed manner.
Ill. Offering lifts to the locals.
It is appropriate to end this Section by mentioning another method that came
by chance but proved useful, it was to offer lifts to people travelling from one
settlement to the other. In such a harsh environmet offering a lift is as honourable
as offering a glass of water. We often had to sit in the Jeep, in some cases for hours,
doing and saying nothing. Thus by offering people a ride one had the chance of
actually talking to the locals in a very natural way, some of whom turned out to be
living in the reconstructed houses, or were offered the houses and refused to move
into them. Thus some genuine insights were obtained and the journeys were made
more enjoyable.
7.5. THE AFFECTED AREAS.
On the 13th December 1982, at 12:12 noon local time, Dhernar Province and
some adjacent areas were struck by an earthquake of 5.8 on the Richter scale and
for about 45 seconds. The epicentre was located approximately 15 km north of
Dhamar city, about 15 km south-east of the town Maabar and about 2 km west of the
village of Rissaba. A series of after-shocks resulted in many houses, that were
cracked during the main shock, falling down. Furthermore, Matthews (1984:63)
referred to a second earthquake with a magnitude of 4.0 and about 3 minutes in
duration, at 02:53 on the 30th December 1982. His claim is based on a
damage-assessment report prepared by P. Schurink & H. Rekveldt (1983). However,
other sources have referred to the same event as more of a big tremor.
The 1982 earthquake was largely unexpected because there was no substantial
geological or even historical data evallable to predict such an event. Internationally,
the area was mistakenly not identified with major earthquakes. "However, recent
research indicates that there have been major earthquakes in North Yemen in this
century, which escaped attention due to Yemen's tsoletlon 12 , and more recently
because of the Second World War" (Aysan, 1983). DHV Consulting Engineers
IZ Until the death of Imam Ahmed in 1962 North Yemen was closed to the world under his rule. His
death was followed by a republican revolution. HoweverI It was not until the end of the civil war between
royalist and the republicans in 1970 that North Yemen opened its gates to international commerce.
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(1985a:3), claimed that" ..available statistics indicate that a major earthquake occurs
in the Yemen Arab Republic at least once every 20 years". TheIr document 'Dhamar
Aided Self-help Reconstruction Project' (1985a), includes a map showing the location
and dates of the major registered earthquakes in 1965, 1962, 1941, 1909, 1895 and
1875. Apparently, the main source on which all researchers seem to have based
their arguments, concerning the seismic history of Yemen, is a two-page article
written by N.N. Ambraseys & C.P. Melville, entitled 'Seismicity of Yemen' and
published in Nature, 303, 1983 (pp.321-323). In their article, they referred to a
number of earthquakes in Yemen as far back as 742 A.C., which destroyed the
famous dam of Marib.
It is crucially important to understand the geographical and architectural
background of the affected areas, which largely contributed to the type of failure of
the traditional houses. Also, it is important to digest the local social and economic
context, in order to assess changes in the cultural life due to the aid received lind the
subsequent resettlement and rebuilding.
7.'.1. Dhamar: The Province.
The District capital Dhamar city is located 100 km south of Sana'e the Capital.
The Province's approximate population is 470,000 covering some 4,000 sq. km. It
encompasses parts of the Western and Central Highlands, which comprise several
highland plains surrounded by mountainous regions. Administratively, the Province
is divided into Districts, seven were considerably affected by the earthquake: Dhamar,
Dhawran, Jahran, AI-Hadaa, Ans, Maghrab Ans and Jabel al-Sherq.
a. Geography and climate.
The geographical location of the affected area is approximately where the
Western Higlands meet the Central Highlllnds. There are three micro-geographic
zones within the affected areas: the Western Highlands with steep mountains and crop
growing terraces, the higher Central Higlands with drier volcanic plateeus lind some
agriculture and the Northern Plelns. Most of the settlements lire at altitudes between
2,500m and 3,000m, where the temperature can drop, particularly in November and
December, below -4Co. The diurnal temperature range of this area is about 25
degrees to a maximum 20Co. This explains the need for heavy structures to store the
daytime heat for release at night. Summer is wet and winter quite dry. •,
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Figure /7·3/ A typical Dhamari village, clustered on the crest of a hill.
[Source: The author, 1991/
b. Settlements and their architecture.
The earthquake devastated traditional villages and towns. many of which are
inaccessible (as in the recent Iranian earthquake, June 1990). For defensive reasons.
traditional Yemeni villages are often clustered on the crest of hills, leaving the valleys
for agriculture, on which their economy depends.
The size of settlements varies; a typical village comprising 20 to 30 clustered
houses. some with 300 houses, a typical town would have over 400 houses. The
main building material is stone, either with a dressed face, roughly-coursed or used
as rubble in mud mortar. However mud bricks, both, fired and sun-dried are used in
some places. The use of local timber for roofing has restricted the dimensions of the
habitable spaces to about 3.5 meters span.
"The tredltlonal highland home is a defensive structure, allowing for all domestic
activity within its' massive stone walls", (Leslie, 1987:83). The most common house
type within the villages takes the form of a two to three storey family dwelling, with
the ground floor reserved for crops storeqe and animals. The upper rooms are
grouped around a central staircase. The same room can be used for eating, sleeping
or chewing qatt, at different times of the day. Reflecting the social structure, a
Dhamari dwelling is built in an additive process to house an extended family, as the
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need arises and depending on the availability of labour and cash. Thus the ground
floor is often built of massive roughly coursed stone, while the upper walls are of
smaller dressed stone.
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Figure /74J Plan of a highland house, Jebel al·Shirq.
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c. Population: culture, kinship and values.
Dhamari culture is very much evident to the extent that it makes Dhamari
people distinct from any other Yemeni people. Apart from the special Arabic dialect,
they have their own informal laws, and customs. Coming from 21 different society
which shares some of their values it was possible to perceive these differences, but
the real challange was to understand them and agree with them. This is something
that seems to have been totally ignored not only by the Central Govemment but also
by the intervening intemational groups. Within the Dhamari population itself, there
Is a major distinction between rural and urban societies and between those who
inhabit the Westem Highlands and the Eastem Highlands. The latter are considered
tougher and more closed societies, in which the tribal structure is still very much in
evidence and leads to continuing tribal wars.
Additional clues as to the nature of Dhamari culture can be found in their
buildings and the way they use them. "The house is often a Significant indicator of
the ways in which spaces are respected and utilised within a building: the degree of
privacy or security that the dwelling affords, the numbers of people that occupy it,
their domestic relationship and responsibilities to each other, and so on" (Aysan [,
Oliver 1987:10).
Understanding the local Kinship is essential for a better understanding of the
cultural context. In Dhernar, the extended family is the dominant social structure
within the affected area; grandparents, grandchildren and unmarried brothers and
sisters are expected to live under one roof along with the "biological unit" of a male
and female pair and their children. Such a household would be a part of a larger
kin-group (All'a) that might be divided between several settlements. The tribe
(Qabila or Ashira) is the largest group within this social hierarchy, comprising many
such kin-groups, and usually having control over a well-defined territory. Each
settlement has its own 'wise' man (Aqel) who enjoys everyone's respect, while the
tribe is led by the 'Sheik', who represents the power and the centre of decision-
making within the tribe. Rules conceming territory, land ownership, tenure and
inheritance are very specific to the region.
"Values are the beliefs, the attitudes and the expectations of conduct by which
21 society lives" (Aysan (, Oliver 1987: 10). In Dhamar there are a number of values
that are known and observed within the community even though they do not exist in
a legal or formal way. They relate to matters of responsibility, propriety, privacy,
politeness, respect and behaviour. Although these values may seem irrelevant for the
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reconstruction project, it is these attitudes that gave each community its particular
character and lie behind the failure of a number of reconstruction projects. Many of
these values, of course, owe their existence to Islam; questions of inheritance, strong
family relations, the role of women, and so on.
d. Local economy.
Economically, the affected areas are largely dependent on agriculture. However
in some of the settlements, which are higher and drier, agriculture is limited to a
subsistence level. The topography makes it difficult to introduce mechanisation.
"The commonly grown agricultural products like grains, millet, maize, fruits,
vegetables, sorghum and qatt are locally consumed and only a small proportion is
marketed. Consequently, [in these areas] very little cash is generated from
agriculture". (Aysan, 1983:53). Uvestock too plays an important role in the
household economy. The other source of cash since the late 1960's, after a long
period of Yemen isolation, is the migration to the oil-rich countries of the male labour
force. This reached its peak in the late 70's and early 80's. Aysan (1983:53),
claimed that "..on average one [person] in each household is working abroad". In
some settlements such as "Tlnin', there was a time when only women, old people and
children were left in the village. Recently, as a result of the August 1990 Gulf Crisis,
this situation was reversed, with hundreds of thousands of workers being forced to
return to Yemen, due to its unclear political stand in the crisis. There was a general
belief within the Gulf States that Yemen might be supporting Iraq in its annexation of
Kuwait. Thus, those who were working in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries
were sent home for national security reasons. By the time the field visit was
conducted it was estimated that one million Yemeni workers had returned, putting an
intolerable burden on the Yemeni economy, which was already in a deep recession
and now accompanied by the termination of all financial and development aid that
used to be offered by the Western and Arab States. Some of this aid was part of the
original reconstruction programme, which has now been brought to a halt.
7.5.2. The scale of damage.
Although the earthquake could be classified as moderate, it caused extensive
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damage over a vast area, mainly because of the vulnerable condition of the
houses 13. The first figures issued by the Government showed that the total number
of affected settlements was 1176. The number of destroyed houses was estimated
at 25,045. While those with notable cracks was 18,458. In total there were 78
schools, 651 mosques and 82 water projects destroyed. Finally, the total affected
population was about 354,000 (SCREAA, 1983:2). It is worth noting that those
losses were estimated in a survey that was completed in January 1983, and did not
include losses from subsequent tremors". Nevertheless, those figures were the
ones adopted by the Govemment and upon which the relief and reconstruction
programmes were planned.
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Figure /7·5/ Damage anallJsts.
[Source: Coburn £j Leslie. 1985}
13 This observation brings to light the on going discussion on vulnerability issues. as to whether
natural disasters are nothing more than man-made disasters triggered by the forces of nature.
14 Usually tremors will result in the destruction of some of the cracked buildings. also they might
damage some of the surviving ones.
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In any other disaster sltuatlon it is very much the case that 8 researcher might
be faced with different estimates from different resources, some of which are slightly
exaggerated and some of which are under estimated, particularly, when each
organisation conducts their own separate survey I 5. In the case of Yemen, the
sources available to the author, more or less, agree on the scale of damage. The
similarities in their assessment might be due to the fact that they 811 based their
studies on the ebove Governmental essessrnent. For Instance, Schurink (, Reveldt
( 1983), were quoted in Matthews (1983), to claim that: "Some 1150 villages and
settlements in 21narea of about 4000 km2 around Dharner were destroyed in the
disaster. About 1500 people are said to have died, ... It hea been estimated that at
least 300,000 people were left homeless; 42,000 houses became uninhabitable, of
which 15,000 were completely wrecked. Inaddition, mosques, schools, w2ltersupply
facilities, wells and government buildings were destroyed". Other sources, such as
Coburn (, Leslie (1985:2), claimed that the earthquake caused extensive damage
over 6000 krrr', destroyed 25,000 houses and d2lm2lged18,000 others. WhileAysan
(1983), reported that around 15,000 houses were destroyed and 2,000 people were
killed and many more were left injured and homeless.
Piepenburg (1983) in his damage estimation claimed that, "..some 1,300
villages had been affected, with some of the settlements being completely destroyed.
2,800 lives were lost and 300,000 people were made homeless". The same
commentator also claimed that the Yemeni Prime Minister at the time valued the total
damage at USS 2 billion; a figure 21Shigh as one third of the total investment
allocated to the (1982·87) five year Yemeni Development Plan.
From the above mentioned figures, we can see that, in general, all the damage
estimates almost coincided with the Supreme Council of Reconstruction claim of
1987 that, "The damage and losses due to the earthquake were very large in relation
to the strength of the shock. About 2,000 people were killed and another 2,000 were
injured. Some 40,000 houses were affected, of which 50% have to be considered as
tot811ydestroyed. The value of the lost and damaged property is estimated at about
USS 2 billion" (SCREAA, 1987:47).
However the most comprehensive estimate was given in a recent document
15 This is an important issue. In natural disasters, governments tend to exaggerate their losses in
hope of more aid. However, after wars such estimates would be considered highly political, based on
the belief that they affect the public morale, thus they maybe kept to a minimum.
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published by the EOR!6,which claims that altogether 2,500 people died and another
4,800 were injured. 25,045 houses were destroyed (46.1% of the total number of
houses in the area) and another 18,458 were seriously cracked, most of which
beyond repair (33.9% of the total number). Adding the two figures shows that 80.0%
of the total number of houses within the affected area became uninhabitable. In this
document there was also an adjustment to the figures given in previous documents
concerning other losses. In addition, it was revealed that 131 water projects were
damaged and a considerable loss was inflicted on the animal husbandry sector, where
587 cows, 1,646 sheep, 23 camels and 122 donkeys were killed. It is important to
note that people never received compensation for such losses, which are very
important for a rural community. Only a few water projects were reestablished.
7.'.3. Types and causes of damage Incurred by the buildings.
Many damage assessment reports were produced after the earthquake! 7. They
all concluded that although damage was variable, it largely depended on siting. age
of the building, quality pnd type of construction as well as the state of maintenance.
Of course, the interaction of two or more of the above reasons was common.
In terms of siting, those traditional settlements located on steep hills and
hill-tops (originally for the purpose of defence and security)IS suffered the most
damage. This fact wes established when observers such as Aysan (1983), recorded
that In the very same settlement, houses built on the plains surrounded by steep hills
were less affected. Apparently, it was long before this earthquake that people had
started building outside their traditional settlements.
As we all know, it Is more convenient for public and private relief agencies and
organisations to provide their emergency shelters on the lower, flatter lands rather
than the higher, hilly ones. Those factors, combined with the professional judgement
concerning the vulnerability of such hilly sites, made it almost certain that many
newly selected housing sites were to be located in flat areas. On the other hand, the
16Obaid, Ahmed (1990) TheDecember 1982Earthquake, the Relief and Reconstruction Programmes,
the Executive Office for Reconstruction.
17 For more detail see attached bibliography.
II Yemen has a rich history of tribal conflicts and wars, which led to the development of such
defensive settlements. A summarised research on Yemen's tribal history can be found in the work of
Harvard School of Architecture (1983). published in Development and Urban Metamorphosis Vol. II.
Yemen Background Papers.
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continuous local need of flat land for agriculture, as well as the long established
traditions of living on hill-tops certainly suggests the opposite.
QuaUty and type of traditional construction influenced the degree and type of
damage incurred by the buildings. Most of the traditional structures within the
affected areas are built of stone masonry. However, as Coburn (, Hughes (1983)
reported, in a few places adobe buildings and stone masonry were found in the same
damaged village. They also found that, the usually older stone masonry construction,
appeared to have suffered greater damage than similar adobe brick construction.
Overall, the different damage assessment reports on the Dhemar earthquake
concluded with five main types of damage, summarised in the Coburn & Hughes
(1983) report as being:
a. Comer failure; the separation of the comer from both walls, usually
as a diagonal wedge. (observed in 46% of collapsed, 35% of
uncollapsed buildings).
b. External wall to wall separation; a vertical separation between two
bonded walls. (62% of collapsed, 71%of uncollapsed).
c. Skin splitting; the separation and bulging of the two leaves of a wall.
(58% of collapsed, 21% of uncollapsed). Aysan (1983), claimed
that this type of failure occurred in what she considered relatively
new houses, where the techniques of cutting the imported stone in
pyramidal shapes and laying them as a facing material with thin
joints resulted in the separation and the collapse of inner skin.
d. Mid-wall damage; vertical or diagonal cracking leading to failure
usually at eaves level. (32% of collapsed, 14% of uncollepsed).
e. Internal wall to wall separation, and wall to floor separation.
(observed in 100% of uncollapsed buildings).
Furthermore, the traditional Yemeni life-style has tended to the extension of
buildings as the need arose and the finance permited, with very little, if any,
consideration of the bonding between the old and the new parts.
Such observations had important implications for different preventative,
life-saving measures introduced into the newly reconstructed buildings and
settlements. It was important to see what implications these observations had had
on the repair schemes. Most governments it seems in this situation prefer to rebuild
than repair. While repairs represent a greater challenge, particularly if preventative
methods are to be incorporated and if one is dealing with damaged settlements that
are of architectural value. Rebuilding is more politically Impressive and
constructionally more manageable, though perhaps less economic. What it shows
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is that natural disasters are often seen by governments as opportunities to receive
large quantities of overseas aid and by individuals to receive a new house. rather than
carrying out repairs. using local labour. professionals and materials. It has to be said
that donor Governments likewise want to see 'symbols' of their generosity.
«: '-
Some or the aamagea seWements are slill untnhaoited until today.
"Source: The euttior. J 991]
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In terms of the age of the building It has been proved that It Is not necessarily
the sole cause of failure. Different field surveys have shown that If a traditional
building has been maintained properly it can withstand an even greater shock. "The
benefit of sound construction, no matter how old the building, and of careful, skilled
maintenance, is everywhere evident in those buildings which survived unscathed
throughout the earthquake region" (Lewcock, 1983:6). Apparently, traditional Yemeni
construction recognised the need for certain construction principles in order to
withstand earth-shocks. Such details are evident in many surviving buildings. It is
just in recent decades that, "...builders have become skimpy and careless; building
materials and mortars are often poor, foundations weak, wooden ring beams are
inadequate and often are not properly joined, and roof beams are of poor quality and
too short, with bearing over only a short distance Into the walls" (Lewcock, 1963:6).
Nevertheless, it seems too simplistic that it was only the carelessness of the
builders that led to such disastrous consequences. It also has to do with economic
pressures that must have led both the householders and their builders to cut costs by
excluding some of the traditional reinforcement details. For instance timber was
often used in the walls to strengthen and stabilise stone work; in recent years this
practice has been abandoned.
In conclusion, from reviewing the scale of the earthquake in relation to the
damage it caused and by referring the different types of damage to the different
vulnerabilities demonstrated by the settlements in terms of siting, construction
techniques or lack of maintenance, it is clear that the area represented a fragile
physical environment, even before the earthquake. Thus, the author wonders if the
Dhamar earthquake of itself, was nothing more than a 'natural hazard' that triggered
a 'man-based disaster'.
t
7.6. THE EMERGENCY & REUEF STAGE.
"The Government reacted quickly, mobilising the entire army
to provide immediate relief. Foreign aid in /lnance, tents and
foodstuffs, especially from neighbouring Arab countries, began
to pour in and continued to do so by daily flights to Sana'a's
airport. European relief agencies flew in medical teams from
Holland, technical assistant from Germany and a search party
with trained dogs from Switzerland" (Piepenburg, 1983)19.
)9 The use of trained dogs has been criticised in a culture where dogs are considered unclean.
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Following the disaster, a general State of Emergency was announced in the
country, followed by a typical official response, in which a variety of resources were
mobilised through Public Works, Social Services and Health Ministries. In addition,
the military was involved in re-establishing communications, search and rescue
operations and damage clearance. An early intervention was carried out by members
of the nearby PLO base.
It is worth noting the organisational pattern of 'disaster management' that was
adopted by the Yemeni Government. Some documents referred to an Emergency
Council consisting of high government officials and representatives of foreign aid
organisations, that was quickly established for the co-ordination of the relief effort.
(see Piepenburg, 1983). This Council was headed by the Army Chief of Staff, with
a number of Rellef Committees, each operating within an administrative district. A
Relief Committee comprised members of the Co-ordinating Council of Local
Development Associations, the Dhamar Governorate, the Central Planning
Organisation and other Yemeni institutions, together with representatives from foreign
missions, bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and non-governmental organisations.
(see Coburn & Leslie, 1985:2).
However, the organisational pattern was much clearer after the establishment
(by Presidential decree) of the 'Supreme Council for Reconstruction of the
Earthquake Affected Areas' (SCREAA). This council consisted of the Vice President,
the Prime Minister, ministers in various fields of technical and humanitarian services,
the chairman of the Central Planning Organisation and the governor of Dhamar
Province.
The grass-roots relief work was carried out by the District Relief Committees,
with its headquarters in Dhamar city. "These committees were responsible for
receiving the relief supplies from Sana' a airport and other ports inY.A.R.,transporting
them to Dhamar city and distributing them to the districts and villages" (SCREAA,
1983:3). Naturally the initial preoccupation of the local authorities was with the
overwhelming medical care needs, which drove them immediatly to send an appeal
to all friendly countries asking for help. Besides the food and blankets, tents were the
main form of temporary shelter for the estimated 300,000 homeless. Some
observers, such as Coburn and Leslie (1985:2), claimed that "A sizeable number of
people left the affected area to seek accommodation elsewhere". Taking refuge with
relatives and neighbours, whose houses survived the earthquake was another way of
meeting the immediate need for shelter. Self-build emergency shelters started to
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appear as early as January 1983, using timber frame and corrugated iron sheets.
There is no reference as to when the state of emergency ended and the Relief
Programme started. Nevertheless, a Supreme Council Report written in June 1983
referred to the programme as still being in existence. The same report justified the
continuity of the programme as being due to "..the continuous occurrence of
tremors". Furthermore, as part of their effort to ensure the continuity of the Relief
Programme, the Yemeni Government established a Relief Office in June 1983.
(SCREAA, 1983).
In their' Reconstruction Programme' document (1983: 1) the SCREAA referred
to the Relief Programme when they wrote:
"The Relief Programme includes distributing tents, food,
clothes and cooking utensils because a great number of
families lost these things and were not able to return to their
normal living patterns without this assistance".
In terms of how the aid was distributed it is important to note the role played by
the Yemeni Local Development Associations (LOAs). The LOAis an elected body
according to administrative districts, with a representative member per 500 people;
some kind of a town council. Special attention was drawn to the (LOAs) in Aysan's
. conference paper (1983:54), when she stated that:
"The LOA, as a pre-established association had an important
role in the assessment of damage, distribution of aid and later
in the organisation of education programmes".
The same author also claimed that because of the tribal structure of the society
in Dhamar, where the first loyalties are to the tribe rather than to the State, "...the
LOA as a local organisation played an important intermediary role after the
earthquake" (Aysan, 1983:54).
There has been some criticism of the way emergency aid was handled. Jolyon
Leslie in his presentation at the 'Second YorkWorkshop on Settlement Reconstruction
AfterWar, 1989' provided a clear insight into some of the shortcomings that occurred
during the Emergency Period; in some isolated villages it took days and weeks for the
aid to arrive, by which time the local people had already organised their own water
supply, cooking facilities and even shelter. This demonstrates the fact that local
communities are not as helpless as is so often assumed. The same author also
criticised the use of sniffer dogs to look for corpses, in a society that considers dogs
as being unclean. This, he claimed made the local people angry because they felt
as if the dogs had defiled their dead. He talked about prefabricated clinics that had
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been distributed to some mountain villages that lacked even clean water supplies, as
the original water wells were blocked by the earhquake, and in some cases those
clinics had no medical staff to run them. Other observers, such as Aysan (1990)
criticised the way inwhich local structures of power and influence had been neglected
in some cases. She gave an example, when a relief agency ignored the Sheik during
the distribution of plastic sheeting to cover tents, and went on distributing them to all
the famllies. As one would have expected, none used their sheet until they obtained
approval from the Sheik. Some sources such as Leslie (1986; 1989) and Coburn &
Leslie (1985), recorded the occurrence of a well established phenomenon that has
been witnessed in many post-disaster situations all over the world; the raising of
peoples expectations, through exeggerated offlclal promises. on the media. of
assistance. It has been claimed that such political propaganda has led in some cases
to the long term dependency of people on the government. and government on
external aid. particularly concerning re-housing and reconstruction. Immediately.
"..such issues came to be seen in many of the worst damaged villages as a
government responsibility". (Coburn & Leslie, 1985:2). Thus the people who
received such promises have done nothing to rehouse themselves, consequently,
"Some flfteen months after the earthquake it was estimated that four out of ten
villagers in the affected area were still living in some form of temporary shelter" , such
as tents. (Leslie, 1989). During the field visit (November 1991) it was found that a
considerable number of emergency shelters were still in use, even some tents. But
today they are mostly used as kitchens, for storege, or anlmel shelters, etc. It is
interesting to see how the newly introduced corrugated iron has been accepted as a
cheep building materiel. In other cases the corrugated iron has been recycled for
extending and adapting the government provided houses. The fact that only tents
were provided and that people managed to build their own emergency shelter shows
their resourcefulness'".
7.7. REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION.
"The aim of the reconstruction project is to remove all the
features thet have resulted from the disaster and to
compensate the affected citizens for all their losses, including
housing, public services and agricultural losses" . (SCREAA).
20 Plastic sheets were provided, at a later stage, to water-proof the tents which were supplied by
Saudi Arabia.
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Theoretically, tackling the reconstruction problem started with the estabUshment
of the Supreme Council for Reconstruction and its Executive O{flce, in January 1983.
Thus creating a fairly conventional top-down model of reconstruction management,
based on creating a new body to tackle the problem, as against reinforcing the
existing ones. The Council's responsibilities included establishing pollcles and
priorities, while the Executive Office for Reconstruction (EOR) was responsible for
making studies, designs, cost estimates, preparing tender documents and
supervision. (SCREAA, 1983:4). In their first reconstruction document of June 1983,
the Supreme Council summarised the tasks of the Executive Office as follows:
1. Collecting all technical and geological studies concerning the affected
areas.
2. Conducting studies, research and designs for the affected areas.
3. Preparing the designs, cost estimates and time schedules for
reconstruction.
4. Preparing tender documents, advertising, analyzing and evaluating them.
5. Supervising the execution of contracts.
6. Making proposals for repair works and supervising them.
7. Preparing educational programmes concerning the houses to be built up
through self-help and supervising their construction.
8. Making informational programmes for people in the affected areas to build
houses in a safer way.
The EOR consisted of seven main units: Design, Supervision, Public Relations,
Finance and Administration, Repair and Building Education, Self-help, and the
Seismological Unit. All headed by the Executive Director, who is a member of the
Supreme Council for Reconstruction.
The EOR enjoyed full independence from other government departments, both
in terms of finance and adminstration. Thus, financial aid coming from donor
governments and international bodies went directly to its own budget. This
independence had one Intention', to reduce the Inevitable bureaucratic procedures
through which every stage of reconstruction would normally have to go.
Unfortunately this aim was never realised when it came to implementation. The
EOR's budget became so big that it could 'compete' with that of any ministry. As a
consequence ministries started to withdraw their responsibilities towards the affected
areas, and in the cases where they did not, their projects overlapped with those of the
EOR, because of lack of co-ordination. For instance, the Ministry of Education and
the EOR built two schools in the same Village.
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7.7.1. Studies and proposals for reconstruction.
The Yemeni earthquake drew considerable international attention. This might
have been due to Yemen's moderate political stand at the time21• Also Yemen was
enjoying world wide attention directed towards its traditional architecture and the
need to conserve its heritage. It is interesting to notice that within a month of the
earthquake, a number of technical specialists teams from all over the world, were
flown into the area to conduct studies on damage to buildings and to suggest ways
of rebuilding. Those teams were generally unsolicited by the Yemeni Government.
The authors' bibliography contains most of these studies22• None of these reports
it seems were made available to the EOR, they were all commissioned by
international organisations for their own ends. The same has to be said about the
Evaluation Reports that were carried out in the course of implementation.
Almost all these studies recommended self-build as being the most suitable
approach for reconstruction, in order to incorporate long-term development within
short-term relief. They also highlighted the importance of using predominantly
traditional building techniques and architectural forms. Equally, they all agreed on
the importance of introducing steel reinforcement into the reconstructed houses, in
order to make them less vulnerable to future earthquakes.
For a clear idea of their recommendations, it is worth quoting the
recommendation of one of those reports; Coburn (, Hughes (1983) submitted to the
British Government's Overseas Development Administration (ODA). They
recommended that "The burden of reconstruction and repair should lie chiefly with
the householder himself, and construction to any suggested standards will inevitably
be his own choice and responsibility ... Administrative influence on improving building
construction in these rural areas should be concentrated on aiding, recommending,
and informing the householder about methods to improve his own house and raising
the consciousness of people to the possibility of future earthquakes".
The same report concluded that the best approach for reconstruction might be
achieved by three main measures: Firstly, making money available to the
householders, each related to a minimum level of building work estimated to be
21 This is another issue that needs more discussion in detail; the effect of local policies as well as
Intemational relations on the aid received by a certain government, particularly In the case of war
destruction.
22 Piche (, Sirvain for UNCHS (Habitat); Allard (, godefory for Architects sans Frontieres; Arya et
11 for Rorkee University, India; Coburn Ei Hyghes for the Overseas Development ASSOCiation,U.K.;
Copenhaver for USAID, U.S.A., and finally Aysan for the Oxford based Centre for Disaster Management.
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required on his house. Secondly, by implementing a large scale information and
instruction campaign to the villages throughout the affected area. Finally, and in
order to encourage the householder to incorporate strengthening measures Into the
construction of his house, the report suggested that the Government should restrict
prices of strong and durable building materials, particularly, cement, timber and steel.
In the above report there is no mention of public services and infrastructure and
whose responsibility they are. Although those recommendations could have been the
right approach they fell short of being feasible, by putting all the burden on the
householder. Howdo they expect the householder to get access to building materials
and construction information without the infrastructure, such as roads and water
supplies being repaired.
Nevertheless, the Yemeni Central Planning Organisation commissioned its own
joint mission ofthe World Bank, the Arab Fund (AFESO), the Kuwait Fund (KFAEO)
and OAPEC, to conduct a study of the damage and reconstruction options. The
mission completed its recommendations in March 1983, three months after the
disaster. Their report wisely dismissed the option of official provision of temporary
shelter, in favour of immediate permanent reconstruction. This recommendation was
accepted by the Yemeni Government, who later acted accordingly. Four main
reasons were given for this decision; "Firstly, the winter in the devastated areas is
quite severe, particularly in November and December and there are not only people
to be cared for, but animals to be sheltered from exposure to extreme cold. Second,
as the people are used to living in substantial masonry buildings, with their many
advantages, they are likely to want to begin rebuilding in the traditional style very
soon. Third, the masonry houses, properly designed and built, are likely to provide
substantially safer shelter In the event of another earthquake shock than the
temporary shelters. Finally, the considerable expenditure on the temporary shelters
would be ultimately wasted, as the inhabitants would be unlikely to want to live in
them for long, and it is difficult to see what practical purpose they would afterwards
be made to serve nor are the materials likely to be recoverable". (Lewcock, 1983).
Their alternative as a medium-term shelter solution to replace approxlrnately
25,000 destroyed houses, was to provide permanent shelters ""In the form of
government funded mlnirnal'c:ore' units to be built by the villagers themselves with
technical aSSistance. These basic: units would form the first stage of homes that
would be extended by the owner over a longer period". (Coburn & Leslie, 1985:2).
This recommendation was also approved by the Yemeni Government, but this time
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with some adjustment. Firstly, the 'core' unit in the initial report consisted of two
rooms, to which the Government added a third one, on the basis that the average
family size in the affected area was between six and seven. Secondly, while
accepting the self-help approach as a means of reconstruction, the Government
excluded from this approach all the settlements with more than 75%damage or more
than 25 dwellings destroyed. This meant that 127 settlements; about 13,000 houses
were to be built by the 'tender method', carried out by foreign and local contractors.
Leaving the balance of 12,000 destroyed houses to be built with the 'self-help'
approach, amongst 1052 villages. (SCREAA, 1983). However, "The final list
released later in 1984, shows the contractor programme to have grown to 305
separate villages, with approximately the same number of houses to be constructed
as originally estimated". (Coburn & Leslie, 1985:5).
The Supreme Council's decision to pursue an open international contracting
system In villages with a large number of destroyed houses, was based on the claim
that there was insufficient labour available for the villagers to rebuild by their own
efforts. The EOR selected the new sites of those villages, based on technical and
geological criteria, surveyed them and prepared their tender documents". The
designs of the houses were also prepared by them "The units were planned to be a
reinforced concrete frame of columns, beams and slabs, with external and internal
walls made of cement blocks. Alternatively stone, bricks, precast or cast in-situ
materials are acceptable if they meet the requirements of price and time schedule"
(SCREAA, 1983:7).
Although the first intention was to adapt the conventional use of local
construction methods and materials, and adopt simple building techniques that could
be imitated later on by the local people, in the event, a range of different methods
were used from conventional to prefabricated concrete units. Despite the SCREAA
decision "..not to accept frame prefab buildings" (SCREAA, 1983:7), some sources,
such as the Swiss Disaster Relief Unit and the Ministry of Health of Vemen Arab
Republic (1984, pp. 13-14) referred to the use of the prefabrication method, and as
expected "The construction of the prefab houses has been, astonishingly, consistently
rejected ... The bid was based however on a standard type and allowed unfortunately
23 It might be worth doing • limited r.... rch Into the open contr.ctlng system. According to Ed
Cooney. recently the efficiency of such system has been questioned in the United Kingdom. One
wonders how effective it has been in a country like Yemen. particularly. as most of the contractors that
entered the tender were either big local contractors in cooperation with foreign ones, or were totally
foreign contractors.
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Figure f7-7] The prototype unit built by the 'tender method',
{Source: SCREAA, 1984:20}
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figure {7-81 The new settlements layout introduced by the planners for flat and hilly sites.
{Source: The author, November 1991J
In conclusion, three approaches of reconstruction were pursued by the Yemeni
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Government. First, the erection of new houses by both local and foreign contractors,
starting in June 1984 for completion 18 months later. Second, the setting up of
Self-help programmes, this was due to start after the Tender programme was under
way, and be completed by December 1985. The Dutch government as well as the
UNCHS & UNDP set up their own limited programmes of aided self-help. The third
approach was to repair the remainder of the damaged buildings by December 1985.
Target figures for each of the three approaches were given after the disaster, by the
Public Relations Manager of the Supreme Council for Reconstruction, who was quoted
in Piepenburg (1983) to claim, that the first approach would provide 15,000 housing
units, while the second approach would benefit 1,000 villages and the last approach
would contribute to all the repairable houses within the affected area.
Side by side with the above reconstruction schemes, a Building Education
Programme was set up by Oxfam and other relief organisations in co-operation with
the Yemeni Government, to train local builders on how to build reinforced buildings.
This programme has demonstrated some success and has evoked mixed feelings.
Within the scope of our concern, such a programme might give us more ideas on
how to develop a 'small-contractor training programme' in the context of building
after wars in the Middle East. This should consist of small component manufacture
based on strengthening local materials, good employment practices, skill
development and small business management.
7.7.2. The progress of the reconstruction programmes.
Trying to follow and register the progress of the reconstruction campaign six
years after Its due completion date (December 1985) would have been difficult If we
had had to depend on the literature, particularly as there were few sources referring
to the completed projects. However, some of the sources available were written in
1985, 1987 and 1989 in which some reference was made to the output of the
reconstruction until then. For instance, commenting on the progress of the
Government schemes of reconstruction, Coburn & Leslie (1985) expressed their fears
that the Government gave more emphasis to the Tender (contractor-built) approach,
rather than the Self-help or Repair approaches, they wrote:
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"It is clear from the SCR proposals that greater emphasis was
to be put on the contractor-built programme than on the use
of local resources and labour to rebuild the earthquake
damage. To give priority in reconstruction to those villages
with the most severe damage was understandable, and this
strategy resulted in the repair and self-help components being
relegated to 21 subsequent phase, if they were to be built at
all".
According to the Supreme Council's reconstruction programme, the repair
programme was supposed to last two years from the end of 1983 to December 1985,
and cover 17,000 houses. (see SCREAA, 1983). Surprisingly enough, Coburn (,
Leslie 1985, reported that up to October 1985, only some 300 homes and public
buildings in the city of Dhamar were repaired, at an average cost of 23,000 YR.per
house. They went further to claim that at that time "Work has not begun on the
repair of the estimated 16,000 cracked homes in villages". During the author's visit
to Yemen it was found that only 2,216 houses (1,000 stone construction and 1,216
mud brick) had been repaired, all of which were in Dhamar city. In most cases
people carried out the repair of their houses themselves. Many of those who had
waited for Government help, had to abandon their houses 21 few years later as the
damage extended.
Concerning the Self-help programme, in their reconstruction programme the
SCR implied that all the destroyed houses that were not included in the
contractor-built programme would benefit from the Self-help programme, this meant
10,000-12,000 houses. In the event only 1,229 houses were built in this programme.
A recent publication by DHVConsulting Engineers (1989) revealed that, within the
'Dhernar Aided Self-help Reconstruction Project', 1000 (earthquake-resistant)
housing units were completed. This project was funded by the Netherlands
Government, the Commission of European Communities, USAID and the Yemeni
Government. It covered the Magreb Ans region to the west of Dhernar, and was
completed in August 198824•
Another self-help project has been established in the Dawran Ans region. Itwas
referred to by Coburn & Leslie 1985. This project was supported by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in Co-operation with SCREAA. Itwas set
to build 280 earthquake-resistant houses, with the recipients meeting 21 proportion of
24 Note that the original completion date fixed by the SCREAA in their reconstruction programme
was December 1985.
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the cost. Furthermore, in his letter to the author, Jolyon Leslie, October 1990,
wrote":
"I would emphasis that the bulk of reconstruction after the
earthquake was done without any projects or assistance.
people used the best means at their disposal to build some
form of shelter immediately, which involved a significant
change in technology in some cases (corrugated iron, for
example). They were also efrald of the vulnerebility of
tradltlcnal building, while being ewere of its environmental
advantages" .
In short, we can see that the Yemeni Government has placed e greater
emphasis on the Contractor-built programme, rather then on the Repeir or even
Self-help programmes. This was done despite the professionaledvice to the contrary
from almost all the reconstruction studies including that commissioned by the
Government itself. However, the author was surprised to see that in one of the most
recent documents written by the Executive Office of the SCREAA, in September
198625, great emphasis was laid on both; the Repair and the Self-help approaches.
In their 25-page paper there is only one paragraph in which they refer to the
Contractor-built programme, in which they have listed the different numbers of
villages end houses allocated to different contractors. Itwes even more disappointing
to find no mention of the progress or the echievement of the contrector-built
reconstruction.
7.8. FIELD WORK ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS.
This section discusses the findings of the field visit concerning the Contractor-
built programme. The aim is to reach conclusions concerning the efficiency of the
programme and its cultural sensitivity and their complex interreletion in support of
the main hypothesis of this dissertation.
7.8.1. Efficiency In reconstruction.
Efficiency is widely understood to mean "producing effectively end with the
least waste of effort, resources end time". For the Supreme Council for
Reconstruction end its Executive Office, efficiency merely meant good manegement
2S SCREAA (1967), Reconstruction of earthquake affected arMS (n the Yemen Arab Republic. A
paper presented at the Middle East and Mediterranean Regional Conference on Earthen and
Low-strength Masonry Buildings InSeismic Areas. Held at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara,
Turkey, August 31 - September 6, 1986.
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of construction projects, resources, time and physical product (in this case houses).
They denied the 'functional' dimension of the term efficiency. Thus, for them
reconstruction was all about material statistics, standard contracts and the production
of houses. But, this is clearly not the end, only the means to the end; those houses
have to function effectively, both in the short and long term.
Even if we accept that 'efficiency' is only about production, it is clear that the
reconstruction projects were not efficient, for the following reasons:
a. The initially intended number of reconstructed houses was never realised,
b. time limits were never met, and
c. reconstruction budgets were invariably exceeded.
On the 1st May 1983, SCREM announced that 25,000 houses and 17,000
cracked houses would be built and repaired respectively; nine years later only 10,299
units and 1,652 houses were built and repaired. Thus of the contractor-built
programme only 41% was realised and only 10% of the repair programme.
Furthermore, contracts were not signed till the 28th March 1984, (15 months after
the earthquake). Contractors were given three months to prepare themselves and to
bring their equipment and labour and 18 months to complete the contracts. Only a
few settlements were completed by November 1987, other settlements were
completed in 1989, some are still not finished. Thus the emergency shelter
programme was actually realised 5 to 7 years after the earthquake. Contracts that
were supposed to finish in 18 months took 3 to 5 years to complete. The following
are some of the reasons for the delays:
• The mountainous area of Dhamar Province has extremely bad roads and
tracks; only four-wheel drive vehicles with a maximum load of 1000kgs
can be used to transport building materials. Many roads had to be
improved or even opened to accommodate heavy contractors equipment
and transportation. Following the rainy season some villages were
inaccessible.
• Contractors do not appear to have understood the nature of the work and
the difficulties facing them; their main aim was to get a contract. A
number of contractors could not finish what they had started. In fact one
of them (an Italian construction company) fled the country leaving behind
all its equipment and employees.
• The great number of construction sites, 447 in total were spread over a
huge area and this made supervision very difficult and expensive26• This
2& For Instance, it cost $40,000 to introduce a communication system betweem engineers in the field
and the EOR.
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was despite the fact that an attempt was made to reduce the number of
sites by gathering a number of villages into one site.
• The selection of beneficiaries, both in terms of settlements and
individuals, proved to be a prolonged process, particularly as it was
carried out by the EOR, who lacked the staff with the social and cultural
knowledge of the area. For instance, the tribal differences over new
construction locations led to a number of armed conflicts.
• The EOR was newly established with no existing experience in large-scale
housing projects. It was the first time in Yemen that a housing
construction programme of that scale had been commissioned. Lack of
co-ordination between the EOR and other ministries meant that everything
had to go through protracted bureaucratic procedures".
• The contract time of 18 months was unrealistic, particularly for the foreign
contractors who had to establish themselves in Yemen. Even local
contractors had to import equipment that could match the needed speed
in reconstruction. In fact the conception of time is a cultural expression
in Yemen and it is different from any where else. Moreover, the lack of
building materials in the local market for the 17 competing contractors
was one of the main reasons for delay.
7.8.2. Aid and finance.
The reconstruction project was certainly not efficient in terms of cost and
finance. The cost per house more than doubled over the period of reconstruction,
from 68,000 YR per unit ($15,100) to 150,000 YR ($34,000). The terms of the
contract stipulated that local contractors were to be paid 50% in local currency and
50% in US Dollars, while foreign contractors were to be paid 40% In local currency
and 60% in US Dollars. However, the Yemeni Riyal was devaluing from 4.72 YR per
1 uss in 1984 to 12.02 YR per 1 uss by 199028, with drastic effects on the
completion of the contracts.
The other sad chapter in this story has to do with the aid received by Yemen
from different donor countries. For instance the aSAID contribution to the
reconstruction programme was in the form of tons of grain worth $70,000,000. The
Yemeni Government signed a loan guarantee for this amount. The income from
selling the grain in Yemen was in turn intended to pay for the house building
27 For instance in some contracts walls were specified to be build of red brick, but the national
factory could not cope with the demand. The management structure and the operating procedures of
the EOR, meant that 4 months were wasted before the specification allowing the use of concrete blocks
instead of red bricks could be changed.
28 Of course this is the official Central Bank rate, in November 1991, the black market price was 30
YR per 1$.
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programme. In effect the Yemeni Government had to organise to receive. distribute
and market the grain. at the same time as trying to maintain the value of the Yemeni
Riyal to pay the contractors. By 1990 this so called aid had so far cost the Yemeni
Government 800.000.000 YR(almost $66 million at official rates in 1990). and they
are still paying back the loan29•
A similar story was repeated with the Dutch and EEC donors. However. the
Arab donors (Saudi Arabia. Kuwait and Abu Dhabi) were willingto finance a number
of reconstruction sites. on condition that each had its own independent mini
Executive Office. who selected the contractors, supervised the construction and paid
them directly. One of the Italian contractors collected the first few payments,
completed a fewhouses and fled the country, leaving behind imported equipment and
local and Sri-Iankan employees.
.' "
Figure /7-9/ YalTa'a. one of 10 settlements that are totally uninhabited.
[Source: The author, November 1991J
7.S.3. Reconstruction and the local culture.
The fact that efficient production and assumed urgency were given prominence
meant that the cultural dimension of recostruction was overlooked, which in many
29 From an interview with the Finance Manager of the EOR.
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cases led to a total rejection of the new settlements by the local people. We believe
that the 'degree of acceptance' is a good indicatior of the sucess or failure of the
reconstruction project. So we investigated 40 settlements and plotted the percentage
of occupation in each. Below is a list of the researched settlements along with the
percentage of occupation in each newly reconstructed settlement as of November
1991.
Settlement % of Occupation Settlement % of Occupation
Northern Plains Dhamar area
Al-Aulalb 68.4% Dhamar AI-Qare 71.4%
Al-Husson 100.0% East Dhamar 92.2%
Beit Rashid 85.0% AI-Qilah 14.2%
Hijirit Manfatha 100.0% Rakhmah (1) 23.8%
Rusaba 92.5% Rakhmah (2) 25.0%
Central Highlands Western Higlands
Abasser 03.3% AI-Sharjabi uninhabited
Adro'ah 83.6% Beit AI-Fatimi 66.6%
AI-Kawla 70.0% Beit AI-Qaif 67.7%
AI-Mahnasha uninhabited Dawran 88.8%
AI-Matahen 33.0% Hussain Amran 07.6%
Al-Mithaal uninhabited Khalaq 87.5%
AI-Qadadh 09.8% Maria 09.0%
AI-Shalalah 50.0% San'a 45.8%
AI-Talibi 09.0% Wasita 91.5%
AI-Washal uninhabited Yaffa'a uninhabited
Aram uninhabited
Bani Qatra 22.2%
Bardon 07.4%
Bashar uninhabited
Beit Abu Khalabah uninhabited
Beit AI-Dibiani 20.0%
Haker uninhabited
Jarif Midrass uninhabited
Kalabit Mahfad 32.7%
Tlnin 06.4%
Table 7,1. Settlements with the percentage otoccupeuon of the newly reconstructed houses,
in November, 1991.
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Hundreds of settlements were relocated following the earthquake. Itwas not an
immediate relocetion as there was no provision of temporary housing. But in the
long run all the Contractor built reconstruction could be considered relocated
settlements, either pertially or totally on new sites. In general where the destructive
Impact of the earthquake was considerable (more than 25 houses), new houses were
rebuilt to house the affected families on new sites, from within one to two Kms
distance (eg. San'a, Rakhmah, etc.) up to four Kms (eg. Al-Sharjabi, Bardon). In
villages where the destuction was partial, and limited to a small group of houses,
reconstruction took place within the original settlement (eg. AI-Matahin) or within one
Km distance (eg. Beit Rashid, Al-Shalalah). In relation to the resettlement and
relocation three issues were found to be of a great significant to the success of the
new settlements: Site selection, land ownership and proximity to the main road.
a. Site Selection.
Five teams from the EOR were responsible for the selection of new sites. Each
team consisted of an architect, a civil engineer and two geological engineers. The
initial crietiria for the selection was based on the site's geological safety, and on its
being out of any flood zone, trying to avoid agricultural land. Special attention was
paid to ensuring that the site could be extended in the future.
b. Land ownership.
In practice, the relocation policy was difficult and expensive to implement
because of clashes with the private owners of the land. In a few cases the newly
selected sites were already the collective property of a village. In other cases land
belonged to the Government, but the majority of new settlements were on private
agricultural land. Conflicts arose between tribes and villages over the ownership of
the land (in one case resulting in en armed conflict between Bani HuJalja and Al-
Nasarah tribes). The new locations were often too far from the old settlements (eg.
in the case of Al-Shatjabl). When the land was in private ownership the owner was
to be compensated by both the State and the individuals benefiting from the new
houses, later the Government announced it would not compensate any private land
owner. At the same time, the beneficiaries started to recognise the kind of houses
they were to be offered, and became reluctant to move in. Moreover, the idea that
they had to pay the owner of the land or donate an equal piece of their own
agricultural land (in accordance with the trible rule 'Tlan be Tian' or earth for earth)
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as compensation, totally put them off moving. Thus in a number of cases, the
owners of the land ended up with tens of unoccupied concrete houses in the middle
of their land (eg. Al-Talibivillage, etc.)30. Or, as in the case of Tinin, with a number
of small scattered agricultural plots that were no longer economic to farm.
From the beginning it seems strange that individuals would have allowed the
building of these houses to take place on their land, though all of them Signed
contracts with the EOR. Eventually it became clear that they signed the contracts
under pressure from the Sheik, as well as the community, and as a social obligation
towards their village. The leaders of the tribes In turn were threatened by the
Government, that if they did not agree to the new site location they would be
deprived of the benefits of the reconstruction project. The village of 'Jarf Al-Tahlr'
was one of those where the people did not agree to the new site and they
subsequently lost the 40 houses they were due to have replaced.
c. Proximity to the main Road.
The proximity of the selected sites to the main road was a major feature of the
criteria used, in cases where roads existed prior to the earthquake. But as many of
the affected areas were not very accessible, most contractors had to open their own
roads to reach them. Although all the newly opened roads were in a bad state, the
locals feel that the road was one of the few benefits they had from the reconstruction
project.
7.8.4. Factors affecting the degree of acceptance.
By analyzing the data collected during the field visit, one can derive some
general factors that have affected the degree of people's acceptance. In order to
make the factors more manageable they are grouped under three main categories.
The first one constitutes all the physical and economic factors. The second, includes
all the social and organisational ones. Finally, all the factors that are believed to
have played a certain role and do not belong to any of the categories mentioned
above were grouped together under attitudinal factors. The following table classifies
the settlements according to the level of acceptance into Class A, Band C. With
Class A being thriving settlements with the majority of houses occupied; B,
30 In this case the owner never Signedthe contract, it was his brother who did on his behaf. Having
to come back from Saudi Arabia where he used to work before the War he broke into one of the houses
(11 of which are standing empty) and he is safeguarding his land.
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settlements with average number of houses occupied and C, settlements that are
largely abandoned.
Class A I Class B I Class C
Beit AI-Fatimi 66.6% Beit AI-Dibiani 20.0% AI-Sharjabi 00.0%
Beit AI-Qaifi 67.7% Bani Qatran 22.2% AI-Washal 00.0%
AI-Aulaib 68.4% Rekhmah (1) 23.8% Ararn 00.0%
AI-Kawla 70.0% Rakhmah (2) 25.0% Jarif Midrass 00.0%
Dhamar AI-Qaren 71.4% Kalabit Mahfad 32.7% Basher 00.0%
Adro'ah 83.6% AI-Matahen 33.0% Beit Abu Khalabah 00.0%
Beit Rashid 85.0% San'e 45.8% Haker 00.0%
Khalaq 87.5% AI-Shalalah 50.0% AI-Mahnasha 00.0%
Dawran 88.8% Yaffa'a 00.0%
Waslta 91.5% AI-Mithaal 00.0%
East Dhamar 92.2% Abasser 03.3%
RUlaba 92.5% Tinin 06.4%
HijiritManfatha 100.0% Bardon 07.4%
AI-Husson 100.0% Hussain Amran 07.6%
AI-Qadadh 09.8%
Maria 09.0%
AI-Talibi 09.0%
AI-Qilah 14.2%
Class A: Thriving settlements with the majority of houses occupied (more than
66%) and well maintained, and the community facilities are in use.
Class B: Settlements with average number of houses occupied occupation (25-
50%) with some gardens and extensions.
Class C: Settlements that are largely abandoned (less that 20% occupied).
Table 7,2 Classl(1ylng the settlements according to the level of acceptance.
a. Physical and economic factors.
The physical factors were mostly registered by observation, however attention
to some of them was drawn by the locals. It was one of these factors or a
combination of them that led to the acceptance or refusal of a settlement. The factors
to be considered are in relation to the siting of the reconstructed settlements, the
topography of the new site, and the prouision of seruices. To start with, the distance
from the old settlement seems to be a major physical determinant. Our findings
show that the closer the new settlements were to the old ones the greater the chances
of acceptance. The success of the settlement may not be because of its obvious
benefits, but because it is possible to sustain its relation with the old one. In most
cases the new settlements were not thought of, by their inhabitants, as their
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permanent home, as they fell short of the advantages that were offered by the original
village.
In other cases it was found that new settlements within an acceptable distance,
were actually competing with the old ones, since they were neither close enough to
merge with the original vlllage, nor far enough away to establish a new centre. A
related factor is the proportion of the settlements which were relocated and
reconstructed. Inhabitants of settlements which were totally destroyed and where the
majority of the community were rehoused, appear to be more committed to the
development of their new settlements.
The topography of the new site in relation to the old was a strong factor for the
sucess of the new settlement. Villagers were more tolerant in accepting new
settlements if their geographical charectaristics were similar to the old ones, even if
they were a greater distance away (eg. Beit Al-Fatimi). Those traditionally on hili
tops, sloping sites or hill sides that were relocated in flat plains were mostly rejected.
except in the cases near main-road sites. As was to be expected, those who built
their own new houses, tended to locate them just outside the destroyed settlements
despite the warning of vulnerability. Government reconstruction projects using
foreign contractors were almost all on flat land. Siting settlements in valley floors or
flat plains mostly meant on agricultural land, something that was difficult for the
Yemeni villagers to tolerate.
Another physical factor that was observed to have had a marked effect on the
acceptance of the new settlements was, conversely, their distance from the
agricultural land. This was a direct relationship to the economic abilities of the
settlement. There was obviously no re-distribution of agricultural land not affected
by the earthquake, inspite of hundreds of water wells and irrigation canals being
damaged. However, part of the Government reconstruction project was to drill and
reopen some wells and provide them with electrical water-pumps. This action was
most appreciated by the recipients.
The provision of services, both in the form of infrastructure and public buildings,
was included in the Second Stage of reconstruction, not started until 1989 (61
schools, 45 mosques and 17medical centres). Some reconstructed settlements were
eventually provided with a rough road, while others were placed close to a main road.
But water and electricity supplies only reached the urban areas and main-roadside
settlements.
The relocation of villages closer to main roads and the provision of services and
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Figure / i-1 OJLOOking from me :.raailionai village of nnin onto the newly built one.
infrastructure have had a detectable impact on the economic and social structure of
the settlements. Proximity to the main road meant better access to urban markets.
It also meant that employement opportunities in cities became greater. people started
to give up their agricuitural land in exchange for joining the service sector. For
instance. in AI-Kawla village almost 83% of the reconstructed houses were found
inhabited. The entire life of the village is rapidly being transformed to an urban one.
Families that used to own a piece of agricultural land. today, own a Pick-up Jeep.
Men are working as labourers. guards and drivers. At this stage it is difficult to judge
whether this is a good economic indicator or not. Probably it is not in terms of
national food production. But for the Villagers this marginal step towards urbanisation
is considered a good achivement.
Of course. while reading this. one should keep in mind that the last few years
have been the hardest ever in terms of the poor local economy and agriculture. The
last three rainy seasons were not as wet as usual. and the Gulf War left thousands of
young men without jobs. On the other hand the unification with South Yemen created
new working opprotumties particulariy in the transport sector. of which the Dhamar
region benefited the most. as it is located half way between Sana'a and Aden.
Finaily. although the poor design of the new housing units played an important
role in the communities refusal to live in the new settlements, it was not as crucial
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as the above mentioned physical factors or as the forthcoming social ones were.
b. Social and organisational factors.
Determining the social factors proved to be the most difficult. Person to person
interviews played a crucial role. As we have mentioned previously, the interviews
were wide enough to include, beside the users', the views of all those who were, and
still are actively involved in shaping the built environment; local builders, traditional
craftsmen, teachers, local politicians, sheiks, contractors, and the professionals who
worked on the settlement plans and housing designs at the Executive Office of the
SCREAA.
The fact that it took at least five to six years to complete the early reconstructed
settlements meant that no single case was found, where the whole community of a
village or a town had moved to the new settlement as a social 'unit'. Communities
did split up and were largely encouraged to do so by the State provided settlements,
particularly in cases where the destruction was not 100%, but still large enough to
require building a new settlement. Communities that were unwilling to spUt up
abandoned the new settlements, particularly when they did not offer any advantages
over the old. This was due to the fact that, when part of the village that suffered
damage was rehoused, a split within the village community was caused. This split
was deeper and more difficult to cope with when the minority had been rehoused, and
were reluctant to invest in developing their new site.
Settlements such as the villages of Khalek and I\droa'a and the towns of
Rusaba and Dawran, which suffered total devastation, show today, the characteristics
of a thriving relocated settlement, the whole community having been rehoused. Still,
even in those settlements the rich and the influential families did not wait for the
realisation of the reconstruction project and built their own (stone) houses on the
outskirts of the old settlements. While those who could not afford to rebuild and were
blinded by the State's promises, had to tolerate living in self-constructed temporary
shelters, until they were eventually allocated new homes. Today, the division
between those who have and have not is greater than ever, and is expressed even
physically, with the elite families living on the hill tops over looking the rest of the
community.
The social split can also be observed at the family level. It has been said that
Yemeni communities have been going through a very rapid social change since the
revolution of 1962. One face of this change is the movement towards the nuclear
Chapter Seven.
,,
279
.~ ..
Figure /7.11 J Dawran an example of 4 thrtlJlng reconsuucted town, this is due to the total relocation
of the tradlUonal community form the delJ&stated town.
family away from the traditional extended one. There is no doubt that this change
has been accelerated by the disaster and the following reconstruction, nousbly in the
way in which the new houses were allocated. Today it is possible to find some newly
married couples living in their government provided houses. People seem to have
become less tolerant concerning family disagreements. Today, if a son differs with
his father then he and his family will be asked to move to the new house. Similarly,
in a number of cases elderly people were found living on their own, a practice that
would have been totally unacceptable a few years ago.
Inexplicably, when the EOR conducted its damage assessment survey in 1983,
the number of damaged houses was registered. along with the name of the head of
each family, regardless of the obvious fact that they were mostly extended families.
The social pattern of life was not respected or even considered in the allocation. For
instance, families and their relations were not grouped together. either within a cluster
or around a communal space according to their kinship and traditions.
The head of each destroyed house was allocated a new one. Families. unwilling
to split up and with no option except to be rehoused, suffered severe overcrowding
in one house. while other houses belonging to those who refused them stood empty.
The fact that the houses were not allocated as soon as they were completed, meant
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that people had to wait until the whole village or settlement was completed, thus
depriving them from carrying out adjustments on the house and planting their
gardens. In a number of cases it was reported that the internal door keys were
almost always mixed up and rooms had to be broken into.
The complexity of the existing patterns of ownership, is another factor that has
contributed to the failure of many settlements. Ownership problems did not arise
only within the same settlement but also between different tribes over land, which
made the acquisition of land a difficult task. In the case where government owned
land was available nearby the destroyed settlements, there was no problem (eg. the
town of Rusaba). But, in cases where land was not available, existing patterns of
ownership, particularly in very rural areas, proved to be highly complicated, and often
led to considerable delays in the process of rebuilding.
The local social structure could be traced from the family-ties up to the formal
and informal political structure of the whole village. The tribal structure is extremely
evident in the Dhamar region, and the latest political events seem to have
strengthened it, along with the reconstruction project itself". A number of
reconstruction projects were brought to a halt because of tribal wars that are still
continuing. Tribes in the far Eastern areas of Dhamar region would ask for 'modern'
houses, even though their own were not as damaged as those in the Central areas.
A considerable number of incidents of threatened officials and contractors, and the
occupation of building sites were reported. Finally, it became necessary for the EOR
to have its own PoUce force.
These observations were supported by J. Leslie (1990) when we discussed the
informal political systems through which people get things done. He said: "... the
Yemen case also showed how customary power, in terms of land access to resources,
tribal influence, etc. was reinforced rather than diminished by the earthquake. The
very slow process of official reconstruction gave all those with influence time to make
sure that they stayed on top". Security, WDS another factor overlooked by State
officials. This played a significant role in the refusal to move to a number of the
settlements; in Tinln it was given as the main reason. Located between the two
rebelling tribes: Bani HuJalja and A/-Nasarah, meant that any attack carried out from
either side would pass through the Tinln valley, where the new reconstruction was
31 Following the unification and the inroductlon of a multi-party system the tribal structure gained
back its power.
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located. To prove their point to the authors, the inhabitants aimed their guns at one
of the houses to show that bullets could penetrate the concrete blocks. For them this
was not as safe as the traditionally built stone housesl
The importance of security was also observed in the added window bars and
steel shutters. Almost every inhabited house visited had altered its openings in this
way. Furthermore, in many cases where it was affordable, the wooden front-doors
were replaced by steel ones, bought from Dhamaf city.
c. Attitudinal factors.
Aquote from Cobum's report on the Bingol earthquake in Turkey suggests that,
"The degree of development of the resettlement village is a combination of physical
factors, controllable by the planners, with the ability of the villagers to help
themselves recover" (Cobum, et al, 1984:53), emphasised the importance of
considering such attitudinal aspects. There appeared to have been no physical or
social reasons for a certain community to refuse a rebuilt settlement, they just refused
for reasons that had to do with preferences, beliefs and may be lack of motivation to
move. The last could easily be observed in the case of Dhamar, particularly with the
long delay of the construction.
It could also be observed in the case of some old damaged settlements, where
despite the fact that they were not forced by the authorities to abandon them, they
did so simply because they believed that living in those settlements would bring bad
luck. For them, the stones as well had been cursed and consequently were not used
in rebuilding. Some people would rebuild for themselves on the outskirts of the
original settlements. A few cases were found where people rebuilt the same house
salvaging some of the materials. Besides being a sign of bad luck it was found
expensive to clear the old site and to reuse its building material. Furthermore, the
ruined sites were left unattended for years in anticipation of a State built, today they
are inhabited by snakes and dangerous insects.
The fact that the newly built houses and settlements were safer and could
withstand future earthquakes does not necessarily mean anything to some locals.
For them the 1982 earthquake was a test of their will from Allah, and if God wishes
to do so again, nothing could protect them, even living in fortified hill-top settlements.
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7.S.5. Local response to the house design.
In the Contractor-built programme as well as the Self-help programme a
prototype house layout was produced by the Executive Office and was later adopted
for all types of contract. The single storey 48m2 design consisted of three rooms, a
kitchen and we. (see attached drawings). This unit was repeated in its thousands
by the different contractors on different sites, using the lame technology of framed
reinforced concrete. The differentiation in materials was only found in some
settlements, where red brick was used instead of the standard concrete blocks.
The actual people concerned were never consulted on their requirements or
expected to participate at any stage of the reconstruction. No effort was made to
study, register or understand their traditional life styles, building types, technologies
and materials. The damage assessment teams collected only statistical data on the
number of houses destroyed, number of occupants and number of storeys of each
house, etc.
Consequently, there was no difference between the plan layouts for the villages
from those for the towns, inspite of the obvious variations. There was also no
differentiation according to family size or the space requirements for various types
of economic activity. Modern facilities, such as WCs and kitchens suitable for urban
families were incorporated in all the reconstructed houses. Yet piped water to the
houses only occurred in a few of the towns and never in the villages. The same could
be said about domestic electricity supply.
A few years after the reconstruction, and judging by the inhabited houses, it is
interesting to notice the difference between the intended policy, itl implementation
and the way people have reacted and the consequences for them. In general, houses
that were found inhabited had been substantially altered, extended or changed In
some way, or in a number of cases used for functions other than accommodation
(storage or animal byres). Although the degree of extension and alteration varies
from one settlement to another and depends on the economic status of the
inhabitants, it was a general rule that at least a kitchen (Dima) would be added
outside the house. The kitchen provided inside the house was found in use only in
towns and only where people had access to bottled gal supplies. In most calel,
particularly in towns, where the houses were used for accommodation, extra rooms
and in some cases shops were added, which indicates the need for more space.
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Flgure {7·12/ An urban and a rural examples of the different ways in which people haue altered the
prototype house.
{Source: The author. November 1991/
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From the Government's point of view they were supplying emergency houses
in the form of a 3-room core-house that was able to be extended by its inhabitants
in the future. For the inhabitants part, they were promised a house to 'replace their
lost one'. For them a house meant a 'home', similar to the one they previously
owned if not even better: 'more modern'. It was a shock for them to discover that
these, 'match boxes' (as they put it) were to replace their lost homes.
Furthermore, the field study revealed that out of 2,646 reconstructed houses
visited only 1,727 were inhabited, 955 of which were in towns. A comparison of the
State provided units with the traditional house-type, revealed that the fonner had no
relation whatsoever to the latter, either in fonn or the materials used or the use to
which buildings had been put for centuries past. This was particularly marked in the
rural settlements.
The initial reconstruction programme anticipated that the Core Unit could be
extended. In this context two assumptions were made: 1) People will extend their
houses vertically, in accordance with the Yemeni tradition, and might also add few
rooms attached to the ground floor; 2) the extended building will be of reinforced
concrete. Thus provision was made to enable the house to extend in the front and
to add an extra storey. The reinforcing steel of the columns and beams was left
protruding to allow people to tie in their extensions, in the hope that an earthquake
resistant house will eventually be constructed. So far this has not been realised.
During the field visit only two houses out of the 2,646 visited were found to have
been extended vertically. In one case (in the village of Tinin) the owners; two
brothers had combined their two adjacent houses into one. They built a staircase in
the middle and built two storeys on top of the government provided houses. In the
other case, the local community agreed to allocate the house to the local clinic and
the weekly visiting doctor was the one who added e first floor end a side- stelrcase.
People were reluctant to extend their houses vertically for two reasons. Firstly,
staircases were not provided or even planned for by the Government. And for the
inhabitants they were too expensive to build. Secondly, because they had no 'visual
trust' or faith in the strength of the concrete structure. Although they were convinced
that a single storey concrete-block house could withstand earth shocks, It was
difficult to convince them that a 20cm-thick wall could carry a second floor.
In terms of horizontal extensions, only a few houses were found where people
had added rooms to the provided unit as initially intended, end there were no cases
where the extension had been tied in to the structure of the unit. This was beceuse
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people perceived the front of their house as the 'modem elevation', that should not
be touched, after all it is where the main entrance was located.
Finally, concrete extensions were found only in towns and semi-towns, but
never in vlllages. And in all cases the new buildings were not tied to the structure of
the provided unit. Thus all the new extensions are as vulnerable as the traditional
buildings, if not more.
7.9. Summary and conclusion.
The contractor built housing programme in Yemen is another case that
demonstrates how the issue of post-disaster reconstruction is not just a simple matter
of constructing reinforced houses. Our research questions the value of delivering
thousands of earthquake-resistant houses that do not correspond to the local socio-
cultural and economic reality. These houses have not served their intended purpose;
to shelter people as quickly as possible and to reduce their future vulnerability. The
reconstructed settlements suffer from a number of misjudgments and unrealistic
assumptions that were made at both policy and implementation levels. In defence
it has to be said that governments, such as the Yemen, have very little leverage in
these situations and have to be satisfied with what they are offered - no matter how
inappropriate.
The incorporation of mitigation measures has to be faced in a realistic manner
in the following ways:
1. Needs assessment, that reflects the real needs of the people, their priorities and
expectations, rather than the 'assumed ones' by distant professionals and
foreign intervenors. Put at its best, the needs assessment process in Dharnar,
suffered from a lack of understanding and familiarity with the local socio-
cultural, economic and physical conditions, thus programme definitions were
based on purely quantitative data. Also, the manipulation of this data, to suit
the needs of the donors instead of the victims resulted in over-simplified lists
of vlllages and numbers of houses.
2. Estimation and allocation of resources should include central as well as regional
and local ones, including the people's own abilities to reconstruct their
dwellings.
3. Realistic appreciation of differences between urban and rural. InDhamar, there
has been no appreciation of the different needs of rural and urban (or semi
urban) communities. The same prototype house and settlement layout were
used in both villages and towns.
4. The assumed e(flclency of employing big contractors is nothing more than a
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myth. In Dharnar, the initially intended number of houses were never realised;
time limits were never met, what was intended as an emergency shelter
programme took 3 to 5 years to complete; and finally, the reconstruction
budgets were invariably exceeded.
5. Realistic standards of safety, mean there willalways be a certain degree of risk
attached to building in earthquake zones. Safety standards should be based on
available, affordable and culturally acceptable measures. Removing settlements
from hill-tops to valleys on the basis of geologists and engineers' reports is just
not good enough.
6. Organisational demands and responsibilities must be based on local experience;
newly-established emergency bodies should co-ordinate existing implementing
bodies, not the seting up of another one.
7. Realistic appreciation of the dynamics of reconstruction. Rebuilding settlements
and mitigation should be seen as a complex, multidimensional process. Thus
policies have to be flexible enough to accept alteration and adjustment based
on continuous genuine feed back from the field.
8. Plans for reconstruction must be made taking eccount of the real nature of
foreign aid and intervention.
++++
Our exemination of the detailed process of reconstruction following a natural
disaster in this Chapter and that of reconstruction followingwer in Chapter 6 support
the argument that reconstruction after war is considerably different from
reconstruction following natural disasters.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CIVIL UNREST SHAPING THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
IN NORTHERN IRELAND; THE CASE OF BELFAST.
8.1. INTRODUCTION.
"In Belfast, what is being reflected in bricks, mortar and
concrete is a bitterly divided society. More and more the city
is taking the form of two communities at war with each other" .
Cowan (1982).
This Chapter examines the effects of civil unrest on the urban environment,
taking the city of Belfast in Northern Ireland as a case-study. It explores the
continuous destruction, reconstruction and development that has been taking place
from the eruption of the worst conflicts in the late 1960's until today.
The author visited Belfast between the 4-11 March 1990, where he interviewed
a number of officials, professionals and local people as well as visiting a number of
the State Departments. Within the context of Northern Ireland, the 'troubles' are
mainly displayed in the form of both 'illustrative' and 'destructive' terrorism, without
going into the conventional methods of warfare and street fighting, which we have
witnessed in a number of civil wars and conflicts in the Middle East. Still, the Belfast
study helped the development of this dissertation in a number of ways. Besides
developing the author's own abilities to investigate and research in a totally alien
context, it helped derive some lessons that have added to the general context of
examining post-war reconstruction, particularly where religious or social divisions
exist.
8.2. WHY BELFAST?
Northern Ireland, with the conflicts it is living through, seemed to be an ideal
case-study in which political, economic, social and sectarian dimensions are joined.
together, forming a force that has been shaping the built environment and directing
its architecture for the last few decades. Belfast itself was selected as a case-study
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from which some conclusions and policy practices can be derived for a number of
reasons:
• Belfast is an example of a deeply divided community, to the extent that it has
been considered as being 'essentially a place apart' (Boyce, 1991:13): a place
where politics are based on confrontation between entrenched religious
communities, a characteristic that exists in many MiddleEastern countries. (eg.
Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan).
• Furthermore, the continuous violence in Belfast sets it apart from not only the
rest of the British Isles, but from the whole of Western Europe. Northern Ireland
then provides an ideal arena to examine a number of issues that have to do
with war time reconstruction, including the extent of the State involvement and
the role of the general public in what is supposedly a democratic society.
• Over the last 25 years Belfast has become an example where simultaneous
reconstruction and deuelopment take place, and where" ..major inputs Into the
planning process include the security forces, politicians and most importantly
the people themselves" (Dawson, 1984:1).
• Belfast serves as an example that needs to be explored in order to understand
how such civil disturbances can actually affect planning and architecture and
to what extent?
• Finally, Belfast was selected in an attempt to answer the question: ... how is it
possible to implement housing and planning policies in such a 'divided
community', where, the 'sectarian' division increases the complexity of change
and the intensity of conflict? A conflict that "... is not about economic issues
but about non-bargainable issues of religion and nationality" (Rose, 1971,
quoted in Hunter 1982; Singleton, 1985).
8.3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES.
The aim of this study is to investigate how long-term civil unrest can become
a 'war-culture' and can affect the urban environment in a number of ways, besides
direct damage and destruction. This study sets out to examine the following issues:
• The importance of achieving a balance in reconstruction between the realistic
expectations of the inhabitants and the State's short and long-term political
needs.
• To show that civil unrest can have a much greater impact on the urban
environment than the immediate damage and destruction caused by terrorist
bombing.
This Chapter is divided into six sections. The following Section outlines the
methods used to gather relevant information. The second Section gives some
background information necessary for general understanding of the 'troubles' in
Northern Ireland. The following two Sections are concerned with the setting, history
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and architectural background of Belfast, as a case study. The fifth Section contains
the major findings of the study, in terms of the impact of the 'troubles' on planning
and architecture, residential segregation, urban design, anti-terrorist defences and
reconstruction compensation. The final Section serves as a summary and seeks to
draw some conclusions from this case.
t<.epUBUC
~ \RELAND
Ftgure /8-1 J The locaUon of Belfast within the BriUsh Isles.
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8.4. METHODOLOGY.
The research methodology for this case-study followed the general methodology
applied in the development of this dissertation and discussed earlier in Chapter 4,
based on the conventional three stages of:
a. Review of existing knowledge on the subject.
b. Conducting a field study and data collection.
c. Analysis and documentation of findings.
Prior to the field visit, comprehensive research, interviews and discussions with
experts and review of literature were conducted in order to expand the author's
knowledge on the context of the issues, as well as to prepare the ground for each
field visit.
Since the late 1960's, hundreds of academic and journalistic texts have been
produced on the Northern Ireland 'problem', to the extent that it has been termed the
'Factory of Books' (Cox, 1989, in Cunningham 1991). Peredoxtcally, ecedemle
papers, articles and books specifically concerned with the effect of the troubles on
the urban environment and architecture, as well as on the dilemma of reconstruction
planning end development are rare. The most relevant references were found in the
writings of Boal (1969; 1970; 1972; 1978); Boal s Douglas (1982); Cowan (1982);
Singleton (1984;1985) and Stollard (1980; 1989). However, a number of
unpublished papers and dissertations were also consulted, most of the unpublished
references were obtained at the Ubrary of Queen's University and at the Unen Hall
Library, during the visit to Belfast, where the author was permitted access to the
'Political Collection', which contains unique material on the 'troubles' in Northern
Ireland.
The field study to Belfast was carried out in March 1990'. The investigation
was based on meetings with officials and key informants, observations and finally
conducting semi-structured interviews with a wide variety of people. This latter
technique proved useful for a number of reasons. Firstly, because the author's
knowledge concerning the subject was not comprehensive, it was important to
encourage discursive answers. A wider range of information could be covered,
particularly in cases where the interviewee was aware of issues which had not
occurred to the author. Secondly, It was felt that interviewees would talk more freely
than if confronted with a list of written questions. Finally, this technique helped to
IAccommodation and travel expenses were paid by Third World / One World Studies at the Institute
of Advanced Architectural Studies, University of York, to whom I am grateful.
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obtain a sense of the underlying thoughts and critical beliefs of the interviewees.
Additionally, the interviews were conducted with the use of tape recorder when ever
it was appropriate.
The interviews themselves can be classified as follows: Those with academics,
civic authorities (DoE, NIHE), consultant architects and members of the public.
Sterting with the academics, Dr. Paul Stollard at Queen's University, was particularly
helpful in suggesting methodology and establishing contacts. Dr. Dale Singleton, also
from Queen's provided me with a comprehensive and up to date bibliography on
literature dealing with the effects of the 'troubles' on planning and architecture in
Northern Ireland.
The Department of the Environment (DoE), the Northern Ireland Housing
Executive (NIHE) and the Northern Ireland Office are the three civic authorities
contacted. At the DoE, David Nesbitt architect and Jerry Hilliard engineer, both in
the team responsible for the bomb-damaged repairs and building fortifications were
interviewed. Through them the author was made aware of the general security
problems, especially concerning the design of court houses and police stations. Also
Richard Orarn an architect from the Department of Historical Buildings and
Monuments at the DoE, was a great help in establishing contacts for me to meet, as
well as the insights he provided about aspects of conservation in Northern Ireland.
From the NIHE,Mr. Robert Strang, Assistant Director of the Development &
Planning Department, Architect KyleAlexander and Planner Farouk were interviewed.
They explained how the Executive evolved between 1969-1971 and the housing
problems facing them in a divided community, as well as future plans. In addition,
Ms. Judy Hewitt from the Northern Ireland Office, Department of Criminal
Compensation gave the author a comprehensive description of government
compensation levels and procedures.
All these interviews were remarkable for their recognition of the difficult
situation that had to be dealt with no matter how bad things became. On the other
hand, Mr. Cecil Dunbar from the Royal Society of Ulster Architects, tried to convince
the author that the situation in Belfast was as normal as any where else in Britain.
He thought it would have been more useful to study the situation in Beirut. The
author had the impression that, such people had either adjusted to abnormality, so
that they could no longer distinguish between that and normality. Or perhaps they
were deliberately trying to ignore the problems as a means of surviving in a difficult
climate. C.O. Andrews, another architect from the Royal Society explored the
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problem from the point of view of the private architectural practice. Finally, we were
able to meet a number of local people in both Protestant and Catholic areas of
Belfast, as well as at the University.
First-hand observations took the form of systematically walking or driving with
some of the interviewees around the inner city areas with a large scale map and a
camera, noting and photographing features like barriers, bricked-up buildings, wall
murals, etc. By this means the author was able to familiarise himself with those
areas and features and as a result developed the 'classification of barriers' at the
'interface lines', recorded in the Fifth Section.
In Belfast, some people would insist that the terms 'Nationalist' and 'Loyalist'
should be used rather than 'Catholic' and 'Protestant'. They support their argument
with the view that the conflict is not based on religious conviction as much as it is
based on cultural, national and political dimensions. The author agrees with that
point of view, but at the same time one should not dismiss the historical religious
dimension of the conflict, thus in this Chapter, it was decided to use the terms
Nationalist / Loyalist or Catholic / Protestant interchangeably where ever it is
appropriate.
Methodological observations.
It is important to conclude this section by registering three observations:
• The difficulties for the author in writing about Northern Ireland were mainly
generated from a feeling of being a 'total outsider', who seemingly found it
difficult to integrate with the local population. A condition that in itself was
helpful in developing an understanding of the issues.
• It became evident that in such cucumstances of fear, distrust, resentment and
contempt, the inquiring outsider might be given a certain amount of biased
misinformation, even at the professional level.
• This field work, conducted at an early stage, had a great influence on the
development of this dissertation. It provided an opportunity to research into a
culturally alien environment, where the author had to develop his methodology
and investigative abilities.
8.5. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 'CIVIL WAR' IN NORTHERN
IRELAND: TWO COMMUNmES IN CONFUCT.
In order to understand the effect of the civil war on planning and architecture,
it is important to be aware of the conflict's history and the philosophical ideology
behind the three parties involved: the British (the army and administration); the
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Northern Irish Protestants (the Loyalists); and the Irish Catholics (the Nationalists).
This section can not be more than an introduction to the Northern Ireland 'problem'
and anyone who wishes a more comprehensive account of the history of Ulster or
Ireland willhave no difficulty in finding suitable references. Books by Elliott & Hickie
(1971); Rose (1971); O'Brien (1972) and Boyce (1991) are recommended. Conor
Cruisa O'Brien's book States oflreiand and Brian Faulkner's Memories ote Statesman
are particularly relevant.
To begin then, it is helpful to know something about the political and
administrative framework in Northern Ireland. Both the Irish Republic and the United
Kingdom constitute the 'British Isles'. The U.K. is governed directly from
'Westminster'. It contains both Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which is
administered by a Secretary of State and the Northern Ireland Office. Thus Northern
Ireland is directly governed from 'Westminster' but on a separate basis from the rest
of the UK. In 'Westminster' Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland) are
represented by 632 MPs, while Northern Ireland is represented by 18 MPs. Of these
18 members, 3 represent the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), which is a
Catholic party; 7 members represent the Official Unionists (OUP); and another 7
represent the Democratic Unionists, both parties are Protestant. Finally, one member
represents the 'Sinn Fein' (SF) Catholic (Nationalist) Party2. In the absence of
effective local government, Northern Ireland is administered by centrally controlled
departments, such as Health fi Social Services, Agriculture, Commerce and the most
important department with respect to reconstruction; the Department of the
Environment (DoE). This department has control over land use planning, roads,
conservation, water and sewage'.
The main problem of Ireland is that it literally has two minorities, with all the
friction, threat and fear that that might create. In Ireland, as a whole, the Protestants
are a minority, but In the six counties of Northern Ireland (Antrim, Londonderry",
Tyrone, Fermanagh, Armagh and Down) the Catholics only form one third of the
2 'Sinn Fein': means literally 'Ourselves Alone', a Nationalist political party that Is believed to
represent the political voice of the IRA. There are many claims that this party is not supported by the
Catholic Church In anyway.
, This Information was obtained from an Interview with Dr. Paul Stollard, and from reviewing the
work of Dawson (1984).
4 As it is known by the Protestent and the British Government, while the Catholics know it as Derry.
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populetion", The 'double minority model', first put forward by Jackson (1971) on
the basis of the decisive vote of 1921, and has been investigated by a number of
authors, for example Douglas and Boel (1982:3-4) and Stollard (1989). When
reading the history of the North of Ireland one comes across two different
interpretations of the conflict. Ruane and Todd (1991:27) summarised these
interpretations when they wrote:
"Those who take the first -the 'cultural'- approach see the
source of the conflict in the abnormality of Northern Irish
political culture: in the expectations, values, norms and
attitudes of the two communities. Those who take the second
-the 'structural'- approach seethe source of the conflict in the
abnormality of the institutional and structural context, in the
way that context locks the two communities in conflict".
Whatever the source of conflict is, Northern Ireland's community is generally
divided into two; those who favour a continuation of the Union with Britain and are
known as the Loyalists (in general they are Protestant), and those who generally
aspire to an independent 'United Ireland' and HomeRule. Stollard (1980: 11) claimed
that "... the terms Catholic and Protestant refer to totally different cultures and not
just religious conviction, this difference is far stronger than any class division and
forms the basis of work, education, entertainment, as well as politics". Thus the
communities moved apart socially and became more spatially segregated,
particularly after periods of rioting in 1911 and in 1926 and in earlier years of 1832,
1835, 1852, 1864, 1872, 1880, 1884, 1886, 1898 and 1901. Thus, violence became
a characteristic of the North of lreland."
Despite the fact that "Ulster people are quick to point out, quite rightly, that the
violence is confined to certain, almost predictable areas, and directly affects the
everyday existence of but few people"? (Boyce, 1991:16), the 'war' in the Province
is continuing and It is principally about a conflict of nationalities and the challenge
5 According to a 1992 estimate Catholics constitute 43% of the six counties. (Ed Cooney, December
1992).
II For more details on these riots see. Jones 1956; Baker 1973; Boal & Murray 1977 and Stewart
1977.
1The term 'Ulster' is traditionally used to describe the nine counties of one of the historic 'Provinces'
in Ireland; Antrim, Down. Armagh. Derry. Tyrone, Fermanagh. Donegal. Monaghan and Cavan. Today,
Ulster is Incorrectly used to refer to Northern Ireland, that was founded In 1921 and comprises the first
six counties in this list. (Boal & Douglas, 1982:ix). It has been ensured that the terms 'Ulster' and
'Northern Ireland' are used in their strict sense except where a 'looser' usage occurs in quotations from
the work of other authors.
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it poses to the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland State. One of the elements of the
'war' is the battle for space or territory at both a 'micro' level within one city in terms
of houses and neighbourhoods, and on a 'macro' level for the whole of Northern
Ireland. However, the 'war' also poses a latent threat to the legitimacy of the
constitution of the Irish Republic, which asserts the territorial and national unity of
Ireland and is rejected by the 'Loyalists'.
At a very Simplified level, the conflict can be said to be at least 800 years old
from when the Protestants settlers, both English and Scottish started to establish their
settlements and neighbourhoods In Northern Ireland. Although, the O'Neil Catholic
faction rising of 1641 against the planters resulted in a Protestant massacre, still the
"..most important of all was the Battle of the Boyne in 1690" (Darby, 1976:4). In
that battle William of Orange gained a great victory against the Catholics, a victory
that is still celebrated by the Protestants every year, and is marked on hundreds of
walls in their territories". Some commentators claim that the history of the Boyne
was virtually rewritten in the 19th century, to become a symbol of Protestant
ascendancy.
However, "... having established an exclusively Protestant legislature in 1692,
a comprehensive series of coercive Acts against Catholics were implemented during
the 1690's and after. Catholics were excluded from the armed forces, the judiciary
and the legal profession as well as from parliament; they were forbidden to carry
arms or to own a horse worth more than £5; all their bishops and regular clergy were
banished in 1697,,, Catholics were forbidden to hold long leases on land, to buy land
from a Protestant, and were forced to divide their property equally among their
children, unless the eldest conformed to the Anglican faith; they were prohibited from
conducting schools, or from sending their children to be educated abroad" (Darby,
1976:4).
Still, It was not until the early 18th century that the comprehensiveness of the
plantation in Ulster started to appear, as well as the natural process of migration from
Scotland and England. Darby (1976:3), writes about two characteristics that
distinguished the Irish plantations: " ..the fact that comprehensive attempts were
made to attract, not only British gentry, but colonists of all classes and also the fact
that the colonists were Protestant and represented a culture entirely alien to Ulster".
Bin fact the year 1990 marked the 300th anniversary of the Boyne battle and many celebrations and
marches took place to ernphastse this victory.
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No matter how simple this statement makes the situation look, one fact is certain:
these plantations meant the introduction of a foreign community that spoke and
worshipped differently and apart. "The presence In Ulster of an unusually large
number of Protestants, and especially Presbyterians, helped give that area its special
characteristic distinctiveness at least in Ireland, but not so distinctive in a wider
British context". (Boyce, 1991:19). Most importantly, this community had close
commercial, cultural and political ties with Britain. This meant that with the impact
of the industrialisation of the regions of the British Isles in the nineteenth century,
Ulster was pushed into economic and polItical prominence, thus adding an economic
edge to the religious argument. These factors served to create further economic
differences between Ulster and the rest of Ireland and between Catholic and Protestant
within Ulster. Furthermore, "Changes in the British economy in the nineteenth
century encouraged the rise of Belfast as the economic centre of Ireland; and the
decline of Dublin again had an important local impact, in that it encouraged the idea
of a second capital with its future vitally resting on the bosom of the British political
and economic system". (Boyce, 1991 :21).
During the nineteenth century the greater prosperity of the North, Its economic
structure and even its physical appearance, increased its alienation from the rest of
Ireland. In the Twentieth Century, "The increasingly militant Irish nationalism,
evidenced by Sinn Fein's capture of seventy-three seats in the general election of
1918 and the parallel militancy of Unionist opposition to Home Rule, symbolised by
the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant in 1912, had made an all-Ireland
settlement increasingly untenable". (Gunningham, 1991: 1). Furthermore, in 1920
the Government of Ireland Act was passed by the British Parliament, it established
two States in Ireland, one for the six counties known as Stormont, and the other for
the remainder of Ireland. "Each was to have its own parliament to deal with domestic
matters; each was to have representatives at Westminster; and a Council of Ireland
was to deal with matters of common interest. In fact the terms only came into
operation in Northern Ireland and the Council never met" (Darby 1976:9).
But, why had these six counties been selected to create Northern Ireland rather
than the traditional nine counties of Ulster? Some sources, suggested that the
straightforward reason was that the traditional nine counties held 900,000 Protestants,
most of whom supported the British connection and 700,000 Catholics, most of
whom wanted to end it. In the six selected counties the religious breakdown was
820,000 Protestants and 430,00 Catholics. Thus the Unionist would be the greater
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majority. (Darby, 1976).
Under the Local Government (Stormont) which lasted until 1969 many events
of discrimination ogainst Catholics were recorded, in public housing, property,
education and even in public employment. Darby (1976), went further to claim that,
"The most serious general allegation in this field was that the government operated
a policy of deliberate discrimination against part of the Province (counties Derry and
Fermanagh in particular), creating conditions which encouraged [Catholic] emigration
to counter the higher Catholic birth rate in these areas".
The 'troubles' of the last twenty five years are simply an extension of this
historical conflict, continuing along the path of violence. "The first important event
in the current conflict occurred on 5 October 1968, when a demonstration calling for
electoral reform and an end to discrimination against Catholics was broken up by the
Royal Ulster Constabulary, RUC(mainly Protestant)" (Stollard 1980: 12). Before that,
Darby (1976) wrote; "In August 1968 the Catholic Lower Falls area (in Belfast) was
invaded by a hostile mob, seven people were killed, and more than 3,000 lost their
homes". The August 1968 events introduced a new element and thus a different
dimension to the Northem Ireland question. Then, on 4 January 1969 another march
sponsored by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA)was attacked at
the Burntollet Bridge by 'Loyalist' extremists, who were beyond the control of the
RCJC.
According to the Sunday Times Insight Team (1972:76); "The first Catholic
Inspired explosions in the recent history of Ulster came around 10:20 pm. on the 20
April 1969, when the first of eleven petrol bombs burst in Belfast sub-post offices".
As Stollerd (1980: 12) claimed, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) did not enter the
scene until after the sectarian rioting of 12-14 August of the same year, following the
annual Protestant 'Apprentice Boys' march round the walls of Londonderry. Then the
RCJCbecame alarmed and reacted with firearms and this led to the intervention of the
Army to protect the Catholics. Since then the so called 'terrorist' activity has grown,
".. what started as street rioting has developed over the years, with the involvement
of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), into a mixture of civil and guerilla war". (Murray,
1982:309).
As a result, on the 14 August 1969 the British Government sent its army into
Derry and the next day to Belfast, in an attempt to protect the Catholic areas against
further attacks. At that time the soldIers were received rapturously by the Catholics.
Casestudy: Belfast. Northern Ireland.
298
"August 1971 saw the introduction of internment", but this only increased terrorism
and following 'Bloody Sunday' on 30 January 1972, when thirteen Catholic
demonstrators were shot during a riot, a return to direct rule became a necessity, so
conceding the IRA's initial objective" (Stollard 1980: 13). Since then, the violence
took the form of shooting and bombing as well as lesser forms of violence, such as
groups of youths stoning army patrols or other youths, became almost deily events.
Possibly, the worst attack launched by the IRAwas the indiscriminate bombings
in the centre of Belfast on 21 July 1972, when nineteen bombs destroyed shops, bus
stations and offices killing nine people. In that year loyalist terrorism became
organised and increasingly active in the Ulster Defence Association. The full strength
of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) was seen during the Ulster (Protestant)
Workers Strike 19741°. It is said that the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) carried out
the bombings and with other Protestant extremist groups had been responsible for the
majority of sectarian murders. Jenkins (1979) wrote in the Guardian, 25 July; "After
ten years, the 'troubles' have now become a professional war ... fought almost
exclusively between experienced terrorists, better organised, equipped end disciplined
and an Army itself lncreesmgly experienced in the business of anti-terrorism".
In 1985, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed between Britain and the
Republic of Ireland which ".. gave to the Republic the right and responsibility to act
as spokes party for the nationalist community in Northern lreland, The pace of
reforms has, however, been much slower than was initially anticipated". (Ruane &
Todd, 1991 :38). Still, the military role of both sides escalated. McAuley, 1991 :63)
claimed that, "Concerned initiallywith the growing political support for Sinn Fein and,
more recently, with the Anglo-Irish Agreement, there has been Increased pressure for
the UDA to adopt a more military role... The Ulster Defence Force (UDF) came into
existence as a 'reserve army' to be used in a 'domesday situetion"', The same author
also stated that "The UDA's current rnllltery cempaign egeinst republicans hes been
carried out by Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)".
8.6. BELFAST, IT'S SEITING s DEVELOPMENT.
In the north-east of Ireland a broad river velley (Lagen) runs north-east along
II The act of detaining or confining of terrorism suspects without trial.
10 The strike lasted between 15-29 May 1974, and had far reaching effects on the daily life of Belfast
and the whole of Northern Ireland. This Is Incidentally the only strike that has brought down a
government in the history of the United Kingdom. (For more detail see McAuley, 1991:51-53).
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the line of the southern uplands boundary and meets the Irish Sea in Belfast Lough.
To its east and south-east. rounded hills rise to 180 metres; to the west and
north-west it is surrounded by steep hills. which on average rise to 360 metres. This
Irish setting saw the development of a British settlement. its steep valley sides
provided a suitable site to contain the city of Belfast. (Boal £, Royle. 1986: 191).
It was not until 1603 that a substantial settlement began to develop. The area
on the Antrim side was granted to Sir Arthur Chichester as part of the Ulster
Plantation Plan (Down was excluded from the plantation). Chichester laid out a
defended settlement which later developed as a market and port, and took up the
manufacture of local linen. By the mid 19th Century there were about 28 flax mills
in Belfast. Moreover, iron, chemical and glass works were founded to serve the
textile trade. at the same time the linen industry further stimulated engineering in the
area.
Although. wooden and then iron ship building did not become a major industry
until the late 19th Century, these had long been associated with Belfast's port, but on
a much smaller scale. By the turn of the century this industry provided the largest
share of employment. "In 1914 the two 'shipbuilding' yards produced 250,000 tons
of ships and employed 29,000 men. Thousands more jobs were provided in
industries ancillary to shipbuilding, such as rope works and engineering" (Boal £,
Royle, 1986:195). "By the second half of the 19th Century Belfast had the fastest
growth rate of any town in the British Isles and it became the third largest port after
London and Uverpool" (Stollard 1980:19). From a population of around 20,000 in
1800 Belfast reached 87,000 in 1851. (Boal £, Royle, 1986:195). In 1901 it had a
population of 349,180.
The emergence of Belfast as a preeminent red-brick Victorian city created
housing and social problems. Boal £, Royle (1986) quoted 0'Hanlon (1853) claiming
that by the 1850's overcrowding and disease occurred as the population squeezed
into Belfast's 'entries and courts'. where land lords exercised strict planning controls,
and mill owners had housing erected, often of poor quality. Consequently, small,
cramped terraces or 'kitchen' dwellings became synonymous with Belfast's growth.
Still, an expansion of housing in the built up areas was not possible until the break-up
of the landlord's estates (mainly of mills and manufacturing industries).
By the 20th Century Belfast had become the chief port of Ulster Province, the
major market town and central place, the chief resort of entertainment and culture,
and from 1921 was the capital city of Northern Ireland. This prosperity led the city
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to become a magnet for migration. "Mainly rural Catholics immigrated in the first
decades of the nineteenth century, but later many Protestants from Antrim and Down
came, strengthening the Protestants' population from 67% in 1861 to 76% In 1901"
(Boal & Royle, 1986: 199). Today, Belfast is home to approximately 500,000 people;
one third of the Province's total population of 1.5 million, of whom 300,000 live
within the municipal boundary!'.
o km 2 BELFAS T LOUGH
N
•I
-+-
. -- -
__ -...,;: -- .: alllv Shore L,ne •••
- ~- "---'"=----= ---:-:=:- -. .
..--~-- --
Pre 1758 •
1758-1858.
1858 - 1902 ~
1902 - 1951 ll[
_ .J
1951 1980
Figure /8-21 Belfast growth J 758- J980.
{Source: Boal (; Royle, J 986: 196J
IINorthern Ireland Housing Executive (1990) Housing Renewal Strategy. Belfast, Review and Future
Policy. Belfast.
Chapter Eight.
'~,
i
\
f,
301
8.7. BELFAST; ITS ARCHITECTURAL AND PLANNING BACKGROOND.
There has always been a strong link between Belfast's architecture and the
political situation in Northern Ireland as a whole. Stollard (1989) supports this claim
when writing:
"In Ireland planning has always been highly political, because
'planning equals territory'. The origins of the present 'troubles'
lies in the planned plantations in the seventeenth century".
To start with, very little remains of the Romanesque and Gothic styles. The
plantations of the Protestants from England and Scotland, which were concentrated
In Ulster, brought strong foreign strains into the local building style. Also over time,
"..repeated destruction and internal strife resulted in widespread· damage, while
rebuilding produced some curiously mixed styles" (Dixon, 1975:vi). Northern
Ireland's First Regional plan was implemented in 1609, when the Government of
London promoted a plan for building 23 New Towns in Ulster and settled them with
families from England and Scotland. The enlargement of the Irish port of Derry and
its renaming as Londonderry is considered the most important of these New Towns.
The city still retains the 17th Century street pattern and walls and it is still a centre
of religious conflict.
Brickwork construction was established only in the 17th and 18th Centuries,
and mainly In the Lagan valley, when the Georgian style was used in many public
buildings, after the introduction of railways, brick became more widely used and was
very often brought from England. Before that and according to Stollard (1980), the
development of architecture in Northern Ireland was hindered by the lack of good
stone, for with a few exceptions, all local stone was either too hard for detailed
carving or too soft for durable building.
As the First WorldWar came to an end the economy slumped and one quarter
of all workers lacked employment throughout the 1920's. This economic situation
was clearly reflected in Belfast's architecture and development, particularly in its
housing sector. Thus in 1919, two years before Ireland was partitioned, Westminster
legislation placed an Increased responsibility for the direct provision of housing on
local authorities throughout Britain and Ireland. From 1921 Northern Ireland became
a partially self governing region of the United Kingdom. At that time, the local
Ministry of Home Affairs, responsible for the provision of housing, was preoccupied
by security matters.
Singleton (1984:6) points out that between the two World Wars, (between
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1919-1939) "..the level of subsidy for public sector housing was lower in Northern
Ireland than in Britain, and ... greater reliance was placed upon private builders than
local authority provision in the Province". Thus, in an attempt to overcome the
housing problem, "Northern Ireland imported the British scheme of grenting e subsidy
to private builders to reduce prices. The policy of building Council houses for rent
was imported less wholeheartedly" (Boal & Royle 1986:201). But the private sector
could not cope with the great demand, although it built 82% of the housing stock at
that time.
The Second World War had three main impacts on development In Belfast.
Firstly, unemployment decreased greatly from the disastrous levels of the 1930's due
to the flourishing of aircraft manufacture. Secondly, in April and May 1941 the city
suffered from heavy German bombing raids, which caused considerable damage to
the ship building industry and the housing stock. Strang (1985) claimed that, in
those raids about 3,200 houses were destroyed and at least 53,000 were damaged.
"At that time Belfast was the least protected city in the United Kingdom, perhaps
because of its greater distance from the German airfields on mainland Europe" (Boal
& Royle, 1986:202). What followed was the Housing Act of 1945, which set up the
Northern Ireland Housing Trust as a development agency, with power to provide
housing throughout the Province to supplement the efforts of the existing authorities.
The third and main impact was the establishment of the Planning Commission
which issued a series of reports between 1944-45. These reports included many
major themes that were to dominate planning for the following quarter of a century:
"..a need to control haphazard suburban growth, co-ordination of transport,
decentralisation of industry, decanting of population from inner areas of the city and
the protection of open spaces" (Boal & Royle, 1986:202). Still, "Progress in tackling
Belfast's housing problem during this period was particularly disappointing. The
majority of Belfast's housing was privately rented and rent control legislation meant
that landlords had little incentive to improve their property" (Singleton, 1984:7).
However, the first Belfast Regional Plan, prepared by Sir Robert Matthew was
published in 1964, following Northern Ireland's major regional survey that took place
In 1963. The prime objective of the Plan was" ...to a modest extent, simultaneously
to de-magnetise the Centre, and re-invigorate the many attractive small towns in the
region" (Matthew 1964:18), in other words; limitation and growth at the same time.
Umitation was to be achieved by the imposition of a stop-line round the Belfast urban
area. While growth was to be redirected to a number of 'centres of development'
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elsewhere in the region. Thus, the establishment of a new city, Craigavon, based on
the two towns of Lurgan and Portadown came to life. But," ..the M21tthewnew towns,
almost overnight, ceased to represent any significant source of housing relief to the
inner city... By end l2lrgepeople preferred the problems they knew however extreme
their nature, than 21 venture into new and relatively remote locations whose economic,
social and 'political' futures are largely unknown" (Strang, 1985:2). "This regional
plan also led to a measured discrimination against the rural Catholic areas in the
west" (Stollard, 1980:23), where, according to Hendrey (1974:79), the policy was" ...
that scattered housing in the countryside should be discouraged and Local Authority
housing added where ever possible to existing settlements".
Planning in the 1960's was dominated by urban motorway schemes and
proposals for public housing that would have developed 15-20% of the units as
high-rise blocks. Stollard (1980) suggests that during the early 1960's three projects
were copied from English proposals, which were really inapplicable in Northern
Ireland. These were the motorway network; the new-town concept l.e. 'Craigavon'
and the suggestion for a second university (the New University of Ulster, NUU). The
university proposal is particularly interesting, as it may have been planned for
political rather than educational reasons. The university is sited in the strongly
Protestant town of Coleraine. whereas Londonderry would have been a more suitable
choice, for as well as being the second largest city, it already had a University
College linked with University College in Dublin. The location issue of the NUUhas
been thoroughly discussed elsewhere. (see Osborne & Singleton, 1982: 167-178).
Singleton (1985) indicated that following the report of a ReviewBody (Macrory.
1970) many major services including pienning in Northern Ireland were taken away
from local control and centralised at Belfast. In 1969 the Stormont and Westminster
Government jointly agreed to take housing out of the hands of local authorities
altogether, and the Northern Ireland Housing Executive was set up as the sole
housing agency for the Province, replacing no less then 63 former authorities. Before
that and under the 'Stormont' Government, "...the appointed local bodies had very
comprehensive powers and assumed municipal powers as well. Thus, discrimination
reached its highest level" (Strang, 1990).
In short, the most significant development that took place because of the
'troubles' in terms of administration and political processes can be summarised in
three points:
• The creation of a central housing authority. the Northern Ireland Housing
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Executive, with a major concern for the allocation of houses rather than their
cost.
• "In March 1972 the Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont was prorogued and
its powers were transferred to Ministries of State appointed by the Westminster
Government". (Osborne (, Singleton, 1982: 178).
• The removal of planning powers from the former local councils. A central
planning authority was established, headed by a Minister of State.
Nevertheless, 26 new District Councils were created to replace the former local
authorities, "..but they were endowed with few powers". (Osborne (, Singleton,
1982: 178).
S.S. RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN BELFAST.
"A don't like Cathliks an'Prodesans mixin' thegithir. No good
ivver comes 0' the like 0' that".
St. John Ervine, quoted by Dawson (1984)
Today, the main feature to be noticed in Northern Ireland is the residential
segregation of Roman Catholics and Protestants, a segregation that Jones (1960)
suggested has been a characteristic of Belfast from its inception as a city. Singleton
(1985) agrees with Boal (1982), by claiming that there is no evidence of long tenn
decline in segregation levels in Northern Ireland as a whole and in Belfast in
particular. In fact the contrary seems to be the case especially during periods of
violent conflict. Today, the Province is clearly divided between Catholic and
Protestant territories. Another commentator, Stollard (1989), placed more ernphests
on this fact, by claiming that" ..the security forces are provided with detailed 'tribal'
maps which denote Catholic streets and villages in green and Protestant ones in
orange". Such sharp segregation had a great impact on housing policies as well as
on architectural detail. On the other hand, other commentators including Richard
Oram would claim that such segregation exists only within the working class.
However, keeping in mind that in Ulster 'planning equall tenitory', one can lee
that " ... every public housing policy decision which has a 'Iocational' component is
minutely scrutinised by sections of both communities to ensure that its 'territorial'
interests are not threatened" (Singleton, 1985:306). Thus, the effect of segregation
on public sector housing has been mainly In the field of planning and urban design.
This has led to the fact that; "The organisational and administrative structure within
which housing and planning poliCies are formulated and implemented in Northern
Ireland, takes a very different form from that in the rest of the United Kingdom"
(Singleton, 1985:309).
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In order to review the effect of such segregation policies on architecture, it is
important to understand more about ethnic groups and residential segregation in
general and then relate our knowledge to the specific case of Belfast. The next
Section examines these issues.
This Section is based on reviewing some studies focusing on the social
behaviour of ethnic groups in general. Although, some may disagree with the use of
the term 'ethnic' in the context of Northern Ireland, on the basis that Northern Ireland
has two distinct communities and not a basic population with 'ethnic' groups within
that basel2• However, in our view, both communities in Northern Ireland display
many features of ethnicity, as it is widely understood.
Ethnic residential segregation is a very common characteristic of cities, but it
differs from one city to the other in terms of its scale and nature and from one
country to another, of course. Duncan & Ueberson (1959) found from a study
carried out in Chicago, that ethnic residential segregation is inversely related to
assimilation; the process of absorbing and incorporating. Thus one ought to explore
the relationship between two main elements; ethnic groups and the degree of
assimilation, in order to analyze the spatial and physical forms of residential
segregation.
First, some definition must be given to the term 'ethnic group'. As cited by
Boal (1978:57), Cohen (1974) provides a very broadly based statement that an
ethnic group can be operationally defined as, a collective of people who share some
pattern of normative behaviour and who form a part of a larger population, interacting
with people from other collectivities within the framework of a social system. Gordon
(1964:27) takes the term ethnic group to mean "A.nygroup which is defined or set
off by race, religion or national origin or some combination of these categories". He
claims that all these categories have a common social-psychological referent, in that
they serve to create a sense of belonging to a certain group. Thus, the basis for
ethnic categorisation can be racial, religious or national origin and the categorisation
can be employed both by the group itself and by the larger social matrix of which it
is a part. Hence," ..it seems reasonable to claim that Protestants and Roman
Catholics do indeed form two ethnic groups". (Boal, 1982:249).
One should always keep in mind that, ethnic status is not necessarily a function
of minority status, frequently majorities may display many of the features of ethniclty:
12 A comment made by Dr. Paul Stollard after reviewing this paper in July 1990.
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this is certainly true of the Protestant majority in Belfast. In this instance, perhaps,
one should not talk of the Catholics being segregated from the Protestants, but of
mutual segregation achieved simultaneously by both groups.
Although for some, assimilation is considered to be an inevitable process that
only requires sufficient time, Cohen (1974) goes so far as to claim that in many
situations the reverse can occur. In this instance, a group adjusts to the new situation
by recognising its own traditional customs or by developing new customs to enhance
its distinctiveness within the contemporary situation.
Assimilation is inversely related to the degree by which groups establish their
own institutions, meaning that, "... those ethnic minorities with the highest degree of
institutional completeness display the highest levels of residential segregation"
(Driedger & Church 1974 as quoted In Boal 1978). In fact, any ethnic group, and
that is particularly true in the working class areas of Belfast. usually succeeds in
creating and maintaining a comprehensive set of ethnic institutions; religious,
educational, political, recreational, etc. It is believed that through these institutions
an ethnic group retains its members. preventing them having contact with the rest of
the community or at least making such contact unnecessary.
In terms of spatial and physical segregation. ethnic residential clusters in cities
seem to be basically conservative in nature. Gradually. and under the pressure of
social or political unrest they might become even defensive in function. Conflict
situations between ethnic groups in cities would lead people to feel threatened. Such
perceived threats may materialise in the form of physical violence as in the case of
Belfast. or may remain as psychological threats. StJII.Boal (1972) claimed that "The
ethnic residential cluster emerges as a complex mechanism for providing defence,
for preserving culture and indeed for launching attacks on the 'host' society. The
existence of the group itself within a clearly defined area enables an organised
defence to be developed".
The long history of communal conflict in Belfast illustrates time and again the
importance of the ethnic cluster as a defensive arrangement. For instance during the
1971 riots, isolated households have withdrawn into the heartland of their groups and
that group in tum, has been effectively able to defend its own segregated area (Boyd,
1969; Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission Research Unit, 1971). A
report on disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969 notes that" ...the two communities
..fell apart into their respective 'ghettos', where at least they had a sensation of
security". However, the ethnic community grouping, as a defensive structure, can
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become counterproductive under certain circumstances. For instance, the
concentration of Jews in the medieval 'ghettos' meant that they could more readily
be controlled. This last concept I believe has been used by the British administration
in Northern Ireland. A comprehensive justification of my view is demonstrated later
on in this Chapter.
In tenns of psychological aspects, Kramer (1970) indicates that the ethnic
'minority' community may be the only place in which its members feel at ease.
According to her, they opt for ethnic enclosure in an alien world, finding it a 'haven
of refuge' in unfriendly surroundings. Furthennore, and especially when we are
speaking about working-class ethnic groupings, slums provide an environment of
relatively 'low pressure' for social adaptation and change. In Belfast, it seems to me
that beside the ethnic factors, social class does affect the degree of segregation; it
tends to be higher within the working-class, who are concentrated in the traditionally
poorer areas of the city centre.
Moreover, spatial concentration of an ethnic group can provide it with a 'base
for action', in the struggle of its members with society in general. This struggle might
take a peaceful political form or may become violent. In tenns of political action,
spatial concentration may enable the group to elect its own representatives, who can
then attempt to fight their group's battles in the political arena. Such areas also
provide potential bases for urban insurrection or guerrilla warfare. Certain areas in
Belfast have functioned in this way from time to time: rioters and members of
insurrectionary groups 'disappeer' into such areas, protected by the silence of the
inhabitants, a silence based on either sympathy or intimidation.
In conclusion, such spatial ethnic concentrations display all the basic features
associated with a territory: "They provide a source of identity, they are characterised
by substantial degrees of exclusiveness and they act to compartrnentalise activity
spatially" (Boal, 1969). The patterns of the Roman Catholics and the Protestants in
Belfast provide a classic example of the basically sectoral, religious and even national
nature of ethnic areal for the growing non-assimilating groups, where their
institutional completeness is quite high.
In Northem Ireland as a whole. the sectarian geography can be simply
represented by saying that the main Catholic areas are in the south and the
south-east of the Province, particularly County Fennanagh and South Armagh
(nearest the border with the Republic). While, "...most towns of any size in NIare still
predominantly Loyalist" (Orarn, July 1990). Ifone is to exclude the modem housing
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estates in some of the major towns within the south of the Province, then most of the
historic urban boundaries are strongly Loyalist, such as Armagh and Enniskillen. The
strongly Protestant areas are in the north and north-east, particularly County Antrim.
In Belfast, the area to the east of the river Lagan is strongly Protestant (except
the Short Strand district), while in the west the Catholics control the Falls,
BaUymurphy, Andersons Town and the Old Markets Area, with the Protestants
controlling the Shankill, New Lodge and other areas. (Stollard, 1980:21). More
comprehensive demographic studies of Northern Ireland's spatial frameworks and
community relations can be found in the work J. Neville Douglas (1982).
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8.9. THE IMPACT OF THE 'TROUBLES' ON ARCHITECTURE s PLANNING.
'The troubles' have influenced all flve of the major building types, domestic,
industrial, commercial, govemmental and recreational in different terms and scales.
"The impact of the conflict on the building stock has been dramatic and it is not
simply a matter of a few isolated bomb damaged buildings. During the worst years
of the troubles (1972-73) 14,000 dwellings were affected by a total of 284
explosions". (Stollerd, 1989). It was reported that, between 1969 and 1976, more
that 25,000 houses were destroyed or damaged by explosions in the city (Strang,
1985:2). Still, during the last few years, the domestic sector has suffered least attack
and therefore been least affected. Nevertheless, the security element has been
strongly reflected in the design of private houses over the last twenty years,
especially those designed for politicians, where 'safety' glass, steel shutters and entry
phones can be found.
Today the 'terrorist attacks' cause the greatest share of damage, even more
than the sectarian violence between people in the streets. Keeping in mind that,
"They attack specific buildings with some ulterior motive in mind. When this ulterior
motive is known and when this is combined with the ideological character of the
insurgent campaign, a certain type of building willbe more likely to experience attack
than others" (Mallon. 1972:12). 'Emotive' buildings such as police stations (called
barracks in Ireland), law courts, government offices and railway stations are obvious
targets, but when the psychological and economic nature of terrorism is also
considered, all buildings are seen to be at risk. Entertainment and gathering places
such as cinemas, pubs, hotels, etc. have become victims as well. The industrial
sector has also suffered many destructive attacks, thus the security factor has had
some effect on the design of Industrial buildings. In this case the desIgn has been
altered mainly to minimise the effect of an attack, simply because the cost of
replacement for many industrial buildings is not high enough to justify expensive
security measures.
Murray (1982:320) classified the 'terrorist attacks' into three categories
according to the type of target:
1. Classical guerilla warfare: attacks on the security forces, on central and local
government personnel and installations, and on the infrastructure of the State
(public, transport, utilities, communications, etc.).
2. Economic guerilla warfare: attacks on economic targets, such as, commercial
and office buildings, industrial premises, etc.
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3. Sectarian conflict: attacks on private houses, schools, public halls, clubs and
other buildings or locations identified with one ethnic group.
8.9.1. The effect of the 'troubles' on the urban environment.
Wandering around in the Belfast city centre, one can see and feel immediately
the effect of the troubles on both its physical appearance and on its people's urban
life. The most obvious effect is the closure of the town centre not only to traffic, but
also to pedestrians after a certain hour at night; consequently the centre is not
inhabited. During the day, as a pedestrian, one has to pass metal fences and security
gates, which certainly contradict normal urban life. Such measures were introduced
to reduce the number of car bombs being driven into commercial and administrative
areas. Nevertheless, this enforced pedestrianisation was taken as an opportunity to
develop pedestrian precincts, especially in areas where shops are commercially
strong enough to attract customers. This has led to the improvement of the street
furniture and resulted in some successful examples, such as Fountain Street.
Figure {84J Going into Belfast's city centre one has to pass metal fences and security gates.
{Sources: The author. J 990}
The fact that commercial retailing buildings have been badly hit in an attempt
to cause economic decline, has led to a number of changes in shop and office design,
which have certainly affected the visual quality of the city centre. A main feature
common today in shop design is the use of strong roller shutters. which at night
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prevent access to any entrances or set backs on the facade. In many of the big
shops the facades have no set backs, where bombs could be left and the main door
is permanently manned. David Nesbitt revealed that, "It is important to avoid
locating offices, especially governmental offices, over shops due to the possibility of
bombs being placed in the shops". This actually happened at the Dial House and
many others, such as Newry and Downpatrick.
Other physical effects of the troubles on architectural design can be traced in
some of the recreational buildings, particularly hotels and bars. Stollard (1980)
claimed that, "These are prime targets for attack as they are always associated with
one or another section of the community". He also gave examples such as the IRA
Drinking Club in the Old Markets area, Rose and Crown Bar on the Ormeau Road and
the Black Swan Hotel on the Usburn Road. In all of these examples and many more,
concrete walled enclosures around the main entrance have been built to give blast
protection and to prevent direct entry or vision. Canopies are avoided and if they
exist already then they are covered with a steeply sloping roof, to prevent anything
being lodged on them. Windows are kept to a minimum and have a mesh covering
to prevent anything being thrown through, in some cases buildings have no ground
floor windows. Around the pavement, concrete blocks, planting pots or just concrete
filled oil drums have been used to keep car bombs away from the walls of buildings.
Such measures are generally applied with little consideration being paid to the
appearance of the building. However, more suitable methods have been used
recently, such as at the complex of Omagh Courthouse.
The other main effect on Belfast's urban life has occurred in its demographic
patterns, as a result of the major population movements that took place between
1969 and 1973. It was reported that during this short period about 60,000 people
in Belfast were forced to move from their mixed areas to safer sectarian ones. Also,
it was reported that, "..80% of those forced to move house were Catholics, although
only 26% of the city population were Catholic" (Stollard, 1989). In general, the
Protestants tended to move to 'safe' estates on the outskirts of the city, while
Catholics moved back into their already crowded and overpopulated areas, because
they felt unsafe in new suburban estates where they were in a religious minority.
These movements" ..have led (in the mid 1970'sJ to a housing surplus in Protestant
areas and a severe shortage in Catholic areas" (Stollard 1980:42).
The Protestants, mainly the young people who left their homes, were able to
expand to new and better properties on the outskirts, leaving behind the elderly
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people. While young Catholics with greater potential fertility, and thus a potentially
bigger population (especially, considering that, the Catholic church does not allow
the use of contraceptives), moved into their traditional heertlends, creating
overcrowding. However, the Protestants "..saw no reason to embark upon major
housing schemes to provide additional homes for Catholics and attempted to block
any new development. They were particularly angered by proposals for
developments in areas which were traditionally part of their territory, and which could
affect both politically and perhaps strategically the security of their existing housing
stock" (Stollard, 1989).
Although discrimination in housing allocation has always been a feature in
Belfast, Stollard (1980:43) claimed that: "Until the early 1970's housing policy was
unaffected by the troubles and 'mixed estates' were still being built". After the
burning of 30 out of the first 46 completed houses of the Farringdon Gardens in
1971, it was realised that any new developments would be bound to become Catholic
/ Nationalist or Protestant / Loyalist, depending on their siting. Robert Strang from
the NIHE, revealed, "...for the last 15 years we have been pursuing policies of
'separate development'. One has to be pragmatic, we could not force the issue of
Catholics and Protestants living together, simply because they do not want to. For
instance if we announce 20 houses for Catholics in a Protestant area, they will not
feel safe and no matter how badly they needed the houses they willnot move in and
the houses will remain uncccupled"!'.
In these terms, "The Poleglass housing scheme became the most celebrated of
the attempts to provide additional housing (effectively for Catholics) on the western
edge of the city. This original plan (1974) was for some 4000 dwellings to house
18,000 people. After much opposition planning permission was given (1978) for half
of the development, but the protest continued. Construction did not start until 1980
and the full 2000 units were only completed in 1988" (Stollard, 1989). A
comprehensive investigation into the political process and behaviour behind the
Poleglass housing scheme can be found in the writings of Osborne (, Singleton
(1982); Singleton (1984;1985).
Still, we should bear in mind that up till now we have been talking about social
public housing, while in the private sector such degrees of division do not exist.
13 According to a personal interview with Mr Strang; Assistant Director of the Development &
Planning Department, at the Northern Ireland Housing Executive.
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Perhaps because people buying their own house tend to be from the 'economically'
higher middle class. Thus, they tend to be more 'bourgeois', they have more in
common with each other and less at risk, for they are more concerned for their
property values and getting their children a good education, than the working-class
and the 'no-class': mainly homeless and unemployed.
8.9.2. Housing estates layout.
Although the effect of the troubles on public sector housing has been mainly in
the field of planning and policy making, many efforts have been made with urban
design and housing layout.
In recent years, housing layout in Belfast can be distinguished by the planning
use of the cul-de-sac, where pedestrians and vehicles can be observed, to help to
give greater security to the residents, as outlined in the 'defensible space' theory of
Oscar Newman.14 (Stollard 1980:26). Dawson (1984), suggests that, the theory
behind a 'defensible space', can be seen as an effort on the part of the planners, to
counter criticism made at the time about schemes like the Divis and Shankill flats",
In such schemes planners were accused of importing British planning and thus, not
making an effort to cater for the needs of the people of that city.
Inan attempt to manipulate space to achieve social ends, the American planner
Oscar Newman (1972), defined 'defensible space', as providing an environment
totally under the control of its residents. According to him this aim can be achieved
by the provision of a range of mechanisms: real and symbolic barriers, strongly
defined areas of influence and improved opportunities of surveillance. Still, some of
these plans, when applied in Belfast, such as on the Poleglass Estate, proved
unacceptable as there were inadequate escape routes in the event of attack, thus the
'defensible space' became a 'potential' trap. At this point it is important to note that
"Newman's work has been widely criticized on two main counts. Firstly, because of
the concentration on architectural determinism, with too little attention paid to factors
other than design. Secondly, on the methodological inadequacies of his research".
14 Newman. Oscar (1973). Defensible Space, Architectural Press. London.
IS The Divis scheme, is a concrete high rise housing complex built in the 60's, forming a Catholic
ghetto in the lower Falls section of Belfast, while the Shankill is a similar scheme Intended for the
Protestants.
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(Stollard,1991:17)16.
Figure 18-5/ Cul-de-sac can deter.
[Source: Stollard. 1991:67/
To give a clearer idea about the trends in housing layout in Belfast, the Short
Strand development area was chosen as a case study. The author visited the area
accompanied by the architect K. Alexander from the NIHE, who also provided the
author with layout plans of the new development. An older layout plan of the area,
before the changes took place, can be found in Dawson (1984: fig.5).
By producing a Negative/Positive space study of the new development, it
became evident that a system of space hierarchy has been introduced, ranging from
public, semi public to private space. Aimed at minimising the through-flow, new
bending, semi-public roads were introduced to replace the previous ones, along with
an extensive use of the cul-de-sac. Moreover, the semi-public space is divided up
into blocks or semi-courtyards, that are either defined by the site design itself
(buildings) or by the positioning of shrubs, fences, etc. The concept of semi-private
space is believed to play two main sociological functions. Firstly, it increases the
16 For more details see: Warren £, Stollard (l 988), Safe as Houses: a working paper reviewing the
importance of housing deslgn and layout in achieving security. Institute of Advanced Architectural
Studies, University of York, U.K. Also, Stollard et al (1989). S4{er Neighbourhoods; re~esignjng
housing developments to reduce crime and enhance community safety. Institute of Advanced
Architectural Studies and the Safe Neighbourhoods Advisory Service.
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feeling of neighbourliness and responsibility for the space, by decreasing the
functional and physical distance between neighbours. Secondly, it symbolically
discourages a potentially dangerous outsider from entering the semi-private space.
(Dawson, 1984). Though shrubs can also act as cover for an attacker.
Other measures were also introduced to ensure a 'defensible space', for
instance, pedestrian entrances are defined by archways, differential surfacing and
bollards. The symbolic barrier serves to define the pedestrian path as 'semi-public'.
Similarly, semi-private space, existing between the houses, is defined by differential
surfacing and occasionally archways. In the original plans the private space of
individual houses was to be defined by differential surfacing, but it was found that this
was not enough and therefore, real barriers of boundary walls were introduced.
Moreover, Dawson (1984:30) claimed that. "..windows and lights are positioned on
houses to enable the residents to observe the more public area of this environment".
This claim colncldes with the author's observations when he entered the
neighbourhood. The inhabitants do not only observe you, but, they try to ensure that
you are aware of being observed.
The other feature to be noticed in public housing layouts is the use of physical
barriers: 'peace lines' which divide the two communities' estates. Nevertheless, such
barriers; walls, corrugated iron fences, etc. can be demolished in a day. Thus they
are not really permanent, unlike the designed housing layouts that create a whole
new urban environment, planned from the outset - in the name of 'redevelopment' -
with sectarianism In mind.
Furthermore, after looking carefully at many of the recent housing
redevelopment layouts that have been adopted by the Housing Executive in Belfast,
as a replacement to the Victorian terraces, one wonders if the layouts have in fact
been introduced because of the Government's need to control the two communities
within their estates. Such suspicions can be supported by the fact, that there are less
renewal and conservation schemes of the traditional housing areas in the centre of
Belfast, than redevelopment. That is, most of the schemes depend on large-scale
clearance, where the pre-existing maze of terrace streets have been replaced by well
defined spaces. with controlled entrances. In some cases, security gates and high
surrounding walls were erected to try to ensure full control over the estates, in case
of riots. If such security dimensions are generated out of an overall genuine social
need, then the author wholly accepts the need to create 'safe neighbourhoods', as a
feature of planning. But, the alarming issue, that attracted the author's attention, is
Case study: Belfast. Northern Ireland.
316
the degree to which the security forces are involved in planning issues in Belfast.
Endorsing this observation, Beresford (1982) claimed that:
"There is evidence to suggest that new housing developments
in Catholic areas are being designed with the security forces
operational requirements in mind".
The same commentator suggested that the Poleglass development was an
extraordinary instance, where a series of pedestrian paths linking cui-de-sees. were
designed to facilitate the movement of army vehicles. He went further to claim that
the 10 feet wide paths have been designed to road specifications, with deep
foundations to support heavy vehicles. This claim, also, coincides with Dawson's
(1984: 11) opinion:
"Withthe continuation of civil unrest in the city, the authorities
are taking advantage of the inner-city redevelopment
programme to replace the socially unacceptable peace lines by
architecturally designed barriers. Although aesthetically
pleasing, the devices employed by the architect and the town
planner are more permanent and therefore represent perhaps
the ultimate in hard territory".
_ PI'It.lAAY AOUTE== OISTRICT ROUTE
,
\
= LOCAL "OUTI!
___ S£CURITY WALL
Figure {8-6} A view from the Shon Strand development, where the pre-existing maze of terrace strf!et.s
has been replaced by well defCned spaces, with controlled entrances.
/Source: The HOUSing Execu live. 1m}
In this respect, the involvement of the security forces in the physical planning
of Belfast has always been a subject of considerable controversy. Such involvement
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became more evident after an article was published in the 'Guardian', 13 March
1982. The writer of this article claimed that he had documentary evidence, which
consisted of a series of letters leaked from within the DoE, showing that the security
forces had insisted on the removal of a row of houses from a planned development
in the Ardoyne, a Catholic area known for its acute housing need. Commentators,
like Singleton (1985:311) and Cowan (1982) believed that, the security forces felt
that this row of houses, that were located directly opposite the Protestant Woodvale
area, presented a security threat. Moreover, another commentator, Dawson
(1984: 12) claimed that the same evidence had been made available to him and he
claimed the existence of the 'Security Committee on Housing', a body where the
security forces meet with the Belfast Development Office. This Committee has the
power of veto over any proposal which may pose a threat to security: usually a
housing development at the Protestant-Catholic interface. Dawson (1984) further
stressed that" ..the Housing Executive plays no part in the Security Committee, a fact
that has resulted in some costly mistakes in the past". Myown investigations support
this last claim, and a detailed description of security decision-making is given at the
end of this Section.
8.9.3. The 'Peace Lines'.
"It seems inexpressibly degrading that in a city of the British
Isles, neighbours have to be kept apart by tangles of barbed
wire, sheets of tin, brick walls, concrete barriers and piles of
burnt-out cars". Murphy (1978), quoted by Dawson (1984).
The major civil unrest or 'troubles', which began in the late 1960's, led to the
intervention of the British army in the summer of 1969. Following this an attempt
was made to keep the two communities apart following serious disturbances, by
creating 'peace lines' consisting of high corrugated iron fences. Singleton (1985),
commenting on this point, emphasised that makeshift barricades had been erected
by the local population in 'flashpoint' areas, even before the involvement of the army,
to stake out the boundaries between the two communities. Today, what started as
'temporary barriers' have become permanent walls, in other words a 'sectarian
counterpart' of the recently demolished Berlin WaU17•
The legacy of social division in Belfast has today left the city with some 13
'fla.hpoint' locations or 'interfaces', where the rival communities live in close
17 The demolishing of Berlin Wall was started in November 1989.
Case study: Belfast, Northern Ireland.
318
proximity to one another. They are locations where conflict does frequently occur
and all of these locations lie within the Housing Executive's public housing estates.
"Such walls and barriers are still being sought by rival communities as a prerequisite
for their future stability" 18.
According to an undatedreport "Copingwith Conflict", preparedby the Housing
Executive, as well as interviews with planners in the Executive, these locations are:
1. Alliance Avenue, Ardoyne.
2. Ainsworth Avenue / Springfield Road.
3. Bryson Street, Short Strand.
4. Cluan Place,Short Strand.
5. Crumlin Road / Ardoyne.
6. Cupar Street.
7. Duncaim Gardens / Hallidays Road.
8. Elimgrove street.
9. Lower Newtownards Road, Short Strand.
10. Manor street.
11. RodenStreet.
12. Springmartin Road / Springfield Road.
13. Suffolk, Stewartstown Road.
For the purpose of this Chapter, we will only discuss five cases that the author
has visited andmanaged to collect more detailed infonnation about. These locations
are:
a. Suffolk, Stewartstown Road.
b. Crumlin Road / Ardoyne.
c. Manor Street.
d. Lower Newtownards Road and Cluan Place.
e. Ainsworth / Springfield Road.
,
)
At each of Belfast's interface locations, the extent and severity of
inter-community conflict has resulted in physical barriers of varying types being
erected. In an attempt to try and reduce the risk of friction between the two
communities several designsolutions havebeenreached. Recentlythe Executive has
attempted to incorporate elements which are more visually attractive. Those
solutions can be broadly categorised into four:
a. Concrete and brick peace-line walls.
These are the more conventional and now pennanent 'peace-line' walls that
reflect the deeply entrenched nature of Belfast society. They are visible in several
J8 According to an interview with Mr. Robert Strang from the NIHE.
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areas. Concrete or brick walls are features at: Bryson Street, Cluan Place, Cupar
Street, Duncalrn Gardens and Elmgrove Street. Such walls vary in height from 8 to
20 feet (eg. Cuper Street). "The existing wall at four of these locations has
subsequently been raised in height by an additional steel palisade structure" (Strang,
1985).
,••....
Figure /8·7/ The brick 'pesce-line , wall in Cluan Place.
{Source: The author. 1990/
b. The CGI fence.
High corrugated galvanised iron fences and steel palisades apart from
eliminating visual contact, provide a visually stark reminder of the enmity between
the divided communities. They have to be high to discourage missiles being thrown.
But they do not stop mortar bombs. They have been adopted as barriers in the
following locations: Ainsworth Avenue (Springfield Road), Alliance Avenue
(Ardoyne), Crumlin Road (Ardoyne side), Duncaim Gardens (Hallidays Road), Manor
Street, Springmartin Road, Springfield Road, Suffolk (Stewartstown Road).
c. Environmental barriers.
The use of environmental barriers consisting of lower and ornately patterned red
brick walls, railings and planted areas were recently introduced, as an alternative to
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the stark and glaring image of the conventional cal barriers. These environmental
barriers are currently a feature at: CrumUn Road (Ardoyne) and Lower Newtownards
Road.
Figure IlNJ] The environmental barrier at the Lower Newtownards Road.
[Source: The author, 1990J
d. 'Buffer' Zones.
In a number of areas, the two communities have also been separated by 'buffer'
zones of 'alternative land uses', other than residential housing comprising either
vacant land, areas of sheltered housing or areas of industrial land-use. Major
roadways have also been used to form buffers. Lacy (1974: 12) claimed that,
"In Northern Ireland the use of roads was also seen as a means
of defence. They were used to physically divide the city into
sectors, each of which was then occupied by each of the main
national groups, thereby acting as barriers segregating
potentially hostile societies".
Such 'buffer' zones are currently a feature at the following locations: Roaden
Street, where the West link motorway helps to form a central buffer with Catholic
West Belfast: Springmartin Road / Springfield Road,where a voluntary environmental
project (Farset City Farm) and a special school help to form a barrier between the
Springmartin and Moyard Estates: Albertbridge Road, where an Environmental
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Improvement Scheme, a dual carriageway, and two sheltered housing complexes are
used to separate Nationalist and Loyalist housing developments at Short Strand and
Woodstock Road.
Nevertheless, the Housing Executive reveals in its undated report Coping with
Conflict that, "None of these approaches has arguably proved entirely satisfactory.
In many areas, the so-called 'peace-Iines' are in fact a contradiction in terms. They
are in many instances characterised not by peace and harmony between neighbours,
but by conflict, tension, damage to property and continuing instability". However, it
seems that, by building barriers between communities the Executive is unwittingly
accentuating the divisions in local society.
What are the circumstances in which barriers must be provided and on whose
advice are they undertaken? To answer this question it is important to keep in mind,
that In such a divided community housing renewal means maintaining one's territory,
beside being a social need. Thus, any plans or proposals for housing renewal are
closely scrutinised by residents, along with their political representatives and a
sophisticated process of consultation has evolved. Architect K. Alexander from the
Housing Executive in Belfast, emphasised that, "...immediately after announcing any
public Housing Renewal Area, the area will take one colour or another". In other
words, it has to be either entirely Protestant or Catholic, despite it having been mixed
before.
This process of consultation is also applied to Community Associations who are
widely encouraged to take part in discussions regarding lay-out, house-type and
phasing of redevelopment schemes. Under such circumstances, particularly when
either community wishes to continue living close to, but separate from a rival one,
security issues naturally arise. "These risks are assessed not by the Housing
Executive, but by other Statutory Agencies. Three agencies exist for this specific
purpose: the Belfast Development Office of the Department of the Environment; the
Northern Ireland Office and its relevant security personnel; finally, Civil
Representative Officers who provide a liaison service between the Executive and the
security forces" (Coping with Conflict).
Thus, these agencies and their representatives advise the Housing Executive on
any security issues likely to arise from housing plans. Even more, they assess
whether walls or other physical barriers are required, as part of a new development
to be implemented by the Executive, in order to reduce the risk of inter-community
conflict. Still, Singleton (1985:310), quoted Cowan (1982), claiming that, "There is
Case study: Belfast. Northern Ireland.
322
evidence that the proper role of planners has been usurped by the security forces, to
an extent which greatly exceeds the needs of security". Contrary to this opinion, in
his revision to this paper, Orern (July, 1990) wrote:
"The professional planners are represented on all the decision
making panels. Where they had a positive proposal to make,
their view is considered with at least equal value to that of the
security forces".
Oram goes on to suggest that, today there is a serious and positive attempt not
to make security a major issue in decision-making: a view shared by the security
forces. However, necessary security must be achieved; the question is to whose
satisfaction?
Alternatively, after major incidents in the past, where lives have been lost, the
Northern Ireland Office has undertaken to provide barriers in places such as Cupar
Street and Manor Street. It is important to note that physical barriers of any fonn
result in additional public expense. This cost Is covered either by the Northern
Ireland Office or the Belfast Development Office. It is estimated, however, that since
the start of the troubles in 1969, the provision of 'interface' barriers or 'peace lines'
in Belfast has cost the government a very considerable amount of money.
8.9.4. Individual case studies on the 'Peace Unes'.
a. Suffolk Estate / Stewartstown.
The Suffolk Estate was built by the Northern Ireland Housing Trust during the
late 1950s and early 1960s. Today it comprises 524 dwellings in houses, flats and
maisonettes, in a mix of high and low rise blocks, made of concrete frame with brick
infill. The Estate's main problem is a direct consequence of the changing sectarian
geography of West Belfast since 1969. Suffolk represents an isolated (yet long
established) Protestant estate surrounded by Nationalist housing. According to a
report presented by the Executive 'Coping with Connlct: Violence and Urban
Renewal In Belfast', this estate has a high level of empty properties and tranlfer
applications.
The principal interface is at Stewartstown Road where the estate adjoins the
Nationalist Lenadoon area. A secondary Interface also occurs at Oranmore Drive,
in the estate close to Loyalist-occupied private housing. Both Interfaces consist of
high solid steel fences. Furthennore, at the main Stewartstown Road Interface, an
entire terrace of nine dwellings is uninhabited except for a Housing Executive
sub-office. This area of conflict has also had an adverse effect upon adjacent
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commercial premises.
A comprehensive planning study of the estate has recommended that the
Stewartstown Road frontage should be developed for commercial, community
services, or specialist housing uses. At the Oranmore Drive interface, the provision
of a more environmentally acceptable barrier has been recommended.
b. Crumlln Road.
This interface runs along the main Crumlin Road frontage between Flax Street
and the Holy Cross Church. It is along this line that the road separates the Ardoyne
(Catholic) and Woodvale (Protestant) areas. Recently, a housing development has
been completed on both sides of the road. The 'peace line' here takes the form of
an environmental barrier consisting of walls and dense planting, separating the new
houses from the road. Also, some of the houses have been set back from the main
road frontage. Finally, "..a large corrugated iron fence adjoins the environmental
barrier and shields a vacant site, ... where 13 dwellings were withdrawn on the basis
of security advice" (Coping with Conflict) 19.
Another part of the development to the south side of the Crumlln Road has also
been set back from the road frontage and screened by an environmental barrier. Still,
this continues to be an unsettled and volatile interface. Several dwellings on either
side of the Crumlin Road are even now being protected with window grilles.
c. Cluan Place (Short Strand).
"Cluan Place is on the periphery of the nationalist Short Strand area where
sectarten conflict has flared on several occasions over the years". (Strang, 1990).
In order to minimise the opportunities for conflict, different measures were taken.
These measures were illustrate in the Executive's report Coping with Conntct as
follows:
At Cluan Place, strong pressure from adjoining Protestant residents and their
political representatives led to Ministerial agreement in 1982 for a 3.5 meters high
wall to separate the two communities. Following further incidents, the height of the
wall was twice raised at the request of residents. The wall has been raised by the use
of an additional framework supporting COl sheets. This work was completed in April
Ie Earlier, we have discussed the role played by the Security Forces and the Army in determining
the new housing developments layouts.
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1986 and K. Alexander claims that the 8re8 hes been relatlvely peaceful since then.
An alternative approach to Interface housing has been achieved at Albertbridge
Road, between the junction of Mountpottinger Road and the Albertbridge, where
Catholic occupied housing at Short Strand faces Protestant housing within the Lower
Woodstock. A 'zone of neutrality' W8S provided to separate both residential
developments. This zone consists of a major duel-cerrtaqeway at Albertbridge road,
two sheltered housing developments, e church, dense planting close to dwellings on
the Short Strand side and an environmental improvement scheme at the junction of
Albertbridge Road and Mountpottinger Roed20• This zone is to be extended by the
interposition of a private housing development at the Mount.
This altemative was possible because considerable space was availeble for
development purposes. The LowerWoodstock Roed was also re-routed as part of the
redevelopment process.
d. Lower Newtownards Road.
The Housing Executive reported that, "..the isolated nationalist community in
Short Strand has also given rise to two further interface locations nearby" (Coping
with Conflict). These are at Bryson Street where the boundary with the Tower Street
Housing Action Area is marked by a security wall, and at Lower Newtownerds Road
where, walls, landscaping and specially designed railings delineate the interface. New
housing has been constructed at this later location, which has been e traditionel
flashpoint at the times of the Orange Order parades. The primary objective was to
retain the existing community within its traditional territorial boundaries. Thus,
bungalows (one storey houses) were built, instead of the traditional two storey houses
facing the street, with minimum openings: all in an attempt to avoid direct contact
between Nationelists living in those houses and Loyalists marching elong this street
every year. Additionally, single storey buildings (obviously) do not allow firearms to
be used from higher floors, a necessary measure e5 the development is very close
to the aDA Head Quarters.
20 Consisting of lower and ornately patterned red brick walls, railings and planted areas.
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e. Manor Street.
This interface gained notoriety in the summer of 1986 when major
inter-community strife took place, resulting in serious damage to around 50 new
properties. This area is one of the best examples of how redevelopment schemes can
unfortunately lead to greater segregation between the two communities. Before
redevelopment this area was traditionally a mixed one. In fact, it has been said, that
it even continued to be mixed, for a period of time after the completion of
redevelopment schemes, until the summer of 1986, when a major inter-community
conflict took place resulting in serious damage to around 50 new properties. This
event not only ended the mixed housing area, but more importantly resulted in the
erection of a 'peace line': a high corrugated iron fence separates adjoining houses
along the interface to the east and west of Manor Street. Furthermore, "The street
itself is now permanently closed by a steel fence. The area of most acute friction
continues to be Roe Street / Avonbeg Court where most of the empty properties are
located" (Coping with Conflict).
According to Robert Stnmg, the significant number of vacant properties and the
continuing sectarian incidents within the Manor Street area, makes it Belfast's most
difficult to manage interface location.
In conclusion, "A high level of new housing investment in this area over recent
years has been jeopardlsed by continuing Instability. As a result the area has
become blighted. This blight has extended to a vacant site to the south of Roe Street
which was to be sold for private sector development. However the site has been
returned to Housing Executive ownership and it is unlikely that private development
will be undertaken for some time" (Coping with Conflict).
8.9.5. Wall paintings and graffiti.
Wall graffiti has always been an expressive type of art that responds
immediately to the social, economic and political circumstances of a certain nation,
city or locality and demonstrates strong feelings with bold messages. This is often
particularly true in the case of war or civil strife. However, one should distinguish
between 'official' graffiti and the popular wall graffiti. Usually, the official graffiti aims
to support the Stete, the Party or even the militia', political stand on the war. The
popular type of graffiti is usually done with less artistic sensitivity. but with a more
striking message representing people's suffering.
This remarkable phenomenon could be found in its most sophisticated type of
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political propaganda in Belfast, particularly in the inner city. These wall murals have
the effect of clearly identifying an area as being Catholic or Protestant, although It
should be remembered that the sentiments expressed are not necessarily those of all
of the people living in the area. In this context, Gallagher (, Hanratty (1989:100)
claimed that:
"Periodically under attack from the IRA. passively resented by
one third of its citizens. outnumbered by a Catholic majority in
the whole of the island the majority population of this new
Protestant state of Ulster laboured to project a sense of
separate culture and identity. The introverted imagery of past
myths became the territorial justifications of the present. Thus
William of Orange, the red, white and blue of the Union Jack
and the red hand of Ulster became the mainstay of separatist
Ulster identity and wall painting the outward expression of an
inward insecurity".
~III,.
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Equally, the Republicans (mostly Catholics) created their own graffiti which
incorporates symbols of the Celtic culture and Catholic suffering. The Republican
graffiti even went as far as associating the IRA with other international revolutionary
movements, such as the Palestinian Uberation Organisation (PLO) and the African
National Congress (ANC). Such wall paintings reflect attempts to gain respectabiUty
through intemationalisation of the Northern Ireland conflict on the part of the IRA.
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The international significance of the conflict goes back to the William of Orange
campaign. and in particular the BattIe of the Boyne. These expressions support the
claims of some observers that" ..it is obviously a fatal misconception to believe that
the 'troubles' are totally contained within Northern Ireland". (Oram, July 1990)21.
8.9.6. ANTI-TERRORIST DEFENCES.
Although any type of building might be a target for terrorist attack. some
buildings such as court houses, police barracks, governmental offices, post offices.
telephone exchanges and some industrial buildings offer a greater threat as obvious
targets. Newly designed buildings, have been subjected to comprehensive security
considerations beginning even from the site selection stage. This is especially the
case with those buildings specially constructed for the 'security forces' (very often
combined with army barracks. especially in rural locations) and police stations. In
general, newly built buildings have been surrounded by reinforced concrete and wire
fences erected as high as possible to repel thrown bombs. Windows have been kept
to a minimum and are of laminated 'bullet resisting' glass, with steel ventilating grills.
Previously, buildings incorporated certain specific 'anti-terrorist' defences, despite the
fact that in many cases those defences contradict the visual and architectural values
of the buildings. particularly those of historical interest.
Police barracks are the most obvious and advanced examples of anti-terrorist
defences, even more than the army barracks themselves, because of the intensity of
attacks they have been subjected to during the last few decades. These barracks are
located in urban areas, which makes them even easier to attack and, moreover, they
incorporate personnel sleeping accommodation, which is a favourite target.
The design philosophy for defence depends on understanding the nature of the
weapons and the means of attack available to the terrorist. Jerry Hilliard22,pointed
out that in Northern Ireland the biggest threat is the 'Vehicle Bomb'. Such a bomb
can vary In weight from 100-2000 Ibs. of explosives. The other main threat is the
'Mortar Bomb'. a very dangerous weapon that often contains at least 45 lbs. of home
made explosives. These are considered the main single threats, and protection of
buildings from these is the major priority. These two types of bombs are considered
21 For more details on the issue of wall graffiti. see Gallagher (, Hanratty (1989) The War on the
Walls. In Ulster Folklife, Vol.35. 1989.
22 Jerry Hilliard. senior engineer. responsible for the design of 'antl-terrcrlst' defences. at the
Department of the Environment, Belfast.
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dangerous not only because of the scale of damage they produce but also because
they act differently in each attack depending on their weight and location, which
makes countering them almost impossible .
. ' ,.
Figure {8-10/ The extra defences added to a Police barracks at Downpatrtck.
{Source: Oram. 1992/
Nail and petrol bombs are other weapons, but they are used most directly
against the civilian population rather than buildings. However, their main threat is
that they are produced locally. Moreover, direct shooting represents a high
percentage of the threat to life; the use of small arms, machine guns and the latest
weapon; the heavy machine gun. Fortunately the latter cannot easily be used in
urban areas because it is too large to be hidden: it tends to be used in the country
side. More recently, semtex (plastic) explosives and a home made version of the
RaG7 rocket are becoming favourite weapons.
Years of experience in Northern Ireland and elsewhere made it evident that. no
matter how comprehensive the design against terrorist attack is, it is almost
impossible to prevent damage, simply because the deSigner can not easily predict
the nature of the ettack and the scele of demage eSlociated with it. Nevertheless.
design can certainly minimise the effect of such attacks. In cases where the newly
designed building's value does not justify expensive precautions, simple defences can
be incorporated. Those include security fences, "The bringing up of all cable runs
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inside the building, lockable manhole covers, sunken oil tanks with a remote filling
point outside the building and an escape door at the rear (of buildings)", and in some
cases a 'blow off roor23•
In cases where the newly designed building is of great importance, such as
court houses and police stations, and at the same time likely to represent an obvious
target, every precaution possible willbe taken which means spending a great deal of
money.
In such cases the first problem facing the designer would be site selection; it is
of vital importance to have a site that is not overlooked, in order to avoid direct
targeting. This concept, for instance, has resulted in newly designed court houses
being built outside the urban centres. Thus, what once used to be a big feature in the
civic heart of a town, today, becomes a citadel on the outskirts. David Nesbitt, an
Architect at the Department of Environment, while designing a new court house,
comments on this point by saying:
"It is not easy to find a site that Is not over looked end at the
same time within easy travelling distance from the city centre.
In some cases even if you managed to find one, the
neighbouring properties are likely to become a major
problem ... we recall a case where the search has been going
on for ten years".
Court houses that already exist, whether they have been under attack and
restored or not, are all surrounded by high walls and fences, in order not to be seen.
Thus, in many cases a listed building that cost a fortune to keep, can not 'contribute'
at all to its urban setting. Architect Oram from the DoE, Conservation Department,
claimed that recent policy is otherwise. Ennlskillen and Omgh Courthouses were
given by him as examples that have been built in less obvious ways, and appear to
the untrained eye to be 'normal'.
In the design of some buildings, particularly those related directly to the public,
architects will try to make the defences as inconspicuous as possible in order not to
detract from the character of the building. An instance is the Enniskillen Telephone
Exchange in which, according to Stollard (1980), the ground floor has brickwork
facing to a 300mm concrete wall In order to give protection against blast, but
2) Stollard (1980). claimed that there 15 an Increasing use of such roofs in single story buildings,
where the roof is designed to lift off in the event of internal explosion. The design of the fixing details
deliberately includes weak bolts which shear so that the roof lifts uniformly and then drops back into
place. In such designs there Is a need to provide a ring beam at eaves level to hold the walls together
when the roof lifts.
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maintaining an acceptable appearance. Yet in other cases it is psychologically
important to make the building look obviously strong in order to prevent it from being
attacked. This philosophy clashes with the determination of many people not to be
beaten by the terrorists, but rather to carryon with their lives as normal. Such people
would argue that" ..any building whose appearance had been markedly dictated by
security needs represents an admission of defeat" (Stollard, 1980). They also would
claim that if a building is too ostentatiously defensive it would only serve as a
challenge to the terrorist. In a similar way Stollard (1980:35) cited Mr. Ralph Brown,
Official Unionist Chairman of Dungannon Town Council, criticising the closure of
town centres by claiming that, ''...It would allow the IRAto thInk they had won again".
After selecting an appropriate site the next step would be to ensure that through
the architectural deSign, a bomb willnot be able to enter the building. Internal bombs
are the most dangerous simply because a small internal blast is subjected to multiple
reflections which magnify its pressure at least by 5 to 6 times, thus causing greater
damage. This is the reason why underground parking where bombs might be hidden
is no longer used in Northern Ireland. Stollard (1980) puts stress on this point by
saying:
"Car parks should never be designed beneath a building as
they provide the ideal location for a car bomb, as in the case
of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive where one was
placed directly beneath them".
In short, "To start with, you must keep the bomb out of the building and as far
away as possible" (Jerry Hilliard). Thus to keep a clear stand off, at leest 12-15
meters from the boundaries (perimeter) is very important. "You can not design a
building directly on the foot peth and at the same time expect it to resist a car-bomb;
even if you provide e huge section of reinforced concrete walls, still a considerable
amount of demage will take place" (Jerry HUliard).
If a sufficient recession has been provided and a wall which a vehicle cannot
pass, has been erected, then it is even possible to build a normal building; otherwise
more money wUlbe needed to reinforce the walls of the building itself, In order to
withstand the very high pressures. It is self evident that any blast spreads out with
an equal pressure that decreases with the distance from the centre. This fact can be
demonstrated by a greph of the pressure caused by a bomb in relation to the distance
from the building. From the graph one can see that maximum pressure exists at the
shortest stand off point, where the graph climbs steeply. The lowest pressure, is
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when the blast reaches furthest from its centre.
After providing a sufficient set back, a security fence surrounding the site plays
a crucial role. This security fence might be built in different forms and of different
materials: wood, corrugated iron, chain-link or palisade fencing, etc. Such fences can
be used first to prevent visual observation, a need mainly for high security buildings.
Fences can also be designed to prevent 'projectile' attacks in the three main forms:
sniping, rocket and mortar attack. This kind of defence can be helped when the
building has been completely screened from view.
Sniping is the hardest threat to counter because of the nature of the attack,
which is usually carried out by a single terrorist. It is very difficult to prevent a bullet
from penetrating structures, keeping in mind that, "A high velocity rifle will fire a
bullet capable of penetrating a single skin of brickwork, and if it hits at the correct
angle, a normal cavity wall" (Stollard, 1980:51). Thus the main objective of the
fence would be to prevent observation.
Rocket attack and particularly using the RBG?'s, have been recently introduced
end used in Northern lreland24• Defensive screens can be used around the building
to protect it by detonating the rocket before it reaches the target. In the case of
mortar bombs, the main concept behind the fence is that, the higher the fence, the
shorter the distance any object thrown over it will go. The other application would
be through the use of a blast wall around the site. In this case the stiffness of the
wall is very Important, because it will absorb some of the blast energy. But what is
more important is that It should reflect and thus tum the blast. That will help to
create a safe shelter area right behind the wall. In short, a blast wall can only protect
a short distance behind it, depending on its height and stiffness.
"Security lighting is also important at this first line of defence and this should
be designed to illuminate the surroundings while leaving the building in darkness. In
this way a potential terrorist has no cover, while his target remains hidden" (Stollard,
1980). The current security illumination technology depends on infra-red and ultra-
violet rays that can act in place of the eye.
The next defensive step is the building itself. The majority of the attacks have
been by planting bombs; placed either in cars driven up to the building, or left in
unattended cars, suitcases or bags. They were either internal bombs or external ones
24 According to a personal interview with Mr. Jerry Hilliard, Senior Engineer at the DoE, responsible
for antr-terrcrlst defences.
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left as near as possible. The main threat of a bomb is not only from Its direct blast,
but more so from the magnified pressure reflected off the surrounding lurfeces.
Thus, in the case of en external bomb, the orlentetlon of the building can play an
important role. It is maybe helpful to have the nerrowest elevation feeing the street
from where the main threat lies.
The blast can be reflected off the ground creating e reduced pressure area
followed by a magnified one. In this case the height of the building plays an
important role in the scale of damage. If it is a single storey building then it stends
a good chance of being in the (negative) reduced pressure zone, thus possibly able
to survive the blest. Otherwise, the higher storeys are the most likely to suffer. This
reesoning applies only to buildings far enough ewey from the bomb blest.
The other factor is in terms of the shape of the building itself. It is essential to
have a plan shape that does not 'collect' blast. A U sheped plan is a very good
example where the blast willcertainly be collected in the void end magnified causing
greater damage. A rectangular shape will suffer less, pertlcularly If its elevetion wes
designed to be as smooth as possible. "If you build your building with flush walls,
every thing dead flush; the doors, windows, wells, no eaves or overhengs end no
recessed openings, then the blast will be more easily reflected off the facede. But If
you build a building incorporating modem trends such as feature columns, a big
overhang on the roof or deeply recessed windows, you tend to prevent the blast from
more easily being reflected", (Jerry Hilliard) end doing more damage. Thus the ideal
building might have a circular plan with no angles or niches to catch e blast.
Although a building can be designed in a way to lncorporete structural defences,
creating a bomb-proof building is practically impossible. But some types of damage
can be minimised, end more importantly, the repair costs can be kept as low as
possible. For instance, the services and all importent functions should be
concentreted in the core or basement, then the scale of damage would be reduced.
More expensive measures incorporating the use of moving fecedes ere also possible.
This defence can be taken one step further by the provision of a separate structure
for the core, so that in case of an attack, the perimeter can completely collepse
without endangering the core. In short there are two sorts of damege: e) demage to
fabric and b) to operational aspects of a building. The facades may be damaged but
buildings could continue to be used.
Load bearing walls are one of the most vulnerable structures to blast,
particularly those of brickwork with timber floors and roof. Although, such
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construction is normally stable under vertical loading it does not easily resist
horizontal forces generated by blast. Jerry Hilliardindicated that framed buildings are
much stronger and stand a better chance of survival, as well as being more easily
repaired. Stollerd (1980), claimed that a monolithic framed structure is almost
impossible to demolish. In the framed structure the continuity Is provided by the
linked three dimensional horizontal and vertical members. Still, as Jerry Hilliard
pointed out, the use of large precast floor units proved to be a great danger in an
explosion, as they tend to lift and drop without breaking up.
In the case of external exploded bombs it is important to restrict the blast waves
to the outside of the building to prevent greater internal damage. Windows of
ordinary glass will allow such waves to enter the building, be trapped and magnified.
This situation can be helped by the use of laminated or polycarbonate glass. Plastic
film on the glass can help the inhabitants to protect themselves from shattered
fragments. In these ways it is possible to restrict the area of damage suffered by the
building.
However, bombs placed inside are the most damaging to humans and fabric.
The blast from these will be at least 5-6 times stronger than similar bombs placed
outside a building, because shock waves from the blast are contained Inside, creating
greater impact. One way of reducing the effect of an Internal bomb is to provide a
means to 'vent' any explosion, such as with 'blow-out roofs or wall panels'. These
are all the more necessary, as one can no longer depend on the assumption that the
glass in the window willdestruct first, particularly if it is 'safety' glass. Such glass has
much stronger glass/frame joints or even frame\wall joints. Still, "In the design of
blow-out or safety panels there is also the problem of balancing the designed
weakness of the panel against the strength needed to resist accidental damage and
wind pressure". (Stollard: 1980).
So far we have mentioned mainly physical defences which are aimed at
deterring or preventing attack, but many buildings are also using their very style as
a psychological defence. Stollard (1980) suggested thet the new Central Stetion was
an example of this concept in a number of ways; firstly "...the approach to the
entrance is concealed by a number of walls so that one can enter into an unobserved
area and once inside the building, the large waiting arees with little opportunity for
concealment would make the terrorist uneasy and insecure". Inother examples dark
colours with small windows or simple repetitive units have been used to give an
impression of strength and to convey a feeling of security.
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David Nesbitt, senior architect at the DoE supported the psychological view of
defence, when he said that in some cases we do add bullet resisting glass windows
to buildings, while their walls are actually too 'soft' to resist blast. Other measures
are also important and can help minimise the risk of terrorist attacks, such as,
permanent security staff, inside control on external gates, and the use of advanced
monitoring and surveillance equipment.
S.10. THE EFFECT OF THE 'CONFUCT' ON THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY.
Having considered the effects on architectural design and planning, we must
also consider the effect of all the strife on the construction industry, as this is equally
important in helping determine the future built environment.
Although there are a fair number of contracting firms in the Province besides
some Scottish, English and Eire companies, it is often difficult to find an appropriate
contractor ready to undertake construction in troubled areas. Robert Strang
(1985:3), Assistant Director of Development-Planning in NIHE,wrote that in the early
1970's "...contractors refused to tender in the most troubled areas, particularly in
West Belfast. Many building sites were easy targets for theft and vandalism, skilled
workers were in short supply, further aggravated by a curiously sectarian bias in
certain key trades, and workmen generally were, understandably, reluctant to go into
'difficult' areas". Certainly, contactors are generally still reluctant to get involved in
any government project. While the author was interviewing Mr. Nesbitt from the DoE,
a letter arrived from a contractor working on the repairing of a bomb-damaged court
house, in which he informed the DoE about his intention to give up the work, no
reason was given. Perhaps he had been threatened.
As stated above, within the labour force itself, there ere strong sectarian
divisions and often skilled workmen are unwilling through fear to work outside their
own 'safe' areas, even when they are unemployed. Recently a brick-layer was killed
by a sniper while working on the roof of the High Court of Belfast. Nevertheless, in
big projects taking place in neutral areas, both Catholic and Protestant workers will
work together, despite the pressure to which both might be subjected by the
paramilitary groups.
Those paramilitary organisations also subject pressure on the contractors
themselves, requiring them to pay protection insurance money. "They will come to
the contractor, especially if he was involved in a government project or in a project
that benefits the other community, and threaten him that something nasty might
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happen to his building site or to him, unless he pays a certain amount of money as
protection" (C.G. Andrews}".
Such pressure makes it very difficult and costly to conduct any development
projects in the traditional hard line areas of the two communities. Robert Strang
raised the point that, ".. .in the Executive we had to accept the fact that part of the
cost of the development is going to those paramilitary organisations, despite the fact
that prosecutions have been taking place, and many people have been sent to
prison". They pay the contractor extra expenses, which he in his tum pays out in
protection, or for hiring security firms.
8.11. RECONSTRUCTION COMPENSAnON.
Compensation for rebuilding bomb-damaged buildings is available from the
Criminal Damage Branch, which is part of the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), as set
out in the Criminal Damage Compensation (Northern Ireland) Order 1977.
Compensation is payable when damage is caused to property as a result of a criminal
act (terrorist attack). It is based on the cost of repairs to, or the replacement of the
damaged property ifthe cost of the damage is more than £100, and it is caused by
a terrorist organisation.
Provided that damage has been caused, one may also be compensated for
consequential loss, for instance loss of profits in the case of retail shops.
Compensation always takes the form of a certain amount of money that has been
agreed on between the Applicant and the NIO. The latter does not have any input
into conducting the reconstruction, (for instance they do not select the contractor,
instead it is up to the applicant to chose his own).
However, compensation is given with certain restrictions. Firstly, "Payment will
only be made after work has started on rebuilding, this has prevented many
businesses from being able to rebuild" (Stollard 1980:31). Secondly, the idea of
criminal compensation is to reinstate the property to its prior condition before the
damage: "Compensation willnot be paid for stolen property unless it was recovered
in a damaged condition, stolen or destroyed cash, jewellery, including watches,
except where it formed the stock of a business or had been kept on business
premises for repair, auction etc" (NIO, Criminal Damage Branch leaflets).
The amount of compensation is also reduced if the building is in any way
25 According to a personal interview with architect C.G. Andrews.
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'improved' by the reconstruction, Judy Hewitt, from the Criminal Compensation
Department, tackled this point by saying:
"We do not P8Y them to Improve their properties, th8t Is the
Idee of what we C8)) 'betterment', which is deducted; you
consider whether after a scheme, a building is better than it
was before, say it has been improved or they had decided to
take the opportunity to refurbish 8 building. Then there Is an
element deducted for that to make sure that they are only
compensated to the state they were in before the d8m8ge
occurred. That is the theory behind it".
Regarding the matter of historical buildings, Architect Richard Oram from the
Department of Hlstorical Buildings and Monuments at the DoE, wrote to the author
s8ylng, "The fact is th8t Historic Buildings 8nd Conservation Are8s grants are
available to aid the 'betterment' issue and are edrnmlstered in collaboretion with NIO
on a regular bases. Which, I would go as far 85 saying is very efficiently organised II
Whereby all owners of damaged property are informed by letter of the potential grant
aid on an elemental basis". On the other hand, Comforth (1978: 122) criticiSing the
betterment clause. wrote: "[it is] .. clearly inappropriate when dealing with listed or
traditional buildings" (Cornforth. 1978: 122). especially if we consider the fact that
compensation is being assessed in respect of market value rather than cost of repelr.
"Naturally most people want to repair their buildings and go back into business as
soon as possible. But within Conservation Areas and particularly the more important
ones like Queen's [the Queen's University eree of Belfast] it must be faced thet there
are likely to be extra costs of restoration, simply because of the position of the
building and the need for correct details" (Cornforth, 1978: 122).
Judy Hewitt, emph8sising the existing shortages in the compensation
regulations regarding Usted Buildings, described the sltuetlon of a pub, a listed
building that was damaged beyond repair and had to be demolished. In the
Department's view the pub was not reelly worth the cost of rebuilding to Its previous
appearance, "... after all its no longer a Uated Building. That is only one example of
quite a number of similar situations"26. This example was justified by Oram (July,
1990) as being a case in which damage was so severe that only a minimal amount
of historic fabric remained. The same commentator revealed that. generally the
Conservation Department operates a 60/40 role, l.e., If 60% of the historic fabric is
destroyed no extra grant is offered. However, at the same time he claimed that this
215 According to an interview with the author in Belfast ~ March 1990.
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is not absolute and depends on the historical importance of the building in question.
The Criminal Compensation Department deals with all aspects of claims
concemed with issues of compensation. It is therefore important for them to know
if another body. for example the Historical Monuments and Buildings Branch (DoE).
will provide some sort of financial aid. when dealing with buildings of historical
interest. It is considered an offence punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both. to
fail without reasonable cause to notify the Secretary of State of any sum recovered
for a loss under any other statutory provision or common law. This also applies to
deliberately attempting to obtain compensation by deception. Obviously the financial
criteria must be worked out so that the applicant wlll not be able to claim
compensation from more than one source.
Should they fail to reach an agreement on the amount of compensation. which
often happens in the first round. the applicant has the right to complain. The
negotiations will then continue between the Department's loss adjusters and the
applicant's lawyer. They will be expected to come to an agreed figure and settle the
case on that basis. Otherwise. if it does not get settled by this 'informal' procedure.
the applicant has the right to appeal to the County Court within 6 months from the
date he receives the Notice of Determination.
8.12. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
What began at the beginning of the 17th century as a modest settlement on the
steep valley sides of River Lagan in the north-east of Ireland. is now Belfast; the
principal urban centre of the Province and the capital city of the 1921 established
Northern Ireland. Today. the city has an urban population of around 500,000 people.
of whom approximately 300.000 live within the municipal boundary.
Historically Belfast is a city characterised by its divided community. Its divided
social fabric is very clear and physically well defined in many places. Belfast's social
pattern has been influenced by centuries of community grouping. often associated
with places of work. worship or social amenity. This fact. added to the city's
acknowledged religious and political differences between its two main communities;
the Nationalists (mainly Catholics) and the Loyalists (mainly Protestants). gives
urban renewal. planning and housing proposals increased complexity. that does not
exist anywhere else in the United Kingdom.
Before the author became personally involved in the Northern Ireland situation.
the whole issue was nothing more than journalist's reports in the newspapers. At that
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time it very much reminded me of the Palestinian question, where In my
understanding it was a very clear case of struggle towards liberation. But, certainly
I was mistaken, it turned out not to be as simple as I had thought. It Is not only a
conflict between two groups, but there is a third group involved and that is the British
Government and its army. The Northem Ireland community is not just made up of
Nationalist and Loyalist terrorists, but rather the vast majority from both communities
who want to live a normal peaceful life without violence. The terrorist attacks are
conducted by very small numbers of activists from both communities, who are
supported by what can be called 'non-active terrorists'. As Oram (July, 1990)
explained, "These are people who belong to terrorist oriented groups, parties and
clubs all of which give money and active sympathy to terrorist activities". The army
entered the scene in the late Sixties to play the role of policeman; today it is seen as
an instrument in the hands of the British Government, who rules direct from
Westminster, to help control both communities.
As a result of this study It Is clear that the Government, in its drive to contain
the situation, promotes planning policies that are based on short term solutions. For
instance, the provision of public housing (usually combined with subsidies), leisure
centres and other social benefits, in the hope that such an approach will 'legitimise'
the State in the eyes of the vast majority of the citizens. The fact that the housing in
the Province, over the last decade, was not affected as It was elsewhere In Britain
supports this c1aim27.
Another decision not to impose the Community Charge or 'Poll Tax' on
Northern Ireland Is part of such approach. At the same time It is trying to hold down
unemployment. But the community as a whole is paying the price of a lower
standard of living with fewer opportunities for economic growth28• This
government's policies only seem to intensify the segregation issues, which in tum
make it more difficult to achieve a long term political solution. The underlying socio-
economic problems of the Province have long been established. Under the Labour
administration 1974-79, three main economic problem. confronted the Northern
27 In his paper dated 1985, Robert Strang from the NIHE, talking about the Executive's
achievements, Indicated that, "There can be little doubt that without the measure of support received
over the last decade [from the central government], the city would almost certainly have experienced
a scale of social and economic collapse beyond all reasonable hope of recovery" (Strang, 1985:8).
28 Strang (1985:7), claimed that unemployment remains high even by the standards which now
prevail throughout the U.K.; about one-third of all households In the Province are in the receipt of
Housing Benefit; average income per person Is some 30% below the U.K.
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Ireland economy: "..the erosion of manufacturing jobs, the collapse of inward
investment and the poor prospects for public-sector job creation when the
government was trying to limit public expenditure". (Cunningham, 1991: 125). Later,
under the Conservative administration 1979-88, "".the changes in economic policy
were of emphasis rather than a qualitatively different policy". (Cunningham,
1991: 159). Central government investments were directed towards supporting
private capital in the service sector and new hi-tech industries. The regional
manufacturing industries, which were potential large employers, did not benefit as
much. Efforts to attract national and international investments are often hindered by
the security factor of the Province. (For more details on this issue, the author
recommends Cunningham's (1991) book British Government Policy In Northern
Ireland 1969-89: Its Nature and execution, as an essential reading).
In conclusion, the Northern Ireland question has very strong economic, social
and religious dimensions; when these are combined with terrorism, they can create
the political solution that in the end has to prevail. The holding operation that has
to take place while the politicians refuse to compromise, is certainly evident in the
built environment of Belfast. Our conclusions will concentrate on lessons that could
be helpful to urban designers and planners, in clarifying their role in balancing normal
social/environmental needs, with the constraints of sectarian violence and
maintenance of law and order, within a divided community.
The role of the professional is to anticipate and influence this metamorphosis
in a positive and active way using the particular tools at their command (which
includes 'concessions' in some contexts), with a view to making a contribution to
long term social and environmental harmony. We believe that such an insight can
help in evaluating and understanding the contribution and strength of approach to
architectural and planning decisions. We all must be conscious that our responsibility
as architects and planners has a unique role in such situations, because as our
designed environment takes shape, it starts limiting, directing and even shaping the
lives of those who use our buildings and open spaces. Thus, we should not employ
our professional abilities to enhance existing social or sectarian divisions, but rather
to enhance better understanding and assimilation between communities.
Based on these beliefs the conclusions of this Chapter have been categorised
into a number of themes that serve the overall objectives of this dissertation, in the
general context of post-war reconstruction:
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Theme 1: The effects of war and clull strife could go beyond physical
damage to influence planning and the built enotronmen: In the long term
and thus to affect the soclo-cultural structure of a particular society.
This study tried to demonstrate how the effects of continuous 'strife' in Belfast
could go beyond physical damage, to affect the entire socio-cultural, political and
administrative structures of the society. We examined the spatial and physical
residential segregation in Belfast between the Catholics and the Protestants and
highlighted the different aspects involved in dealing with ethnic groups. We also
investigated the long-term effects on architecture and the urban environment, which
varied from control of access to a particular area, to actually erecting physical
barriers (the peace lines). The troubles have also affected the layout of public
housing estates, emphasising the idea of defensible space. The built environment is
being used to promote propaganda of a sectarian war-sub-culture.
Theme 2: Centralisation uerses local decision making.
A view has been formed on how the conflict between the two communities and
the continuous 'war' has left Northern Ireland with a unique planning situation. in
comparison with other British regions, both in terms of policy making and
implementation. As we saw in the Second section of this paper, Northern Ireland has
no effective local government. it is administered by centrally controlled departments,
one of which is the Department of the Environment. This department has control
over land use planning, roads, conservation, water and sewage. Singleton
( 1985:309) supported this view, when he wrote:
"Unlike the rest of the U.K., extensive use is made of largely
unelected Boards to administer housing and planning policies
In the province".
Today, public housing in Northern Ireland is also centralised. It was taken out
of the hands of local authorities and other public agencies in the early 1970's,
through the creation of a centralised housing authority (the Northern Ireland Housing
Executive). One can trace many centralised planning and housing decisions with no
difficulty at all. The 'Poleglass' housing scheme is one of the most obvious examples.
In this case the Direct Rule government from Westminster was determined to
implement the scheme which was seen as needed for the Nationalist minority, despite
the Loyalist objection and determination to stop the scheme in whatever way
possible. Eventually, the pace has been forced by the central power, but the
Protestants' opposition managed to cut the project by half. Thus the original plan that
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involved building 4,000 dwellings and other facilities to house up to 18,000 people,
has been compromised to only 2,000 dwellings.
This example demonstrates two points. The first, that even in the U.K., the
"fortress of the western democracyl", where the concept of decentralisation and local
government has grown up, Northern Ireland's conflict made It almost impossible to
decentralise planning decision-making. Although superficially many decisions seem
to have been taken locally, those that directly touch the conflict are mostly
centralised decisions. Northern Ireland's experience until 1969, showed that having
a powerful local government in a similar situation of ethnic groups, did lead to
discrimination against the minority. In fact, if the situation had remained unchanged
and no central decision had been taken, it is very unlikely that even half of the
intended Poleglass scheme would have been built.
Nevertheless. a step towards administrative decentralisation has been taken by
the DoE and the NIHEas each of them created a new spatial framework, comprised
of units known as Aree Boerds. Still, "Area Boerds were composed predominantly of
appointed individuals and not elected representatives; local interests were thus more
easily controlled and professional administrators gained greater freedom in decision
making". (Douglas, 1982). Conversely, the second point illustrated that although
centralised decision-making in such a divided community proved to be more
effective, one should not underestimate the community power and ignore the
continuing threat of violence, which might shatter the community if individual
objectives were not fulfilled.
Such conclusions might lead us to question the demand of many authors
(Davis, 1986; 1988; 1989) for more powerful local government in post-war situations
in the Middle East, particularly where such ethnic divisions exist. Certainly it implies
that if we are to have decentralised planning bodies, then their overall structure
should be formulated in a way that guarantees the rights of all communities. Of
course, this guarentee is only possible if those communities are prepared to
collaborate in the workings of the .state' and not work only for its destruction.
Theme 3: Reconstruction and ethnic dlDisions.
The Fifth Section demonstrates that ethnic residential segregation is a very
common characteristic of cities, and Belfast is not an exception. In Belfast,
segregation has been a characteristic of its urban life since its inception. This
highlights an important lesson: ethnic groups living together are not a 'reaction' as
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much as a need. Consequently, we should deal with segregation as a psychological
need that may be more balic than our physical planning pollcles. Thus we can not
force ethnic mixing and subsequent assimilation; it can only be encouraged. The
long history of communal conflict in Belfast stresses the fact that no matter how
cohesive the degree of mixing between the two communities, when a riot starts both
groups will instantly withdraw into the heartland of their communities. In fact we
noted a similar situation in the Lebanon when the civll war broke out in the mid
1970's, when hundreds of thousands moved from the eastern part to the western
sector of the city and vice-versa. (see Faouri, 198'?). This conclusion highlights the
importance of planning with a thorough understanding of the real psychological and
cultural needs of the local communities, as well as their innate abilities.
Furthermore, the Seventh Section of this paper showed us how 'sectarianism'
has a powerful influence, not only on decision and policy making but also on
implementation. This influence could take the form of sectarian divisions within the
labour force, which consequently affects the efficiency and production of, for instance
the construction industry. Furthermore, paramllitary organisations in such divided
communities could also subject pressure and even threaten the construction sector,
and subsequently the economic structure and the political stability of the state as a
whole.
Theme 4: Reconstruction and public participation.
The study of Belfast leads us to question the concept of popular partlcipetlon
as it is defined in the West, based on democracy:
"Popular participation in development should be broadly
understood as the active involvement of people in the making
and implementation of decisions at ell levels end forms of
political and socio-economic activities ". (Usk, 1988: 15).
Apparently, in Belfast, the citizen's input is only considered at the execution and
implementation level; that is public perticipation in planning end housing decisions
are closest to what we might term as 'centrally controlled participation'. Moreover,
the concept of participetion is often implemented by those who are teking part by
attending the local planning committees; those who can afford the time. Thus they
are often either unemployed or retired people. It seems that such people are usually
the hard liners of any community and they tend to represent a certain section of age
and soclal class. Consequently, the people's main input is limited to demanding
larger housing units or more segregeted end better defended neighbourhoods. We
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hold this view despite official claims of the importance and the extent of peoples
participation. Robert Strang (1985:8) from the NIHE said, recommending methods
of dealing with communities in conflict:
"As far as humanly possible carry the local communities with
you in terms of information, effective consultation and decision
making. In Belfast nothing can happen without local support".
However, it is important to note that in Belfast it was definitely 'the people' who
caused the change in planning and housing policies and an end to high-rise housing,
not through participation committees but instead by street confrontation.
Theme 5: Housing provision, a product or a process?
It might be appropriate to suggest in this context some changes in the way
public housing is being provided in Northern Ireland and particularly in Belfast, where
housing has largely been seen as a product that has to be delivered to both
communities. We have declared previously our belief that the Govemment is trying
to buy people's approval of its control, by providing them with high standard housing
schemes. We have nothing against the quality of housing provided, although we
have some doubts about the layouts, where, I think defensible schemes have been
carried too far. Houses have been 'cheaply' rented mostly to unemployed people or
families receiving housing benefit, which makes the process seem endless with no
reasonable positive resultsZ9•
There is an argument that says that the housing estates as places, have to
belong to those who live in them. This 'sense of place' and people's 'sense of
belonging' to it can only be engendered over time and with people's involvement in
the process of reconstruction. This may encourage a stronger sense of responsibility,
not only towards one's house but alse towards the neighbourhood and consequently
towards the whole city. Such a 'sense of responsibility' may help reduce the scale
of conflict between different neighbourhoods, it may also decrease vandalism within
a neighbourhood; a phenomenon that can be seen today in the middle-class privately
owned housing estates.
This argument does not mean that we are not aware of the Executive's view
point, that there is a need to maintain and even increase its housing stock to meet
Belfast's great demand for housing. Nevertheless, if the above given reasons were
2g In fact the face value rent is not cheap, but they are subsidised through government benefits of
one sort or another.
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combined with the well identified costs of managing and maintaining a public housing
scheme, it would be very reasonable to extend the opportunities for private housing
schemes. This could be achieved with higher subsidies provided by the government
to help people in need. This is not easy and could only be achieved through
encouragement, for, "..in NI there is no tradition of home ownership among the
working class as there is increasingly in other parts of the U.K. People do not see it
as a status symbol -a rung up the ladder- to own their homes. It seems that
ownership is not a great incentive here, this may well be an inheritance from Gaelic
co-ownership, which was accepted over much of the country until WW1" (Orarn, July
1990).
However, credit must be given to the NIHE for their efforts in handling ethnic
conflicts. Still, this study observed clearly that the Executive does not consider the
issue of confrontation between the two communities as seriously as It should;
immediately, from the planning state of any housing scheme. On the contrary, most
of the time, such consideration occurs when the scheme has arrived at Its detailed
design stage (that is unless one side or the other of the divided communIty discover
it before its official announcement). At such a late stage, when only limited options
are available to the intended residents, the sole solution would seem to be a physical
barrier or a 'peace line'. Afterwards, the total effort would be concentrated on
creating 'environmentally acceptable' barriers, for which there Is no question of the
costs, that are usually paid either by the Northern Ireland Office or by the Belfast
Development Office.
Credit must also be given to the NIHE because of the quality of housing
schemes which were established in the 1970's and 1980's, which would be
considered an exceptional effort if compared with the high rise housing schemes built
in the 1960's, such as the Divis and Shankill flats. Most of today's built schemes are,
in the main, 2 storey house types, each with its individual access and private open
space. Most of the schemes are built of traditional materials and to the highest
standards and specification. In short, concems about territorial identity, security and
building forms have merged to produce a form of housing scheme, particularly in the
inner areas of the city, that are distinguished for their two storey terraces either
grouped around courts or short through routes. Here In Belfast the emphasis has
been on creating defensible areas.
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Theme 6: Social and physical mitigation of war and dull strife.
In Belfast, we saw what had been started by the local population with temporary
barricades at some 'flashpoints' areas, to become defined boundaries between
Catholic and Protestant territories following the inter-community violence in August
1969. These were later replaced with more permanent corrugated iron structures by
the British army. Moreover, when some of these areas have later been developed,
the redesigned housing layouts further emphasised even more the existence of such
divisions with the increasing application of 'defensible space' planning concepts.
Also several of the early examples of 'security walls' or barricades have been
strengthened and others have been built to heights in excess of 20 feet within the
.developments. Today such redevelopment, "...provlde(s) dramatic physical evidence
of the apparent permanence of a divided community" (Singleton, 1985:310), despite
the great effort on behalf of the architects and the huge investments made by the
government to make such barriers look as acceptable as possible.
During the last decade, the reaction of the authorities has changed from street
confrontation by police, then the army, to temporary barricades and patrol lines, to
permanent barricades in many different forms. Not just walls and gates, also gardens
and trees, the alignment of streets and in three-dimensional gradients, hollows,
banks, salients all positively pursued into the physical environment, some of it is
positively imaginative.
Moreover, the Northem Ireland problem now seems to have entered a phase
where the generating demands of civil rights, including equal employment
opportunities, better housing conditions, have largely been met. This has brought an
end to the large scale rioting of whole neighbourhoods, which characterised the
1970's and to some extent reduced tile social vulnerability of entering into civil strife.
Today, the war is fought more or less between paramilitary troops and the security
forces. This war Is made possible by an infrastructure of passive sympathy from a
much larger group who provide safe houses, food, even weapons, and make the
direct pursuit by the security forces very difficult, not only on a national level but on
an international one as well.
The anti-terrorist defences Section of this Chapter showed how it is becoming
more and more difficult to protect against bomb damage. Nevertheless, the Belfast
experience showed that a number of defensive measures can be incorporated in the
design of buildings and in the layout of housing estates to reduce the degree of
damage caused by bombing. However, these measures have other generally
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undesirable side-effects on the urban environment, particularly on its spatial and
visual qualities.
Theme 7: Reconstruction CompenSlltlon.
The long-term continuation of the conflict in Northern Ireland and the fact that
insurance companies do not cover bomb damage made it necessary to establish a
bomb-damage compensation agency: the Criminal Damage Branch. There are a
number of lessons that can be learnt from the Northern Ireland experience in this
• Compensation is given to landlords as well as businesses and factories, in order
to repair or replace damage caused to properties by terrorist ettack.
area:
• There is not a fixed value of compensation, as it varies according to the degree
of damage, a fixed minimum damage cost is necessary in order to qualify for
compensation. .
• Compensation is also given to opportunity loss or consequential loss, such as
loss of profits in the case of retail shops. Thus the aim of compensation is not
just to return the victims to their pre-damage status.
• Due to the fact that both war and development in Northern Ireland occur
simultaneously, along with the availability of building materials, it was possible
to award cash compensation, which additionally was more manageable.
• Payments are conditioned to the start of reconstruction and are paid in
instalments.
• The amount of compensation is reduced ifthe building is in any way 'improved'
by the reconstruction.
Of course such a model of compensation is only possible in situations similar
to Belfast, where damage is very limited on a day-to-day basis, thus it is possible for
the compensation department staff to meet the victims and to discuss with them the
amount of compensation. Also such a model is appropriate in places where
comprehensive records of the pre-damage state of buildings are available, and where
people can produce certificates of their belongings and their income.
Theme 8: Reconstruction and De"elopment can be used to achle"e a balance
between the realistic needs of the Inhabitants and the State's Immediate
political needs.
Belfast is a clear case where reconstruction following its urban riots and terrorist
bombing, as well as normal development, is planned to meet the State's immediate
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needs of security, legitimacy and domination. But at the same time a great effort has
been made to compensate people for their losses and to provide them with their
housing needs. However, most of the short-term development projects in Belfast as
well as the failure to attract external investment can, in some cases, be interpreted
as a government bias towards meeting its own needs, rather than those of the local
people. However, one should keep in mind the fact that the British policy is a
'holding operation' while a political solution is sought. Consequently, its expression
in architecture, planning and construction, can make only a limited contribution to
the outcome, whether in positive or negative manner .
••••
The Belfast case study demonstrated the fact that conflicts are not restricted
only to countries from the South, this continuing conflict in Europe offers a number
of lessons in terms of reconstruction and post-war development. The coming
Chapter (9) willhighlight a significant issue that has arisen in all of the studied cases,
and that is the role of the affected population in the process of settlement
reconstruction.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE ROLE OF THE STATE
AND COMMUNITIES IN RECONSTRUCTION
9.1. INTRODUCTION.
By researching three different casestudies of reconstruction in Iraq, Yemen and
Northern Ireland, a number of strategic issues that go beyond conventional practice
in reconstruction became apparent. One of the most important of these issues is
where the line should be drawn between the state's role and that of the community
in reconstruction? Why and how? In other words, what is the practical extent of
participation by a community devastated by war, that is acceptable to a post-war
government, beneficial to the community and would encourage the international
NODs and agencies to help in the effort of reconstruction. Of course, this dissertation
recognises the fact that there may not be 'a line' as such, thus it does not attempt to
draw such line, but rather to highlight the participation issue in the hope of achieving
effective integration of internal and external resources of both the State and
Internationally.
Concerning 'social and psychological issues', the author wrote in November
1989 as part of his recommendations for the reconstruction of Fao and Basrah cities
in Iraq: "The participatlon of people needs to be regarded as a potential primary
resource for reconstruction. Such participation can occur at varying levels and
stages; clearing the rubble, local planning and decision-making, rebuilding homes
and evaluating completed projects" (Barakat, 1989f). In the same document the
author went on to recommend that, "Dlsabled people should be given equal
opportunities to participate 'normally' in the development of the country ..., the role
of women, which was already developed during the war, should be emphasized as a
vital resource in reconstruction", These recommendations were given on the basis
that "Such participation of the population will not only maximise the resources of
skills and labour, but will also assist those who need work as a process of therapeutic
readjustment. Such participation will also add local character and contribute 8
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national identity to the reconstructed settlements". (Barakat, 1989f).
These recommendations were adopted by the Iraqi Supreme Committee for
Reconstruction, and were published in their 'glossy' document: The International
Seminar on the Reconstruction Campaigns of Basrah and Fao. Still, people's input
in the reconstruction of Fao was negligible. The author believes that Fao is a true
case of 'reconstruction by central decree', where the whole city was seen as a single
giant monumental project'. Despite the officials' declarations concerning the
importance of planning decentralisation and the government's commitment at a
national-political level towards 'people participation', the breakneck speed of
reconstruction of Fao denied any involvement of its people. Such rapid rebuilding
forced Iraq to pursue planning by decree, assuming the needs and desires and
Ignoring the participation of the users.
This experience caused the author to rethink not only the form in which he
delivered his recommendations but also the issue of people participation, and its
validity in a post-war situation in the Middle East. The aim is to reach a conclusion
on why would a State edopt e particular policy and advertise it, while when it comes
to irnplernentatlon, the whole policy is ignored. Are there elny gelps in the theme of
pertlclpetlon that makes it inapplicable? On the other hand, what makes the
perticlpeticn theory' a must' in all governmental development policy documents but
not in their application.
The deeper the issue of community participation is researched the more
complex and controversial it is revealed to be. The fact that we are deelling with e
highly politlcal and centralised post-war context, suggests some doubts on the
effectiveness of a participeltory approach for reconstruction. While at the same time,
the very context of el11post-weir activity raises a number of questions, the answers to
which, the author suggests, lie entirely within eI pertlclpetory approach to the task of
reconstruction. For instance, there can be little doubt that it is needed as a process
of therapeutic readjustment by the affected population. Also, it is difficult in the case
of resettlement and relocation to solve elny arising problems of land ownership
without involving the public. Finally, the simple rebuilding of eI city is highly unlikely
to bring its life back without the full participation of its people.
This Chapter seeks to examine the concept of community participation and its
overtones of democracy, within a Middle Eastern reality of a strongly centralised
I For more deteils on the reconstruction of Feo city see Chapter 6.
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planning and reconstruction effort. It argues that if achieving democratic
participation has proved to be difficult in normal development contexts, then it seems
unlikely to be achieved following any kind of war or even civil conflict, particularly
in that today's wars are mostly limited to countries where people.'. opinion. are
hardly taken into account. Nevertheless, when local communities are excluded from
the process of rebuilding their own settlements, their participation is usually replaced
by costly, utopian schemes decided upon by centralised governments and often
realised through the involvement of large national and foreign contractors. (See the
case studies of contractor-built reconstruction in Dhamar, Yemen and Fao, Iraq).
Hence, to bring the governments down to earth, a degree of people involvement is
needed in reconstruction, even if it is minimal (eg. the controlled type of participation
in Belfast). Thus, the aim of this Chapter is to provide a better understanding of the
positive linkages between a 'realistic' involvement of the people and a successfully
reconstructed settlement.
By involvement we do not necessarily mean full participation, as it is widely
understood in small scale development programmes. Neither do we mean false
participation (as we will later on see in exemining the DASH project in Yemen). In
our view people's involvement can be achieved through the Government developing
a reconstruction planning approach that enjoys the following ettributes: (1) reelism;
(2) sensitivity and (3) flexibility, and that it is locally based, while being pert of wider
regional and national strategies; an approach in which plans are constantly developed
on the basis of genuine research and feedback in the field and not excessively from
the Centre.
This author maintains thet in order to echleve such an approach, there is a need
to address two types of audience, who, beside local communities, are the main actors
in reconstruction, in an attempt to influence their attitudes towards post-wer people
participation in reconstruction. These eudiences are:
a. Central Governments. The aim should be to persuade them of the importance
of involving the people in the process of reconstruction. The erguments could
be as follows;
i- In a post-war exhausted economy (and even in normal circumstances) it
is impossible for the State to meet all the needs of the population.
Eventually, many needs will be met by the people themlelvel. Hence,
the role of the population in reconstruction might as well be part of a
planned strategy.
ii- If a nation has been at war with another nation, the population has made
many sacrifices, then it behoves the government and the leadership to
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reward the population with change and change that meets the changed
circumstances due to the war.
Thus there is a need to clarify the benefits behind participation and the fact that
participation in reconstruction does not necessarily threaten their authority.
b. International Agencies and NODs. They need to appreciate the fact that they
can not achieve much without the involvement of Central Government. They
have to be realistic in their attitude towards demanding direct grass-roots
involvement in reconstruction. They need to join efforts to help governments
change their attitudes too.
Through evaluating the issue of participation in terms of its costs and benefits
and by examining one of the most proclaimed cases of 'self-help' post-disaster
reconstruction (that took place in Dhamar, Yemen), this Chapter concludes by
formulating a conceptual understanding of the issue, based on a partnership between
the State and the local communities. A partnership In which the State is required to
be more responsible and accountable to the war-stricken population. Of course, we
do not mean assuming responsibility over the planning and implementation of every
detail, but rather by behaving in a sensitive, realistic and flexible way towards the
concerned population.
9.2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NOTION OF PARTICIPATION.
It seems ironic that one needs to research and advocate the theme of
community participation in the Middle East, where until just a generation or so ago
this was taken for granted in many respects. This is particularly true in rural areas
and emong the Bedouins, where co-operation and communal activities is a matter
of survival. It is interesting to notice that they tackled their problems in a certain
hierarchical order of priorities and social structure, starting from the scale of the
single household family, through to the tribe, and up to and including the whole local
community. In that sense national borders, as such, did not exist. Itwas community
boundaries that defined the extent to which collective action would be taken. What
many so-called 'experts' forget is, that, historically, most societies have a long
tradition of popular participation at the local level, which they managed to maintain
until it became one of the first casualties of .colonisation' and, later on,
'modernisation' and other forms of top-down development (United Nations, 1975:32);
coming under European imperial domination destroyed all that, as they were
subjected to their absolute authority. Too many MiddleEastern communities became
economic resources and wholly dependent on their rulers, who controlled the means
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of production and the markets. That is when the story began. But, the bitter reality
is that the nationalist and socialist movements that gained Independence for their
countries, replaced the imperial control with a .state-centralised , domination, in which
the population was again to become dependent on the State. No one can deny the
considerable improvements that have taken place in terms of economic progress,
industrial development, health and education, but, also no one can tum a blind eye
to the political corruption and indifference that accompanied so much government
activity; elitism, intolerance, poor economic management and last but not least wars.
Proponents of community participation (who seem to be mostly NOOs,
community workers and 'outsiders') are usually seen as being critical of State
controlled social provision, arguing that it is " ...bureaucratically administered,
governed by impersonal regulations and routines and unresponsive to the problems
and needs of individuals". (Midgley, 1966b:6). Thus participation is portrayed as the
right alternative, which will "...not only humanize the bureeucracy, but strengthens
the capacities of individuals and communities to mobilise and help themselves".
(Midgley, 1966b:6). In their conventional attitude towards Oovernments, Intemauona!
NOOs have presented themselves, not only as being non-govemment8I, but also antl-
governmental. Demonstrating examples of such attitudes are the feed-back reports
by intervening NOOs during the recent plight of the Kurds", "There are, however,
a number of cases where NOOs have worked closely and successfully with so called
Southern governments". (Anderson f, Woodrow, 1969:36).
To start with, it is Important to know that a number of studies and authorities
have explored the question of local people p8rticip8ting at the different levels of
'social development' (Midgley, 1986c), 'development planning' (Bungnicourt,
1962:57-76; Hakim, 1962:137·144), 'rural development' (Hall, 1966b:87-105),
'health and medical care' (Hollnsteiner, 1982:35·56; Hardiman, 1986:45.70)
'education' (Hall, 1966a:70-87), 'water and sanitation' (Drucker, 1985:2-5),
'low-income housing projects' and 'upgrading squatter settlements' (Abrams; 1964;
Turner, 1966; 1972; Ospina, 1987; Hamdi, 1991) and so on. "In fact it is rare these
days to find a document on development strategy or approaches, which does not
refer to participation or suggest that the strategy under discussion is participatory in
2 Talking about international aid agencies and NOOs, we should keep in mind that disaster aid is a
major reason for their existence and that they all share the underlying belief that their help is wanted;
the official response is often slow and inefficient; they can be uniquely suited to work with the poor; and
they are meant to be politically neutral. (notes from Disaster Management Course, Oxford, 1990).
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nature" (Oakley & Marsden, 1985:1). "Popularized by the United Nations and other
official bodies, it now permeates the literature on the subject". (Midgley et al,
1986:vii).
Most of the references dealing with the notion of participation date the beginning
of the concept back to the late 1960's and mid 1970's, when it started to be used in
the context of new approaches to 'development administration' (eg. Gittell, 1980:29;
Martin, 1988:vll). An earlier source of inspiration for contemporary community
participation can be traced to the 1950s 'community development movement'
(Midgley, 1986b: 17). Other researchers would even date it as far back as the 1930's,
when in America, the theme was introduced to fight unemployment and urban blight
in inner city areas (Claude & Zamor, 1985; Usk, 1988:vii). The 1970's witnessed the
introduction of the participation concept into the developing countries, in an effort to
replace new-housing development by 'upgrading' in cities, and to improve
development policies in rural areas. The 1976 United Nations Vancouver conference
marked a significant shift in policy towards participation, when it stated and for the
first time:
"Public participation should be an indispensable element in
human settlements, especially in planning strategies and in
their formulation, implementetion and management; it should
. influence all levels of government in the decision-making
process to further the political, social and economic growth of
human settlements".
The emergence of the notion of participation as an approach to development
is well documented elsewhere (Midgley, 1986b: 13-44; Ward 1982: 1-16). However,
the return to community participation was a much needed reaction to large scale
centrally organised development schemes, which have so often left the human being,
the family or the community with hardly anything to say about his or her own
environment. A return that was to a large extent advocated by international NCOs.
Still, despite the richness in which the subject has been researched and
documented, there are not many references on its application in reconstruction
following disesters, and hardly any following war. The writings of, in particular, Ian
Davis (1978; 1981) and Fred Cuny (1983; 1986) led to •community participation'
becoming a cornerstone in 'disaster management'. In fact, the community-based
epproech to the mltigetion of natural disesters end emergency planning and
reconstruction, became one of the key issues discussed at the International
Conference: Disasters and the Small Dwelling, held in Oxford (2-6 September, 1990)
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and constituted several items on the agenda of the United Nations' International
Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) (1990-2000). Few attempts can be
found, in which the issue of participation has been examined within a post-war
reconstruction context. (eg. Zargar, 1989b:300-350; Leslie, 1991; Barakat &
Cockburn, 1991a:60-65).
"However contemporary writings on community participation are coloured with
lofty sentiments and the difficulties of achieving effective community participation are
not always recognized. Numerous controversies attending the idea of community
participation are also neglected. Above all, the literature on the subject has not dealt
adequately with the issue of the role of the state in community participation".
(Midgley et al, 1986:vii). What is not being highlighted in those writings is the fact
that genuine participation needs a degree of normality and political stability, within
the community and the larger State.
It is important to emphasis that in our cross-cultural examination, it is the
similarities between and among communities rather than the differences and the
diversity of behaviour, that will contribute to greater understanding of the
reconstruction process. Of course, this approach does not and should not
underestimate the importance of understanding different cultures and operating within
their limitations, when it comes to discussing specific cases of participation. Our
cross-society generalisations are supported by recent 'disaster behaviour' research
which concludes that, at the level of the individual and family response to risk;
warning, emergency and recovery there is a striking continuity and similarity across
societies and cultures. (Dynes, 1992:67- 71). "On the other hand, cultural differences
are most frequently revealed in terms of the organizational and political structures.
Some societies are rich with community organizations which can deal with disaster;
others are not. Some societies assume a helplessness and dependence on the
Government; others do not. Some expect a diffuse and decentralized decision.
making system; others reflect a centralized and direct governance". (Dynes,
1992:70).
The social organisation and the political issues it can generate seem to be the
decisive element in whether to pursue a participatory approach to reconstruction or
not and to what extent. Thus following war it is important to evaluate the community
we are dealing with, as well as the particular State concerned.
Chapter Nine.
355
9.3. DEFINING THE POST·WAR COMMUNITY.
To serve the objective of this Chapter ,we are seeking a definition for the term
community that does not exclude any part of a certain social group, not even the so
called 'community elites' (as referred to in the writings of Hollnsteiner, 1982:39);
more or less a combination of the two definitions given in the Collins Dictionary:
"Community, the people living in one locality, or a group of
people having cultural, religious, or other characteristics in
common". (Collins Dictionary).
Inother words, "The word community denotes a social entity, organized in some
fashion, however loose and informal, and with some sense of identity • not just the
inhabitants of a locality" (White, 1982: 18).
Authors writing about the issue of community participation take it for granted
that the reader understands what they mean by community, while authorities
considering the issue of participation "...do not seek to define the term formally and
instead use it loosely to denote a sectc-speuel entity" (Midgley, 1986b:24), that
would serve their agendas. Practically in any context one needs to start employing
the concept of participation by defining the community it is set to serve. Similarly,
but theoretically, we willstart by tackling the concept of participation by defining our
community.
Having the population of war-devastated urban areas in mind, the author finds
it difficult to relate directly to most of the advertised practices in community
participation. Mainly because much contemporary literature on the issue is
concerned with rural communities, and in particular the deprived and disadvantaged
section of them, focusing on ".. the lowest level of aggregation at which people
orgenize for common effort" (United Nations, 1975:31). On the other hand the
limited publications that deel with the notion of participation within an urban context,
generally conceive the urban community as an urban slum or squatter settlement
population. (Midgley, 1986b:25).
In a post-war context, dealing with the urban population, the rich would have
suffered as much as the poor, if not even more. In fact it is almost certain that the
amount of loss by the better off is greater than that inflicted on the poor, although the
former might recover faster than the latter. Thus, we need to involved the whole
community (that is, ifwe agree that a society can be divided into poor and elite). In
short, in post-war reconstruction we need to involve all the sections of a certain
society and on different levels, starting from "the lowest level of aggregation" as
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defined by the United Nations (1975:31), growing to include local groups, offiCials
and professionals. Thus we are not limiting our definition to that of the United
Nations, in which it conceived community participation as taking place in small
communities occupying squatter settlements (United Nations, 1976).
In his writings on community participation in the planning and design of urban
housing Hamdi (1991 :83-85) identifies four types of communities that one may deal
with, emphasising that "The likelihood of success of most programs depends on a
number of conditions that need to be understood", within each type of community.
The four types of communities are:
• Integrated or parochial: Neighbourhoods where people share a common
view; there is social homogeneity; they speak a common langauge and
may ethnically be related. Thus the likelihood of success is greater in
such communities. On the other hand, there maybe less need to introduce
the concept.
• Diffuse: Applies to most new developments, whether of the site and
service kind or public housing, where they start with little or no
community structure. "Interventions are difficult here because initially it
is not clear whose interests need to be served".
• Stepping-stone: People living in a place on a temporary basis. Thus they
" .. have no long-term commitment locally, and will probably move if
dissatisfied rather than get involved".
• Transitory: Applies to neighbourhoods where communities are going
through radical class or ethnic transformation, ".. from black to white or
from middle income to upper income, ... There will be old-timers and
newcomers, and their differences will be acute".
A post-war community could be any of the above mentioned types or a
combination of more than one. It seems that professionals dealing with
reconstruction have the opportunity of emphasising one type of community over
another. For instance, by ignoring the original settlement and its previous population
they will be dealing with a diffuse community, building new sites and waiting for
people to move in and structure a community. Or by building a settlement for war
refugees they will be investing in a stepping-stone situation. In post-war
reconstruction professionals have the opportunity, that may not exist in a newly
planned settlement, of actually dealing with an Integrated, more easily defined
community. The survivors of a devastated settlement have a common concern and
share the same traditions. It is most likely that the war has brought them closer to
each other in a solidarity that strengthened their social entity.
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Nevertheless, war-torn communities are with special needs and at the same
time special abilities. The special needs would have emerged as a consequence of
war:
• Psychological stresl due to lOISof relatives, living through the war or just
as a reaction from the loss of home and property.
• In some cases unbalanced communities, either because of excessive male
casualties that leave behind women and orphans, or simply because of
migration leaving the poor and the weak. Also as a result of the increased
number of disabled people.
• Ex-service men with exclusive military skills, in some cases for a
considerable number of years.
• An extra-ordinary proportion of imported labour and immigrants.
• A community that might have mixed with refugees from other regions or
countries.
• In most cases its a community full of fear and suspicion. They do not
speak out easily.
All these needs put a question mark on the possibility of achieving genuine
participation. On the other hand, it may be a community with a number of special
abilities brought out perhaps by the war:
• The role of women would have been strengthened.
• Increased solidarity and a new found strength for coping socially.
• A community that shares' a common goal: to rebuild itself.
• Capability of adjusting to harsh conditions and an ability to survive
against all the odds.
Of course the degree of needs and abilities differ from one war-tom community
to another depending on the type of war and its effect (see Chapter 2). Consequently
the role that could be played by participation differs.
9.4. DEFININCi THE POST-WAR STATE.
Similarly in a country that has just emerged from war, the State will have
special needs. In the Middle East, within the relatively short history of the 'state', its
involvement has been rapid in all sectors of social development, education, health,
housing, social security and many other public services. However, a war tends to
increase the powers of the executive and administrative arms of the state, as well as
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the police and military. They will no doubt have developed a totally dominating role
in the prosecution of the war that embodies an even greater powers. Consequently,
the power of the government that previously rested, as it often does on the support
of the mllltary, may well increase and be reflected In an ever Increasing grip on the
every day life of the citizen.
In the light of today's realities of centralisation and the fact that the State
"v.dominetes the lives and affairs of its citizens to an extent previously unknown",
(Midgley et el, 1986:vii), it would be naive to argue that reconstruction can be
approached without the involvement of the State, through the ruling Party structure.
Although local communities can face some of the tasks of reconstruction, in addition
to the serious problems of deprivation and poverty, still, they need the involvement
of the State in particular areas. On the other hand, it seems to be equally naive to
assume that immediately following a war, it would be possible to reestablish a more
democratic relationship between a strengthened centralised dictatorial bureaucracy
and the formal representatives and authorities.
Any State, emerging from a war has special responsibilities, such as:
• To its population who wants to return to 'normal' life as soon as possible.
• To resist pressures from the military to retain its newly gained power-
base.
• To maintain its authority for national security reasons.
• To replenish its resources and finances, to pay military debts and to aid
reconstruction.
• To overcome the fear and suspicion among minority groups, including
refugees, and to ensure local political stability.
How can we expect from a ruling regime or party, suddenly to transfer all or
even part of their power or authority to local communities or even to regional
councils? Waging war, by definition, means a strengthening of the centralised
authority. Many of today's wars take place in countries where peoples' opinions are
hardly taken into account, indeed it often the case that the war started because one
area wanted more autonomy. Thus in order to change attitudes at the top we need
to:
1. Demonstrate the benefits that can be gained from encouraging participation in
the reconstruction process.
2. Show how more willingness and creativity by involving the population Can
radically improve the rebuilt environment.
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Particip8tory programmes do suggest 8 democratic process for reaching
decisions in 8 more open political climate. (Hamdi, 1991 :83). More democracy does
not necessarily come about as a result of a war, this certainly applies to many
countries in the Middle Eest and elsewhere, such as Northern Ireland as an example
in Europe. What we hope to establish is that, the political implications of a local
reconstruction project do not necessarily have to match the politics of the country;
l.e. allowing the people to have a say about their environment does not necessarily
mean 8 step towards allowing them more of a say at the national political level.
During the drive towards rapid modernisation in the Middle East, the
governments and their architectural and building professionals have blindly imported
Western models of planning and development that were fashionable at the time (at
best or ten years or more out of date at worst). This required more effort in clarifying
the objective and shaping the mechanism of centralised over-all planning. Today,
there are widely spread beliefs among central govemments that any involvement of
the public in planning and decision-making, would tend to challenge and threaten the
authority of our established institutions. Such beliefs were developed from the fear
that, "...participation is opposed to centralised decision-making" (Bugnicourt,
1982:58), and that" ...citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power"
(Arnstein, 1971:35), and may involve the redistribution of power away from the
centre. That is not necessarily true, these assumptions are based on Western notions
of participation, built upon decades of representative democratic evolution with all its
obvious benefits and associated costs.
In conclusion, it seems that in a post-war context, governments are likely to
discourage any real form of free participation for one or more of the following
reasons:
1. Unwillingness on the part of the state, the government or the party to
share power (insecurity, lack of trust, etc.).
2. Assumed urgency for provision of food and shelter and the restoration of
normal life. A process that could be delayed considerably if people are
continually having to be consulted.
3. Rushed and heroic political rhetoric to provide houses and to rebuild
utopian dreams, in a victorious manner, "..all losses shall be replaced"
type of statement.
4. Faith in the power of centralisation, as a means to modernisation through
Western technology, and essential external aid and trade.
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5. An elitism on the part of many professionals born of a sense of their
superiority through receiving technical education.
6. Hidden political agendas and personal benefits from reconstruction by
international tender.
7. Uttle or no philosophical sense of the moral responsibilities of
government.
Thus our role should be to try and counter some of these reasons in areas where
change is possible and feasible for reconstruction, such as changing attitudes at the
intermediate level of State employed technically oriented professionals. In other
words, 'development by education'.
9.5. PARnCIPA nON AS A MEANS OF IMPROVING
RECONSTRUCTION POUCIES.
A wide variety of interpretations and definitions are associated with the concept
of 'popular participation' (see Arnstein, 1971: 176; Moser, 1983:3; Whyte, 1983:6;
Usk, 1988:15-18, etc.), "This is not surprising since differences in cultural and
socio-economic settings, stages of development and political structures and styles
are bound to influence both the degree and the nature of popular participation in the
development process" (Martin, 1988:ix).
Acknowledging the diversity in which the term 'popular participation' or
'community participation' has been understood and interpreted, this Chapter adapts
the "working definition" given by White (1982), which in origin is derived from
Towards a typology of popular participation, a World Bank publication, May 1987.
He writes "..participation has three dimensions: the involvement of all those affected
in decision making about what should be done and how; mass contribution ... to the
Implementation of the decisions; and sharing In the benefits of the programmes"
(White 1982: 17-18) [emphasis added]. Adding '0 this definition the component that
was cited by Whyte (1983:6): " ..involvement in the eualuatlon and modlflcation of
the programmes", one can derive four basic element. of popular involvement that
ought to compose any participatory approach for reconstruction, in order to achieve
clearly-defined objectives and targets of reconstruction. These elements include the
involvement in formulation, Implementation, monitoring and eualuatlon of the
reconstruction programmes, in order to achieve the collective benefits (see Martin,
1988:vii). Put simply, our aim should be to develop reconstruction programmes that
euolue from lncrementallmprouement based on fleld experience, rather than imported
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notions of development by management theories.
Dudley (1991a:8) concludes that, "Community participation and self-help may
be seen either as a tool for carrying out a task or as a goal in itself,,,. In the literature,
and from personal experience with the aid agencies and indigenous development
organizations [NGO's), the three functions of goal, technical tool and political tool
frequently appear to be confused". (Dudley, 1991a:8). In fact, our examination
shows that for most NGOs 'participation' is seen as a goal and in some cases as a
'hidden political tool'. This position has been recently declared by Habitat
International Coalition (HIC) and Enda Tiers Monde, when they concluded that:
"..[local participation is),,part of the process of strengthening
community groups so that they are equipped to participate at
higher levels when spaces are opened up". (Enda Tiers Monde
s HIC,April 1992)3.
In this study we are advocating participation as a 'tool' or a 'means', rather than
as a 'goal' or an 'end' in itself. Simply because this seems to be the most realistic
approach in a post-war context in the Middle East for the present and foreseeable
future. Moreover when talking of participation as a 'tool', we should make it clear
that we are not aiming at participation as a political tool, but rather as a technical one
that is badly needed following a war. Thus, we are simply saying that the local
community is a valuable developmental resource.
9.6. BENEFITS AND UMiTATIONS FROM PARTICIPATION IN
RECONSTRUCTION; FOR BOTH, LOCAL COMMUNITY AND THE STATE.
"Effective and operative partnerships begin with a discovery of common
interests and subsequently with inducing a convergence of interests as a prelude to
planning". (Hamdi 1991:81). Thus it is very important when advocating participation
in reconstruction, to clarify the benefits and the limitations of such an approach, for
both the local community and the State. In this Section we are concluding some of
these issues, in an attempt to influence the States' policies, thus we are addressing
the intermediate group of official professionals, that are sandwiched between central
government policy makers, on the one hand and local communities, on the other.
They are the conduit for the transmission of ideas and feedback between the powerful
and the powerless.
3 Part of the declaration reached by a number of international NOOs meeting in Tunis, during the
international conference Environment, Poverty and the Right to the City, 21-21 April, 1992.
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This Section starts by highlighting a number of 'publicised' benefits and
limitations of participation. These claims are evaluated in the light of the author's
recent research, limited experience and developing judgement. To support some of
these benefits as well as to expose, in an objective matter, some of the possible
limitations of participatory reconstruction, this Section draws on the first hand
experience of evaluating the Self-help Reconstruction Project in Dhamar (1982-
1989).
9.6.1. 'PubUclsed' benefits of participation.
Arguing in favour of participation, White (1982:20-34) puts forward ten distinct
reasons why community participation is needed in development. At the same time
he acknowledges that "All of the reasons will not be found equally valid from every
point of view, while some may be thought to apply in some situations and others in
different ones, but they are not in general mutually exclusive, and taken together they
make a strong argument" (White, 1982:20). The ten advantages are":
1. More can be accomplished.
This advantage is based on the view that more will be accomplished if the
energies of the people are harnessed. "It is a view which now lies at the heart of
much development thinking, following disillusionment with older assumptions that
development would flow from capital investment in 'modern' economic and social
institutions". (White, 1982:21). This claim is particularly relevant to a post-war
reconstruction context where resources both, financial and material are bound to be
minimum and the only largely available resource is human (eg. Croatia 1991-92).
But it should be remembered that most groups of people subscribe to leadership.
2. Services can be provided at lower cost.
The comparative cheapness of partiCipatory approach is often advocated and
the writings of White (1982) are no exception. This advantage is well publicised on
the basis that "..if services can be provided at lower cost to each community, they
can be provided to more communities altogether". (White, 1982:23). But the
question really should be 'who is benefiting form the cost reduction'?'. Would the
savings made be released for realisation of more projects, or would they be used for
other purposes'? We have to keep in mind that cost reductions could only be partly
achieved through adopting 'locally appropriate' organisational and technical
solutions. Further savings might only be achieved by transferring the burden, in real
resources terms, to the community. Thus accountability to the community is the key
word that emerges.
3. Participation has an Intrinsic value for partlclpants.
This argument assumes that the active participation of the people in the
processes which affect them can lead to their greater satisfaction in place of feeling
~For more details concerning the ten benefits of participation see the writings of White (1981; 1982).
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alienated and powerless. This could be reflected in harmony and unity within the
community, an important consideration for war-torn communities with their special
social and psychological needs.
4. Catalyst for further development efforts.
This argument is based on the assumption that the establishment of an
organisational framework for voluntary participation, as well as the enthusiasm
generated by one success "...willprovide both the means and the stimulus for further
efforts to tackle other needs". (White, 1982:25). In the context of reconstruction two
questions could be asked:
(1) Could the reconstruction agency itself continue to provide the needed
stimulation? Alternatively would the locally imposed / adopted
organisational framework survive without the external agency into a post-
reconstruction period?
(2) Would the community be more or less inclined to participate in solving
less pressing problems, having passed the most urgent stage of
reconstruction.
5. Participation leads to a sense of responsibility for the project.
"It is thought that when people have taken an active part in the planning and/or
implementation of a project, they will collectively consider the completed project as
their own, have pride in it and a sense of responsibility for it, and therefore use it, do
so responsibly and avoid damaging it, and do their best to maintain It". (White,
1982:26). This could be a significant advantage of participation as we saw in the
casestudy of Belfast, however one should be aware that communities are not
individuals and it could be misleading to generalise that a community can become
responsible.
6. Participation guarantees that a felt need is involved.
This argument is based on the assumption that "Communities demonstrate their
needs for the project and their willingness to support and use it once complete, by
making the collective effort to organize and participate in construction, or by making
a financial contribution". (White, 1982:26). In our view, it is important to consider
the willingness of people to participate as nothing more than an indicator of need and
not necessarily a guarantee of satisfaction by the final outcome of the project.
Chapter Seven demonstrated how despite the fact that the Dhamari villagers made
a contribution by providing land for reconstruction, they did not always accept the
reconstructed settlements.
7. Participation ensures things are done the right way.
Based on the previous examination of reconstruction case-studies, we are
inclined to agree with this argument. particularly when it comes to house design and
settlement layout. However, one should not underestimate the value of professional
knowledge. Local communities may not be aware of some planning, design or even
economic issues that are essential for reconstruction. Thus, the issue here is not just
the participation of the users, but allo the imaginative approach by the professionals
to extract the real needs and expectations of the users and to try and realise it, using
the best of their professional knowledge.
8. Use of indigenous knowledge and expertise.
Through more participation this is more likely to be achieved by: (a) "..giving
close attention to local expertise during the process of consultation in the planning
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and design stage" (White, 1982:30): and (b) the use of indigenous techniques,
building materials and the organisation of local labour. In our view, the use of
indigenous knowledge and expertise has to be planned as an integral part of the
reconstruction programme. It is not realistic to say that participation will lead to the
use of local resources.
9. Freedom from dependence on professionals.
This is not always a realistic argument, based as It Is on the claim that
"..professionals in most developing countries enjoy a standard of living incomparably
higher than that of the mess of the population. In this context, a radical approach to
community participation envisages the prospect of freeing the mass of the population
from dependence on a virtual monopoly of expertise controlled by professionals".
How well can people be equipped to meet their own needs? What this Chapter is
advocating is not 'no professionals' but 'different professionals'. This takes us back
to our commitment to 'development through education', and in this case, re-
educating professionals to be able to work with the people, rather that for the people
in reconstruction.
10. The development of consciousness.
The aim of this argument Is to use participation "To develop consciousness
among the weaker sections concerning their situation, or at least their rights under
existing laws". (White, 1982:33). This argument tends to perceives participation as
a 'goal' or an end in itself, in contrast with the way we see participation as a 'tool' to
achieve what Is likely to be more successful reconstruction and not to lobby people
against their governments. Having said that, we do accept the development of
political and economic consciousness due to participation, but we do not cell for it
to be an aim of participation.
On the other hand, a number of 'publicised' limitations have been discussed
during the last decade and have raised serious objections to the efficiency of
participatory planning. These arguments have built on the fact that communities are
not necessarily always 'integrated' and many of the States are not very democratic
either. One of the related issues is the question of whether the average head of
household is able or even wishes to participate in making decisions at regional or
even local level. What contribution for Instance, could an illiterate and
tradition-bound lay people, in isolated communities or even in ethnically divided
ones, possibly make to the analysis, projection. and the input-decisions, which go
into shaping an over-all reconstruction plan? Seen from this angle, the question
could then be restated: Is it realistic to think of popular participation as anything more
than peoples' 'co-operation' in carrying out activities and 'modifying behaviour', as
considered necessary by the nation's experts? Or perhaps the Original question
should be reviewed to ask, whether a particular reconstruction plan is of any use to
these people?
It has been claimed that local participation will lead to a 'wish list' rather than
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a 'need list'. "Some say that participatory processes take too long, that people do
not know what they really want even if asked, and even when they do know, ...they
have neither the time, the commitment, nor the capability to be involved in decisions
that can be very costly if they are wrong ones". (Harndt, 1991:84).
Others would argue that the implementation of participation would increase the
burden of menegernent on already stretched planning systems. Or that it could be
used to empower the rich and the elites to resist development programmes that do
not serve their needs. Finally, it could be argued that community participation does
not lead to any better recovery of costs and, in some cases, not even to greater
satisfection.
9.6.2. A partlclpatlon story: the self-help reconstruction project In Dhamar.
This study is based on findings from the author's visit to the area, two yeers
after the completion of the project in November 1991. Research and data collection
methods employed in this study are discussed in Chapter 5 of this Dissertation. This
section draws also on findings from an Impact Study cerrled out by the Institute of
Housing Studies, Rotterdam, immediately after the completion of the project (see
Dijkgraaf, 1989). The aims of this study are:
• To give an example of community participation in reconstruction, that
took place within the reality of a centralised planning system and in the
abnormal circumstances of post-disaster, highlighting the benefits and the
limitations faced by such a programme.
• To try to reach some useful general conclusions, concerning the efficiency
of participatory reconstruction and whether itwas culturally more sensitive
than reconstruction, as it were, by tender. (The contractor-built
reconstruction is discussed in Chapter 7 of this dissertation).
The main lessons from this Section are centred around the following issues:
1. The scale of disaster end the pre-disaster planning reality, makes it very difficult
to activate a genuine participation epproach.
2. The intended role to be played by the intemational agencies and the reality of
their aid. It seems that their interest was mostly in conducting a costly
experiment in soclal engineering. Something a centralised state cannot usually
afford.
3. The combination of the two issues above tended to limit the role of the so called
participants to physical labour.
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4. An important question for us would therefore be: Is it worth trying to pursue a
participatory approach in post-war reconstruction or would it bemore important
to concentrate on changing the attitude of professionals to understand and
encourage participation among the affected people, so that they both become
more sensitive to the real needs and abilities of the people.
9.6.2.1. Formulation of self-help reconstruction Policy.
The 1982 earthquake in Dhamar, Yemen, struck at a time when participatory
approaches for development, upgrading squatter settlements and self help housing
were gaining momentum within international development agencies as an attractive
'new'theory. Almost all of the studies conducted by teams, from all over the world,
following the earthquake recommended self-built, as being the most suitable
approach for reconstruction in order to incorporate long-term development some
how, within short-term relief. They also highlighted the importance of using
predominantly traditional building techniques, materials and architectural forms.
Equally, they all agreed on the Importance of introducing some reinforcing
construction methods to the new structures being built. to make them less vulnerable
to future earthquakes.
At the very beginning the Government accepted self-help as an approach for
reconstruction. for which it was supposed to provide financial inputs through the Co-
operative and Agricultural Credit Bank (CACB) and guarantee the availability of steel
and other imported building materials at a fixed price. through the Yemeni Foreign
Trading Centre (YFTC). The decision was superficially acknowledged intemationally
and a number of aid and development organisations showed a willingness to help the
Yemeni govemment implementing such a programme. But. as time passed and
resources began to be put aside for reconstruction, implementation policies started
to change.
The Govemment excluded from this approach all the settlements with more
than 75% damage or more than 25 dwelllngs destroyed. This meant that 127
settlements; about 13,000 houses were to be built by the 'tender method' , carried out
by foreign and local contractors. Leaving the balance of 12,000 destroyed houses
to be built with the 'self-help' approach. amongst 1052 villages. (SCREM. 1983).
However. "The final list released later in 1984, shows the contractor programme to
have grown to 305 separate villages, with approximately the same number of houses
to be constructed as originally estimated". (Cobum & Leslie, 1985:5). The Executive
Office selected the new sites of those villages. based on technical and geological
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criteria, surveyed them and prepared their tender documents. The Supreme Council's
decision to pursue an open international contracting system in villages with a big
number of destroyed houses, was based on the claim that there was insufficient
labour available for the villagers to rebuild by their own efforts.
By November 1991, of the 12,000 houses only 1,100 were realised using self-
help methods, of which 910 were part of the Dhamar Aided Self-help Project carried
out by the DHVConsulting Engineers of Amersfoort, from the Netherlands, who
initiated the idea, and were sponsored by:
• The Kingdom of the Netherlands Dn.8,5m
•
•
The European Economic Community
The Yemeni Government using the
United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) loan.
ECU.2,5m
YR.70,7m
•,....
~ A~:'- ~,.'~. I ........._I _ roY""'" ... ~ ....
...~-~~ ..~ ."'~.~
I • ~, MAGR.'~ ...,
~AN'. +r~
;r~ ".
• SClY'\O
•I
Figure {9-1J The Location of Magrib Ans and Jabal A/·Sharq where the DASH project was carried out.
The UN sponsored self·help project was carried out in the area of North-West Dhawran.
The remaining 190 houses were realised by a UN sponsored self-help project
in the area of North-West Dhawran. It took six years to build the 1,100 houses
(October 1983 -August 1989), while it was anticipated to build the 12,000 houses
in two years. Nevertheless the project has been highly publicised at national and
international levels and over the last decade, has been considered an outstanding
example of reconstruction achievement through community participation. The latest
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of these acknowledgements came from the Swiss Disaster Relief Evaluation Mission,
who conducted an evaluation study of the Dhamar reconstruction early 1992, as a
contribution towards the reconstruction efforts following the AI (JdeinEarthquake, 140
km South of Dhamar, which occurred on 28 November 1991'. As we explore the
Self-help project, we can not stop ourselves from wondering why this project has
been given ell this publicity end on whet basis?
9.6.2.2. The implementation process of the DASH Project.
The Dhamar Aided Self-help project was carried out In Maghrib Ans and Jabal
Al-Sharq districts of Dhamar Province. According to the Institute for Housing Studies,
(which was assigned to monitor and evaluate the project) the project objectives were:
Short- term: to provide shelter for the people affected by the earthquake in
accordance with government policy.
Long-term: to transfer knowledge about appropriate earthquake resistant
building techniques.
Originally the project had three components through which the above mentioned
objectives were to be realised:
• The construction of 1,000 houses.
• The training of local builders.
• Repair of damaged buildings.
During the course of implementation the emphasis was shifted from training to
construction and the repair component was totally forgotten. The Project Office was
established in Dhamar City and was staffed with a majority of Dutch experts, for
whom a small 'peradlse' was built for their eccommcdenon". A number of branch
offices, called 'Building Advice Centres' were also established in Thilah, Dubah,
Wathan, Madinat Al-Sharq and AI·Jumha. These centres were necessary because of
difficult access to the mountainous area.
The project was divided into phases of nine months. Each was completed by
an evaluation by the IHS mission and recommendations were made for the next
!IThe author was In Dhamar when the earthquake took place In November 199 J. The Swiss DI••• ter
Relief Unit (SDR), decided to focus on the reconstruction efforts of AI Udeln Instead of making reUef
contribution. Thus the first step was to send an evaluation team to study the previous experience of
Dhamar.
15 Interview with Yemeni experts and EOR staff showed the degree of contempt they had towards the
Dutch staff who created their own quarter; imported everything including wine and even toilet paper;
celebrated Christmas and had their girlfriends living with them, without any respect to the feelings of the
locals.
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phase. The initial step was to start by informing the Governor and Local
Development Associations of the intentions of the self-help programme. This was
followed by the selection of villages and informing the Sheiks and the villagers.
Those benefiting from the programme were to be identified by the EOR, and were to
be consulted on whether they preferred the Nagron system or the traditionally
improved one. Meanwhile, the DASHteam worked on approving the programme and
its budget, making funds available for execution and management, and arranging to
import building materials for a 100 Nagron and a 100 traditional but improved
houses, through the Yemeni Foreign Trading Centre".
This case study is presented to show that it is not enough to adopt a
participatory development theory, the theory has to be adjusted to the local
conditions and circumstance. In practice the DASHProject suffered from a number
of limitations mainly because of the way it was implemented. The process went well
beyond schedule, the initially envisaged two year period for the completion of the
project became six. In an attempt to put the blame on the Yemeni Government
instead of those who designed the project, Dijkgraaf (1989: 12) claimed that the delay
in the programme was "..a direct result of the lack of experience of the Executive
Office for Reconstruction and the Yemeni government in large-sale housing projects
in general and in self-help housing in particular". Delays in approval processes due
to bureaucratic procedures, were often given as the main causes of delay. However
the following limitations were apparent:
i. Management and {lnance: The hard currency donated by the Dutch government
and the EEC were used to directly pay the Dutch team and consultants. While
purchasing building materials and issuing payments to the locals depended on
the income generated from selling the USAID grain (to the value of $70
million). Such a complicated path of fund supplies, caused a considerable
delay, as it caused the progress of the project to be directly linked to the
marketing of the grain. (This issue has been explored in more detail in Chapter
7).
ii. Productivity: What was started as a laudable, if not over ambitious self-help
programme, apparently capable of providing a greater number of houses than
by the tender method, ended up as no much more than pilot project with less
than 10%of the programme completed.
iii. Speed of construction: Similar to the contractor-built programme, what was
anticipated to take two years took six. In fact, by August 1989 only 40% of the
houses were completed, 40% were partly finished and 20% were far from
7 The difference between the two construction systems is described later on.
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completion.
iv. Building materials: Providing stone, sand and water was not as easy a task as
was portrayed by the Project team. At the same time cement, roof joists,
plywood, etc. were often unavailable et the YFTC, and often had to be
purchased by the DASH project from the local market at higher prices. As a
result the participants found themselves trapped; faced by shortages of building
materials, yet having signed the EOR contracts and borrowed the money to pay
for them.
v. Access to the area: The extremely bad condition of the roads in the area meant
that only four-wheel drive vehicles, with a maximum load of 1,000 kg, could be
used. However, a positive step was eventually taken by the Project when they
hired local vehicles.
9.6.2.3. Flndings {rom the field.
Based on findings from the field study this Section will group the shortcomings
of the Project into five categories in relation to:
I. House design and building materials.
II. Selection of beneficiaries.
III. Provision of sites and issues of lend ownership.
iv. Participants contribution.
v. Cost and Finance.
I. House design and building materiels.
The beneficiaries had no say whatsoever in the design of the house. Similar to
the contractor-built ones the houses did not correspond with the size and type of
individual families needs. The layout was predetermined by the Project experts, who
produced a prototype house that was repeated everywhere (see Figure 9·3). It has
been claimed that the idea behind this standardization was to "...construct a modem
house within it a kitchen, bathroom and toilet, in order to 'educate' the population of
Yemen... [also) through standardization a reduction in the construction cost could be
obtained"l (Dijkgraaf, 1989).
However, the house. were designed to accommodate a second floor that could
be extended later on by the owner. In fact two slightly different layouts were
introduced. One was that of the Dutch prefabricated house, the so-called 'Nagron'
type, of which only 67 were built and the other WaS the so-called 'traditional
improved' house. In the latter, the walls were built of rectangular local stone with
cement mortar, replacing the traditional cut-face stone with earth mortar. An
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Important element of this house was the 'U' shaped concrete blocks. These blocks
were used to make the comers; door columns; and the horizontal tie-beams by
introducing steel reinforcement into the blocks. Plywood was used for the flat roof,
nailed on timber joists, both were imported. As was the plastic sheeting used to
waterproof the roof, to which a layer of soil was added as protection and insulation.
Wooden doors and windows were also imported.
The choice of materials for the 'Nagron' house was dictated by the system. The
walls were constructed of galvanized wire-mesh frames assembled on site and filled
with rubble and mortar. These were then plastered on both sides and the corrugated-
metal sheeted roof was supported on the walls. Practically everything was imported
from the Netherlands, including fittings, windows, doors, electrical fittings etc.
In their Impact Study (1989) the Institute of Housing Studies, based in
Rotterdam, claimed that "The majority of the people questioned were content with the
[house] design". (see Dijkgraaf, 1989). However, the field visit conducted by the
author in November 1991 revealed the opposite. None of the 45 households visited
seemed to be satisfied with the layout of the house and the size of the rooms. This
became clear through observing the way in which people altered and extended the
original houses. To alter a house in which the family invested money, land and
labour must have been a difficult declslon, that they would not have resolved to do
unless they were highly dissatisfied. During interviews a number of critical remarks
were made, some of which corresponded to the findings of the IHS Impact Study.
Materials Although natural stone was widely appreciated as a building
material. "The concrete U-block was seen as the weakest part of the
chain ... This U-block with its reinforcement was still seen as a
strange element in the construction of the house". (Oijkgraaf,
1989:20). This fact was observed in the field, as people have
attempted to paint the concrete blocks.
Size [; layout The size and layout of the reconstructed houses did not correspond
to the needs of people or to their traditional way of living (two
bedrooms of 6.25m2 each and a bigger room of 10m2). They seem
to have been accepted because of the exciting image of 'modernity'
they were portrayed in. People complained of the lack of flexibility
during the construction. Details had to be executed exactly as
planned. For example, the number and size of openings, room size
etc.
Dlwan There has been no appreciation of the value of the Diwan as a social
space. The size of the rooms was too small, none of the three
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rooms can function as a proper 'Dlwan', as a place to receiving
guests. Nevertheless, those who used the largest room (1Om2)as
Diwan complained, that in order to entre one had to pass the so-
called kitchen and toilet, facing the bedroom door. Privacy is a
fundamental concept among these people. A number of houses
have added a separate Diwan. In one case a 36m2 Diwan had been
built.
Kitchen & tollet Similar to the contractor-built houses, the kitchen and inside toilet
provided were hardly ever used. People added their own kitchen
(Dima) outside the house, in accordance with their tradition due to
the fact that the use of wood (hatab) or animal dung as a fuel,
produces a lot of smoke.
Security Many had changed the timber front door, specified by the project,
for a steel one and added steel bars and shutters to the windows for
security.
Extensions In general, the degree of extension and development of the Self-help
houses was very limited when compared to those of the contractor-
built houses. This is mainly because in the former case the owner
has already invested all his savings in the construction, while in the
latter the owner received the house free.
II. Selection of beneficiaries.
One of the main differences between house reconstruction by Tender and Self-
help, is that the latter construction can not start unless a beneficiary has been
identified and a contract signed. As the qualification criteria for either house were
never made clear, there were delays in drawing up the list of respective beneficiaries.
Those on the list were said to have been changed a number of times by the EOR
Selection Committee, through pressure put on the Committee by local Sheiks and
influential people. Even rumours of bribing came up during the implementation.
(Dijkgraaf, 1989: 16).
III. Provision of site and issues of land ownership.
The provision of the site was the responsibility of the family, in fact it Is the only
stage in which the beneflclary made a decision. The issue of land ownership was
arranged by the community itself without interference from the project. The owner
of the house was always the owner of the land. Thus the decision on the location was
up to the owner. A new phenomenon appeared, in which people were selecting the
new construction site close to their agricultural land or even on it. Although this
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might have been seen by the locals as a good step towards improvement, a number
of people later showed regret at having moved too far from their original settlement
and community". This shows how people's preferences can change over time and
through experience.
The availability of land had not led to any delay in construction, unlike the case
of reconstruction by Tender. In some cases families had to buy the land and the
price they paid was not considered as part of the 1/3 contribution they had to make
towards the cost of the house. Hence some families ended up paying more than
others.
IV.Beneficiaries contribution.
Beside providing the land, it was the family's responsibility to provide stone,
sand, gravel, water and unskilled labour, while the Project contributed the imported
building materials, such as cement, windows, doors, steel, joists, plywood, plastic foil,
etc. and payment for skilled labour. In this unrealistic notion of participation, the
provision of building materials by the families was presented as an easy task, in
which they could collect their own stone and carry water to the building site. In
reality only 30% carried the water themselves and 10% carried the stone, but the
most difficultwas providing the sand, which was not available in the area. Moreover,
the owner had to provide the builders with meals and 'qatt'. (Dijkgraaf, 1989: 17).
V. Cost and finance.
The total cost of the house was estimated at YR90,000. The contribution of the
beneficiary amounted to YR30,0009• The responsibilities of both parties were made
clear in a contract signed between the EOR and the beneficiary. The contract
consisted of four parts referring to the four building stages, foundations, ring-beam,
joists and roof. In order to insure that the money was used to buy building materials
for the construction of the house, the beneficiary received payment at the completion
of each stage, which he in tum used to pay the mason. After which he was entitled
I Traditionally. people lived in clustered settlements overlooking their agricultural land. They will
travel in groups every morning to work on the land and return by sun set to their village.
9 The cost of the contractor build house ranged from YR 68,000 to YR 150,000. The beneficiary
received it for free. Only YR 50 registration cost was to be paid and even this was cancelled at a later
stage.
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to collect building materials for the next stage and so on.
Roughly 1,000 houses would have cost the Project 60m YR. The Yemeni
contribution through the USAID loan was more than 70m YR, which means that 70%
of the total budget allocated for the project as contribution from the Dutch
government and the EEC, was spent on administration and consultancy fees carried
out by Dutch teams."
The fact that each beneficiary had to contribute 1/3 of the cost, to participate
physically as unskilled labour and to provide the land, meant that the poor, the weak
and those who could not provide a piece of land did not benefit from the programme.
This created social divisions. Furthermore, it was reported that less than 10%could
afford the whole amount without obtaining a loan. "Jewels, guns and cows were sold,
or were given as pawn to obtain the necessary finance ... The average debt of families
is YR 25,000. Quite often money was borrowed from various people in the village.
Some of the families were quite worried about how to pay these debts in the near
future". (Dljkgraaf, 1989:17).
9.6.2.4. Summary and conclusion.
The significance of the Self-help reconstruction project in Dharnar arises from
the fact that it is the first governmental housing project in Yemen, and probably In the
region, in which the intention was that people be Involved and in the event they were
to a certain extent. 1,280 earthquake resistant houses were built over a period of six
years, using a mixture of local and imported building materials, 90% of which are
inhabited today. The Dutch and EEC project realised 1000 of these houses while the
rest were built by the UNDP. Lessons concluded from this case study can not be said
to show much gain for Self-help over the Contractor built housing, either in respect
of efflciency or cultural sensitivity. In general, the Dhernar Self-help reconstruction
programme was not a great success; it suffered from a number of shortcomings
because of the contradiction between the Intention and the practice of such iii
participatory approach. As part of the greater reconstruction project, a special
Division was established to administer the self-help programme, within the Executive
Office for Reconstruction. Casting the self-help scheme in such a project based
approach meant that the programme lost its flexibility and a great deal of its
10 From a personal discussion with the Finance Manager of the Executive Office for Reconstruction,
Dhamar, November 1991.
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advantages, for the sake of so-called productivity and quality control. Users
participation was limited to implementing what had been decided upon and designed
by professionals, seemingly with little or no insight into the local social, cultural and
economic context, but with a great concern about the technical aspects of designing
an earthquake resistant house. The result was standard designed houses regardless
the different needs of families.
The project lacked sensitivity towards people's real needs. For example, if an
initial study was conducted before carrying out the project, it would have been clear
that neither the size of the rooms, nor the arrangement were culturally accepted.
Finally, rigid decision making and bureaucratic implementation meant that the
planned project could not be adjusted to findings from the field, despite the fact that
professionals worked directly with the beneficiaries.
9.7. RECOMMENDATIONS: TOWARDS A PARTNERSHIP IN RECONSTRUCTION.
In this Chapter we have explored a number of advantages for employing the
notion of participation in development. However, our examination of the self-help
reconstruction programme in Yemen, demonstrated the fact that we should not be too
idealistic about what can be achieved by popular participation in reconstruction. It
is much more difficult to apply the notion of participation in a reconstruction context,
particularly post war, than it is in small development projects. Still, it is not
impossible to reach a pragmatic kind of participation we prefer to call 'involvement',
that acts as a 'tool' to achieve proper reconstruction within the political, economic
and social realities of a post-war community.
Our examination of reconstruction case-studies showed that there are a number
of linkages between involving the local population and resolving issues that are
exclusive to post-war reconstruction. This Section presents some of these linkages,
in an attempt to persuade State professionals of the need for involving the people in
reconstruction, at the same time it attempts to show that 'participation', as we see
it, does not undermine the State's power.
9.7.1. Reconstruction Issues that can be resolved by 'people's Involvement'.
l. A controlled, but progressive action towards participatory democracy.
"Contrary to the opinion of those who believe that popular perncipetlon, by its very
nature, is an 'action towards democracy', it seems that the ruling system can control
such actions and if its own power is endangered can stop them, unless it is convinced
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that the final result is compatible with Its own goals". (Zargar, 1989:318). Our
examination of reconstruction and development in Belfast supports the latter claim.
In fact it is just as likely that involvement of the public will help dissolve or possibly
even eliminate popular misunderstanding of decisions and thus work in partnership
with the central government. But more importantly it can contribute to the reduction
of expensive and wasteful State machinery and enrol the energies of the community
in carrying out the many tasks, now, If not performed by the government, are
promised and so often remain undelivered.
Today, with the recent world-wide shift to market economies, many governments are
trying to convince themselves of the necessity to restructure towards a more
democratic society, particularly those emerging from national and civil wars, for
example Croatia. Adopting perticlpetory reconstruction could serve as an example
of what can be achieved.
ii. International development aid.
People's involvement in reconstruction is necessary in order for governments to
obtain fair deals of international development aid. Participation is considered a good
thing and has become a pre-condition for the intervention of a number of
international organisations such as the World Bank and the United Nations Centre for
Human Settlements. In their publication FY89 Sector Review Urban Development
Operations; Reaching the Poor through Urban Operation, the World Bank (1989: 1)
cited, in relation to its urban development lending, "Strong commonalities can be
identified ... (i) the subsequent endorsement of national government poliCies of
decentralization ...; (ll) the recognition of a pivotal role for the informal sector in
providing urban services and employment and in supporting the shift from a
subsistence to a market economy; (iii) recognition of the need to strengthen local
institutions .."., etc.
International agencies have to recognise that it Is not realistic to attach participation
as a condition to aid packages. This is because:
1. States can manipulate the issue by only including it on official policy papers,
but not necessarily in reality and implementation. A different approach could
be to implement reletively small participetory reconstruction projects or self-
help schemes accompanied by an international campaign that would encourage
the greater use of formal local end municipal authorities and in-country
institutions and NOOs to support national reconstruction plans, as in the case
with the present World Bank policy for the development of institutional urban
management.
2. In a state where democracy is badly needed and resources are limited,
participation could be used as a political vehicle to avoid State responsibility for
reconstruction. During the author's visit to Iran, he had the impression that the
government there, tends to justify its inefficient role in reconstruction by
claiming that it is pursuing a participatory approach.
Chapter Nine.
379
iii. Building social solidarity.
Social and political InstabllltJes are often post-war characteristics, generated by all
kinds of pressure. Participation in reconstruction would emphasise the social
solidarity that would have already been established between individuals and families
of a community during a national war. Thus, building the local capabilities through
involving them in the action for peace. Such involvement could also help to
strengthen the relationship between the state and people.
iv. Comprehensive reconstruction.
The multidisciplinary nature of the task of post-war reconstruction demands a
comprehensive approach, in which the integrated tasks of the economy, housing,
Infrastructure, health, education, employment etc. can be tackled. Promoting a
partnership between the local communities, the private sector and the Government,
for instance to provide housing. This would allow the government to concentrate its
efforts on other vital reconstruction issues, such as economic recovery and the
provision of infrastructure, thus enabling investment in revitalising industry and
commerce, including the construction industry, refugees, etc. Of course, for
approach to work, the Government has to facilitate the process and mobilise the
private industrial sector and the community to rebuild its own settlements.
v. Pertlctpetlcn as a psychological therapy.
The psychological and sociological disturbance ofwar have been explored in Chapter
2 of this dissertation. The connection between people participating in reconstruction
following a disaster and the speed of their psychological recovery and the
reestablishment of their social patterns have been researched elsewhere (Raphael,
1986; 0rner, 1988; 1989 Najran s Zargar, 1988; Cuny, 1983; Meyers, 1991). A
common conclusion has been reached: "..the greater the role of the survivors in
different reconstruction activities, the greater the chance of a rapid psychological
recovery" (Zargar, 1989:301) and the return for social and therefore economic
normality. (Dynes, 1992:67-71).
vi. Participation as a means of insuring cultural continuity.
We are tackling the issue of Post-war reconstruction in the Middle East, at a time
when there is a recognition that Western models of architecture and urban planning
are not very suited to the local resources, climatic circumstances, energy use and
socio-cultural well being. This combined with the universal disillusionment with
'Modem International' architecture, means that we must take this opportunity to have
a rethink. Nowadays, reconstruction should be seen as a good opportunity to
recognise the contribution that 'traditional knowledge' can make to the solutions of
many contemporary problems. Moreover, it could be an opportunity to actually
implement some of this knowledge. Central planners of all kinds must learn to view
the potlcles of local development through local engagement and harness the latent
commitment and energy inherent in all sections of the society.
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Traditions date back to the beginnings of any human society and are often among
the very few surviving 'properties' of any war or dlsester-devesteted society. The
decades-old traditional architecture of entire settlements could be razed to the ground
In a few hours, yet the traditions which created and maintained the growth of thole
settlements will still be alive, as long as there are lome human survivors, they mUlt
be drawn into the national effort.
In our view, no matter how good the architect or planner is and how strong his belief
in tradition, it is very difficult to achieve a local identity in a rebuilt city without the
direct involvement of its inhabitants, simply because tradition is greater than any
individual planner or architect. It is time to open our search for identity to the
contribution of the lay people concerned, rather than limiting it to a group of elitist
and professional experts, often lost in their own maze of assumed values and
assumptions, many of which come from other cultural sources.
In e post-war planning situation we have an opportunity that may not exist In e newly
designed settlement. The traditions of e partially devestated community are
everywhere in evidence and well established within the surviving inhabitants, we do
not need to look far for them, we just need to respect and employ them.
9.7.2. Suggesting a model for a partnership.
How then should the people, who represent the nation's greatest resource, be
helped to playa more effective role in reconstruction? And to what extent does this
include some share in policy as well as decision-making, concerning settlement
rebuilding. We believe that "Much caution must be exercised in emulating
programmes that may have worked in one place for another". (Hamdi, 1991:80).
Caution is needed in order not to repeat mistakes made in the 1950's and 1960's
when Western models of planning and construction were imposed through Cold War
politics. It is true that we borrow from each other, but surely by now It is obvious that
imposed Western forms, without alteration or adjustment are simply inappropriate
and only serve those interested in making profit from the misfortune of ordinary
people. In our view, community participation methods and techniques should be
adjusted to the different socio-cultural, economic and political situations not only
between different countries, but also between different communities within anyone
country. We must take our lead from and be accountable to, the 'affected
community'. Thus it is important to work towards strengthening local institutions and
encourage positive governmental attitudes towards participation. It is more Important
to represent pertlcipetlon in a community-state partnership instead of the anti-
governmental image often publicised by internetional NOOs. It is clear that NOOs
can not operate without the established governmental infrastructure in normal
development situations, let alone during or after war. Recent examples of NOOs'
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failure to operate in Somalia, where the Central Government infrastructure has been
severely disrupted, supports this claim 11.
It is refreshing to see that in a recent publication Cuny (1992:24) wrote: "We
have to restructure our thinking about how Governments work and find new ways to
involve NGO's and Governments in a better dialogue". Nevertheless, he still believes
that "This is going to be difficult, given the problems of many of the Governments we
have to deal with in the Third World" (Cuny, 1992:24). Though, he still does not go
into some of the shortcomings of the way NGOs operate.
The Dhamar participation story demonstrated how difficult it Is to implement
reconstruction programmes that draw on a participatory approach, while constrained
by central planning decisions made in the interest of obtaining aid from the West.
"[Central] Planning has tended to be too theoretical, and lacking in real meaning for
the average person whose life it hopes to affect. While community development has
at times been too engrossed in practical local problems, with little if any direct
relation to the overall intention at national level". (United Nations, 1967:4). On the
other hand central planning depends too much on precision and logic, overlooking
the waywardness of the human factor when it comes to implementation and even
more when it comes to feedback and evaluation. Following a disaster and because
of the assumed urgency and great need, community participation, seems from the
planners point of view too relaxed. On a closer look, however, it is easy to see how
these very differences in emphasis, are what makes community participation and
over-all planning complementary or indeed justifies their being considered as two
essential aspects of a single process of development.
We may not be able to rebuild from the ashes without a centralised
decision-making body, but that does not deny and should not preclude the
importance of involving the local communities in the rebuilding of their own
settlements, if only because they possess the essential 'know how'. On the other
hand, this does not mean using 'people's participation' to provide cheap labour to
implement projects imposed from above. And it certainly does not mean avoiding
responsibilities by burdening the people in the name of participation.
This Section seeks to illustrate an approach to reconstruction that allows a
partnership between the state and community to grow. John Turner's concept of
11To assist Noos in the distribution of aid in Somalia the United Nations deployed 50,000 American
and French troops in December 1992.
The role of the State and of the Community.
382
"users decide, sponsors provide", identifies the role of the SUiteas cited by a number
of participation advocates. (Turner, 1976:149). Our examination 80 far shows that
this definition may not be entirely always appropriate in the Middle East context.
Although we see the State's role in reconstruction as an enabler, and facilitator to
help communities rebuild their own settlements, we have to acknowledge the
dominating role of the State. Of course different States emerge from war with
dJfferent needs and, Similarly different communities will have different needs and
abilities to contribute, thus it would not be realistic to suggest that participation is a
'good' and necessary thing in all post-war situations. What we are suggesting Is that,
there are different modes and levels of participation, and one has to consider what
is best for a particular situation.
9.7.2.1. Institutional development: a prerequisite for a sensitive approach
According to Hamdi (1991 :81) "Institutional development is an idea very much
in currency among supporters and funding agencies". However, institutional
development is widely taken to mean building capabilities within government
organisations and institutions and advancing their efficiency in receiving revenues,
managing land and controlling development. What we are seeking is some kind of
institutional development (both formal and Informal institutions) that would allow
some space for participation in the three stages of settlement reconstruction:
formulation, implementation and monitoring. Of course this approach Is not limited
only to structural adjustment pcllctes, but also to attitudinal change on behalf of the
existing organisational structures.
The objective of such development would be to identify altemative institutional
arrangements and attitudes that are able to draw on the experience of different
dJsclplines and can establish direct relationships among officials of the State, ita
professionals, the market, and the community represented by its formal and Informal
organisations.
i. Formal institutions.
1. Concluding that we should not underestimate the role of central government
and its professionals, we recognise, that, no matter how actively citizens are
involved in the action of rebulldlng, they alone will not succeed In rebuilding
war-damaged areas in an attractive, healthy. creative and functional form; free
from poverty and fear, because of the nature of the task of reconstruction which
may not be influenced only by national government decisions but also
international or United Nations decisions (e.g the UN sanctions aginst Iraq).
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2. The State bears a great responsibility to strengthen substantial programmes
designed to create new enterprises and to upgrade the surviving organisations
providing employment, housing, health and welfare services. But these
programmes can only succeed if they can be effectively linked to the real needs
and energies of the citizens. Thus institutional development is needed to
achieve:
Sensitivity. In assessing needs. as well as the potentials of local communities.
Realistic planning, that corresponds to the emerging needs of the post-war
period and to what is affordable and acceptable.
FlexlbUlty, from policies that are should be flexible enough to accept adjustment
based on feed back from experience.
3. We might be seen as an advocate of centralised planning and direct
government intervention in reconstruction. But nevertheless, we are critical of
the excessive bureaucratization and professionalisation of State intervention and
believe that community involvement in reconstruction ideally needs to be
promoted much more vigorously and effectively, because of the many long
term benefits for the community, its settlements and the State. But for the time
being we have to approach it with a realistic and pragmatic view. We may be
able to achieve little, but it should be a steady change for the better.
4. To be able to achieve such institutional development retraining professionals is
essential.
ii. Informal institutions.
1. We have always had the view that, ".. 'settlement reconstruction' is an
'incremental learning process' by local people. who have to learn to 'grow it' for
themselves and thus to 'grow with it'. The product; the 'new' settlement has to
'belong' to those who live in it. This 'sense of place' and people's 'sense of
belonging' to it can only be fully realised over time, but we believe it can be
planted right at the beginning by putting the responsibility with the prospective
lnhebnants through their tnuoluement". (Barekat & Cockburn, 19918:60-65).
2. Such involvement should be built on 'respecting' the existing hierarchical social
and political structures. There is no need to intervene in order to create our
own 'ideal' structure that suits some inevitably Western based concept of
pertlclpetion, in which everybody has to have a voice. In some communities
only the head of the household has a say, in others only the head of the tribe
has. In both cases we should not be tempted to enforce our ide8ls, no matter
how unfair the social structure might seem to us.
3. The development of lnfermel institutions should be based on: (a) Respecting
and strengthening existing ones, such as social coping mechanisms, tribal
systems, religiOUSstructures, etc; and (b) education and public aW8reness to
appreciate the difficult task of national reconstruction and the great role
individuals and families can play.
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9.7.2.2. PeoplesI involvement in the different stages of reconstruction.
Our investigations of the Dherner Self-help programme showed that despite the
fact of limited involvement of the local communities in reconstruction, a number of
advances were apparent to the author, though they had little to do with the biased
feedback presented by the IHS's reports. Thus we suggest that every effort should
be made by central government to involve the people in the reconstruction process.
Such involvement should be seen as part of an established national reconstruction
policy. They can take part in the formuletion of the reconstruction plans, their
implementation and evaluation of the results.
1. Formuletion.
During the formulation of reconstruction policies, peoples' inputs have to be
considered, and this could be done either indirectly or directly et the different steges
of needs assessment; esteblishing feeslbllity; reconstruction priorities end finally
design.
Indirect participation Is the minimum form of involvement In the process thet
has to be achieved in all reconstruction programmes. For instance, the minimum is
to involve the affected communities at the stage of assessing the needs and losses.
An involvement that would inevitably maximise the sensitivity of reconstruction
policies to the locel conditions. This could be done indirectly through employing
sensitive qualitative techniques elong side the quentitative ones. For this purpose
retraining professionals might be necessary. This kind of participation can be
echleved by e step by step epproech:
• 'Walking through': actually visiting the damaged areas, understanding the locel
culture by talking to the survivors, observing the environmentel end economic
structure, as well ss the immediete needs and the scale of damage.
• Conducting meetings with groups of people. This Is e more advanced method
of indirect involvement in the formulation of reconstruction policies. It could
eesily be carried out in an informed etmosphere.
• Organising community development group., could be the most advanced
method to Involve people, through their representeucn, while respecting the
local IOcio-power structure.
Direct partiCipation at the stege of formulation of reconstruction policies and
plans may prove to be much more problemetic end in some cases impossible at first,
due to the reasons we discussed earlier. However, assuming that participation Is an
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objective desired by the State. one of the major deterrents is likely to be
communication. In order for the local inhabitants to participate effectively without
misunderstanding the professionals (who usually use their own vocabulary). people
need more time and education to assimilate and the professionals need more training
in communication skills. At this stage. involvement can be attempted in one or more
of the following ways:
• Establishing feaSibility: Assessing the feasibility of planned intervention is the
first step in which a community can be involved.
• Defining prlorltles: Identifying priorities for reconstruction. is a step in which
community input is crucial. For instance. a number of studies have shown that
shelter often comes as the forth or fifth priority to people affected by a disaster
or war. (see Aysan (, Oliver 1987; Masri. 1991).
• Designing poucies. Involving communities in designing reconstruction policies
or strategies might be impossible. However. they could start by being involved
in the design of local neighbourhoods and shelter. "This type of participation
can be facilitated by the skilful use of scale models. drawings. competitions.
posters. 'comic books' and video tapes" (Wegge. 1983:7). However. as it is
difficult for laymen to visualise the out come of two dimensional blue prints. the
encouragement of community representatives to make study visits to different
sites where they can talk to the residents. might be the best means. A major
deterrent is the fact that the State usually wants to provide a 'product' rather
than a 'process' for development.
At this point. it is necessary to note that direct participation in the formulation
of reconstruction plans is particularly needed during the restoration and
reconstruction of war damaged settlements. Existing structures. both physical and
social. have to be supported and It may become necessary. for instance to evacuate
a particular area or to rehouse some families. greater involvement of the people could
better ensure their rights and help to reduce any friction. when it comes to
implementation.
ii. Implementation.
The direct participation of local people in the physical implementation of a
reconstruction programme might prove to be the easiest thing to do (eg. clearing the
rubble. building houses. skilled and unskilled labour. etc.). However. it is important
to draw attention to the fact that direct partiCipation in implementation could take
other forms beside labour input. such as participation in a management role.
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• Labour Input: "Labour input can vary from as little as an individual putting
finishing touches on his house to as much as groups carrying out Infrastructure
work" (Wegge, 1983:8). A number of studies have pointed out the relation
between labour input and cost reduction as well as good maintenance.
However, such involvement could easily be turned into exploitation. It may be
easier to start with the involvement of people in the construction of their houses,
than in the construction of community services or Infrastructure In order to
restore some sort of normality.
• Management: Participation in management during implementation does not
only help in developing the project, but can also be an important means for
initiating self-motivated development. It is up to officials and professionals to
realise some degree of participation In the management process. However, this
is often hindered by the fact that reconstruction is mainly seen as a construction
project, in which meeting schedules is very important. 'Working together' in
managing the implementation can also include: beneficiary selection, provision
of construction sites, participation In skills development, supervision, issuing
and supplying building materials and continuous feedback.
• Enablement: This, we are so often told, is the ideal role for govemment or the
outside intervenor: to enable the people to rebuild their lives. However, an
enabling role makes a number of assumptions that have legal and financial
implications that have to be addressed.
iii. Evaluation and Monitoring.
Following the implementation of each stage of reconstruction, feedback Is vital
for the design and implementation of the following stage. Our examination so far,
showed how monitoring and feedback are concepts lacking in the reconstruction
management models currently employed in the Middle East.
What we mean by monitoring Is very different from the usual evaluation reports
and mission statements that tend to be exclusively concemed with measurable
performance. It may seem ironic that Intelligence Departments and Military Police
divisions can and do gather detailed Information while other govemment's
departments such as housing and development are unaware of people's reaction
towards the provided reconstruction programmes (I have In mind the case of
Dhamar; Yemen and Feo, Iraq).
The creation of a monitoring function could benefit from involving the
community Itself.
• •••
This Chapter showed how important it is to define specific state/community
post-war relationships. They would differ from one country to another and from one
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conflict to another. The key issue, however, is to understand and operate within the
existing traditional formal and informal structures, which can provide us with valuable
insights into the nature and extent of people's involvement in reconstruction. The
coming Chapter (10) concludes this study by pulling together the arguments and
conclusions from our previous discussions.
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION: THE YORK CHARTER,
A STEPPING STONE TOWARDS COMMON IDEAS.
10.1. INTRODUCTION.
At an earlier stage of this work, three main areas of concern in relation to
studying the rebuilding of settlements after war were identified, namely: (a) Lack of
specialised knowledge on the subject; (b) States being irresponsible in their attitude
towards rebuilding settlements; and (c) absence of international interest and
commitment to the issue of reconstruction. As we reviewed the existing literature and
examined specific case-studies, it became clear that if the rebuilding of human
settlements after war is to be, in any way, responsive to the real needs of the people,
immediate action is needed to bridge the gaps apparent within those three areas of
influence.
Thus, it was felt that the knowledge acquired so far in this research should be
presented in a way that sows the seeds for an urgently needed considered philosophy
of reconstruction. Such philosophy would establish the general framework of
recommendations for reconstruction that ought to be respected nationally and
internationally. Furthermore, it should be based on the moral conviction that says,
the innocent victims will be fully compensated and their local communities
reconstructed. In other words, the aim of such philosophy should be to aenoe a set
of recommendations by which it Is possible to speed the recouery of the 'surulvors'
and to "rebuild' settlements In a post-war context, where the local organisational,
social and cultural structures are disrupted, and where many resources are In short
supply, while at the same time, allowing the Slate to meet Its Immediate political
needs from reconstruction, without lnmctlng a negatlue soclo-culturai Impact on
society. Furthermore, In order for these recommendations to be widely disseminated
and hopefully, eventually respected, we have summarised them in a Charter that
builds on previous United Nations work in this field.
The aim of this Chapter is to pull together the conclusions of previous
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discussions. It willdo so in six Sections. The first summaries the previous Chapters,
highlighting a number of General Conclusions that have to do with war and
subsequent reconstruction. The following Section will present some
recommendations using the 1976 UN·Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements,
as a general framework. In the expectation of promoting better dissemination of
'good-practice', the third Section will put those recommendations in the form of a
Reconstruction After War Charter. In this Section the Charter and the stages of its
progress will be reviewed. The fourth Section draws attention to some cautionary
remarks to do with post-war reconstruction research in general and the applicability
of the Reconstruction Charter in particular. Finally some suggestions on future
research.
10.2. GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
In the absence of hard data, Chapter 1 was presented as a number of working
hypotheses, which best defined the author's stand concerning the dilemma of war,
peace and development. Itwas suggested that war is directly related to development
in both, developed and developing countries. Developing countries continue to spend
an estimated 200 billion dollars a year on their armed forces. In the developed
countries the production of arms is supporting a considerable section of their
economies, while the consumption of these weapons in the South, suggests that too
many 'small' conflicts are due to the failure of fair economic and social development
policies, at both national and international levels.
The theoretical background of the study of reconstruction after war was
reviewed, making a number of speculations on why the issue of war and the
subsequent reconstruction has been neglected by intemational disaster research.
Accepting the similarities that have been identified between natural and war disasters,
this Chapter argued that being too much dependence on natural disasters literature,
could be misleading. Thus, it attempted to understand war by formulating a general
framework, based on identifying a number of dimensions in which war is different
from natural disasters and that can be used to 'measure' war. It highlighted the fact
that war has always played 8 part in human history, and whether we like it or not, it
has a feeling of horrible 'normality'. Therefore, reconstruction should be looked at
in a similar way and an international mechanism should be established to address
such 'normal' needs. Chapter 1 ended with the issue of war vulnerability, claiming
that it is very difficult to assess the scale of vulnerability and subsequently to take
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mitigating measures against possible war damage, simply because the means of
destruction are being constantly updated. Also the somewhat predictable nature of
natural disasters is not the case with wars. Though some would argue that even there
we could be better prepared to take preventative action, however, there are a number
of measures that can be taken to reduce damage, in areas of social, cultural,
economic and ideological vulnerability.
Having briefly analyzed armed conflicts and their different dimensions, Chapter
2 explored some of the effects of war and stages of recovery. Citing that though no
two wars are alike, in terms of their effects, we distinguished the effects of war into
three main categories recognising in practice they overlap: immediate impact,
indirect effects and side effects. To plan reconstruction we presented an integral
picture of the impact of war on the four responsibilities of a stable State: the
community, the government, the market and the environment (built: housing in
particular and ecological). The impact of the different bounds of a society were
reviewed. A particular emphasis was given to the psychological effect of war and to
the issue of refugees and displaced people.
Finally, Chapter 2 reviewed the different stages of recovery after war through
introducing the concept of a war sub-culture. It cited that social preparedness is
more likely in the case of war than in other types of disasters. Soon after the war
starts, people will develop their own ways of dealing with the sacrifices demanded of
them, they will eventually become used to lower standards of living, in their efforts
to survive. War subculture is not only about 'preparing' for and 'surviving' the war;
the strengthening and rebuilding of social relations is usually one of the positive
outcomes of going through hard times together and this is why war survivors should
not be looked upon as helpless in the reconstructing of their homes.
The gathered experiences in Chapters 3 & 4 identified a number of common
issues and dilemmas, in an attempt to cover some of the gaps in the knowledge of
reconstruction after war, which existed due to. (1) lack of documents on the subject;
(2) the fact that it is difficult to depend on the available literature. which mostly deals
with the aftermath of the Second World War in Europe; (3) the absence of a
satisfactory conceptual framework for the study of reconstruction after war. Thus the
experience of post-war reconstruction in 30 countries was reviewed. 16 of which were
after the 2WW. These experiences were evaluated and grouped under 'main
headings' of issues, which must be considered when formulating I nltlonal
reconstruction strategy (In Chapter 3) and issues that should also be observed during
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the process of reconstruction, in order to reduce possible undesirable outcomes. (in
Chapter 4). It was concluded that reconstruction is unlikely to be fully controllable
by the State, there are a number of factors that will inevitably regulate, and in some
cases dictate, the reconstruction strategy and its outcome, the intermittent recurrence
of attacks; government policles and resources; international political pressure; the
economics of reconstruction; and the social and psychological impact of war.
Three observations are evident from past-experiences relating to national
reconstruction strategies: 1) the need for a national strategy directly depends on the
nature of the war itself and the extent of the damage inflicted on the society; 2)
establishing a strategy requires a long time, as lengthy and arduous debates are
bound to erupt, particularly where different political parties and social groups, are
involved; 3) whlle each nation's strategy for post-war reconstruction, may be unique
and relevant to that country only, a framework might be developed that is common
to most if not all post-war nations. However, in order to formulate a national strategy
a number of 'good practice' issues should be considered: Administration and
organisation; damage assessment and resource evaluation; defining goals, objectives
and priorities; reconstruction and development; resource mobilisation; centralisation
versus local decision-making; timing of actions and phases of reconstruction;
training, education and research. Upon reflection it has to be admitted at this stage
of our research that most of them seem like common sense.
At the planning level, the issues that were argued varied from, whether the
planner should view post war reconstruction as a 'crisis' or an 'opportunity', to,
whether to replicate that which existed before the war or reform the environment.
These issues were categorised under the following headings: conservation of cultural
heritage; public and private roles and investments; housing and infrastructure
provision; legislation; attracting back pre-war population and issues concerning
settlements; reconstruction and civil defence; environmental problems and solutions.
Over Implementation, a number of arguments were put forward, concerning:
local needs assessment; the promotion of local participation; compensation; speed
of reconstruction; building techniques; quality control; monitoring and evaluation, and
finally the role of the media. Those arguments were the seed knowledge towards
developing the forthcoming reconstruction recommendations.
A deSCription of the research methods adopted by the author through out his
studies was presented in Chapter 5. It discussed. besides the literature survey and
research methods used during field work in four countries (Iraq. Iran, Yemen and
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Northern Ireland) a number of workshops, conferences and short courses that have
acted as 'Ieamlng tools' for the author. The author devised appropriate data
collection techniques that satisfied the different explorative and descriptive needs of
each case. These techniques were dependent on (a) being socially acceptable (b)
being innovative (c) using locally available resources; (d) making and taking
opportunities; (e) using locally acceptable practices.
Chapter 5 was concluded by listing a number of observations conceming the
research and research methods on the subject of reconstruction after war, in the hope
that by considering some of thole observations, researchers can In the future carry
on with further studies on this important topic in a more effective way.
Chapter 6, 7 and 8 presented the field work carried out in Basrah and Feo,
Dhernar and Belfast, respectively. Each case~tudy had its own objectives and
supports one part or more of the main hypothesis of this dissertation. In conSidering
the reconstruction experience of Iraq in Chapter 6, the emphasis was on aspects of
decision-making and implementation of reconstruction at a national strategy level,
based on a short term evaluation using the 11 Principles of Reconstruction derived
in 1989. The extreme centralization of decisions and the marginalization of the local
inhabitants resultd in the unsatisfactory outcome of the reconstruction of Fao city.
Attention was drawn to make governments more relponlible and responslve to the
real needs of war suffering people.
Chapter 7 examined the post-earthquake reconstruction projects carried out in
Dherner, Yemen between (1982-1991). This time our examination exceeded
reconstruction policies to look into the detailed process of reconstruction
implementation by contractors and the long term results of such processes on the
reconstructed settlements. More than 50 settlements were visited and a detailed
evaluation was presented, based on feedback given by the local inhabitants nine
year. later.
The contractor built housing programme in Yemen demonstrated how the i.sue
of post-disaster reconstruction is not just a simple matter of constructing reinforced
houses. Our research questioned the value of delivering thousands of earthquake-
resistant houses that do not correspond to the local soclo-cultural and economic
reality. These houses have not served their intended purpose; to shelter people as
quickly as possible and to reduce their future vulnerability. The reconstructed
settlements suffer from a number of misjudgments and unrealistic assumptions that
were made at both policy and implementation levels. In defence it has to be said that
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governments, such as the Yemen, have very little leverage in these situations and
usually have to be satisfied with what they are offered - no matter how inappropriate.
Realism was the key concept concluded from this case. It was argued that
reconstruction and the incorporation of mitigation measures have to be faced in the
following ways: (I) realistic assessments of the real needs of the people, their
priorities and expectations, rather than the 'assumed ones' by distant professionals
and foreign intervenors; (2) when estimating the needed reconstruction resources,
regional and local should be included as well as central, including the people's own
abilities to reconstruct their dwellings; (3) realistic appreciation of differences between
urban and rural; (4) the assumed e!flclency of employing foreign contractors Is a
myth; (5) realistic standards of safety, mean there will always be a certain degree of
risk attached to building in earthquake zones. Safety standards should be based on
available, affordable and culturally acceptable measures; (6) Organlsatlonaldemands
and responsibilities must be based on local experience; newly-established emergency
bodies should co-ordinate existing implementing bodies, not set up another one; (7)
realistic appreciation of the dynamics of reconstruction. Rebuilding settlements and
mitigation should be seen as a complex, multidimensional process. Thus policies
have to be flexible enough to accept alteration and adjustment based on continuous
genuine feed back from the field; (8) plans for reconstruction must be made taking
account of the real nature of foreign aid and intervention.
Chapter 8, was dedicated to look at the issue of war and reconstruction in a
totally alien context for the author: Belfast, Northern Ireland. Following an extensive
debate, Chapter 8 concluded by listing a number of lessons or themes learned form
the experience of Belfast and can be adapted somewhere else. These themes were:
(1) The effects of war and civil strife could go beyond physical damage to influence
planning and the built environment in the long term and thus to affect the socio-
cultural structure of a particular society; (2) Centralisation seems to replace local
decision in planning and development in time ofwar, even in a country as democratic
as the United Kingdom; (3) Inan ethnically divided community reconstruction should
be used as an Instrument of integration; (4) 'Centrally controlled participation' is
being practised in Belfast and it has shown some positive effects in terms of
improving the reconstructed environment; (5) the Belfast experience supports the
8rgument that reconstruction of housing should be looked at 8S 8 process and not a
finished product; (6) The anti-terrorist defences section of this Chapter showed how
it is becoming more and more difficult to protect against bomb damage.
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Nevertheless, the Belfast experience showed that a number of defence measures can
be incorporated in the design of buildings and In the layout of housing estates to
reduce the degree of damage caused by bombing; (7) A number of conclusions in
relation to damage compensation were reached; and finally (8) It was concluded that
it is possible for reconstruction and development to be used to achieve a balance
between the realistic needs of the inhabitants and the State's immediate political
needs.
Chapter 9 suggested a model of looking at reconstruction as a partnership
between the state and the local communities. It maintained that there is a need to
address two types of audience, who, beside local communities, are the main actors
in reconstruction, in an attempt to influence their attitudes towards post-war people
participation in reconstruction. On the one hand Central Governments, need to know
that the involvement of the people in reconstruction is crucial, and that this
involvement if directed in a proper way, will not necessarily undermine their authority.
On the other hand International Agencies and national NOOs need to appreciate the
fact that they can not achieve much without the Involvement of Central Government.
They have to be realistic in their attitude towards demanding direct grass-roots
Involvement in reconstruction. They need to join efforts to help governments to
change their attitudes too, and never portray themselves in an anti-governmental
way.
10.3. SOME RECONSTRUCTION RECOMMENDATIONS.
Having looked at a number of reconstruction case studies, it was recognised
that the nation State, as well as the international NOOs could use reconstruction, as
a powerful Instrument, that does not necessarily support the real needs of the people
suffering from war damage. Thus, It was felt that It Is crucial for any reconstruction
recommendations given by us to build on already existing, and internationally
respected Human settlement principles and recommendations, which hold States
responsible for and accountable to their communities, and emphasises the
international responsibility towards human suffering from war, no matter where they
are. This feeling is strengthened by the current development In the role of the United
Nations as a liberation force (eg. Kuwait 1991); a peace keeping force (eg. Lebanon;
Croatia and Bosnia 1992/3; Kampuchea 1992. etc.) and an aid relief force (eg.
Somalia) that might be developed into concern with post-war reconstruction (a small
UNDP-UNCHS reconstruction programme Is being conducted In Afghanistan).
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Note that in this Section we are using the phrase recommendation and not
guideline or principle. This is because we do not believe in establishing a
reconstruction 'cookbook', but rather a set of nutritious recommendations based on
the body of knowledge and insight derived from this dissertation and in conformity
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vancouver Declaration on
Human Settlements I.
The Declaration of Human Rights is specifically used in this Chapter to derive
a set of Entitlements of Civiliannon-combatant suffering from war damage to his/her
physical environment, while the structure and content of the Declaration on Human
Settlements is used as a general framework within which we will place our
reconstruction recommendations, building upon the two direct references to
reconstruction in:2
(1) Recommendation B.13 "Planning for temporary human settlements should
provide for community needs, and the integration of such
settlements, where appropriate, into the permanent
network of settlements"; and
(2) Recommendation B.14 "Planning for human settlements should avoid known
hazards which could lead to natural disaster. The
planning of reconstruction after natural or man-made
disasters should be used as an opportunity to improve
the quality of the whole settlement, its functional and
spatial pattern and environment".
Our recommendations shall cover eight areas: (a) reconstruction policies and
strategies; (b) national economic recovery; (c) social and psychological aspects; (d)
public participation; (e) settlement reconstruction planning; (f) institutions and
management; (g) shelter, infrastructure and services and finally (h) legislation and
issues of land. Of course, the author is aware of the fact that the forthcoming
recommendations would require further editing using intemationally accepted
legislative language.
I United Nations (1948) UniverSa, DeclaraUon of Human Rights. Final Authorized Text, United
Nations Office of Public Information, DPI/15·September 1983, reprinted in UN, New York, August 1988.
2 From the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements. Vancouver. 1976, came a
comprehensive plan for national action to improve the quality of life in human settlements. This action
plan was adopted by delegates of the 132 state attended the Conference and embodied 64
recommendations.
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10.3.A. Reconstruction poUdes and strategies.
A.1. • Countries involved in ermed conflicts should establish es e metter of urgency,
a national strategy on the reconstruction of war-damaged settlements,
embodying the sheltering of refugees and displaced people, end other related
economic and soda I activities within their natIonal territory.
i- Such e stretegy should be based on Internationally accepted human rights
end settlement decleretlon.
ii- It is Important to recognise that difficult choices may have to be made
between conflicting requirements, such as defence and reconstruction.
iii- A national strategy should enjoy a firm political commitment and be
supported by public understanding.
iv- Such strDtegy should be based on e notlonal assessment of the extent of
damege to the economy, infrastructure and settlements. Equally
important is to have an overall evaluation of the surviving resources and
the conditions of the people.
v- It should be devised to facilitate the economic, social, cultural and
physical revival of war damaged settlements, focusing on the central role
of the survivors as agents for reconstruction.
vi- It should take Into account the national as well as the international
economic and political constraints.
vii- It should recognise the feet that it may take years or even decades for a
settlement to be totally reconstructed after the devestation of wer.
A.2. • A national lettlement reccnstructlen strategy should be an integral pert of a
national economic and social post-war development polley. Governments
should attempt to review and adjust their pre-war development policies,
interrupted by the war, rather than drawing new reconstruction and
development plans.
i- It should be formulated through a genuine interdisciplinary approach.
li- A national strategy has to be supported at the highest political level while
being formulated In co-ordtnatlcn with regional and local planning levels.
iii- A Settlement reconstruction .trategy has to tlJke Into account all
settlements affected by the war, rural and urban, dispersed and
concentrated, old and new.
lv- It has to be directed at all section of the society that have suffered from
the war regerdless of ethnic origin, poUtJcal stend, etc.
v- It has to be con.lltent with the need for prelervation and r.ltoration of
settlements with cultural and/or architectural interest damaged by war.
Also with the need to protect the natural environment.
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vi- A national strategy needs to take into account the social and economic
changes in society due to the war, i.e. the emerging war sub-culture.
A.3. • A netlonel reconstruction strategy should have clear goals and objectives,
concentrating on key issues and provide basic direction for action.
i- It is important that reconstruction goals can be read in their economic,
political, ideological, social, cultural, etc. constructs.
li- To implement such goals, however, they have to be composed into
workable, feasible, and specific objectives at social, sectoral, and
territorial levels, covering all spheres of the society's political economy.
iii- To achieve these objectives they have to be arranged in order of priority,
reflecting immediate needs, long-term goals, and/or availability of
resources.
iv- In setting objectives, the government should be realistically modest and
not utopian, accounting for resources, needs, perceptions, expectations,
potentialities, and constraints. More importantly there is a need to be
realistic in terms of accounting for global trends as well as international
and national constraints and opportunities.
A.4 .• The reviving of war stricken settlements must receive higher priority in the
allocation of available resources, which ought to be identified, mobilised and
carefully distributed between the various components of the reconstruction
strategy, In particular human capacities.
t- In order to better identify reconstruction resources both existing and
potential, it is helpful to think of resources in terms of their types: (1)
human; (2) material or physical; (3) services and (4) financial or credit.
Ii- Subsequently each resource should be identified in terms of its immediate
and long-term use possibilities. Thus determining its (a) quality; (b)
amount; (c) distribution; (d) cost; (e) function; (f) ease of use and (g)
impact. In cases of lack of one kind of resources emphases should be put
on other kinds, for instance in case of lack of financial resources labour
intensive activities should be given priority. This would not only remove
bottle necks but.will also 'provide badly needed jobs.
iii- Indigenous resources must be distinguished from external resources and
emphesised. The latter must be carefully identified in terms of the
foregoing characteristics, their national origins, and the conditions
attached to their purchase, transfer or adaptation.
lv- Allocation of resources must always be approached with a view to
improving effiCiency and eccountabiUty.
v- Inter-regional solidarity should be organised end encouraged between
regions that have suffered from the war end those thet have not.
Similarly, twining between cities should be part of such policy.
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vi- Self-reliance in reconstruction should be encouraged, and the role that
could be played by the private sector should be enhanced.
vii- The development of new sources of finance to be made available for the
people to rebuild their own houses, based on suitable terms and
conditions.
viii- Priority should be given to research in the development of resources.
building materials, technologies, energy, etc.
ix- Special attention should be given to training issues and to what could be
named as reconstruction education;
x- In addition, reconstruction education should facilitate technical training for
ex-service men to equip them with skills that could help In transferring
them from fighters to builders, thus making their future employment
easier.
A.5. • Any national reconstruction strategy must be explicit, comprehensive and
designed according to a realistic appreciation of the dynamics of reconstruction.
Rebuilding settlements should be seen as a complex, multidimensional process.
Thus pollcles have to be flexible enough to accept alteration and adjustment
based on continuous genuine feedback from the field.
i- It is important for reconstruction strategy to anticipate failure and act
accordingly.
H- Such a strategy requires continuous evaluation based on genuine
feedback from the inhabitants, hence comes the Importance of co-
operation and participation of all sectors of the population.
iii- Thus, the so-called 'controlled decentralisation' has to come into
existence. Controlled decentralisation is seen as a half-way solution that
could meet the needs of the central body and to lome extent that of the
local people.
iv- The best time to plan reconstruction Is during the war so that the nation
is prepared for considerable start in reconstruction activity when the war
is over.
v- Gradual reconstruction, allows more space for local people to participate
and most importantly, it helps in developing the much needed local skills.
thus leaving less need to rely on outside help.
vl- Cultural pollcles have to be thought out carefully. Part of these pollcles
are concerned with preserving cultural and physical symbols that will
allow cultural continuity. More importantly, cultural pollcles promoting
peace, tolerance and mutual understanding through education are needed.
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A.6. • Governments should monitor and continuously evaluate the conditions of the
reconstructed settlements as integral part of the reconstruction strategy.
i- Reconstruction should be carefully documented and evaluated and results
published periodically in various forms and places.
11- This Is needed for a better management of reconstruction and for the
transfer of the experience to the general public (to encourage
participation), academic communities (for theoretical development), and
to practitioners in other countries and in the future.
iii- The evaluation and documentation of reconstruction plays a crucial role
in assessing the long-term implications of reconstruction on the socio-
cultural and economic life of the community.
iv- It is essential to establish an independent national body with the task of
monitoring the reconstructed settlements, assessing the potentials, social
and environmental costs and benefits of alternative reconstruction plans.
v- Field evaluation is best carried out as an independent component in all
major reconstruction programmes.
vi- The national monitoring body should be responsible for the
documentation and analysis of studies. It should also be able to
disseminate the results to other concerned institutions in order for them
to be able to adjust future reconstruction plans.
10.3.B. National economic aspects of reconstruction.
B.l. .It is crucial to recognise the fact that unlike most natural disasters, war affects
the economy of the entire country. Thus, post-war reconstruction is dependent
on the state of the national economy following war.
l- However, the state of economy is dependent on a number of factors: 1)
pre-war economic conditions; 2) the extent of damage to economic
installations and the degree of opportunity and productivity losses; 3) the
potential for revival of the economy; 4) the availability of national and
international resources; 5) the degree of adaptation needed as a result of
population displacement; mortality and occupation of territories .
•
if· Wars generate budget deficit next to a huge private liquidity, inflation.
unemployment, and poverty among other problems.
iii- Wars do not just destroy part of what exists; they also prevent a society
from making new investments, to utilise its production capacities and
resources, and to develop its skills and technical capabilities. This proves
the strong relation that should exist between reconstruction and
development. Therefore, developmental reconstruction should not be
concerned with damaged items but deficits that will remain after
rebuilding all destroyed structures.
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B.2. • The reconstruction of the economy is a pre-requisite for physical
reconstruction (housing, Infrastructure, etc.). It is important to recognise that
by supporting the economy, governments will be producing wealth that will
initiate recovery initiatives, thus taking pressure off the public sector.
B.3. • Post-war governments will be faced with the task of creating sound economic
policies that are directed towards generating higher public revenues, redirecting
the wandering cash towards more productive use, encouraging investment,
creating jobs, and undertaking redistributive reforms.
j- Reestablishing security is crucial for this to happen.
B.4. • It is important to counter the intensification and acceleration of economic
tendencies operative during the war, into the post-war era.
i- One of these tendencies can be observed in the industrial sector which,
due to tariff and trade barriers, is likely to have shifted emphasis from
export to the home market, consideration that must be addressed
following a war.
ll- Another tendency could be the central government's approach to provide
people from the war damaged areas with direct contributions of cash and
food, etc. This approach could be expected to change once the war is
over, and the government should shift emphasis from direct contributions
to individuals, to revitalising the economy of war-damaged regions by
improving the economic infrastructure, activating productive sectors, and
creating employment.
iii- This issue is more urgent to consider in countries where there is little or
no infrastructure that is needed to distribute income or even aid (eg.
social security). Thus, the only way for money directly to reach the
people would be through labour intensive projects and this requires a
healthy economic system offering job opportunities. This would also help
in controlling levels of inflation and consumption.
B.5 .• Before the preparation and Implementation of post-war reconstruction plans,
the general economic ground must be surveyed afresh, and agreements as to
what is needed and how it should be planned for, must be accomplished.
i- This involves a new Investigation and analysis of facts and a
comprehensive study of traditional habits, customs and ideas.
ii- Immediately following war, there is a need for the collection of statistics
on a nationwide scale in order to identify areas of urgent economic and
social problems aswell as to update knowledge on the resources available
for the country and the conditions of its people.
iIi- There are five categories in which variou. kind. of .tati.tics need to be
gathered, which can be applied to the measurement of economic trends
and used in the assessment of the success rate of economic policies of
reconstruction of war damaged areas: (1) employment; (2) national
product; (3) national expenditure, (4) prices and (5) finance and money
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supply.
lv- It is important to keep up-to-date information and statistics during the
different stages of reconstruction planning and implementation.
B.6. • One of the major requirements for a smoother return to economic activity in
the post-war era Is, a careful control of the monetary system to prevent
unemployment and high inflation. This objective could be achieved through,
both, taxation (on those who benefited from the war) and incentives (to those
who lost).
B.7. • Experience gained from reconstruction after war indicates that the most
healthy, most simple and practical way of creating quick employment is
activating the construction industry which includes the production of building
materials, contractors and builders.
i- Reviving the construction industry will create immediate employment to
able-bodied persons, generate income, stimulate people to improve their
own environments and encourage young people to enter technical
vocations.
10.3.C. Social and psychological aspects.
C.l. • People are the principal factor in recovery and reconstruction. During war the
survival of people must be induced, facilitated and planned as the foundation
of reconstruction and development.
i- Hence the importance of the provision of civil defence mechanisms and
war shelters.
C.2 .• Following survival a number of steps have to be taken in order to enrich and
improve the society and its ability to contribute to the reconstruction efforts.
Thus the whole reconstruction process should be seen as a means by which
exalted human values should be enhanced. As such the government's
responsibility does not end with reconstruc:tion of the city's physical structures
and/or infrastructural system.
i- This consideration is particularly important if we are to change the
conventional attitude of viewing the survivors as reclplents of aid, rather
than as agents of development.
C.3 .• There are a number of social needs that would have developed exclusively
due to the war and its consequences. Some urgent pollcles, concepts, schemes
and institutions have to be formulated to provide the necessary support to those
who have suffered in the war.
i- InphYlical reconstruction thole poliCies should include new building code
regulations and modification of the existing structures to accommodate
this population.
ll- The physically and mentally injured population, amongst whom are the
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disabled war veterans and ex-servicemen.
iii- Often war victims include children, and thus special policies and
institutions are needed to care for them.
C.4. • Dealing with refugees is another important aspect of reconstruction and social
development. Policies that make the refugee population and other war-inflicted
groups become used into the victim's mentality and lead to their increased
dependency on the state must be avoided. Rather, they should be provided
with start up capital, technical assistance, and social support to begin a new
life.
l- Such incentives are particularly critical for those who wish to return to
their war-shattered residences. Assistance might be given to them for
housing provision and job creation.
ll- The critical point to remember is that the state's policies should lead to
increasing affordability of the war-inflicted families rather than their
dependency. Clearly, the state must be ready to provide housing for
those who otherwise will be left homeless.
C.5. • Conflicts introduce levels of psychological stress which often inhibit rational
or responsible behaviour by populations. Oood will disappears in time of
conflict. Memory and interest in the past may be lost or seen as undesirable.
Social behaviour may breakdown and introduce consequent destructive actions,
such as looting.
i- Very little can be done to alter the psychological state of communities in
times of conflict except to remove the source of stress.
jj- It is important however for those who intervene to recognise the likelihood
and nature of irrational or conflictual contact.
iii- Recognition of the importance of involving the survivors in reconstruction
as one kind of therapy.
10.3.D. PubUc participation.
D.1. • Public participation in decision making is a human right. a political duty and
an instrument essential for post-war reconstruction. It has to be understood and
respected internally and never Imposed by an outsider or an international
agency. Thus it is important to work towards strengthening local institutions
and encouraging positive governmental attitudes towards participation.
i- Within a post-war context it is crucial to represent participation In a
community-state partnership rather than the anti-governmental image
often publicised by international NOO•.
ii- It is clear that NOOs failed to operate without the established
governmental infrastructure during or after war situations.
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0.2. • World-wide experience suggest the existence of a number of linkages between
involving the local population and resolving issues that are exclusive to post-
war reconstruction.
i- In a rapidly changing 'world order', public participation in reconstruction
can be used as a controlled, but progressive action towards democracy.
u- Public participation in reconstruction would encourage international aid
and development agencies to participate in the reconstruction process.
iii- Participation would ernpheslse the social solidarity that would have
already been established between individuals and families of a community
during war.
iv- Approaching reconstruction in a partnership with the local communities
and the private sector would facilitate the task of achieving
comprehensive reconstruction.
v- The greater the role of the survivors in different reconstruction activities,
the greater the chance of a rapid psychological recovery.
vi- Public participation is the only way of achieving cultural continuity in the
reconstructed settlements.
vii- Participation is crucial for its role in enabling the people to manage and
look after their own environment. Subsequently, to achieve sustainable
reconstruction.
0.3 .• Public participation as a 'means' of improving reconstruction policies should
be encouraged to constitute an integral element in the planning, implementation
and evaluation of such policies as well as in the future management of the
reconstructed settlements.
i- Particular attention should be paid to the definition of the role of public
participation as a technical tool to mobilize human resources badly
needed following a war, when financial and social ones are scarce.
ll- Sensitivity and realism in assessing needs, planning and implementing
reconstruction are prerequisites for public participation.
0.4. • It is clear that participation embodies a number of benefits and limitations to
the reconstruction process. Thus, the mode, nature and extent of public
participation must respond to the newly emerging social, political, cultural and
economic needs of post-war societies and states.
i- It is much more difficult to apply the notion of paructpetlon in a
reconstruction context, particularly post war, than it is in small
development projects.
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ii- Still it is not impossible to reach a pragmatic kind of participation. Such
participation requires changing in attitudes at the intermediate level of
State employed technically oriented professionals. In other words,
'development by education'.
10.3.E. Settlement reconstruction planning
E.l. • A broad-based settlement planning system seems Indispensable for the post-
war reconstruction. Otherwise, the risk of chaos, duplication, and wasteful use
of scarce and valuable resources would be high. Such system should occur
within a general social and economic reconstruction framework.
1- Settlement planning should be geared to long term development.
ii- Special emphasis should be placed on the recognition of the difficulties
inherent in a truly comprehensive approach for reconstruction planning
and the need to evolve and employ suitable methods and procedures.
iii- Settlement planning as a continuing process must be effectively linked to
institutions which implement the actual reconstruction.
E.2. • A purely planned approach to reconstruction is neither possible nor desirable
as it encourages bureaucratic red tape and inflexibility no matter how
decentralized it might be. Similarly, it is unrealistic to expect the market
mechanism to reconstruct on its own.
i- Existing planning procedures should be reviewed with the aim of making
the process less bureaucratic, In some cases legislations and plans have
to be quick enough to actually catch up with the speedy return of the
populatlon, even if it was on the cost of professional perfection.
ii- Although it is important to have a general planning framework, within this
framework the market mechanism should be allowed to rebuild itself.
iii- Mixed approach for the implementation of reconstruction programmes is
the most attractive proposition. There is no fixed formula for such a mix
as the amount of the Ingredients in the mix could vary from case to case
and time to time. However, 1.lue. such ai, the degree of burden of the
public sector and the dominating ideological and political structure, as
well as the availability of private resources for Investment influence the
formula of such mixture. The private sector could be encouraged in areas
of attractive investment opportunities, requiring moderate investment with
high returns.
E.3. • Planning for reconstruction and managing resources and implementation
without a proper assessment could lead to a waste of resources and long-term
social problems within the community.
i· Traditional ways of surveying people's needs, depending mainly on
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collecting quantltatlve data suffers from a number of shortcomings. which
means that the type of information collected does not reflect the real
needs of the local population.
ii- Recently. communication skills of assessors have been given a great
importance. Damage assessment should go beyond counting destroyed
structures and the number of death and injuries. to determine the extent
of damage. type, importance to the local communities, ownership, local
priorities for reconstruction, and most importantly, opportunities and
difficulties of replacement, and flnancial value.
iii- Damage and needs assessments have to be thorough and frank, without
minimizing difficulties. bottle-necks, etc.
iv- The local skills which exist need to be identified and made use of as
effectively as possible.
v- Reconstruction plans should not be built on anticipated external help.
Outside agencies can help. but only if they have a clear idea of what is
needed.
vi- It should be understood that bilateral aid is most likely to have hidden
strings, particularly in post-war situations. Furthermore, free gifts should
not be accepted just because they are free. It is important to make sure
that help offered matches long-term as well as short-term needs.
E.4 .• Reconstruction planning should encourage the return of the population to their
deserted settlements. Such return indicates a healthy su.rt for the reconstruction
process.
i- Often people are eager to return to their settlements while government
bureaucracy and military conditions do not allow them to do so.
li- In other cases, mostly because people have spent a long time away from
their settlements, direct incentives might be needed to attract back at
least the younger people.
iii- These incentives could take the form of creating employment
opportunities; ensuring employment and income; provisions for home
ownership; providing job placement facilities for war veterans; distributing
land for housing, developing small-scale industries; creating share holding
opportunities in public industries through long-term and easy credit; and
providing provisions for educational facilities, etc.
iv- As importantly is the issue of attracting back. businesses, banks.
insurance companies, small industries, etc. This needs more investment
in infrastructure, financial and physical security as well as social stability.
E.5 .• Settlement reconstruction planning should attempt to achieve a balance,
between retaining what was good in a settlement with a cultural or symbolic
value and at the same time using reconstruction as an opportunity to improve
the built environment. However, as far as possible reconstruction should
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attempt to reflect regional and local characters based on indigenous values.
i- The rising opposition between those who want to rebuild the settlement
to its pre-war form and those who want to capitalise on the opportunity
to reform and modernise, should be seen as a healthy sign for any
reconstruction programme.
Ii- Each approach has its own advanteges and limitations. For instance,
while total reform may advance and modernise the built environment, it
would inevitably cost more and slow the reconstruction process because
of the different limitations of having to create a new pattern of land
ownership, Infrastructure, etc. Also, It makes It almost Impossible to
involve the local population;
iii- On the other hand restoring to pre-war conditions has the value of being
able to involve the locals, help them to go back to normality faster and in
a more settled fashion, however, one would miss the opportunities of
advancement and modernisation.
lv- In any case major clearance operations should be avoided, attempts
should be made to rebuild and rehabilitate as far as it is feasible.
E.6. • Planning for the reconstruction of rural settlements should aim to stimulate
their agricultural economic base.
l- It should be recognised that the social coping mechanism of rural
communities is stronger from that of urban, also they tend to be more
attached to their local land. They are more capable of reconstructing their
own shelter.
jj- For the above reasons planning efforts should be concentrated on devising
medium and long-term agricultural development programmes.
E.7. • Temporary settlements for refugees and/or displaced people should, as far as
possible be avoided. Buildings vacant during the war could be used to
temporary accommodate them (eg. hotels, schools, etc.),
i- As the period of war is unpredictable, the 'temporary' refugee camps may
easily become permanent settlements. The longer people seek refuge the
less the likelihood of their return.
if- In cases where there Is no other option but to provide a temporary
settlement phased integration into exllting settlements network Ihould be
planned.
iii- It is important to erect temporary accommodation within devastated
settlements and not on the outskirts of lettlements, el thil proved to be
socially more acceptable. Also this way exilting Infrastructure cen be
used.
E.S. • Careful relocation of settlements may become necessary for security
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considerations. or because of total devastation. Still relocation imposes long-
term economic. social. cultural and psychological burdens on the people, and
should be avoided as much as possible.
1- Careful selection of the location of new settlements.
il- Planning for new locations should avoid known hazards which could lead
to natural disasters.
iii- Special attention should be given to providing for the welfare of the
affected inhabitants especially with respect to employment opportunities
(source of living), basic infrastructure and services.
iv- Attempts should be made to reflect in the new settlement, as far as
possible, the social and cultural fabric of the old settlements, in respect
to extended families. neighbourhoods, tribes, names of squares and
streets etc.
E.9 .• Settlement planning should enable and encourage social, cultural and
religious integration between different ethnic and religious groups.
E.10 • Despite international conventions (such as the Hague 1954) cultural heritage
properties are continuing to be targeted in wars. Hence, reconstruction should
be aimed, as far as possible to counter such losses. Conservation efforts should
be focused where the most important historical and architectural buildings and
sites are at risk, not to restore them, but to stabilise their condition, paying
particular attention to the places where people can live and work.
i- It is essential to take measures to protect cultural monuments in foreseen
circumstance of war.
ii- Often local and even national conservation authorities can not respond
quickly enough to unforeseen circumstance. Even when war starts they
would have to compete with higher priorities (safety, health, security).
Ill- Thus It Is recommended to make the protection of monuments a natural
part of the responsibilities of active civil protection institutions (eg. fire
brigades, civil defence, etc.).
Iv- Readiness planning for protection in times of war; (training, community
model. manuals, guidelines, etc.). Communities may not be aware of the
available skills and priorities of action (what to protect) or appropriate
means of protection.
lO.3.F. Institutions and management
F. 1. • The designation of institutions responsible for the formulation of
reconstruction policies at national, regional and other appropriate levels is
crucial. It is important that such institutions are based on local experience and
enjoy the direct support of the highest political level.
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i- A reconstruction management model should provide for the following: 1)
Central co-ordination of all efforts of reconstruction on 21 national level
carried out by the central government and its agencies; 2) Regional co-
ordination, carried out by 21 number of administrative units in all war
damaged areas that can be coordinated by 21 central regional authority;
3) Communal/local administrative structure that would look after the
immediate concems of the people living in war-dameged areas.
Il- Reconstruction planning institutions should be coordinated by and
accountable for 21 central policy formulation office. The latter should
report directly to a supreme council of reconstruction, preferably headed
by the President or Prime minister.
iii- The fact that reconstruction can be an enormous and costly task that will
stretch the public sector at all points, means that allocation of roles to 21
wide range of governmental departments is essential, as well as the
delegation of authority to non-governmental bodies. Thus, the
reconstruction programmes do not necessarily have to be implemented
by such institutions.
iv- Thus, while the central institution is responsible for drawing bold
reconstruction strategies and planning projects of netlenel importance, the
regional and local institutions would be responsible for settlement
planning and monitoring and evaluation of reconstruction programmes.
v- Some of the reconstruction needs are best addressed by local bodies,
such as: housing, relocation / resettlement, local infrastructure and health.
vi- The existence of too many organisations dealing with reconstruction
efforts could be as confusing and cause obstacles 215 the absence of any
organisation at all.
F.2. • Reconstruction institutions should playa coordinating role between national
government departments responsible for areas of social and economic
development: Ministries of housing, environment, education, health, transport,
etc.
l- To do so reconstruction institutions should ensure adequate representation
of the real needs and aspirations of the inhabitants on the policy-making
level.
F.3. • It is more desirable to allocate reconstruction planning responsibilities to
already well established institutions; such as Ministry of planning. However,
when this is not possible and a new institutions have to be established, they
should be flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances, and should not
outlive their original purpose.
i- In case of creating new institutions, It Is Important to establish their life
span and budgetary Instrument •.
ii- Means should be provided for the continuous review of such institutions
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to ensure that they are responsible to the affected communities' needs.
iii- Transferring functions and responsibilities to permanent institutions in
preplanned stages, should be part of the agenda of such temporary
institutions.
lv- Existing Institutions taking over reconstruction responsibilities should
evolve and adapt to new organisational pattern that corresponds to the
urgent needs of reconstruction.
F.4 .• Institutions should be designed to encourage and facilitate the involvement
of the public in the planning and implementation of reconstruction through a
partnership. They should be able to entre into co-operative and collaborative
arrangements with other public and private organisations and explore innovative
approaches for management, giving more responsibilities to the local
communities.
i- To achieve such aim it is important to build in a mechanism of
consultation between various types of institutions at different levels.
ii- Facilitate dialogue between the affected communities, professionals and
decision makers.
iii- Provide for continuous training programmes for professionals on needs
assessment, communication skills, and feed back evaluation.
F.5. • For institutions to act effectively they need four basic requirements: (1)
authority to act; (2) competence to act; (3) resources to act and (4)
acceptance by the war-affected community.
l- Post-war legislations must establish a clear and firm authority for
reconstruction institutions.
ll- Having the authority and resources to act, without vital knowledge needed
for the tasks at hand could lead to a disaster of reconstruction.
Ill- The development of research capabilities, and the acquisition and
dissemination of knowledge and information on reconstruction should
receive high priority within reconstruction institutions, and it is best
developed in association with established research organisations (eg.
universities) .
F.6. • Separate financial institutions and adequate means are necessary to meet the
requirements of reconstruction.
I- The main role of such institutions would be to negotiate terms of loans
and aid with intemational banks and institutions. It is important to have
confident institution that speaks the intemationallanguage of investment
in order not to fall into long-term debt trap.
Il- Through such institutions government can pay compensation while
ensuring that public and private investors in reconstruction, especially
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those receiving compensation are protected from the damllging effects of
monetary inflation.
iii- Selectivity in directing public funds, to give priority to areas where private
investment is unlikely.
F.7. • Mechanism should be established for the future manegernent of reconstructed
settlements. This is best handled by local organisations dominated by local
inhabitants.
i- This is important in order to prevent speculation on people's basic needs
lind aspirations.
Ii- It is also important in order to Sustain cultural, architectural and social
heritage.
iii- Maintaining and restoring infrastructure and settlement facilities for
general public welfare in the long run is only possible through such
mechanism.
iv- Providing information and incentives for inhabitants to maintain and
improve their dwellings and surroundings.
10.3.0. Shelter, Infrastructure and services
a.l. • The political pressure on post-war governments to be seen implementing
physical reconstruction is appreciated. However, the badly needed shelter,
infrastructure and services should not be entirely used lIS a political propaganda
exercise. People have the right for proper physical reconstruction.
i- Governments should avoid raising false expectations by promising the
replacement of each and every single home damaged by the war.
Ii- Such raised expectations often lead the people to believe that if they
reconstruct their own buildings they will lose on govemmental aid.
a.2.• Shelter, infrastructure and services should be planned in an integrated way
and provided in a sequence responsive to the real needs of the war-devastated
communities.
i· For instance, to be able to reach the war damaged areas, Infrastructure
repair is needed, and for life to retum to devastated settlements, services
are needed.
ii- Estimation and allocation of resources should include central as well as
regional and local ones, including the people's own abilities to reconstruct
their own shelter.
ijj- In order to achieve such aim it is Important to phase reconstruction over
several stages and regulate the flow of financial resource. in accordance
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with the sequence of operations envisaged in each phase.
0.3 .• To be able to provide services and Infrastructure to war damaged areas,
access to and within settlements has to be secured and civilian safety
guaranteed. This Includes mine clearing and the demolishing of unstable
buildings.
I· Operations of clearing mines and demolishing unstable buildings are best
done by military engineers divisions.
li- Rubble clearing can also be handled by military, but this will exclude the
population from their right to salvage their own belongings.
0.4 .• The reconstruction of shelter, infrastructure and services must be geared to
achieving the over-ell objectives of national reconstruction strategy.
i. Employment generation by using labour intensive construction methods.
ll- Encouraging public participation and private investment in construction,
including the voluntary sector.
iii. Combination of settlement improvement with reconstruction.
iv. Mitigation against natural disasters and possible future war damage.
0.5 .• Recognising that the post-war needs for shelter, infrastructure and services
are nearly always greater than the capacity of public authorities to provide
them. The role of central government ought to be concentrated on providing
infrastructure and needed services, while its role in housing provision should be
mostly preparative [i.e. mobilizing and directing the needed resources towards
enabling housing construction by the private sector and the people themselves].
i- The concentration of scarce central government resources in the housing
sector would create shortages and bottlenecks in other sectors.
jj_ Given secure employment and adequate means for construction of low
cost housing, people will do the rest themselves.
iii- Post-war housing should not be seen as a finished product that needs to
be urgently delivered to war-devastated areas.
0.6 .• Conventionally, It was thought that speed of construction could only be
achieved through the application of modem building technologies,
prefabrication and mass production. This is not necessarily true.
I- Such beliefs have often driven governments into a scale of reconstruction
much bigger than what they can manage, with negative results.
Ii- It is important to recognise that speed in construction is likely to achieved
at the expense of quality control and building standards, and even more
so at the expense of the socio-culturel values of the affected communities.
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0.7. • Enabling people to house themselves Individually and/or co-operatively
should be encouraged and programmes and instruments to do so should be
devised.
i- This would require simplification of procedures for acquisition of land,
building permits, etc;
Ii- Facilitating long-term financial loans;
iii- Provision of infrastructure on a totally subsidised basis, in conjunction with
shelter being provided by the people for themselves;
iv- Incentive to the imaginative use of local materials and the recycling of
debris, e.g. through demonstration projects.
v- Ensuring the availabillty of building materials In the market in affordable
and fixed prices.
vi- Developing the construction industry.
O.B. • The crucial importance of the construction industry should be recognised and
the industry should be given the political, financial and technical support it
requires to meet the national reconstruction objectives.
i- Special attention should be given to removing obstacles to the
development of the local construction industry.
jj- Encouraging the establishment of small and local building material
manufactures and construction contractors.
Hi- Simplifying formal procedures for such establishments.
iv- Hoving a training component for bullderl, contrectore and labour.
v- Providing finance guarantees and if necessary selective subsidies to local
building material industries, particularly at the early stages of their
establishment.
0.9 .• Realistic appreciation of differences between urban and rural settlements.
Such appreciation should be reflected on all decisions concerned with the
provision of shelter, infrastructure and services.
1- Attempts to concentrate dispersed rural population In bigger lettlements
through reconstruction on the basis that that would make it cheaper to
provide them with lervicel, would only lead to a dilalter of
reconstruction.
0.10. • Realistic standards for shelter, Infrastructure and services should be the
bases for any reconstruction policy. Standards should be baled on what
is available, affordable and culturally acceptable.
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i· The adaptation of imported standards of provision should be avoided.
U· The use of local materials and construction methods should be
encouraged. Also there should be a reduction in the dependency on
foreign technologies. resources and materials.
iii· The salvaging of building materials and metals from destroyed buildings
should be encouraged. In this case issues of ownership have to be
tackled.
lv- Prominence should be given to the human dimension through
understanding and appreciation of local social and family structures and
their specific needs.
0.11. • Investing directly in permanent housing proved to be the most sensible
thing to do. A first step should be to utilise buildings in need of minimum
repair. Of course in some cases. where the situation is such that it is
impossible to wait. (i.e. people can not be sheltered anywhere else) and
that it is necessary to utilize temporary shelter either for climatic or even
political reasons a limited number of temporary housing units can be
provided.
I. In these cases it is recommended that such structures should be built not
at the periphery of urban areas but in the heart of the cities and war-
damaged neighbourhoods. in order to build on the existing soclo-
economic pattems and to make use of the surviving public utilities.
0.12. • Post-war infrastructure (transportation and communication) policy should
take Into consideration any new economic. administrative and/or
defensive role played by settlements in war zone.
I. Infrastructure should be designed to minimise any possible future impact
of war.
0.13. • Safe water supply and hygienic waste disposal should receive priority in
reconstruction of infrastructure.
0.14. • In the reconstruction of settlements the quality of the environment must
be preserved. Pollution should be prevented by minimizing the generation
of wastes; wastes which can not be avoided should be effectively
managed.
i. Rubble produced from clearing damage should be reused to cover
swamps. flll roads. etc.
ll- Builidng materials used in reconstruction should be environmentally
sound.
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10.3.H. legislation and Issues of land.
H.1. • Proper post-war legal framework (in terms of new laws and enabling
legislation) for policies to be Implemented and in some cases to be enforced is
crucial. Such framework for reconstruction legislation must establish clear and
realistic direction, while safeguarding civilian rights.
i- Issues of land ownership and speculation in prices, public acquisition of
land, building laws, urban zoning, price control for building materials,
tendering procedures, etc, have to be examined in detail.
H- Promulgation of 'emergency' legislation that enables the implementation
of reconstruction strategies, while safeguard individual rights against
arbitrary decisions.
iii- Reconstruction legislation shouid aim at the benefit of the whole
community, thus it should be realistic, easily understood and efficiently
applied.
iv- Such legislation should be revised periodically to correspond to changing
circumstances and needs of society. It should not outlive Its original
purpose.
H.2. • Compensating clvlllans for the ioss of their property Is one of their basic
rights. A legal framework has to be established as to who should be
compensated and in what form. It should be noted that direct payment is not
necessarily the best and only way of compensating people for their losses.
i- The fact that insurance companies do not Insure against war damage
should be recognised. Thus governments are the only source of
compensation for people suffering losses from war.
Il- In the same way some governments are forced to compensate others, the
state has to compensate its population.
iii- The form of compensation can vary from direct payments, long-term
loans, to building materials, land, tax relief, etc.
iv- Whatever is the agreed form of compensation it should take into account
the complexity of reconstruction and anticipate unforeseen changes in
circumstances. For instance, it should take into account the damaging
effect of inflation.
H.3. .In the aftermath of war deva.tation, iand i. often the only .urvlvlng reaource,
the proper management of which couid become a great allet to reconstructicn
by individuals and the nation.
H.4. • Comprehensive knowledge of pre-war land u.e and patterns of land
ownership is a basic requirement for both urban and rural settlement
reconstruction planning.
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i- Without solving land ownership problems, reconstruction can not start.
ll- This requires the introduction of new surveying methods and mapping
technologies suitable to the post-war conditions along side effective use
of the existing infonnation.
iii_ Development and use of methods for assessing possible economic, social
and environmental impacts from proposed reconstruction land use.
I
I
!
I
H.5.• Pre-war patterns of ownership rights and inheritance should be respected as
far as they do not pose a threat to public welfare.
I- However, promoting land refonn measures to bring ownership rights into
confonnity with post-war needs of society might be necessary in some
cases.
H.6.• Land owned by the government should be used, as a first option, wherever
land is needed for resettling communities, providing infrastructure and services.
Acquisition of private land for such purposes should be avoided as much as
possible.
i- Land acquisition should be resolved only when it is in the interest of the
nation and general public, e.g. extension and improvement of existing
settlements, provision of public services, preservation of historic areas,
and protection of natural environment.
u- This recommendation is particularly relevant in cases of post-civil war and
when dealing with rural communities, where it proved to cause far
reaching conflicts.
H.7. -It is crucial to anticipate urban land speculatlon and to have the appropriate
measures to recapture the rise in land values due to reconstruction and change
in land use.
l- This requires frequent assessment of land values since the end of the war,
and determination of the rise of value relative to pre-war values.
Ii- levying eppropriate land taxes, e.g. capital gains taxes, land betterment
charges on lands with higher post-war value.
til- Those taxes could be paip into reconstructing public fecilities within the
same area or to compensate other owners for the acquisition of their land.
iv- It is fair to adapt pricing and compensation policies relating to land value
post-war, rather than its pre-war commercial value, when acquiring lend
for public use.
Conclusion
416
10.4. THE YORK CHARTER FOR RECONSTRUCTION AFTER WAR.
Yet another Charter, It might be said. There are already a number of Charters
and international Declarations on different issues, which are partly or even totally not
respected in some countries. For Instance, newspapers give us daily evidence of the
brutality with which the Declaration of Human Rights is abused. Similarly other
declarations do not seem to be internationally respected, so what is the value of
another Charter?
In our view, despite the fact that such declarations can be abused, yet they
remain there as internationally accepted standards of Government behaviour and
responsibility, which if not met will become the basis for accusation. It is perhaps
with this that the York Charter for Reconstruction After War should first be judged.
Not that the process of which It is the outcome has been of merely academic Intere.t.
The meetings, site visits and exchange of experience and views over the last few
years have been of immense value in supporting the need for such a 'reconstruction
referencepoint or standard'. It is believed that the production of this Charter would
add to the existing 'stepping stcnes' by which mankind makes it. slow progress
towards higher common ideals.
The idea of concluding this research by a Charter first came to light in July
1991, during the Third York International Workshop on Reconstruction after War.
This workshop was planned by the author and Charles Cockbum with a wider
aspiration in mind; namely, 'to make the reconstruction policies of governments more
responsive to the needs of people'. The Workshop participants agreed that a step
forward towards achieving such an aspiration could be the production of a Charter
that embodies some principles of good government practice in reconstruction.
Another step could be by encouraging a network of future workshops to promote
such policles, disseminate knowledge and monitor practice across the world.
A set of principles to constitute the York Charter was developed by the author
and jointly edited with C. Cockburn (between November 1991 and May 1992). These
principles were presented at the Roots of the Future, a Global NGD Conference in
relalion to the 1992 Earth Summit, December 1991, Parts, and the International Forum
on Habitat, Poverty and Environment, April 1992, Tunis. The Charter was also widely
disseminated through publicationl• The aim of this publicity exercise was to obtain
3 The Charter was published In Barakat (, Cockburn (1991b; 1992), and In~. issue number
two, 1992.
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some feed back. Later on, during the Post-war Reconstruction and Conservation in
Croatia Conference, November 1992, York, the Charter was tabled at a specialised
planning for rehablUtation workshop, to see whether the principles embodied by the
Charter are applicable to a specific context, in this case post-war Croatia. The
overall feeling was that the Charter is very useful indeed as a reference point.
Over the last few months a number of remarks on both the content and the
structure of these principles were received. These remarks centred around the
following issues:
1. Esteeming the York Charter to be a sound, humanitarian set of guidelines
advocating the rights of human beings, hurt by war, to be treated with respect
and decency. It is sad that 10 many generations of human history have passed
without these minimal guarantees. (L. Kulba, USA).
I
I
I
2. The fact that the document would be stronger if it would say who is to be
responsible for ensuring the rights of the victims of reconstruction. (Human
Settlement Workshop, Paris, Dec. 1991).
3. The design of the structures, materials used, the process of reconstruction etc,
should not create by themselves sources of pollution. (P. Poddar, India).
4. The Charter must be promulgated on behalf of the war suffering people to
Governments and aid-agencies including military agencies.
5. The Charter must set out the rights of non-combatants to have their property
restored in accordance with certain ethical, ethnic and practical standards. (J.
Warren, UK).
6. The duty to provide this services must be with the combatants. Any failure to
provide it must be complained oho the United Nations - perhaps via UNESCO.
7. Too much emphasis on the maximum use of local resources might imply
exploitation.
Those remarks and others were taken into account and based on the previously
mentioned reconstruction recommendations, the author proposed the final text of the
York Charter for Reconstruction After War. (see appendix 2).
The Charter consists of seven sections: (1) Introduction; (2) Aim of the Charter;
(3) War destruction; (4) The 60 Post-war reconstruction recommendations; (5) The
entitlements of non-combatant suffering from war damage to his/her physical
environment; and (6) Support for the Charter.
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10.S. REMARKS
The recommendations outlined above are not a recipe for success. They simply
indicate an approach to reconstruction of war damaged settlements which this study
suggests may lead to 8 greater tendency to success than otherwise. We expect each
reconstruction group to design their own guidelines for rebuilding and their own
detailed settlements plans. However, in applying these principles the following
considerations should be borne in mind:
• Continuation of war. Undoubtedly reconstruction is very much affected by the
continuation of war. In fact, in some cases, reconatruction may never begin before
the total termination of hostilities. Even when It does, reconstructed projects may still
run the risk of destruction. A decision has to be made on whether It is worth starting
reconstruction during the war and risking further damage for the lake of helping
communities recover as soon as possible and on their own land.
• Political Hidden Agendas. Post-war reconstruction Is a highly political and
ideological issue. This effect occurs mainly because war is waged and halted by
polltlclans and reconstruction is bound to follow the political trend. Thus, one should
draw attention to the often hidden agenda of reconstruction priorities. In many
countries, rebuilding of the national defence system has been the flrst priority for
post-war rebuilding. Astronomic investment, badly needed for recovery and
reconstruction, is redirected towarda purchasing weapona and training soldiers, on the
basis that force is needed for securlty, without which no long·term Investments and
reconstruction can take place. Politically symbolic reconatructlon II often another
hidden agenda and could become a must in some contexts. Reconstruction policies
should not fall into the trap of such agendas, at the same time they should not resist
it altogether because of the political weight often behind such agendas. The
challenge is to allow a breathing space for such hidden agendas to be partly realised
while achieving as much as possible of the people's real needs. One must pacify,
temporize, agree and in general, as with flre: be ready to retreat only to advance
later.
• International constraints and opportunities. In the case of war damage
international assistance will atrictly follow political alliancea. In a post Cold War era
the United Nations seems to be the main hope for international co-operation, and it
la through the United Nations that war-devastated countrfel can be helped to recover.
The UN might be able to play a more active role in reconstruction if resources are
made available. This could be achieved through the establishment of an international
Chapter Ten.
419
I
I
I
I
war reconstruction fund administered by the ON into which member states would all
contribute a fixed proportion of their O.N.P. and reclaim according to an agreed
measure of their need. Having said that, it is important to acknowledge the fact that
the existing power structure of the ON has out lived its intended purpose, and now
there Is a case for a more world-wide representative structure. This may sound
politically naive and practically impossible; yet what alternative is there other than
leaving the casualties of war to reconstruction programmes constrained by
devastated national economies and international enterprise culture II .. in which strides
forward seem to be made at the expense of the less fcrtunate". (Oreen, 1991:15).
• l)e".'opm.nt. Thinking of reconstruction as a step in an ongoing development
process is not an easy task, as it involves recovering the war's opportunity costs and
then going beyond such recovery. However, every effort should be made to ensure
that any investment in reconstruction is being planned as part of a longer term
development process. Reconstruction inevitably enters the field of development and
becomes concerned with a socioeconomic transformation in the direction of broad
national goals. Long-term comprehensive planning and strategic thinking become
the most urgent, as does government financing and international assistance.
• Tr.lned profession.'" This research emphasises the fact that reconstruction
should be approached in a multidisciplinary manner in order to acheive positive
results. However, the lack of trained professionals (eg. policy makers, economic and
physical planners, architects, engineers, managers, local leaders, psychologists,
public works officials, credit administrators, builders, and intermediate personnel to
assemble information on the population and its disruption) is often an obstacle for
any reconstruction strategy. In our view there is a need to train professionals
(particularly architects and planners) in the different aspects of reconstruction
planning and management.
• Manipulation. During war, central governments use different techniques to
lobby the people around their policies and to ensure that propaganda messages have
reached everyone. The objective is to achieve govemment policy regardless of any
hardship imposed on the people. In reconstruction the objective is to bring benefits
to the people suffering from war damage. In both cases the activity to publicise
policies and recommendations is about manipulation. We, the outsiders are trying
to change attitudes towards a direction which we prefer. We have to learn the skills
of governmental manipulation which have become highly sophisticated, analyze and
implement them with a greater feeling of responsibility. Unlike, central govemments,
Conclusion
420
we have a responsibility to be realistic about our recommendations. We also have
a responsibility to publicise the limitations and possible short-term hardships of our
recommendations.
10.6. FUTURE RESEARCH
The principles embodied in the York Charter for Reconstruction After War
constitute a proposal for the skeleton of 21 common philosophy of reconstruction after
war. There is 21 need to explore In more detail some aspects of the Charter and its
appJicabUJty. Some examples of topics for future research are Identified below:
Topic 1. The Reconstrucuonist.
This study showed the importance of re-training professionals (architects,
planners, engineers, etc. ) in 21 multidisciplinary manner that corresponds to the
needs of reconstruction after war. More research Is needed to identify the best way
of doing so, on a national and international levels. AllO research can be directed
towards education and raising public awareness, to see how is It possible to
emphasize the moral values of human rights and their reflection on reconstruction.
Education on reconstruction should be also targeted at the mllltary. Soldiers and
commanders need to see the long-term results of their actions. A.sa start, military
education could address cultural Issues.
Topic 2. Specific reconstruction recommendations domains.
This study suggested general inter-cultural reconstruction recommendations,
based on a number of location-specific studies. More of such studies are needed with
attempts to draw up specific domains. In this study. the Middle East (as 21
geographical, cultural and poUtical) was identifled as one such domain. There is a
need to identify other domains which have relevance to reconstruction
recommendations. There would be scope for classiflcation In tenns of other
geographical zones, such as the Balkans, or Latin America. Alternatively there would
be a scope for classification in terms of type of war: civil, national or international,
etc. It is important to accumulate a number of such studies and then to compare the
results.
Topic 3. Other reconstruction fields.
Although the focus of this study has been on physical settlement reconstruction,
Chapter Ten.
I
I
(
I
I
I
•I
I
421
It has attempted to do so in a realistic economic, social, cultural and political view.
It Is Important for researchers from disciplines other than architecture to examine the
specific issues of economic, political and social reconstruction that accompany the
physical one.
Topic 4. Testing the recommendations.
Research is needed to test the above recommendations in specific and real
situations. For instance, the initial examination of these recommendations by a
group of Croatian planners and architects (November 1992) showed their relevance
to their situation. Howevert there is a need to test them in the field and in a variety
of countries, to see whether they could become an international philosophy.
Topic 5. Intematlonal action towards post-war reconstruction.
The international community can and should play a major role in supporting
national action in reconstruction after war, irrespective of political alliances. Further
research is needed to identify ways in which technical and financial assistance can
be best directed towards the reconstruction of settlements. Also the best ways in
which the above recommendations and the reconstruction rights of the civilians can
be safeguarded. The United Nations could playa Significant role through its already
established organisations and infrastructure, what is needed is a plan of co-ordination.
The United Nations Centre of Human Settlements (UNCHS) could be a possible
provider of such co-ordination, funded by the UNDP, World Bank, the recently
established European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, etc.
Topic 6. The use of the media In reconstruction.
This study has touched on the role of the media in conducting war, a more
comprehensive study is needed. More important is to find ways in which the media
can be employed to aerve the objectives of reconstruction. For instance, the
international media are represented in almost all situations of civil and national wars,
would it be possible to convince them to report on issues of reconstruction rather
than exclusively reporting destruction? An international documentary film on the
needs and prospects of reconstruction in a number of countries could be a good step
towards raising international attention as to the importance of the issue.
Conclusion
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Topic 7. Post-war reconstruction and the role of Non Gouemmental Organisations.
There is a need to investigate in more detail, ways In which the attitude of
international NOOs can be changed and in which the skills of their aid workers can
be improved to be able to better cope with a war situation. The aim should not be
just to help people to survive the war but also to grow within themselves the leed.
of recovery and reconstruction. Field workers should be equipped with the needed
knowledge/skill to ensure: (1) higher perfcrmance, leading to better use of manpower
and resources; (2) better understanding of the needs of those to be helped; (3) an
increased awerness of personal safety; (4) smoother and more efficient intervention
leading to a faster recovery and more appropriate social reconstruction; (5) a
decrease in post-traumatic stress disorder amongst staff and survivors/refugees. A
great deal of knowledge can be identified from the experiences of returning European
volunteers and field workers, who have spent time in war zones.
Chapter Ten.
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D ETA r LED G U r DEL r I E S
PJlIlCIPLE 1: IT IS VITAL TO UIIJIISB LOC.l.LLTA'UUBLB IJa)IJiCBS
f It is e&S8Dtial in aDY COUDtry that 1s 8CODmllcally ezhauat8d by
war, to develop reccmstrocticn pol1ci_ that aaz1a1&e all locally
available resourc_ <i.e. labour, stills, bulldJ.Dg .. tc'1ala,
including debris, institutions ad laadandaip> ill ardar to
regenerate the ecoDCllYad reduce the CCBta ot 1aparted. goads ad
services.
1. Reeonsr:r'UctioDis OD.l.Vpart 01 rfIs.ttlU.Dt.
2. You csnno: resettle people. The_vmust rN.ttl. th.... lves.
3. You C.!D do a lot to belp p.aple resettle Uu .. lvn -
orqvidect you reetrict your assistance to tb""e jot. tlley•caDnot do lor tbemselves.
Otto Koenig_berger
A distiDCtioD must be arsv» b.t"HD tbe n~ity tor
decentralis.a preparedness plaDDiDg and tlle equal
neeess.ity for decentralised implu.DtatioD at u. local
level. Sectoral and mlnlSterlal ccmflicts tbrutu
efleetlve polic.ies. If decJsioD-lIaiiDg at local le.,.ls i.
taken to ceDtral government. tbere is IJ tfNk.Ding of th.
autborl ty of local. oi'ticials centralisaticm also
results iD both bumaD and material a.. i.t.tDce floodJD.8
illto the area from celltra 1 sources. thus reducill8 tlle
opporrunJties for tbe revival of tb. local IICtmC11ly. or for
local officials to tolk. responslbility lor tb.ir 0tfD
structures.
Ya.emln Ay.an and Paul Oliver
'.'h1lst the centre will have a l!ev :-01e to fulfil in reconstruction
plannlng. it 1s important ~o note the dangers oi over-centralisation of
power and decision making.
7he local communltv within overall ~e~lonal developmen~ strategies ana
its admln1str'at1on should exerclse oower over the dec1s1ons which will
eifect them. rJovernments will oe Wlse to accept th1s pr1nclpla which
:s in tnelr awn interests.
Appendix One.
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NOnDally States wage wars. but it is left to the affected communities
to recover an~ in some lnstances rebuild.
Thereiore the character and scale of war needs to be me~ with a
matching character ana scale of reconstruction.
For example. a war mav be a skirmish or tribal feud - anci recovery
will probably be a local response. or it may be conflict be~waen two
countries. or an international war with multiple countries involved. In
such situations a forelgn country may (as in the case oi the U.S.A.
after ~orld ~ar 2) prOVide extensive reconstruction assistance.
In addition to the active involvement of the local population in the
recons~rucdon process through. for example, self-build projecu, people
should also be consulted in decision-making. Inevitably this slows
down the overall process but the social gains are likely to be well
worth such minor hold-ups. The ult1lDa~esatisfaction of the occupants
of " s.ttlem.D~ with :.tS final form is a v1tal relat10nshill that will
no~ occur with a full" professionalise<i recons'truction process. It is
essential to plan around people and their perceptions and aspirations
ra~her than expect people to lit in with predetermined plans.
Part1cication can occur at varying levels and stages from initial
consultations to t~e evaluation 01 completed projects to give feed-bac~
for subsequent schemes.
1.4
.
I
I
I
I
The recycling of debr~s is a vital :atter with such categories as:
architectural salvage. L.e. components (doors. windows. etc.)
preciOUS me~als '-i.e. lead pipes)
rubble ior hardc~re
reusable ~1:1ber. atc.
:~e recycling can :e a communltv endeavour involving youth brigades.
=cou~s. atc.. but ::lust be sucervised since t~ese are secunty issues
concernlng theft opportunities.
1.5
-i-- ....
An i:lventOr'l cr 3vall",ble resources tor recons'truction is t!le essential
::rst stec. :t should i~clude such matters as:
Guidelines for the reconstruction
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skills
labour
the role of women (see Item 1.g below)
local leadership ( These are vaal. aDa many polit1cal lead.rs
(
( are 19norant ot such vital resoure••.local ins~itutions
aSSistance programmes
tralnlng institutions
1.6 Ski 11s and IechnglQiY
The assessment of resources proposed above should be related to quality
considerations. i.e.
what level of skills
what type of technology I in terms of:
a) its appropriateness for the task in hand and
b) whether:!.t!s accesslble or approprlable <1.e. usable> to the
community in question
the qual!ty of ~!le inst!tutional structure of the Stag. <both in
terms of public and prlvate institutions).
1.1 ~Qbi li-=At,iCn Qf l)o$Qyr-::es
Human resource. are mobilised 1n variOUS ways:
by patriotism
by concern for a new future tor the1r famlly or com.UDlty
by good local ana national leadersn10
by religiOUS concerns
by economlC lncentives.
~lormaHv a comolnation 0% the above wlll :e neeaaa.
7ralning 0% ?ersonnel at 311 :ev81s should ideally be S .. D a. a
,:cllIpiementar.,element 0% r'9constructlon. ~.e.:
Appendix One.
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local leaders
craftsmen
builders
government public works officials
officials concerned witb credit administration.
1.9 The Role gf Vgmen
This 1s a decisive factor 1n the mobilisation of local resources for
reconstruction for two reasons:
a) women traditionally play a vital role in building provision and
maintenance in most countries (particularly for low-income bousing)
b) frequently wars have a decisive impact on the role of women in
society - wbere tbey are obUged due to shortage of man-power to
exercise tasks normally regarded as male preserves.
Therefore in post-war reconstruction operations women can be utilised
to expand on tbis new expression of -:heir role as they provide "basic
needs" acrose tbe wbole spectrum of ::Jciety.
Their leadership role is a decisive factor in effective recovery.
1.10 "Un-met 'peds"
Whenlocal inventories of resources are complete it will be possible to
determine "un-met needs"; from such information a furtber resource
analYSiS of international assistance can be undertaken.
1.11 The Local Commupitv - ~he Pr!,ory Resgurce for Recgustruct;Qu
Throughout this section of tbe Guidelines people (or more 5tieciflcally
the local surviving reSidents of the area being rebuilt: :'ave been
regarded as 'the pr1mary resource. The mobilisation of tbeir ~ollect1ve
energy, skills and support is the most important pre-requlsite for
reccr.sttucticn. But tbis resource must not be supplanted. neglected or
by-passeci. It will need to be carefully nurtured by civic and national
leaders by means of encouragement. institutional support, and
intervention wbere local conflict prevail. etc.
Guidelines (or the reconstruction
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PRIICIPLB 2: BFFBCTIV! RBCOISTiUCT 101 WILL on r OCCUR VID IT IS
COXPRJmlilsm II ITS &:CPl.
f The Plulling Process w11l need to be wicle-nuagi1l8. CO"f'vins IIUCla
issues as: laaecU.ate pest-War Pl.aJlDi1l8lct1'11t1_; the i.e weat
at leeds aDG Daaage; The PlaDDiDg ProcBIiiI; Pri'lata aDd Public Ral_
ill JlaamstructiOll; lapleaeDtatiOll of iacaDatruct101l aDd Lcms-T...
Pl.aDning Consicierations.
... we ]Just plaIJ for tbe fiIJe rebuildiIJ8 of our "'ar-dalJa8ed
tOWDS. Ir'e ]Just SfHf to it tbat our tOWD. bK'aJIe pl .. Nnt.
bealthy and convenient places in whicb to Hve and work ....
1Ieanwhile. there is a great aJlount of pnparatary .,ark to ~
done. lIany difficult1es to be overcolle. JaaulI.rable details to
be worked into IJn ordered scbelle and lIucb Ifl8'iSlation to ~
drafted so tbat once we turn froll ",ar to peace we lIay beg:J.lJ
buildins at oace.
V.S.Xorr1son 1943
<First Minister of Town and Country PlaDning in U.K.>
wben you ellMrk on reconstruction plaDain8 everyone you
tlJlk to bllJlIes tbis or tblJt problell you encouater on th.
disaster. But gradually as you proceed it b«oD .. all tao
apparent tbat at least 90S of tbe probl .. s you 4TW confrrmt:J.n8
were preseDt well before tbe disaster occurred. All tbat b_
bappened is that tbe disaster bas acted as a sUT'g'8CD'scal1»l
to expose tbese latent weakness.. ill buildings. tbe urbaJI
fabriC. the plannlng systeJl or tbe adJlinlstrat1ve
illirastructure.
George lez
Principle 2 is an all-embracing issue that covers six them... they will be
covered in sequence as follows:
2.1 Immediate Post-liar Planning Activities
:2.2 The Assessment of leeds and Dama~e
2.3 The Planning Process
2.4 Private and Public Roles in Reconstruction
2.5 Implementation of ReconstructiOn
2.6 Lon~-term PlanniD~ Considerations
Appendbc One.
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2.1 Immediate post-War PlOp»i»i Actiyities
2.1.1 The Balance of ReHet to Reconstruction: There is a need for
an Emergency Action ProgramJle to return settlements to
normality as quickly as possible and to restore public morale.
But early decisions need to be taken to establish a balance
between relief and reconstruction, in order to avoid wasting
precious resources that will be needed in the long-term
reconstruction process.
Guidelines for the reconstruction
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2.2 Ih~ Assessment Of Needs And DAmOie
2.2.1. Needs Assessment: Information about the victims whose l1v_
and property have been damaged or destroyed is an important
input in reconstruction planning. Phvsical planning to restore
the artibcts of a socletv should recognlse the demographics
(gender. age. employment and social statu.) of the survivor'S.
of community members lost or disabled and their nHels.
Usually this is best dchieved by direct survey carr1ed out in
close relationship with the damage surveys noted below. There
can be the highly produc~1ve involvement of survivors in this
planning process - especlally if there is an opportunity to
improve upon what has been lost <or even re.ov.a>.
2.2.2. Assessment of Surv1vors I Status: Some of the population
aifected by the war will have been permoplptly displaced by
the devastation of thelr envlron.ent. So.e of those
temporarily displaced mav be needing a "staging post- prior to
being returned. Others may "dig-in" to make a pol1tical stand
(1.e. Palestinians in Gaza. etc.).
Therefore. a full appralsal of the affected population with
subsequen~ monitoring :s neeaed. prlor to making physical
reconstruction plans.
2.2.3. Damage Assessment: Prior to plannlng and implementation of
the reconstruc~ion programme it will be e... ntial to undertake
an assessmen~ of the damage sustained. This should include
building and infrastructure condition survey. to determine what
should be retalned. renewed and rebUilt.
2.2.4-. Assessment of Deticits: Careful no~e should be taken of pre-
war deficiencies in the housing stock or urban infrastructure.
and ways to compensate for the lack of:
a) building I and
b) maintenance
during the war period. Such "losse." will need to be added to
the losses resulting from the war.
Itppendlx One.
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2.3.1.
2.3.2.
2.3.3.
Overall Planning: An integral approach involving physical.
social. economic and transport planning is essential. The
reconstruction tea. must b. multi-disciplinary. and include.
amongst others. planners. architects. engineers. economists.
landscape architects and social scientiSts. The close inter-
relationships between land use. transport systems. economic
develoPJlent and cultural issues need to be recognised. Plans
should be realistic and capable of being implemented.
JUl1tary InvolveJlent in Reconstruction: The military possess
expertise in engineering and infrastructure. Such skills and
resources can be mobilised in reconstruction efforts.
Some aspects of war planning will later be seen as
reconstruction planning.
Flexible Planning: During reconstruction planning numerous
matters will surface whilst the design process continues. and
this presents the need for a high level of flexiblli ty. Any
rigid approach w111be difficult to sustain in view 01 changing
priorities and newly discovered needs. Another name for this
flexible approach is "action planning" and experience would
suggest that this is a more effective attitude than traditional
planning approaches.
Guidelines for the reconstruction
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2.4 Prhlate "nd Public Doles 1n Reconstruct ion
2.4.1.
2.4.2.
2.4.3.
Appendix One.
Public Sec~or versus Private Sec~or Economic Input.: A Vital
question concerns ~ to d.termln. an appropriate ratio
between public and ?Tlvate !nvestm8nt. and what br1tn" to
use?
Three factors need to be consldered:
1) Measuring the burden of t~e Public Sector:
look into budget deficit and coapan with other
countries
look into t~e resourr.~s and organ1sational capacity of
the Government
measure the public sector's .ffectiv.n.... usill8
appropriate methods.
2) The provision of public goods and g.rvic.. lIust remain in
the public doma1n <this is on account of the private
sector's lack of interest in rav .. tment. in such provi.ion
and. prod.uctiOn).
3) The 1D1xtureof what is best su1ted for public and. private
sector investment is sector-'a12eQ!!C;. C.rtain sectors of
raconsuuct1on invite pr1vate investm.nt more tban othen.
On the other band.. the public sector is mont effective in
sectors wbich reqUire large lnvestm.nts with low returns.
Public Sector versus Private Sector Planning: Given the scal.
01 the task both the public and. private sectors will need. to
be involved in the process of reconstruction.
It is wise for planning authorities. particularly within poor
countries. to recognise that their role is limited. and althou!h
they mlght see themselves as "goal scorers-, they may be better
regarded as "reierees". !t is unlikely that most 3ocieti •• bav.
ade~uate finances to supporT. a full reconstruction programm••
Therefore much of t.he plannin~ proce.s will b. to chann.l the
resources ot tbe private sector in t~e appropriate direction •.
Labour ~ntensive versus c'3pl tal !ntenslve Reconstruction: Th.
normai ::l8xim for lOW-lncome bousing developm.nt in De'llop1nS
Countries - labour :'ntensl ve construct:.on in lieu of capital
intenslve construction - ~~ a cr:.~1cal :3ctor in reconstructiOD.
This l~ due to two iJctors:
- i1r~tlv. emclovment senerat:.on of ex-serVlcem.n and. women
- seccnc lv, ,be neea ";0 re~enerate ,::.. ,:ama~ed or dislocated
eCCllO::1V.
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Hewever. there is also the need for partial mass-production of
buildings or buUding components (1.e. roof trusses. windows,
door frames, etc.). This need will be particularly important
where speed of reconstruction is a high priority. The factory
units that pretabr1cate sucb items could be partially staffed
by disabled people <see Principle Q, page 00).
Guldelines for the reconstrucUon
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2.5 ImplementatiQn of Reconstruction
2.5.1. Implementation: Utilit1es and social infrastructure must be
seen in parallel and be integrated in overall building
reconstruction and economlC development.
2.5.2. Institutional FrameworK: Planning and implementation are
complementary concerns and must been SHn as such from the
outset. An effective authonty is needed. with adequate skill.
and resources to implement the plan. This authority needs to
represent both polit1cal and technical decision making. cs..
Guidelines under Principle 4, pages 00-00).
2.5.3. International Assistance: Reconstruction is such a costly
venture that countries are tempted to acquire musive
international loans to finance operations. In addition,
authorities bave often brought in foreign consultants and
foreign building systems as part of a bilateral or multHateral
aid project. All of tbese processes are a two-edged sword and
all potential beneIi ts need to be welghed against their coat.
in SOCial. economiC or cultural terms.
Appendfx One.
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2.6 Lcni-Term Plannini Cpnsideratipns
2.0.1
2.6.2
2.6.3
Urbanisation: Rational settlement and economic development
policies will determine the urban/rural balance of development.
Reconstruction in rural areas is likely to be significantly
different to that in urban areas. The focus of these
recommendations is towards the urban context, but must take
into account rural-urban migration.
Pre-disaster Planning and Preparedness: The process of
disaster planning, in anticipation of a disaster. is well
established for all natural disasters in many countries.
However, there are very few countries in the world where this
has been undertaken in an1:icipation of wariare. lormally pre-
disaster planning against hostilities is primarily concerned
with protection of people and property. and it is unlikely that
detailed plans can go beyond this point to a consideration of
reconstruction plannlng.
Reconstruction and Development: The conflict will have
interrupted and severely retarded pre-war development plans
and projects. Thus. reconstruction can pick up the pieces of
such discarded plans and may incorporate those which remain
relevant into ~econstruction plans.
The later stages of reconstruction should be regarded as a
developmental activity - but with certain reservations and
d1stinct10ns as are noted in these Guidelines.
Guidelines for the reconstruction
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PRINCIPLE 3: THE TIMING OF ACTIONS IS CRITICAL
• There are critical timing considerations in reconstruction that
relate to the priority or sequence of required actions.
There are some problems of GovlfrrJlIent ill whicb spHd of
decision is tbe great tbing. in wbich it is essential tbat same
decision, even tbougb it be not the idul decision. should be
taken quickly ...
... you do well to ask yourself two quntiC1Ds. Pirst - is tlle
da.age that would be done by so.e dela, in r.acbing a deci5icm
more serious than tile da.age tilat a wroag declsicm would
entail? Second - is tbe material tbat is the subjfICt of your
deliberation sucb tbat a dec.1sion found to be defective in
practice can readily be lIJJended?
V.S. Xorrison. 1943
3.1 When tQ Reconstryct?
There are two options:
A as damage occurs during wariare. rebuild and rtpa1r - to
maintain accommodation and strengthen public morale;
a don't rebuild during hostilities, since there i& a risk of
"double reconstruction" .1S earlier actions are further damaged
or destroyed.
(Option B is normally the best course of action - but temporary repair.
should be effected).
3.2 Retyr~ini Residents
Reconstruction needs to be timed to relate to when people have returned
to their locality following war-evacuation or from military servic•.
3.3 !ncentives to Encoyrue the Retyrn Of ReSidents to Their LpCAlity
Some form of incentives may be needed to attract families back to th.ir
oridnal settlements, since they may have become accustomed to a ne",
environment that is not scarred b.., damage and does not lack es..ntial
services.
3.4 ?",nnij'i Dyr1ni the !Jar
Wherever possible reconstruction can be planned during the war. ready
for raoid pos~-war 3ction. Speed:s essential to capltali.e on
political will and :undin~ provlslon ~nat wlll become a declining
resource over time.
Appendix One.
437
3.5 eho'e' gf Shelter RecPDstttlctign
Frequen:ly shelter reconstruction policies go through a 1-2-3-
sequence:
1 = tents or temporary shelter
2 = prefabrication
3 = permanent reconstruction.
Attemots should be made to avoid the prefabricated option on cost
grounds. since this is essentially a "double reconst.Tucticn". So the
beSt course of action will b. 1 and 3, but this implies the possibility
of ~ reconstruction.
,
Guidelines (or the reconstruction
of towns and cities devastated by war.
438
PRIICIPLJi 4: DO lOT VAlT FOR POLITICAL AID ECOIa.Ie RBPOUS
• If reccmstruction is delayed to await pol1tical or eccmaaic ntfDrM
there is a risk of losing the IIOJI8DtU.for action that aist. 10
the ilIaed:14te past-war situation. lIDwe.ar IUIW les1alat1ma 111
naraally __ nt:14l but this eaa probably be intnxiucad in parallel
to tapleaeDtation.
"a.1t.1ng for - or l.111k.111gresettl .. eDt wJtb ~aJor «:orJ0JI1c ar
pol.1t.1cal refoT1ls. sucb as legJslat.1v~ cbaDg_ .1D lalld teDurw.
taxat.1oD Oil local democracy llIeans lo.lD8 tbe Lrlpetu. far
cballge wbicb exists .111tbe .1J1J1ediatepost-d1saster pelad.
Otto Koenigsberg.r
It .1s essential to base reconstructioll plalls Oil tbe g1,$t1PI
social-pol.1tical sltuation.not Oil wisbful tbJ.u1ng of wbat you
would l.1ke it to be - realism is tbe first pr10r1ty.
Paul Stollard
New laws or enabling legislation will probably be needed to facilitat.
reconstruction.
4.2 Exprgpr;,otiQn
The expropriation or compulsorv purchase of sub-standard property, or
property with unclear land titles. or property that is in the way of
changes in road layouts. may be a vital necessary tool.
This may be particularly appropriate where rents have been frozen at
totally unrealistic levels. thus not prOViding sufficient incos. for
owners to maintain their property.
4.3 CgmpensAtign
Appropriate compensation payments for those who suffer los... in
famllies. livelihoods. household assets. buildings. vehicle.. liv .. tack.
etc.. will need to be establisbed beiore reconstruction cOlIs.nc... Fair
compensation can be regarded. as a pre-condition tor reconstruction.
4.4 Aiencies to MApAle Recgnstnctign
It may be necessarv to ~egallv establ1lib special recon.truct1on
agencies. especially where tbe scope and cOllplexlty is too great to b.
t3ckled by local d.ut!lorities. Sucn developm.nt agenCies should have
execut ive powers and :!leir cwn bUQ~ets • .1nd -:;hould cOllprise local .ud
~overnment31 :-epresenut1';es dS '"ell as experts co-opted for <:h.1r
~rofe5slonal exnerience. I
IA.PpendIx One.
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4.5 Efficiency v"r:;ys EQyity
Authorities wi11 need to balance two concerns that may often be in
conflict. namely the concern for national growth (efficiency) and equity
of distribution of resources in reconstruction <equity),
4.6 li,ew Admini5tratiye Sy:aTems
In organising a reconstruction programme many countries have formed an
entirely new layer of government administration. On the surface this
kind of specialised "task orientated" agency may seem an effective
measure. however, in reality it i$ probably advisable to link the ?????
4.7 ~:ah Be:aQllrCes
It must be recognised. that the maintenance of cash resources is the
pre-r~uisite to reconstruction planning.
These sources include:
domestiC funds
foreign currenc~/.
A different strate~y ':0 locate and maintain money supply from ~
sources is essential.
Prior ~o physical reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure there
aav be a massive advantage in rebuilding the damaged or dislocated
local economy _ industry/maritetS/agriculture/commerce, etc. Once this
has recovered finance will begin to ilow within the economy and thus
aid reconstrJction on a wider range of levels.
However. in consldering this priority it is important to note:
a) That there are critical "11fe-11ne" elements that will need to
be addressed simultaneously.
b) Sot all the above sections are as complex or as costly to
relnstat.e. ~or ~xample, agriculture is a simpler task than
indust.rial reconstruct.ion.
c> Rebuilding ditierent sect.ors will need to be:
~) ~ut in order ot ?rlority of im~ortance;
2) put in a time seauence.
Guidelines (or the reconstrucUon
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nIlCIPLB 5: TBiU ARB LIllITliD OPPORTtJIITIES TO UFOU T!B DBSIGI OF
BUILDIIGS lID SETTLBJOiIT PATTBUS II RliCOISTl1JCTIOJ.
• There are obvious unique oppartuni ties fer rat~ in reco.,_, aDd.
reccmstruct1C1l acticms, but these auat not becaae -utopian ctr..aa.
in view of azceediDgly tight econoaic constraints.
It was expected tba t post- war reconstruction would 81'I. tbe
Xodern Kovement enonous impetus; in fact tbat froll tbe f:l.rst
ten years of reconstruction tbere would •• ~ a Europe
transformed - at least as regards tbe newer parts - frTJIJ tbe
scene of confusioll. arising froll gelleratjollS of conflict1118
aims and prejudices, into a SCflne adOrDftd wi tb a cOD.i.tnt,
tbougb perbaps a regionally diflerent1ated, standard of
02rChitecture deserving the adjecti'l. 'lladera'.
Somebowtbat bas nat happened. The confusion is still w1tb us.
The products of ten years of rebullding are little different to
look at frail what tbe.v would bave b.. n before tbe warj at
least that is tbe impression tbat the traveller gets everywhere
ill Europe ......
J .J(. Richards 1955
The immediate post-disaster perlod prov1d.. the pl4D1l1ng
(refomer) with two unique advantages:
a. survivors are ready to accept cbllngfl;
b. Tbe public is ready to proVide funds.
On tbe otber band tbere are strODg forces against chllnge:
a. Frigbtened people and. even 1I0re, fr18btned
autbor1ties are wary of cbange. Re/oT'll needs courap.
b. Pre-disaster cOllditions. bowev.r bad. appear to
victims in a rosy ligbt.
Otto Koenigsberger
5.1 Relgcatign Plannini
Numerous attempts bave been made to relocate entire com.uniti ••
following disaster impact. There are variOUS reasons for this. such a.
the desire for a "green field" site ratller than cope with rebuilding in
the midst 01 dereliction anc building debriS. However. the expert.nce
O! communities that have been relocated is fairly negative. Tb.... are
social reasons for this whicll include the desire for cont1nu1ty. but
there are also a wide range of pract1c:ll is.u" to be noted. Tb...
include problems of land ownershi? eXlsting investment in a &ettlemen~
(it may appear that all has been destroyed but there are l1k.ly to be
underground services. roads. etc. ·..,hich may be restored>. The only
scccees stories 01 :elocat10n planning appear to be on nth.r a _... ll
scare where sections of a communlty have been moved. But on balance
the total transplant of an entire settlement sbould not be regarded a.
3 viable option.
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5.2 Utopion ~;<pectot1gns
Residents and authorities may have aspirations and expectations that
are utterly unreast1c for:
rapid reconstruction
the standard of reconstruction
new amenities
"new houses for 311". etc.
Authorities will need to continually inform the publ1c they serve as to
the "art of the possible". given stringent economic conditions. But
plans should allow for subsequent improvements as resources become
more plentiful.
Guidelines for the reconstrucUon
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PRIICIPLB 6: IT IS VITAL TO PUSDVI TBI CULTVUL BDIT1GI II
DCOISTilJCTIOI
• To re-establish the COJIIIUDlty'sidentity ud pl'OYlde cultural
ccmt1Dulty. it is IlIperatlve to pna "e or rebuild _l.ectecl
daJlagec1 or d_troyed cultural IAnd.arks.
Tbe restoratioll of II falJilJ.aT env1ronllent 80e5 a lOD6 w.y to
make dJ.saster victims fHl settled.
Otto Koenig_berger
A basic error of tbe professional cOllllunity 1. to a_WI.
implicitly tbat fOT1Jal studies. plall. a12d d.. 18D• anr
requiT8l1e12ts for NlConstructicm. There is alrud1 • pla12 for
NlConstructio12. illdelibly SUlIped i12 tbe perceptiC1D of .. ell
resident - the plall of tbe pre-disaster city. The De.., stud1...
plalls aDd desig12scOllpete witb tbe old.
Robert Kat_
6.1 Cyltural LandmArks
SpeciAl consideration should be given to the presentation or rebuilding
of buildings. sculptures. civic plAces. street na.... librari.... useu•••
religious places, memorials, etc" which have sy.bolic importance to the
affected SOCiety. Such buildings and artefacts can provide a ·collective
memory" to help the community to relate to their rebuilt settl••ent.
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PlIICIPLB 7: IT IS BSSBITUL TO IIT10DUCB SUITT DASOIBS II
RBCOISTiOCTIOJ
• ODe of the key refOl"1ltl will be to .1n1Jl1ae or .it1gate future
daJla.8e frca wars or atber fonlll of d1sll8ter ill urban planning and
building das1g1l.
Traditionally. :litigation bas concentrated on buman settleJIents
and Jlan-made buildin88 aDd structures. with tbe focus on
developmeDt of land-use regulations. settl8JIent planning. tbe
d.velopJlent of tecbniques for strengtbening buildiDgs and
structures. and Ue develop.eDt of building codes to encourage
or tlD/orce use of these build1ag techniques.
A broader and more progressive vIew of mitigation bas evolved
I.n tbe last decade. Far e%uple. efforts can be taken to
divtlrsify KonoJlie. and to balance and place jobs and incOJle-
produclng resources strategically so as to reduce tbe
likelibood that all liould be affected in a disaster. EC0Z2C1J1ic
buffers sucb as 1nsurance bavtl received new empbasis.
Fred Cuny
7.1 S.dety Fmctgt§ - RecordiPi Jot Ri$k
The incorporation of mitigation measures into post-disaster
reconstruction is an obviouS subject for any prudent planning of a new
settlemen~. However. the assessment of riSK agalnst natural disasters
can be inIinitelv lIlore precise than against warfare. For example.
earthaua~e force. ~re uncnanging in t~eir nature and the building
process is slow to cunge over time. therefore fairly accurate damage
prediC~:!.ons can be made. This 1s not the case with warfare since
military systems are continually changing and as tbese weapon systems
develop rapidly. there is a mismatch witn tbe very slow process in tbe
renewal of building stock. Therefore. apart from some elements of
dispersal planning and tbe overall location of settlements in
partiCularly vulnerable border situations (see next item 7.2). there is
not a great deal that can be done to plan a city against attack from
modern weapon systems.
7.2 Safety ~!l Sen:nt::rg i)grdgr Zgnes
The reglonal developmen~/recons~ructiOn of sensitive border zones
between potentially hostile nelgbbours requires specific attention in
terms of public safetv. On tbe one hand politicians may see tbe need
to ~opulate such areas to avoid iuture incursions. on the grounds tbat
emp~~1land is a clear invitation for invasion/land grabbing. But
agalnSt tbis strate~lC conslderation. there is tbe conflicting demand to
avoid ?lacin~ populations dnd aconomlC assets in a situation of
unaccep~able risk.
Guidelines (or the reconstruction
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7.3 Air Roid Shelters
Authorities in Iraq and Labanon have lncorporated air rald sh.lt.rs
with garages in the ba•••• nta of bu1ld1ngs a. a g.neral l-sa1
requirement for new building. This ls a prud.nt u.. of reacure .. - but
it haS to be recognised that such provision 1s not a protection against
missile impact.
7.4 SAfety Foctgrs - Bllordinl ',tYrol Piso'tea
The opportunity to rebuild should always take not. of ways to build
structures and infrastructures to withstand natural disaster fore ...
i.e. earthquakes. high winds. flood riau. Such .itigation lI... urea
will affect the sit1ng. form. mater1al selection. structural d.. ip and
planning of buildings.
7.5 Safety FAGtgrs ond L1mited Resources
Within many countries with limited resources exten.iv. ph,.ical
mitigation lI.. surn a. noted under item 7.2 .ay be ecODomically or
politically impossible. Therefore. in such situations it will be
necessary to place emphasiS on preparedness/c1vil d.f.nc. planning (i .••
non-structural safety measures).
7.6 Fire SAfety
Special care will be nec.. ury to .n.ure that ncnul .tructural/fire
safety standards are satisfied. given the seale of building work oel
the risk of relaxed standard. of supervision and enforc ••• nt•.
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I PRIICIPLB 8: IT YILL BE ftmIBLB TO ADAPT SBCTIOIS OF THB YlI BCOIOn
TO RBCOISTRUCTIOI.
• It will be possible to adapt the technology or production capacity
of the "war ecoIlDJI.,- into one that .. y produce e&&e1lt1albuilding
or 1afrastructure ccmpcments neaded 1n reccmstruction, thus
avoidiD8 118&& uneaployJl8nt through factory clD6ures and sbcr'tz1886
of key buildins elements.
The method wbich alone makes possible the construction of
large numbers of aircraft aDd of other machiDes of all kinds
provides a lesson whicb industry cannot ignore ..... it does not
mNn. for example. that its adoption would farce us all to live
in met.2l bouses. Anotber important advantage of eXtending the
applic.2tioD of factory methods to building is that this
extension automaticall_v increases tbe building capacity of the
country.
John Madge 1945
8.1 Prqguct:gn Of ~rmoment5 V@r5u5 Reconstruction Products
~hllst there may be opportunlt1es for the factory production of war
related items to be adapted to the production of items/building
components needed in reconstruction. there is the key issue of wbether
a respected and comprehensive peace-settlement existS. If this is not
the case. then war production for further hostilities can undermine the
use of factory productiOn resources for reconstruction purposes.
"ReconstructiOnists ::lustalso be peace activists" - otherwise resources
may be diverted from recovery towards the defence sector.
Guidelines {or Ute reconstrucUon
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PRIJCIPLB 9: TBi DiDS OP BAlDICAPPHD PBOPLB lOST BB CATBIID POI.
f Special atteDtiOD 1& needed in rebulldiDg to sattaty tluI apec1f1c
Deeds of thOli8 who have been wounded ill .1Dd or body durtJas
bo&t111t1_.
Desplte all lIeasures wbicb 1I1aybe t.ueJJ. SOlI. people 1JJjured1D
d1sasters will in fact becolle pfU'JlaDelJtly disabled. TlIey
therefore stIJDd ilJ need of rdabjjjtIJtiolJ: lJot ilJ the .elJ_ 01
fully restoring tbe. to tbeir farDlIT' cOlJd1tioD. far tbat "ouJd
be impossible. but so tbat tbrough can. tnrat.eDt aDd tra1D.1.
tbey lIay calle to live as llonlal a lUe "s tbe di .. b1Hty
al10"s. alld not. except ill tbe Jlfost utre.e ca.... becOJle a
cbarge upo» tbe socJety in tiblcb tbey live.
11JORO
9.1 RehAhilitatign within Recgn$truct1gn
Special attention should be given to the ba1H.. of tha.e who w.re
killed and to tbose people who have been handicapped by the war.
Rehabilitation and care ot tbe bandicapped should be given special
consideration. Buildings and the entire new settl •• ent will need to be
adapted for use by a larger number of severely handicapped peopl•.
Special inventories of tbe percentages of the handicapped will be
necessary.
Whilst these Guidelines are concerned witb tbe pby.ical recon.truction
of an entire settlement. it is important to recogni •• that sbatt.reel
lives need to be reconstructed and that this "micro-proc ... • 1s an
essential part of the "macro-process". PsycbologistS. psycbotherapists,
health personnel. the caring proI·.ssions and religiOUS leaders have a
key role in this therapeutic activity.
Appendlx One.
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Pi lie IPLli 10: RliCOISTRUCTIOI SHOULD BE R'BGAiDBD AS TB'BIW'T
• It is vital to recognise the therapeutic need to closely involve
war survivors (or vtct1lls) ill rebuilding activities wherever this
is possible. They should be regarded as active participants in the
plaD.Dil1gand 1Apleaentat1011of reconstruction rather than being
.ere spectators of others' actions.
Too of tell it bappens, especially ill poorer countries, tbat large
numbers of able-bodied men stand idle. living on relief, wbile
outsiders get busy on reconstruction. Not only is such a
bappening demoT.llising to the able-bodied. but it wastes much
needed resources.
George Atkinson
:0.1 Therapeytic Readjustment
The affected population needs to become active participants in the
process of reconstruction rather than onlookers. This is essential to
maximise resources of skills and labour. but also to assist those who
need worj! as a precess cr therapeutic read justment. in order to restore
their self-esteem and their place in society.
Guidelines (or the reconstruction
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PRIICIPLB 11: DOYLBDGB nJiDS TO BB OOCU1lBlTBD liD DI$IIlllTBD
f An iD1oraation and education p~ wbich dra.. aD tba
experience of other COUDtries C4D be of sr-t yip to a SOCiety, to
cope with their probl_ of recovery aDd reccmatnJctiaD.
Our Agency is full of activists, nobody ben 11k.. tfr1t1ng',
even less storf.llg tbeir p~pers since "". aNI badly u12d.rstaffed
~12d gener~lly too busy ""itb our ""orE. So i12 corJ.~U.lJce w
telJd to reinvent tbe ""beel two or tbrH tiJl_ ~ ...........
Anon
11.1 The Docymentation Of Suryiy~l ~nd CopiUi Abilities
People are more resilient than buildings.
interviews can gain vaiuable inslghts on
communities coped or survi ved the war. and
decisions on reconstruction.
Aftar wars oral hi.tory
the way individual. and
how they were involvacl in
11.2 EducatiOn/lrainini and Public Awarepess
In order to gain the maximum support of the population in the
reconstruction process. it is essential to place a major empha.is on
the development of human resources by means of informaUoD, training
and educational programmes. Thev could focus on reconstruction
strategies. constraints. priorities. sequencie.. links to development,
the "culture" of recovery. etc. <1.e. taking up the is.u .. raised 1n
these Guidelines).
11.3 Evaluatiop Of Reconstructigp apd its Di§$emipatign
Just as these Guidelines result from the documentation of the
experience of recoven. it is essential to document and publicise the
process of reconstruction. Such reports need to be candid appraisals
that note the failures as well as the succ .. s... Ideally they would be
best produced. outside of Government control. by independent observers
with access to key data.
In the late 1980's some previousl V classified material that relates to
World War II and recovery actions 15 only just becoming available for
public access. Such Governmental secrecy can seriously retard the
"lesson-learn ing process".
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APPENDIX TWO
THE YORK CHARTER FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AFTER WAR
INTRODUCTION
-Preuentlon is better than cure'; a basic rule that applies to war and the subsequent
rebuilding. We would like to think that avoiding wars is everyone's aspiration, but
hopes raised by a peace initiative in one part of the world are soon dashed by a new
conflict somewhere else.
During and after war, citizens, local and central governments as well as international
and non govemmental organisations (NGO's) will embark on the difficult task of
reconstruction and the return to normal life. There appears to be little or no
systematic understanding of this task and its requirements.
Although it Is the citizen who is required to rebuild his/her shattered life, set up home,
restart work and send their children to school under the most difficult conditions; he
or she is the last to be consulted and involved in reconstruction policies.
Consequently official preoccupation with the technical aspects of rebuilding often
overwhelms the genuine needs and concerns of the citizens, resulting in the disaster
of war being followed by the disaster of reconstruction.
AIM OF THE CHARTER
The aim of this Charter is to make the reconstruction policies of governments more
responsive to the needs of their people. This Charter does not offer ready solutions,
it raises strategic issues that go beyond conventional practice and need to be
considered when planning for reconstruction.
Therefore Local Governments and NOOs are expected to formulate their own
reconstruction guidelines in the light of the principles embodied in the York Charter.
DESTRUCTION
War damage goes far beyond the easily observed human and material losses. Social,
cultural, psychological and environmental consequences of armed conflicts are
enormous and can take decades to recover from. In many cases it is impossible to
do so. Reconstruction measures should be planned to take greater account of all
kinds of damage.
The York Charter for
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Environmental consequences of war are not necessarily restricted to the countries
involved in the conflict, they could easily become regional or even global catastrophe.
There Is an 'opportunity cost' for the accumulative results of war. Resources used
in the prosecution of a confllct and on the subsequent necessary reconstruction could
have been directed into the development and greater welfare of the people.
THE 60 RECOMMENDATIONS OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION
Reconstruction poUcles and strategies.
A. Reconstruction policies and strategies.
A.l. • Countries involved in armed conflicts should establish as a matter of urgency,
a national strategy on the reconstruction of war-damaged settlements,
embodying the sheltering of refugees and displaced people, and other related
economic and social activities within their national territory.
A.2. • A national settlement reconstruction strategy should be an Integral part of a
national economic and social post-war development policy. Governments
should attempt to review and adjust their pre-war development poliCies,
interrupted by the war, rather than drawing new reconstruction and
development plans.
A.3. • A national reconstruction strategy should have clear goals and objectives,
concentrating on key issues and provide basic direction for action.
A.4. • The reviving of war stricken settlements must receive higher priority in the
allocation of available resources, which ought to be Identified, mobilised and
carefully distributed between the various components of the reconstn.action
strategy, in particular human capacities.
A.5. • Any national reconstruction strategy must be explicit, comprehensive and
designed according to a realistic appreciation of the dynamics of reconstruction.
Rebuilding settlements should be seen as a complex, multidimensional precess,
Thus poUcies have to be flexible enough to accept alteration and adjultment
based on continuous genuine feedback from the field.
A.6. - Governments should monitor and continuously evaluate the conditions of the
reconstructed settlements as Integral part of the reconstruction strategy.
B. National economic aspects of reconstruction.
B.1. -It is crucial to recognise the fact that unlike most natural disasters, war affects
the economy of the entire country. Thus, post-war reconstruction is dependent
on the state of the national economy following war.
B.2. - The reconstruction of the economy Is a pre-requisite for physical
reconstruction (housing, infrastructure, etc.). It is important to recognise that
by supporting the economy, governments will be producing wealth that will
initiate recovery initiatives, thus taking pressure off the public sector.
AppendlJC Two.
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B.3. • Post-war governments willbe faced with the task of creating sound economic
policies that are directed towards generating higher public revenues, redirecting
the wandering cash towards more productive use, encouraging investment,
creating jobs, and undertaking redistributive reforms.
B.4.• It is important to counter the intensification and acceleration of economic
tendencies operative during the war, into the post-war era.
B.5.• Before the preparation and implementation of post-war reconstruction plans,
the general economic ground must be surveyed afresh, and agreements as to
what is needed and how it should be planned for, must be accomplished.
B.6. • One of the major requirements for a smoother return to economic activity in
the post-war era is, a careful control of the monetary system to prevent
unemployment and high inflation. This objective could be achieved through,
both, taxation (on those who benefited from the war) and incentives (to those
who lost).
B.7. • Experience gained from reconstruction after war indicates that the most
healthy, most simple and practical way of creating quick employment is
activating the construction industry which includes the production of building
materials, contractors and builders.
C. Social and psychological aspects.
C.1. • People are the principal factor in recovery and reconstruction. During war the
survival of people must be induced, facilitated and planned as the foundation
of reconstruction and development.
C.2.
I
I
1,
I C.3.
I
I
C.4.
• Following survival a number of steps have to be taken in order to enrich and
improve the society and its ability to contribute to the reconstruction efforts.
Thus the whole reconstruction process should be seen as a means by which
exalted human values should be enhanced. As such the government's
responsibility does not end with reconstruction of the city's physical structures
and/or infrastructural system.
• There are a number of social needs that would have developed exclusively
due to the war and its consequences. Some urgent policies. concepts. schemes
and institutions have to be formulated to provide the necessary support to those
who have suffered in the war.
..,
• Dealing with refugees is another important aspect of reconstruction and social
development. Policies that make the refugee population and other war-inflicted
groups become used into the victim's mentality and lead to their increased
dependency on the state must be avoided. Rather. they should be provided
with start up capital. technical assistance, and social support to begin a new
life.
C.5 .• Conflicts introduce levels of psychological stress which often inhibit rational
or responsible behaviour by populations. Good will disappears in time of
The York Charter for
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conflict. Memory and interest in the past may be lost or seen as undesirable.
Social behaviour may breakdown and introduce consequent destructive actions.
such as looting.
D. Public participation.
0.1. • Public participation in decision making is a human right. a political duty and
an instrument essential for post-war reconstruction. It has to be understood and
respected internally and never imposed by an outsider or an International
agency. Thus It is important to work towards strengthening local institutions
and encouraging positive governmental attitudes towards participation.
0.2. • World-wide experience suggest the existence of a number of linkages between
involving the local population and resolving Issues that are exclusive to post-
war reconstruction.
0.3 .• Public participation as a 'means' of improving reconstruction policies should
be encouraged to constitute an integrlll element in the planning. implementation
and evaluation of such policies as well as in the future management of the
reconstructed settlements.
0.4. .It Is clear that participation embodies a number of beneflts and limitations to
the reconstruction process. Thus. the mode. nature and extent of public
participation must respond to the newly emerging social. political. cultural and
economic needs of post-war societies and states.
E. Settlement reconstruction planning
E.1. • A breed-based settlement planning system seems indispensable for the post-
wer reconstruction. Otherwise. the risk of chaos. duplication. and wasteful use
of scarce and valuable resources would be high. Such system should occur
within e generel soclel end economic reconstruction frernework.
E.2. • A purely planned approach to reconstruction is neither polilble nor desirable
as it encourages bureaucratic red tape and Inflexibility no matter how
decentralized it might be. Similarly, it is unreeusuc to expect the market
mechanism to reconstruct on its own.
E.3. • Plenning for reconstruction and managing resources and Implementation
without e proper assessment could lead to a waste of resources and long-term .;
social problems within the community.
E.4. • Reconstruction planning should encourage the return of the population to their
deserted settlements. Such return indicates a healthy start for the reconstruction
process.
E.5. • Settlement reconstruction planning should attempt to achieve a balance.
between retaining whet was good in a settlement with a cultural or symbolic
value and at the same time using reconstruction as an opportunity to Improve
the built environment. However. as far as possible reconstruction should
Appendix Two.
453
attempt to reflect regionel and 10cI!Ilcharacters based on indigenous values.
E.6. • Planning for the reconstruction of rural settlements should aim to stimulate
their agriculturl!lleconomic base.
E.7. • Temporary settlements for refugees and/or displaced people should, as far as
possible be evolded. Buildings vacent during the war could be used to
temporary accommodate them (eg. hotels, schools, etc.).
E.B. • Careful relocation of settlements may become necessary for security
considerations, or because of total devestation. Still relocation imposes long-
term economic, social, cultural end psychological burdens on the people, and
should be avoided I!ISmuch es possible.
E.9. • Settlement plenning should enable end encourage social, cultural and
religious integration between different ethnic and religious groups.
E.10 • Despite international conventions (such as the Hegue 1954) cultural heritage
properties are continuing to be targeted in wars. Hence, reconstruction should
be aimed, as fer es possible to counter such losses. Conservation efforts should
be focused where the most importent historical end erchttectural buildings and
sites ere at risk, not to restore them, but to stabilise their condition, paying
partlculer attention to the pieces where people can live end work.
F. Institutions and management
F. 1. • The designetion of institutions responsible for the formulation of
reconstruction policies et national, regional and other appropriate levels is
crucial. It is Important that such institutions are based on local experience and
enjoy the direct support of the highest political level.
F.2. • Reconstruction institutions should playa coordineting role between national
government departments responsible for areas of soclel and economic
development: Ministries of housing, environment, education, health, transport,
etc.
F.3. • It is more desirable to allocate reconstruction planning responsibilities to
already well established institutions; such as Ministry of planning. However,
when this is not possible and a new institutions have to be established, they
should be flexible enough to adept to changing circumstances, and should not
outlive their original purpose.
F.4 .• Institutions should be designed to encourage and facllitate the involvement
of the public in the planning and implementation of reconstruction through a
partnership. They should be able to entre lnto co-operative and collaborative
arrangements with other public and private orgenisetions and explore innovative
approaches for menegement, giving more responsibilities to the local
communities.
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F.5. • For institutions to act effectively they need four basic requirements: (1)
authority to act; (2) competence to act; (3) resources to act and (4)
acceptance by the war-affected community.
F.6. • Separate financial institutions and adequate means are necessary to meet the
requirements of reconstruction.
F.7. • Mechanism should be established for the future management of reconltructed
settlements. This Is best handled by local organisations dominated by local
inhabitants.
Q. Shelter, Infrastructure and services
G.1. • The political pressure on post-war governments to be seen Implementing
physical reconstruction Is appreciated. However, the badly needed shelter,
infrastructure and services should not be entirely used as a political propaganda
exercise. People have the right for proper physical reconstruction.
G.2. • Shelter, infrastructure and services should be planned in an integrated way
and provided in a sequence responsive to the real needs of the war-devastated
communities.
G.3. • To be able to provide services and infrastructure to war damaged areas,
access to and within settlements has to be secured and civilian safety
guaranteed. This includes mine clearing and the demolishing of unltable
buildings.
G.4. • The reconstruction of shelter, Infrastructure and services must be geared to
achieving the over-all objectives of national reconstruction strategy.
G.5. • Recognising that the post-war needs for shelter, infrastructure and service.
are neerly always greater than the capacity of public euthoritlel to provide
them. The role of central government ought to be concentrated on providing
infrastructure and needed services, while its role in housing proviSion should be
mostly preparative [I.e. moblllzing and directing the needed resources towards
enabling housing construction by the private sector and the people themselves).
G.6. • Conventionally, it was thought that speed of construction could only be
achieved through the application of modem building technologl •• ,
prefabrication and mass production. This Is not necessarily true.
...
G.7. • Enabling people to house themselves Individually and/or co-operatively
should be encouraged and programmes and Instrument. to do .0 should be
devised.
G.B. • The crucial importance of the construction industry should be recognised and
the industry should be given the political, flnancial and technical support It
requires to meet the national reconstruction objectives.
G.9. • Realistic appreciation of differences between urban and rural settlements.
Such appreciation should be reflected on all decisions concerned with the
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provision of shelter, infrastructure and services.
G.10.. Realistic standards for shelter, infrastructure and services should be the
bases for any reconstruction policy. Standards should be based on what
is available, affordable and culturally acceptable.
G.11.. Investing directly in permanent housing proved to be the most sensible
thing to do. A first step should be to utilise buildings in need of minimum
repair. Of course in some cases, where the situation is such that it is
impossible to walt, (I.e. people cen not be sheltered anywhere else) and
that it is necessary to utilize temporary shelter either for climatic or even
political reasons a limited number of temporary housing units can be
provided.
G.12. • Post-war infrastructure (transportation and communication) policy should
take into consideration any new economic, administrative and/or
defensive role played by settlements In war zone.
G.13. • Safe water supply and hygienic waste disposal should receive priority in
reconstruction of infrastructure.
G.14. • In the reconstruction of settlements the quality of the environment must
be preserved. Pollution should be prevented by minimizing the generation
of wastes; wastes which can not be avoided should be effectively
managed.
10.3.H. legislation and Issues of land.
H.1. • Proper post-war legal framework (in terms of new laws and enabling
legislation) for pollcies to be implemented and in some cases to be enforced is
crucial. Such framework for reconstruction legislation must establish clear and
realistic direction, while safeguarding civilian rights.
H.2.• Compensating civilians for the loss of their property is one of their basic
rights. A legal framework has to be established as to who should be
compensated and in what form. It should be noted that direct payment is not
necessarily the best and only wey of compensating people for their losses.
H.3. .In the aftermath of war devastation, land is often the only surviving resource,
the proper management of which could become a great asset to reconstruction
by individuals and the nation. ;
H.4. • Comprehensive knowledge of pre-war land use and patterns of land
ownership is a basic requirement for both urban and. rural settlement
reconstruction planning.
H.5.• Pre-war patterns of ownership rights and inheritance should be respected as
far as they do not pose a threat to public welfare.
H.6.• Land owned by the government should be used, as a first option, wherever
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land is needed for resettling communities. providing infrastructure and services.
Acquisition of private land for such purposes should be avoided as much as
possible.
H.7. .'t is crucial to anticipate urban land speculation and to have the appropriate
measures to recapture the rise in land values due to reconstruction and change
in land use.
The entitlements of Civilian non-combatant suffering from war
damage to his/her physical environment.
o The restitution of his/her property or the equivalent.
o The right to recover his/her personal possessions from an abandoned
home.
o The right to an appropriate temporary shelter.
o The right to be consulted about the form of reconstruction.
o The right to draw on skilled help in reconstruction where needed.
o The repair and reconstruction of his/her dwelling in an ethnically
sympathetic manner to standerds no less than previously and with
appropriete hygienic facilities.
o The re-establishment of the local community in a manner no les.
adequate than before.
o The provision of a means of livelihood and workplace.
o The provision of essential community facilities in terms of medical
support. water and fuel supplies, drainage and waste disposal.
SUPPORT FOR THE CHARTER
In order that more planning authorities all over the world join this effort of improving
reconstruction policles, the York Workshop calls upon govemments, intemational
agencies and NOO's to use the charter al a basil for considering Settlement
Reconstruction following War.
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